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Migrations in Latin America and the Mediterranean compared:
Violence, state cruelty and (un-)institutional resistance

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Presentation of the Migreurop Atlas of Migrations in Europe

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Presentation: Migreurop Atlas of Migrations in Europe

This publication (*Migreurop Atlas of Migrations in Europe*, Routledge, 2019**)** is the product of a critical cartographic exercise that has been active and a prominent aspect of the Migreurop network's activity since 2002.

The map and illustrations in the Atlas cover aspects ranging from the general to the very specific, the external dimension of internal policies (home affairs), and how they cause harm and promote authoritarian pursuits inside the EU and beyond its borders. This is one reason why Migreurop being a Euro-African network is important.

Part 1. Thinking migrations

Part 1 addresses the conceptualisation of migration and how dogged EU and member state governments' efforts and deployment of pretexts to restrict or regulate mobility and migration are often based on fallacies. In particular, the impression, which is promoted, maintained and reinforced through the analytical work carried out by Frontex, that migration and/or the arrival of refugees are emergencies against which an expansive coercive arsenal must be deployed to prevent an invasion, are fabrications. History, illustrations of historical migration by Europeans in times of hardship, questioning categories created for migration management purposes, the history of borders, representations and the language used at the institutional level, are all aspects of this conceptual section of the Atlas.

Three images below illustrate some of these aspects. They respectively show the scale of migration from Europe in the 19th century (MAP page 6), the relatively low number of refugees the EU receives in comparison with neighbouring countries to conflict areas (MAP page 6), and the difference between migration as it features in Frontex analyses (general, dehumanising) and a person's concrete migration journey (MAP page 7).

This third image highlights the agency's alarmist outlook, graphically evident in the use of a red arrow to indicate a threat heading straight for the EU, the use of bulk numbers to encompass multifaceted experiences, journeys, routes and motivations, and determination to construe and constitute immigration as a problem. Juxtaposed in the same illustration, the actual route of the winding and lengthy journey of an Afghan who passed through Russia on route to Hamburg is featured, amid progress, setbacks and delays. The Migreurop network has consistently drawn attention to this issue in its statements (see references below). A remarkable similarity can be appreciated between Frontex's analytical portrayal of migration as a threat and those used by far-right parties and groups, including alarmist messages conveyed during the Brexit referendum campaign in the UK regarding Turkey. A red arrow and the collective treatment of 76m Turkish citizens as homogeneous, a red arrow supposedly heading straight for the UK if it stayed in the EU, shows how migration can be used to sow fear in citizens' minds. Thus, the destructive impact of immigration outlooks based on self-interest (as perceived by some institutional agents) does not just affect third-country nationals (which is bad enough), but

it may also undermine the EU project. The first two maps show that large-scale population movements are not unprecedented and that Europeans should be aware of this due to their own history; and they quantify relatively low intake of refugees in the EU compared to its population and to more heavily affected countries. This imbalance provides an explanation about why the EU Agenda on Migration sought to block everyone who arrived in Italy and Greece, and then respectively in its southern regions and islands, to convey the impression of a crisis.

Map 1: a flow map of global emigration in 1858

Map 2: Is the EU facing a significant number of refugees

International migrant flows, according to Frontex* (2016)

The mission of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) is to ensure the "security" of the external borders of the European Union and specifically to check "illegal" immigration on its borders.

On the map on the opposite page, produced by the agency, migrants are represented by thick **red arrows** (red being the colour of danger and prohibition) which **threateningly** point towards the European Union, shown in **blue** (symbolising wisdom and serenity) underscoring the rhetoric of **invasion**.

In addition, the data that is mapped here (the nationality of intercepted migrants) is represented in a way that **perverts** the use of arrows as their misuse makes it impossible to deduce the geographical reality behind these movements.

Map originally entitled: **"Principal nationalities of illegal migrants"**
Source : FRONTEX, FRAN Quaterly - quarter 2 : April-june 2016.

Each arrow hides a countless number of individual trajectories

May 2009: Stay with his brother

Nov. 2008 : Attempt to cross the Belarus-Poland border on foot, then return to Moscow by bus

Nov. - dec. 2008: Wyem stays in the same parking lot for a month and a half

Oct. 2008: Wyem is housed for 5-6 days in the smugglers' apartment

Oct. 2008: Wyem stays in a parking lot for 1 week

January 1st 2009: Crossing into Romania on foot and in an inflatable boat

Dec. 2008: Wyem spends 2 weeks in the smugglers' apartment

Dec. 2008: Crossing the Russia-Ukraine border on foot

July 2009: 1 day in transit zone then deportation to Bucharest (Dublin regulation)

Sept. 2009.- Feb. 2010: Wyem spends 6 months in a detention centre

Wyem's journey from Kabul to Hamburg (October 2008 - July 2011)

— Wyem's itinerary
● Origin and destination cities

Main stopping points during migration
● Accommodation
■ Border Post
★ Holding Centre

May 2009: Wyem travels in the luggage compartment of a Eurolines bus

March - Aug. 2010: Wyem is given accommodation for 6 months by an association in Romania

Aug. 2009: Wyem is given accommodation for 6 days by the same association in Romania

July 2009: Transit zone of Bucharest airport

July 2009: Wyem finds himself in Otopeni holding centre for 1 month

Kabul

October 2008

Wyem pays a smuggler $13,000 to join his brother and sister who live in Germany

Dubai

Each thick arrow in fact masks countless unique personal stories.

Wyem's journey to Europe took nearly 3 years, punctuated by periods of vagrancy, waiting and at least 1 year of confinement in holding centres (some of them semi-open).

Individual level: TerrFerme Programme, 2015.
Wyem's itinerary has been reconstructed by Bénédicte Michalon and Olivier Pissoat, UMR ADESS (CNRS - Université Bordeaux), 2015.
Aggregate level: Frontex, 2016.

0   500 km

Map 3: Wyem's journey vs Frontex

Part 2. Confinement(s)

European migration policies at the national and EU levels have directly led to the creation of a proliferation of typologies of formal, informal and 'extraordinary' detention and reception camps in the EU and beyond. These include reception facilities and other closed or open regimes whose purpose is to subordinate people's rights to the procedures they are subjected to, like hotspots. This descriptive section explores the typologies and geographical spread of such sites, including spaces and settlements set up by migrants themselves that are regularly attacked by police if living conditions improve thanks to their work and people acting in solidarity. Detention centres are sites of coercion and human rights abuses within the EU that normalise discrimination and differential access to rights. The analytical side of part 2 focuses on what this large-scale system of arbitrary detention that normalises mistreatment means, in structural terms, for the notions of reception and for refugees, exploring actual and potential alternatives to detention. The maps and reflections show the expansiveness of this EU policy field's reach and its harmful consequences. The most obvious effect is to subordinate rights, the rule of law and people's lives to migration policy goals, from hotspots on Greek islands, to Calais and the Spanish North African enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, among other affected regions. A map

of Paris (map page 9) provides a multi-layered illustration of migrants' lives, routes, and the order in which informal settlements were created, where they may obtain support or services, and the locations where significant police operations have targeted migrants, among other information.

Map 4: Migrant Camps and vagrancy in the streets of Paris

The map of detention camps in the EU (MAP page 10) and beyond was first produced in 2003 and it serves to highlight a crucial flaw in the EU's institutional reasoning and in political and philosophical justifications provided for its restrictive migration policy outlook. In fact, these are often based on internal considerations like countries' right to set policies on admission, their sovereignty and self-determination. However, already in its initial versions and even more so today, the external implications of the externalisation of supposedly internal policies (home affairs) and of the coercion and mistreatment they entail is clear. What is unclear, however, is why the role these policies have played in undermining human rights and legal frameworks within the EU

should be expected to have different outcomes beyond its borders, from Libya to Morocco and Egypt, the Levant, Balkans and Caucasus, where they have promoted a proliferation of detention facilities.

Map 5: the camps of UE

Part 3. Delocalisation, subcontracting and interventions at a distance.

The term 'externalisation' is used as an inconsequential, supposedly beneficial, development in EU policy documents to reach the EU's own strategic objectives. Externally, it is viewed as contributing to enhancing state capabilities and thus contribute to development in third countries. However, there is little acknowledgement of the fact that it means enhancing coercive state capabilities and that, like in the EU, migration or border controls are also used to criminalise significant segments of civil society, as well as promoting institutional discrimination. Both of these aspects work against development as it features in UN documents and other positive values included, for example, in the 2000 Cotonou Agreement between the EU and Asian, Caribbean and Pacific countries (ACP). The third section on 'delocalisation, subcontracting and interventions at a distance' documents the unstoppable advance of externalisation processes by drawing on the Rabat and Khartoum processes. Crucial aspects of this process include the treatment of people who are expelled, visa policy and policing activities targeting foreigners, the deployment of immigration liaison officers, the Dublin system and biometrics, the business aspects of migration controls and detention as a thriving business. In turn, these practices have significant implications that undermine freedom of movement that was being enacted in the ECOWAS region, lead Niger to work towards locking its borders, and unleash repression at the Greek-Turkish border, where the leading role assigned to Turkey has significant geopolitical implications. Sub-contracting migration policy enforcement functions to third states and commercial enterprises (two maps

illustrate the role of private commercial enterprises in France and the UK) allows the EU and its member states to relinquish responsibility for abuses committed to implement restrictive immigration policy outlooks.

Apart from documenting the use of different databases for migration management purposes, different stages in EU-African cooperation, the consequences of entry and of residence without the required documentation in different phases, and interventions along migration routes deep into Africa, the first map highlights global inequalities. In particular, it highlights how 62% of global wealth is held in the EU, North America and parts of Asia and Oceania (including Australia, New Zealand, Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore and Macao), whereas 85% of the global population lives elsewhere. Data on visa requirements for entry into the EU, the USA, Japan and Australia shows that the immigration policy model that is being imposed envisages allowing mobility for the rich and forcing the poor into immobility. (Map page 12)

Map 6: Rich (visa) vs poor (no visa): worlds apart

## Part 4. Migration routes and surveillance by police and military forces

This section explores the promotion of discrimination, police violence and the authoritarian drift that is inherent in the proliferation of controls deployed to impede people's mobility along migration routes, at borders and in places of transit. Border controls are undermining freedom of movement within the Schengen area, which led to relaxing the rules and expanding the pretexts or justifications that may be used to reintroduce internal border controls, as is evident at the Italian-French border among several others. The strategies Frontex adopts for different borders, including the Mediterranean, are explored, in a context of impunity for questionable and/or unlawful activities. Other aspects include the deployment of police forces with military status (the *Guardia Civil* in Melilla), an uncompromising drive to enact large-scale expulsions, the role of the IOM 'against' migration, police violence in the Calais region, deaths of migrants trying to reach EU territory and the array of obstacles placed in the way of Syrian refugees to stop them arriving. This last case includes evidence of the distance between formal claims (respect for the right to seek asylum and international protection) and substantive interventions to make access to protection in the EU impossible, except for a few handpicked cases that may be used to provide evidence of solidarity under the resettlement framework. The use of classical names for maritime migration control operations is also mocked in the map entitled 'Ulysses vs Frontex' and a map on SAR (International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue) regions and operations shows the methodology used to reveal state crimes like in the case of boats left to sink despite requesting help from the relevant SAR authorities (see below).

Two significant illustrations in this section show the prevalence of external activities in Frontex's interventions, motivated by member states' reluctance to relinquish their sovereignty in Justice and Home Affairs before its authority and presence was also imposed on countries of first arrival (Italy and Greece), and by migrants' deaths. (Map page 14) The latter map shows how the region where EU efforts to stop migrants have been most intense (the central Mediterranean) is also the region where the most migrants have died, although several other regions are affected, from the Atlantic coast all the way down to Senegal, to southern Egypt and Libya, the Balkan region and Calais. The rising numbers of deaths from 1993 to 2016, from dozens to hundreds and then thousands every year, makes for uncomfortable viewing. (Map page 14)

*Map 7: Frontex operations far beyond the borders of the UE*

Map 8: the red mound of migration

Part 5. Mobilisation and struggles

This final section of the Atlas provides a more optimistic outlook to close this critical reading of EU and national immigration policies and practice, by focusing on activities by migrants and civil society actors in Europe to resist the proliferation of discrimination, violence and illegality by states promoted by these policies. Such activities often amount to showing the states that oppose them how they could organise reception if they wanted to, as opposed to trying to suggest that they entail an excessive burden to justify the adoption of uncompromising approaches to deny migrants and refugees' choices and capabilities. Examples of frameworks and regions within which areas of free movement have been trialled are also provided, including Mercosur, the

Community of Andean Countries, ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) or the EU itself. The overview in this section covers mobilisations by migrants and their own accounts of detention, citizen deployment of solidarity at sea to rescue people, and so-called *passeurs d'hospitalité* (smugglers of hospitality). This documentation includes a satellite image and boat tracking provided by academics in a court case (namely Charles Heller, Lorenzo Pezzani and the Forensic Oceanography team at Goldsmiths College) to document state crimes, like when a boat's passengers were left to die despite an abundance of available vessels to conduct SAR operations in March 2011. These are examples of how solidarity and hospitality are increasingly political acts of resistance, due to authorities' actions to criminalise ordinary citizens for '*doing the right thing*'. Some fronts in this struggle are the Jungle in Calais and welcoming cities acting as sanctuaries in several countries, including Spain (which thus become 'rebel cities'). This section ends with reflections on the notion of freedom of movement for foreigners and their relationship to liberal notions promoting the free movement of people and goods.

A map in this final section documents tragic events and revolts in sites of detention across Europe, distributed between incidents involving revolts, fires, attempted suicides, strikes, deaths, escapes, cases involving violence, hunger strikes and a wide ranging 'others' category (self-harm, appeals, the lodging of formal complaints). (Map page 16)

Map 9: how camps cope with revolts and protest

Conclusion

A concluding assessment of the situation as it has developed from 2002 to 2016, since the first map of camps for migrants in Europe (and beyond) Migreurop produced in 2003, calls to 'put an end to inhumane migration policies', for the sake of migrants, the EU, member states, and for both citizens and civil societies in the EU and in third countries.

Special thanks to the authors of the maps: Françoise Bahoken, Olivier Clochard, Nicolas Lambert, Olivier Pissoat

Source: Atlas of Migration in Europe, A Critical Geography of Migration Policies, Migreurop/Routledge, 2019

Other references

An image of the Brexit campaign advert is available at the start of this article,

https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/dark-money-investigations/truly-project-hate-third-scandal-of-official-vote-leave-campaign-headed-by-/

An analysis of this claim's impact on the vote, by Prof. James Ker-Lindsay:
https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/unfounded-claim-turkey-swing-brexit-referendum/

See the Frontexit campaign's video: Europe is at war against an imaginary enemy, http://www.frontexit.org/en

http://www.frontexit.org/en/news/item/903-eu-jha-the-unrestrained-race-to-strengthen-frontex-at-the-expense-of-fundamental-rights

http://www.frontexit.org/images/Bilan%20ENG.pdf

http://www.frontexit.org/fr/docs/83-frontexit-notemeps-externalcoopfrontex-eng-jan2015/file

http://statewatch.org/analyses/no-309-frontex-third-countries-agreements.pdf

http://www.frontexit.org/en/docs/98-report-green-light-to-fundamental-rights-violations/file

http://www.frontexit.org/en/?option=com_fileman&view=file&routed=1&name=PR-frontexit-10122015-EN.pdf&folder=&container=fileman-files&exp_token=eyJ0eXAiOiJKV1QiLCJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiJ9.eyJleHAiOjE1NzU5ODc2MDQsImlhdCI6MTU3NTk4NDAwNH0.SKCm1la0tdfLqJ14FSEXnBGBf66CBEMNupzzuSSk_tA