Centre on Migration, Policy and Society

Working Paper No. 134

University of Oxford, 2018

Immigrant fertility in the midst of intensified enforcement

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WP-18-134

 Versions of this paper were previously published at EconStor (2017) and as a conference paper at the American Economic Association Annual Meeting, January 2017.

Abstract

This paper exploits the temporal and geographic variation in the adoption of tougher immigration enforcement to identify its impact on undocumented immigrants' fertility. Using data from the 2004 through 2013 American Community Survey, we find that a one standard deviation increase in the intensity of immigration enforcement lowers the childbearing likelihood of likely undocumented women by 5 per cent. The effect, which results from police-based measures, might stem from increased uncertainty about the future of the family unit and its resources, including household income. Given immigrants' critical contribution to the sustainability of the welfare state and President Trump's tougher stand on immigration matters, further exploration of this impact is warranted and recommended.

Keywords

Fertility, Immigration Enforcement, Undocumented Immigration, United States.

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1. Introduction

This paper examines how the intensification of immigration enforcement that has taken place in the United States since 9/11 might be impacting fertility among undocumented immigrants. Immigration enforcement has been playing an increasingly important role in American politics. In light of Congress' inability to enact a comprehensive immigration reform, a number of states and localities across the United States have taken immigration matters into their own hands. A variety of immigration enforcement programs and policies have been adopted at the local and state levels, ranging from 287(g) agreements to employment verification mandates (E-Verify), omnibus immigration laws (OILs) and the Secure Communities (SC) program – recently replaced by the Priority Enforcement Program (PEP). All these initiatives intended to curb the number of undocumented immigrants by discouraging their entry and, more importantly, by facilitating their identification, apprehension and, ultimately, deportation. More than 1.8 million of the estimated 11 to 12 million undocumented immigrants were deported under President Obama's Administration alone (Vaughan 2013), and tougher immigration enforcement is also here to stay under the Trump Administration.[1] Figure 1 offers further evidence of the impact of intensified immigration enforcement on deportations for recent years. Interior removals increased by roughly 520 per cent between 2003 and 2011, whereas border removals rose by 76 per cent over the same time span.

At the same time, the Hispanic fertility rate has been declining. A report from the Pew Hispanic Center in 2012 noted the strong reduction in fertility rates among immigrants, especially Hispanics – a group that encompasses the vast majority of the undocumented population in the United States. Between 2007 and 2010, the birth rate for foreign-born women dropped by 14 per cent, compared to 6 per cent in the case of U.S.-born women. Mexican immigrant women experienced the largest decline – about 23 per cent (Livingston and Cohn 2012).[2] In fact, authors' tabulations using data from the American Community Survey (ACS) for the 2004 through 2013 period reveal how this drop reached 26 per cent among likely undocumented women.[3]

Knowledge of how immigrant fertility responds to intensified enforcement is particularly important given the contribution of immigrants to the sustainability of the welfare state. Immigration increases the ratio of workers to retirees and the viability of Social Security (Griswold 2012). The United States is one of the few countries with fertility rates close to replacement rates, thanks to immigrants and their offspring (Kotkin and Ozuna 2012).

Intensified immigration enforcement could impact immigrant fertility through various mechanisms. On one hand, the mere separation from a partner and the fragmentation of the family through the deportation of the household head, a partner or some household members, can either end or place fertility on hold. But, even among intact households, a tougher climate might negatively impact family income (*e.g.* Bansak and Diego 2005; Orrenius and Zavodny 2009; Bohn and Lofstrom 2013), its access to important health care services and benefits (*e.g.* Watson 2014) and, overall,

increase uncertainty about the future of the family unit and its ability to raise children. Under the neoclassical approach to fertility (Becker 1960), the uncertain environment, as well as limited economic resources, make fertility a risky and costly choice. On the other hand, because of birth right citizenship, undocumented women might want to have their children while still in the country to provide them with better life opportunities. In a related vein, a popular claim in the press has been that undocumented women might be interested in having their children in the United States because, in the future, these children could sponsor their parents for citizenship (the so-called "anchor baby" hypothesis) - even though this could only happen once the children reach adulthood and a host of other circumstances are met.

Our focus is on assessing the effect that the piecemeal approach to immigration enforcement might be having on the fertility of immigrant women most likely impacted by such policies – namely: undocumented women. To that end, we use a unique data set that combines data from the ACS and detailed information on the intensity of immigration enforcement at the local and state levels during the 2004 through 2013 period. The ACS is rich in demographic, geographic and immigration information about respondents and their household members. Data on the intensity of immigration enforcement is derived from a variety of sources informing on the adoption of a number of enforcement initiatives at the local and state levels, including: 287(g) agreements signed by localities and states with the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), omnibus immigration laws (OILs) and employment verification mandates (E-Verify) implemented by a number of states, and the adoption of the Secure Communities (SC) program.

To identify the effects of tougher enforcement on the fertility of these women, we exploit the temporal and geographic variation across metropolitan areas (MSAs) in the adoption of these measures. Our findings show that the average increase in interior immigration enforcement over the 2004-2013 period lowered the likelihood of childbearing among likely undocumented immigrant women by 5 per cent; thus, accounting for approximately one fifth of the drop in fertility experienced by these women over the period under consideration. These results prove robust to a number of identification and robustness tests that show how our findings are, if anything, underestimates. We also explore the policy channels to better understand which policies are responsible for the found impacts. We find that the effects can be attributed to police-based measures (as opposed to employment restricting measures, like employment verification mandates), suggesting the importance of deportations and the fear of apprehension they instil in migrants – a factor not necessarily present with employment-based measures in explaining our findings. Lastly, we look more closely into the mechanisms through which the observed impacts are taking place. To that end, we perform a number of heterogeneity analyses, which reveal that the negative impact of intensified enforcement on the fertility of likely unauthorized women is even present in the case of intact households, suggesting that household compositional effects (*e.g.* deportation of a partner) are not the exclusive mechanism through which fertility might end or be placed on hold. In addition, we

find evidence of the impact of intensified immigration enforcement being concentrated among women in the lowest family income quartile, as well as among families where the couple is likely unauthorized. These findings suggest that, both, current and future economic resources – possibly more uncertain when both partners are likely unauthorized – play an important role.

The contribution of this research is twofold. First, it adds to a rapidly growing literature concerned with the consequences of a fragmented and intensified approach to immigration enforcement. To our knowledge, this is the first study examining the impact of interior immigration enforcement on the fertility patterns of undocumented immigrant women. In so doing, it complements a number of studies exploring the effects of intensified enforcement on undocumented immigrants' residential choices, employment, earnings, remitting and on their children's access to healthcare and schooling outcomes (*e.g.* Amuedo-Dorantes *et al.* 2013, Amuedo-Dorantes and Puttitanun 2014, Amuedo-Dorantes and Lopez 2015, Amuedo-Dorantes *et al.* 2016, Bohn and Lofstrom 2013, Kostandini *et al.* 2013, Watson 2013).

In addition, this study contributes to a fertility literature focused on examining how immigrant fertility responds to policy changes.[4] To our knowledge, there are two studies that focus, in particular, on the fertility of Hispanic immigrant women – more likely to be deemed undocumented. Falasco and Heer (1984) explore how legal status might affect fertility through its effects on male and female wages. Amuedo-Dorantes *et al.* (2016) study how welfare reform (the 1996 passage of PRWORA) lowered the fertility of foreign-born non-citizen women. Yet, to date, there is a lack of understanding of how the currently fragmented approach to immigration policy and enforcement is impacting undocumented immigrant women's fertility.

The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 delineates the institutional background with regards to immigration enforcement, and discusses its link to immigrant fertility. Section 3 describes the data and Section 4 the empirical methodology. Section 5 presents the main findings, whereas Section 6 assesses the policy channels and mechanisms through which the found impacts are likely taking place. Finally, Section 7 concludes the study.

2. Background on Immigration Enforcement and Immigrant Fertility

2.1. Interior Immigration Enforcement

Since 9/11, the United States has witnessed an escalation of immigration enforcement aimed at identifying undocumented immigrants for removal. The policies have ranged from worksite enforcement and work eligibility verification, to the engagement of local and state law enforcement personnel in the enforcement of immigration policy. As a result, more than 4.5 million undocumented immigrants have been removed following the passage of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) (Bergeron and Hipsman 2014). While the deportation of criminal aliens has always taken place under the U.S. immigration law, it was with the

enactment of the 1996 IIRIRA and its implementation that removals increased from an average of 3 per cent in the 1970-1996 period to 19 per cent during 2003-2006, and to a record high of 65 per cent in 2012 (Bergeron and Hipsman 2014).

In what follows, we describe the various local and state immigration enforcement policies we take into consideration in this analysis.

2.1.1. The 287(g) Agreements

The 287(g) agreements evolved from the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), which allowed state and local agencies to enforce immigration law. State and local law enforcement entities would sign an agreement with Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) that detailed the extension and limitations of the authority to be delegated. The 287(g) agreements enabled state and local officers to interrogate immigrants, arrest them without warrant and begin the process of their removal when appropriate. This was the only program that allowed state and local law enforcement officials to enforce federal immigration law directly. There were three types of 287(g) agreements: "task force", "jail enforcement" and a "hybrid". The "task force" allowed local and state officers to interrogate and arrest non-citizens during their regular duties of law enforcement operations. The number of agreements in place by 2012 was significantly cut down following the reduction in funding for the 287(g) program, and the almost universal adoption of the Secure Communities program. The "jail enforcement" model permitted local officers to interrogate immigrants who had been arrested on state and local charges about their immigration status. Under this program, 402,079 potentially removable aliens have been identified, mostly at local jails, between 2006 and 2015. Additionally, more than 1,675 state and local officers have been trained and certified by ICE to enforce immigration law (ICE 2016a).

2.1.2. Secure Communities

The Secure Communities (SC) program was designed to empower ICE to prioritize the use of enforcement resources to target non-citizens who have committed serious crimes. This was to be achieved by checking their fingerprints against the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) dataset for criminal arrest and convictions, and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) dataset that tracks their immigration history. The program expanded quickly since its initial implementation in 7 jurisdictions in 2008 to 3,181 jurisdictions in 2013. The Priority Enforcement Program (PEP) replaced SC in July 2015 (ICE 2016b). However, during the life of the SC program, the number of fingerprints submitted grew from 828,119 in 2009 to 6.9 million in 2011 (Meissner *et al.* 2013).

2.1.3. Omnibus Immigration Laws

In addition to the aforementioned initiatives sponsored through ICE, some states intensified immigration enforcement by legislating the state's ability to enforce immigration law in a number of daily life scenarios. For example, Arizona and Alabama enacted laws with provisions that allowed state and local enforcement officers to check an individual's immigration status during a "lawful stop, detention or arrest" if there was suspicion of the person being an undocumented immigrant – the "show me your papers" clause. In fact, Alabama even required schools to record students' immigration status. Arizona was the first state to enact this kind of law in 2010 (SB1070), but it was quickly followed by six other states in 2011, namely: Alabama (HB56), Georgia (HB87), Indiana (SB590), South Carolina (S20) and Utah (H116, H466, H469, and H497).

2.1.4. Employment Verification Systems

Lastly, a number of states mandated the use of electronic programs to check the work eligibility of new employees – also known as E-Verify mandates. E-verify allows employers to screen newly hired workers for work eligibility. The employer introduces the biographic information (name, social security number, date of birth, citizenship and alien registration number) of the new worker into an online computer system. The system examines the information in the dataset from the Social Security Administration (SSA) and from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and, subsequently, determines whether the worker is authorized to work in the United States. In the cases for which work eligibility is not confirmed, the employer receives a "tentative non-confirmation" and the worker needs to correct the problem within eight business days. E-Verify has expanded rapidly since it was first adopted. Specifically, enrolment in E-Verify has grown by more 400 per cent from 1,064 in 2001 to 482,692 by 2014 (Department of Homeland 2014).

2.2. *Immigrant Fertility and Immigration Enforcement*

In recent years, researchers have documented a reduction in fertility rates in the United States, especially among the foreign born population (Livingston and Cohn 2012). As noted in the Introduction, within immigrants, Hispanic women and, in particular, Mexican foreign-born women have exhibited the largest decline. While some of this decline might have been associated to the slowdown of the economy during the Great Recession, our focus is on how the intensification of immigration enforcement might have also played a role in the decision to bear children.[5]

Tougher immigration enforcement might directly inhibit fertility through various, often overlapping, policy channels and mechanisms. The *deportation* of the household's head or her/his partner (with deportations being attributed to police-based enforcement) is likely to either end or place fertility on hold. Yet, even among intact households, fertility might decline in response to a

reduction in family income and/or *uncertainty* about the future of the family unit and the ability to raise children. Both can occur as a result of more restrictive hiring practices (as in the case of employment-based policies like E-Verify mandates), or from apprehension and deportation fears accompanying intensified police-based enforcement. In this vein, prior work has shown how employment verification mandates curtail the job opportunities and, in turn, the earnings of likely undocumented immigrants (e.g. Amuedo-Dorantes and Bansak, 2012; Bohn and Lofstrom, 2012). Likewise, some authors have pointed out how tougher immigration laws can increase fear of apprehension and deportation, leading families to adopt a style of life that restricts their access to employment opportunties, as well as services – including food stamps or Medicaid, even if they qualify for the assistance (Amuedo-Dorantes *et al.* 2013, 2016; Watson 2014).

However, stepped-up enforcement could also motivate undocumented immigrants to have their children while still in the United States as a means to ensure they will get U.S. citizenship and gain access to a wide range of better life opportunities they would lack elsewhere.[6] This view is related to the so-called "anchor baby" hypothesis, according to which undocumented migrant parents might choose to have their children while in the United States with the hope they might be able to sponsor them in the future.[7]

We can formalize the aforementioned hypotheses using a standard model of consumer demand in which fertility choices are made under a set of constrains. In particular, the demand for children can be modelled as a function of household income, the cost of children and parents' demand for children. More formally, we can assume that parents seek to maximize a utility function given by:

(1) $$U = U(n, s)$$

Utility depends on the number of children *n* and all other consumption items –labelled *s*. In this simple model, parents maximize equation (1) subject to the following budget constraint:

(2) $$I = \pi_s \, s + p_n n$$

where *I* is household income, p_n is the per unit price of children, and π_s is the per unit price of the composite commodity. Therefore, the demand function for children is directly related to household income and inversely related to the price of children and household income. Taking the price of the composite good as numeraire, we can express the demand of children as:

(3) $$n = N(\frac{I}{p_n})$$

Using this simple framework, we can foresee how fertility might respond to changes in immigration enforcement. For example, intensified enforcement may raise the per unit price of children by restricting access to proper health care and public benefits, or by negatively impacting the mental and physical health of family members. Since children are normal goods, an increase in the cost or price of children will lead to a reduced demand for children.

The effect of intensified immigration enforcement through employment restrictions is, however, vaguer. Fewer employment opportunities might result in lower household income, leading to income and substitution effects working in opposite directions. On one hand, since children are normal goods, the reduced purchasing power of the household might result in an income effect that lowers the demand for children. On the other hand, fewer employment opportunities reduce the opportunity cost of not working and, in turn, lower the cost of staying home to raise children. This substitution effect would result in an increased demand for children. Therefore, the ultimate impact of restricted employment opportunities on the demand for children remains an empirical question.

Similarly, stepped-up enforcement could raise fertility among undocumented immigrants while they are in the United States if they wish to ensure their children will get U.S. citizenship and, therefore, access to a wide range of better life opportunities they would lack elsewhere. Yet, following Becker and Lewis (1973) and Becker and Tomes (1976) "quality-quantity" trade-off hypothesis, Avitabile *et al.* (2014) find that the granting of birth right citizenship in Germany lowered the cost or price of child "quality", leading parents to lower their demand for children and increase, instead, their investments in child "quality." Specifically, parents maximized the following utility function:

(4) $$U = (U(n, s, q))$$

which not only depends on the number of children and the consumption of other goods, but also on child quality: q. Hence, parents faced the following budget constraint:

(5) $$I = \pi_s \, s + p_n n + nqp_q + qp_q$$

where p_n is the unitary cost of the number of children, which is not dependent on quality, and p_q is the cost of child quality, which depends on quantity. If having the children in the United States guarantees them citizenship, it might lower the cost of child quality, p_q. Following Becker and Lewis (1973), a decrease in the price of child quality has a positive direct effect on child quality, but a negative indirect effect on the number of children due to the increase in the shadow price of quantity. In sum, it might induce them to have fewer children.

Overall, then, whether fertility drops or rises in the midst of intensified immigration enforcement remains an empirical question that we address in what follows.

3. Data

We use two different datasets: (1) the American Community Survey (ACS) for the period 2004 through 2013 – provided by the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (Ruggles *et al.* 2016) with detailed information on the Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) where respondents reside; and (2) gathered data on the adoption of a number of interior immigration enforcement measures that

were popular during that time period – namely: local and state level 287(g) agreements, Secure Communities, employment verification mandates and omnibus immigration laws.

3.1. ACS Data

Our main source of data is the ACS, which provides rich demographic, social, economic and housing information about individuals and the households they belong to. Approximately 3.5 million randomly sampled households are interviewed on a yearly basis. In addition to its size, over the 2005 - 2014 period,[8] the ACS allows us to exploit the temporal and local variation of the immigration policies being considered by consistently identifying the metropolitan area (MSA) where women live.[9] It also gathers information about ethnicity and citizenship status – key traits, along with educational attainment and time in the United States, in deriving a proxy for the likely undocumented immigration status of respondents.

In order to understand how undocumented immigrants are included in the data, it is crucial to know the sample process for the ACS. As previously pointed out by Pope (2016), given the sample design of the ACS, undocumented individual are not more or less likely to be selected. First, the ACS uses as the source of the addresses the Master Address File (MAF). This is the Census Bureau's official inventory of known housing units in the United States. The sample frame is generated using the MAF file. Second, a systematic sample of address is drawn from the sample frame. Therefore, individuals have the same probability of being selected regardless of their citizen status.

The data is collected in four different ways: internet, mail, telephone, and personal visit. First, the household receives a mailed request to respond via internet, with an option to complete a paper questionnaire and return by mail.[10] If there is no response after one month, the Census Bureau follows up with computer-assisted telephone interviews. If there is still no response, the address is selected for computed-assisted personal interviewing. According to the Census Bureau the response rate is above 95 per cent.

A typical concern when studying likely undocumented immigrants is survey non-response. To this end, it is worth noting that: "The ACS interviews the resident population without regards to legal status or citizenship."[11] While the ACS asks the individual whether she/he is a U.S. citizen, no information regarding their specific immigrant visa or legal status, for that matter, is gathered. Thus, to proxy for this population, we use a series of demographic traits shown to be good predictors of immigrants' undocumented status, such as being Hispanic, non-citizens, with less than a high school diploma and with 5 years or more of U.S. residency.[12] Why are these good predictors? The Census Bureau and the Department of Homeland Security estimate that nearly 40 per cent of non-citizens are authorized immigrants (Acosta, *et al.* 2014, Baker and Rytin 2013). In addition, as previous research has pointed out (see for example, Bohn and Pugatch 2013, Orrenius and Zavodny 2016),

most unauthorized immigrants have relatively low education levels.[13] Furthermore, due to the closeness and the presence of a large migrant network, more than 67 per cent of undocumented immigrants in the United States are from Central America. Hence, we follow the convention in the literature of adopting Hispanic non-citizens as a proxy for individuals who are likely to be undocumented (Bohn and Pugatch 2013; Passel and Cohn 2009; Pope 2016; Orrenius, Zavodny, and Gutierrez 2016). Nevertheless, to address any concerns regarding the possibility that the sample might include low-skilled immigrants or college students with non-immigrant visas, we restrict the analysis to Hispanic non-citizens individuals who have not completed high school and who have lived in the United States for at least 5 years. This last restriction further ensures that the low-skilled migrants are not legally in the United States with a non-immigrant visa – typically granted to low-skilled migrants for a much shorter duration.

Using all these traits, along with the weights of the ACS, we obtain an estimated unauthorized immigrant population of 12,791,033 immigrants –a figure that is very close to the estimated population of 11 to 12 million undocumented immigrants in the United States using the residual method. According to the more elaborate aggregate estimates available at the Center for Migration Studies (CMS), the number was 11,010,000 immigrants – a fairly close estimate considering the CMS advertence that: "Estimates are shown for unauthorized population sizes of 1,000 or more. All of the estimates are rounded to 1,000s. The sum of the numbers for the countries is not likely to agree with the U.S. totals because estimates of fewer than 1,000 are not included in the table."

At any rate, to further address any remaining non-response concerns, we also examine the population weights for our group of likely undocumented immigrants. If non-response rose, the weights should have risen, other things remaining equal. An initial inspection reveals that the weights remained stable over the period under study – a result in line with the findings from a series of studies using the ACS over the 2000 - 2014 period in order to assess non-response rates or the loss of representativeness of the ACS following the intensification of enforcement (see, for example, Bohn, Lofstrom, and Steven 2014; Pope 2016; and Orrenius and Zavodny 2016).

Our focus is on fertility. To that end, we focus on women ages 16 to 45 years old, and use the following ACS question: "*Had you given birth to any children in the past 12 months?*" to create a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the answer is 'yes' and 0 otherwise. Because the question refers to the past 12 months and most births in any given year were likely conceived in the year prior, we adjust the rest of the variables in our analysis accordingly. The other descriptors used in the analysis include age, marital status, number of children less than 5 years of age, years in the United States and educational attainment.[14]

Table 1 provides summary statistics for the key characteristics of women in our sample. Our sample contains 106,033 likely undocumented women (namely, Hispanic non-citizen women who have less than a high school diploma and have lived in the United States 5 years or more) living

in the United States between 2004 and 2013. Approximately 9 per cent of them report giving birth in the past 12 months. They are, on average, 32 years old. Sixty per cent are married and the mean length of time they have been residing in the United States is 13 years. About 40 per cent have children less than 5 years of age. Unemployment rates in their MSAs hover around 5 per cent. Other MSA characteristics shown in Table 1 include the share of the electorate voting for Republican candidates for the U.S. House of Representatives, which averaged 47 per cent, as well as the share of women in the MSA receiving Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), participating in the Children's Health Insurance Program (CHIP) or in the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP).[15, 16]

3.2. Enforcement Data

In order to exploit the geographic and temporal variation in the adoption of various immigration enforcement initiatives, we gather historical and current data. Data on the implementation of 287(g) agreements at the state level is gathered for the period 2004 to 2013 from the ICEs 287(g) Fact Sheet website, Amuedo-Dorantes and Bansak (2014), and Kostandini *et al.* (2013).[17] Data on the rolling of the Secure Communities program at the county level is compiled from ICE's releases on activated jurisdictions. Finally, data on state level omnibus immigration laws and employment verification mandates is gathered from the National Conference of State Legislatures.

Our purpose is to gauge the impact of intensified immigration enforcement on the childbearing likelihood of likely undocumented women. Since some of the aforementioned enforcement initiatives are adopted at the county level, it could be the case that a particularly county in the MSA activates a 287(g) agreement, whereas other counties in the MSA do not. In those instances, some of the women in the MSA might be affected by the measure, whereas others might not. In addition, some of the measures might have been in place for only a few months in a given year if, for example, they were activated midyear. To address these issues, we construct a population-weighted index that provides several advantages. First, it accounts for the share of women likely impacted by a particular county-level measure in the MSA. Second, it addresses the length of time the measure was in place during any given year. Third, it facilitates the assessment of the *intensity* of immigration enforcement on fertility by easily allowing us to group the various enforcement measures in place into one index. This is important given the overlap of these measures, many of which were designed to replace one another (as in the case of SC and the 287(g) agreements) and rely on the same local and state police resources. Still, it is worth underscoring that we can only *proxy* for the enforcement intensity to which a woman living in MSA m in year t might be exposed.[18]

Hence, we first calculate the following index for each initiative k:

(6) $$EI^{k}{}_{mt} = \frac{1}{N_{m,2000}} \sum_{c \in m}^{m} \frac{1}{12} \sum_{j=1}^{12} \mathbf{1}(E_{j,c}) P_{c,2000}$$

where $\mathbf{1}(E_{j,c})$ is an indicator function that informs about the implementation of measure *k* in county *c* in month *j* during the year in question, $P_{c,2000}$ is the population of county *c* according to the 2000 Census – that is, prior to the rolling of the enforcement initiatives being considered; and $N_{m,2000}$ is the total population in the MSA.[19] Subsequently, we compute an index of the overall enforcement level to which a woman living in MSA *m* and time (year) *t* is exposed as the sum of the indices for each enforcement initiative at the (MSA, year) level in equation (6). That is:[20]

(7) $$Total\ Enforcement_{m,t} = \sum_{k \in K}^{K} EI^{k}_{m,t}$$

As can be seen from Table 1, our proxy for the intensity of interior immigration enforcement averages 0.82 and fluctuated significantly between 0 (*i.e.* no enforcement) and 5 (all local and state level initiatives) over the time period under consideration. Figure 2 exemplifies the *geographic* variation in interior immigration enforcement over the period under examination, with a growing number of MSAs joining in and adopting interior immigration initiatives. In addition, Figure 3 illustrates the *temporal* variation in the intensity of the constructed immigration enforcement index as MSAs adopted multiple enforcement measures. Finally, the intensification of immigration enforcement captured by Figures 2 and 3 coincided with the increase in interior removals in Figure 1.

4. Empirical Strategy

Our main aim is to evaluate how fertility decisions of likely undocumented women might be affected by the intensification of immigration enforcement. To that end, we exploit the temporal and geographic variation in the immigration enforcement index described above using the following benchmark model:

(8) $$y_{i,m,t} = \alpha + \beta_1\, Total\ Enforcement_{m,t} + X'_{i,m,t}\, \beta_2 + Z'_{m,t}\beta_3 + (M'_{m,2000} * t)\beta_4 + \\ + \gamma_m + \theta_t + \varepsilon_{i,m,t}$$

where $y_{i,m,t}$ is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if woman *i*, living in MSA *m*, had a child in year *t*. $Total\ Enforcement_{m,t}$ is the index serving as a proxy for the intensity of enforcement to which a woman living in the MSA *m* and year *t* might be exposed to.

The vector $X'_{i,m,t}$ includes a range of individual characteristics known to influence the fertility decisions, such as age, marital status, number of children, years in the United States and years of schooling. The literature has suggested that Mexican immigrants' higher fertility rates are attributable to some degree to the fact that many female Mexican immigrants would have entered the United States to reunite with their migrant husbands in response to favoured family reunification (Parrado 2011, Raley and Sweeney 2009). Hence, we control for marital status. In addition, we include the number of children less than 5 living with the mother (Falasco and Heer 1984), and for

years in the United States, since those who have been in the United States longer might be more assimilated and have fertility patterns that look more like those of natives (see, for example, Goldstein and Goldstein 1981). Finally, we control for educational attainment given the inverse relationship between years of education and fertility among Hispanic women (Parrado and Morgan 2008). [21]

The vector $Z'_{m,t}$ contains specific MSA-time varying characteristics which might affect the decision of having a child, such as the generosity of welfare benefits. Specifically, since non-citizen women's childbearing could prove responsive to the generosity of welfare benefits (Amuedo-Dorantes *et al.* 2016), $Z'_{m,t}$ includes time-varying vectors reflecting whether the following public assistance programs were offered by the state: Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), Children's Health Insurance Program and Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP).

Additionally, in order to control for possible differences in trends across MSAs that are spuriously correlated with the MSA treatment effect, we include as controls interactions between pre-treatment MSAs characteristics (measured in the year 2000) and a time trend –namely: $(M'_{m,2000} * t)$. The vector: $M_{m,2000}$ includes the unemployment rate in the MSA and the share of Hispanics in the MSA, as well as the share of people voting republican in the state. The three variables are measured in the year 2000 – that is, prior to $Total\ Enforcement_{m,t}$ turning positive. In addition, they are interacted with a time trend to capture their variability over time.

To conclude, equation (8) also includes MSA fixed effects (γ_m) and year fixed effects (θ_t) to control for unobserved time-invariant MSA characteristics and aggregate level shocks potentially impacting immigrant fertility, such as residing in areas less welcoming to immigrants or the 2008-2009 recession. Additionally, we examine the sensitivity to including MSA-specific time trends in our most complete model specification to account for differences in fertility trends across MSAs driven by factors other than tougher immigration enforcement initiatives, welfare generosity captured by $Z'_{m,t}$ or MSA level controls included in $(M'_{m,2000} * t)$.[22] Standard errors are clustered at the MSA level.[23]

The coefficient of interest is β_1, which captures the relationship between the intensity of local and state-level immigration enforcement and the childbearing likelihood of likely undocumented women. A negative coefficient would be consistent with the prediction that tougher enforcement might curtail fertility among likely undocumented women as a result of the deportation of the household head or her/his partner or, even in the absence of a family deportation, as a consequence of lower family income and increased uncertainty about the family's future.

5. Main Findings

Table 2 displays the results from estimating equation (8) for the sample of likely undocumented women, as captured by Hispanic non-citizen women with less than a high school

education and at least 5 years of residency in the United States, using ordinary least squares (OLS). We estimate a number of specifications that progressively add controls to assess the robustness of our findings to the inclusion of potentially endogenous controls, such as MSA unemployment rates in specification (3). Regardless of the model specification used, the intensification of immigration enforcement appears to have had a negative impact on the childbearing likelihood of likely undocumented women. Focusing on the most complete model specification, which includes MSA and year fixed-effects, as well as MSA-specific time trends, we find that a one standard deviation increase in the enforcement index (approximately equal to the average intensity of interior immigration enforcement during the period under consideration) lowers the childbearing likelihood of likely undocumented women by 5 per cent.[24] As such, tougher interior immigration enforcement could be responsible for one fourth of the fertility reduction experienced by these women over period under consideration.

The remaining coefficients in Table 2 have the expected signs. For example, there is an inverse relationship between the age of the mother and the likelihood of childbearing, whereas the opposite is true with regards to the number of children less than 5 years of age residing in the household. We also find that women who have been living longer in the United States and those who are married (both more likely assimilated) are less likely to have had a child during the past year.[25] In contrast, they display a higher (5 percentage points higher) childbearing likelihood if they reside in a state offering CHIP.

Because interior immigration enforcement took off during the Great Recession years, one might be concerned that much of the impact attributed to the intensification of immigration enforcement was truly due to the recessionary economy. After all, poverty and unemployment grew more rapidly among Latinos (Livingston and Cohn 2012). Although some of the model specifications include year fixed-effects, MSA unemployment rates and/or MSA-specific time trends addressing such a concern, we also experiment with re-estimating equation (8) using two other samples of also Hispanic low-skilled women, namely: naturalized and U.S.-born women. Given their citizenship status, they should not have been affected by the intensification of immigration enforcement to the same extent as their likely undocumented counterparts.

Results from those estimations are displayed in Tables 3 and 4. If, indeed, the impacts found in Table 2 were the by-product of tougher economic times, we should be able to find a statistically significant impact of intensified enforcement on the childbearing likelihood of these two other samples of women. In contrast, the estimates in Tables 3 and 4 clearly reveal the lack of a statistically significant impact of intensified immigration enforcement on these women's childbearing likelihood. In fact, the estimates are statistically different from those in Table 2.[26] In other words, the impacts identified in Table 2 are unique to likely undocumented women.

5.1. Identification Tests and Robustness Checks

The main assumption underlying our empirical strategy is that differences in the outcome being examined across *treated* and *control* units did not predate treatment itself. To assess if that was the case, we estimate equation (8) including a full set of dummies spanning from four years prior to the adoption of any initiative in the MSA in question. In that manner, we are able to gauge if the reductions in fertility preceded the adoption of tougher enforcement measures in the MSA as follows:

(9) $$y_{i,m,t} = \alpha + \sum_{b=-4}^{-1} \delta_b D_{m,b} + \beta_1 Total\ Enforcement_{m,t} + X'_{i,m,t}\ \beta_2 + Z'_{m,t}\beta_3 + + M_{m,2000} * t + \gamma_m + \theta_t + \varepsilon_{i,m,t}$$

where D_b is a dummy for *b* years prior to the enforcement index turning positive. Note that, because the adoption of these initiatives occurred at different points in time across MSAs, D_l might be equal to 2006 for some MSAs, 2007 for others, and so on. Table 5 shows the results from estimating equation (9) via OLS. It is evident that reductions in fertility did not take place prior to the adoption of tougher immigration enforcement measures in the MSA, as none of the coefficients for the preceding years are statistically different from zero. Furthermore, the point estimate on our key regressor continues to be statistically different from zero and of similar magnitude to the one in column (3) of Table 2.

Another threat to identification is whether the adoption of stricter immigration enforcement by the MSA is somewhat correlated to fertility rates in the MSA prior to the beginning of our sample period, that is, in 2004.[27] To that end, we take the year 2004 and aggregate the data at the MSA level to estimate the following equation:

(10) $$Y_m = \alpha + X'^0_m \alpha + Z'^0_m \mu + \varepsilon_m$$

where Y_m is EI_m - namely, the enforcement level when the enforcement index turned positive in MSA *m*, or $EI\ Year_m$ - that is, the year in which the immigration enforcement turned positive in MSA *m*. The vector X'^0_m is the average share of likely unauthorized women between 16 and 45 years of age giving birth in MSA *m* in base year 2004, whereas the vector Z'^0_m contains the average unemployment rate and Hispanic share in the MSA in that base year.[28] We estimate equation (10) including state fixed effects, and we cluster standard errors at the state level. The results from this exercise are displayed in Table 6. Fertility rates at the MSA level prior to the adoption of stricter enforcement measures do not seem to play a significant role in the timing of tougher immigration enforcement or on its level when first adopted by the MSA, even in the absence of state fixed effects.

Finally, one might be concerned about the self-selection of migrants into different levels of enforcement. Undocumented women could be sensitive to immigration enforcement due to the inherent risk of deportation in areas with tougher enforcement. Since migrants, especially undocumented ones, are a relatively mobile population, they might move in response to the adopted

enforcement measures. In those instances, exposure to tougher immigration enforcement, in itself, is likely to be endogenous and, in the example just given, result in a downward biased estimate of the impact of intensified immigration enforcement on fertility.[29]

To assess the degree to which our estimates might be biased due to the non-random residential choices made by undocumented immigrants, we instrument their likely exposure to immigration enforcement using information on what their probable residential choices would have been in the absence of tougher enforcement. Specifically, we use information on the historical location of undocumented women from the same country of origin (Bartel 1989; Card 2001; Cortes and Tessada 2011, among many others). Relying on data from the year 2000 ACS, we construct the following share informing of the concentration of undocumented immigrants from the same country of origin in each MSA prior to the implementation of any of the enforcement initiatives under study:[30]

$$(11) \qquad Share\ of\ Undocumented\ Immigrant_{m,o,2000} = \frac{undo\square umented\ immigrants_{m,o,2000}}{undocumented\ immigrants_{o,2000}}$$

We then interact the share in equation (11) with the enforcement index in each respective MSA and year to instrument for the likely exposure to tougher enforcement. The *shift-share* instrument, where the *shift* is the level of enforcement adopted by each MSA in any given year and the *share* is the one in equation (11), is highly correlated to the exposure to tougher enforcement of likely undocumented women in our sample. The correlation is based on immigrants' entrenched tendency to reside in areas with established networks of their countrymen (Bartel 1989; Massey *et al*. 1993; Munshi 2003; Card 2001; Cortés and Tessada 2010, among many others).

The results from this exercise are displayed in Table 7. The last rows confirm that the IV is a good instrument. The F-stat from the first stage regression is larger than the recommended size of 10 (Stock and Yogo 2005). The estimated coefficient from the first stage regression is positive and statistically significant, confirming the entrenched tendency for immigrants to locate in areas with established networks of their countrymen. Additionally, the estimate from the second stage regression reveals that the same one standard deviation increase in the enforcement index lowers the childbearing likelihood of likely undocumented women by close to 8 per cent. Therefore, our prior estimate provides us, if anything, with a lower bound of the true impact of tougher immigration enforcement on the fertility of these women.

Yet, as a final robustness check, we also re-estimate our model in equation (8) using, exclusively, data on women who report not moving over the past year. As such, their location choice is less likely to be contaminated by immigrants' potential responsiveness to the toughening of immigration enforcement. Panel B of Table 7 reports the results from this exercise. We find a similar estimate of the fertility impact of intensified immigration enforcement to the one reported in Table 2 – a further reassurance of the unbiasedness of the estimate in Table 2.

5.2. Additional Findings on the Impact of Intensified Enforcement on Childbearing

Did intensified immigration enforcement affect the childbearing decisions of likely unauthorized women of childless women, or only those of women who were already mothers? The estimates in Table 8 address this question with a distinction of the impact that intensified immigration enforcement had on the childbearing decisions of both groups of likely undocumented women in our sample. According to the estimates in Panels A and B, a one standard deviation increase in immigration enforcement lowers the probability of childbearing among childless women by 5 per cent, and that of their counterparts who were mothers by approximately 1 percentage point or 6 per cent. In sum, the impact of intensified enforcement on likely undocumented women's childbearing was widespread.

Similarly, we might wonder if the found fertility impacts have only resulted in fertility delays or, rather, have also led to overall reductions in the average number of children per woman. To that end, in Table 9, we regress the average number of children for likely undocumented women ages 16 to 45 in each MSA on the level of immigration enforcement in that MSA a year earlier. According to the estimates displayed therein, a one standard deviation increase in immigration enforcement lowers the average share of likely undocumented women having a child by 3.55 per cent. As such, the intensification of immigration enforcement has not only resulted in fertility delays, as is apparent from the results for childless women in Table 10 but, also, in an overall drop in the average number of children per likely undocumented women of childbearing age.

6. Policy Channels and Enforcement Impact Mechanisms

Thus far, we have documented how the adoption of tougher immigration enforcement at the local and state levels has contributed to the lower childbearing likelihood among likely undocumented women. In this section, we further look into the type of policies not likely responsible for the found impacts, as well as into the mechanisms through which fertility cutbacks are likely taking place.

6.1. Policy Channels

Tougher immigration enforcement has had a negative impact on undocumented women's fertility. But, have all immigration enforcement measures contributed similarly to such an outcome? If not, can we identify which are the more unsettling immigration enforcement policies when it comes to its disturbance of regular fertility patterns? To that end, we group alike policies, such as the ones that involve the local and state police in the implementation of immigration policy, and differentiate between policies that are clearly linked to apprehensions and deportations (what we

refer to as *police-based* enforcement), and policies that are not (as in the case of employment verification mandates). Both policies are likely to, for example, curtail employment opportunities – one by directly restricting the hiring of likely undocumented workers, and the other one by probably inducing them to live in the shadows so as to evade apprehension. Yet, they also differ with regards to their link to deportations. Unlike employment-based enforcement, police-based enforcement is clearly linked to removals and, consequently, to intensified apprehension and deportation fears. As such, the distinction between police-based and employment-based policies underscores the importance of fear of deportation – associated with police-based enforcement and its ensuing deportations. Not surprisingly, the estimates in Table 10 reveal how police-based policies are driving our results, underscoring the importance of deportation fear in shaping women's fertility.

6.2. *Enforcement Impact Mechanisms*

Identifying the policy channel is critical for isolating the importance that deportation fear, in addition to other factors, has in explaining the fertility of likely undocumented women in the midst of intensified immigration enforcement. What can we learn about the potentially overlapping mechanisms through which fertility cutbacks are taking place, such as compositional effects (*e.g.* deportations of partners), drops in family income and increased uncertainty about the family's ability to raise its offspring?

To assess the extent to which all the aforementioned triggering mechanisms might be present, we address the following questions: (1) Do fertility cutbacks solely occur when a partner is no longer present, or are they also observed among intact households?, (2) Are they observed across all families in the income distribution, or are they restricted to poorer families?, and (3) Do fertility reductions take place across all types of couples, or are they limited to couples of likely undocumented immigrants subject to greater uncertainty?

The estimates in Table 11 address the aforementioned questions. Starting with Panel A, we can see that the negative impact of intensified immigration enforcement on the fertility of likely undocumented women is present among intact households.[31] Therefore, the fertility impacts of intensified immigration enforcement cannot be solely attributed to household compositional effects as captured by the deportation of a partner, which can obviously place fertility on hold. Rather, other factors resulting from life in the shadows to evade apprehensions, such as lower income resources and/or increased uncertainty about the future, might be at play.

To further substantiate this conclusion, we distinguish among different types of couples: (a) those in which both partners are likely undocumented, (b) those of likely undocumented women whose partners are naturalized, and (c) the ones composed of likely undocumented women whose partners are natives. As can be seen from the estimates in Panel B, the impact of intensified immigration enforcement is particularly concentrated among women whose partners are also likely

undocumented, suggesting that they probably face greater income restrictions and uncertainty. Note that, to the extent that mothers in the second and third columns of Panel B are likely undocumented, they are also likely to endure reductions in income and greater uncertainty. Yet, the fact that intensified enforcement is not significantly altering their childbearing suggests that significantly greater economic hardships and uncertainty, as we would expect to be greater among couples in which both partners are likely undocumented, are key factors in explaining their fertility choices.

To conclude, we try to distinguish the role played by current income restrictions, as opposed to increased uncertainty – supposedly endured by all likely undocumented women to some degree. Because of the endogenous nature of women's fertility with respect to family income, we take a descriptive approach and look into how the intensification of immigration enforcement appears to have impacted likely unauthorized women's childbearing depending on whether their family income falls in the bottom, middle or top quartiles of the distribution of family income. The results from this exercise are displayed in Panel C. According to the estimates in columns (1) through (4), the intensification of immigration enforcement primarily impacted the fertility patterns of likely unauthorized women in the bottom family income quartile. The fact that the impact is only recognizable among women in this group suggests that, in addition to increased uncertainty about the future of the family unit and its resources, lower family income resulting from living in the shadows might also play an important role in likely unauthorized women's fertility.

7. Summary and Policy Implications

We examine the effect that the progressive intensification of immigration enforcement in the United States over the past two decades has had on the childbearing patterns of likely undocumented women. The analysis exploits the temporal and geographical variation on the implementation of the interior immigration policies to identify the impact of tougher immigration enforcement on these women's fertility. Using ACS data from 2004 through 2013, we find that the average increase in interior immigration enforcement during that time span lowered the likelihood of childbearing among likely undocumented immigrant women by 5 per cent. Since likely undocumented women's fertility dropped by approximately 26 per cent over that period, intensified immigration enforcement could be responsible for about one fifth of the decline.

The impact of intensified interior immigration enforcement on fertility is driven by police-based measures and appears to be stronger among intact families, families headed by a likely undocumented couple, as well as among the poorest families in the bottom income quartile. The findings are suggestive of the importance of limited income resources, along with increased uncertainty emanating from an intensified fear of deportation, on likely undocumented women's fertility. Finally, to the extent that intensified immigration enforcement affects the childbearing

decisions of women in intact households, the implications of this type of policy can be significantly broader, not only impacting households shattered by deportations.

The findings, which prove robust to a number of identification and robustness checks, have important policy implication for the United States. Aside from the damage inflicted on the families of mostly U.S. citizen children affected by these tougher immigration policies, it is worth emphasizing: (a) that these are reductions in fertility that stem from immigration enforcement and, consequently, less likely to be deemed voluntary; and (b) the importance of immigrant fertility – significantly higher than that of natives, in many developed nations. Because immigrants tend to be considerably younger than natives and have higher fertility rates, immigration increases the ratio of workers to retirees and the viability of Social Security (Griswold 2012). Currently, the United States is one of the few countries with fertility rates close to replacement rates, thanks to immigrants and their offspring (Kotkin and Ozuna 2012). Given immigrants' critical contribution to the sustainability of the welfare state and the contemporaneous spread-out embracement of a piece-meal approach to immigration enforcement, further exploration of this impact is warranted and recommended in order to better understand the unintended consequences of such a policy tactic. Gaining such an understanding is crucial given President Trump's harsher stance on immigration enforcement, and the still pending need for a comprehensive immigration reform in the future.

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[1] Between January 22 and April 29, ICE conducted around 10,800 "non-criminal arrests," compared to just 4,200 in 2016 - an increase of more than 150 per cent (U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) 2017a).

[2] This figure is regardless of the citizenship of the women.

[3] In the data section, we explain in detail how we proxy for the likely undocumented status of women.

[4] For instance, focusing on Germany, Avitabile (2014) examines how changes to the German citizenship law impacted immigrants' fertility choices.

[5] An important distinction between reductions in childbearing during economic slowdowns and those associated to intensified immigration enforcement is the fact that, while the former might be labeled as voluntarily planned by women foreseeing greater financial constraints, the latter are more likely viewed as involuntary and forced via intensified fear about detention, deportation and the break-up of the family unit. Our concern is involuntary fertility reductions by likely undocumented women who, to the extent that they lack access to public health care, are unlikely to be associated to greater access to contraceptive services.

[6] Following Becker and Lewis (1973) and Becker and Tomes (1976) "quality-quantity" trade-off hypothesis, Avitabile *et al.* (2014) find that the granting of birth right citizenship in Germany lowered

the price of child "quality", leading parents to lower the number of children and invest in their "quality" instead. Note, however, that the choice for undocumented immigrants is not between living in the host country as non-citizens or as citizens. Rather, it is between living in the United States as citizens and returning to their home countries.

[7] Ignatow and Williams (2011) note how the main source of this term is partisan news websites.

[8] We use data from the 2005 through 2014 ACS surveys. However, since our dependent variable refers to fertility over the past year, we are truly measuring fertility over the 2004 to 2013 period.

[9] An alternative geographic identifier in the ACS is the CONSPUMA, but the latter is only available for the years 2005 through 2011. MSAs are integrated by a large urban core and surrounding communities that have a high degree of economic and social integration with the urban core.

[10] The households are contacted in English and Spanish.

[11] https://www.census.gov/history/pdf/acsdesign-methodology2014.pdf

[12] At this point, it is worth noting that there are other methods to proxy for the likely undocumented status of immigrants, including the use of out-of-sample predictions that rely on datasets containing information on the legal status of immigrants (i.e. *donor* datasets). Unfortunately, most datasets containing such information are not representative of the immigrant population. One exception is the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), which has been deemed to be representative of the immigrant population and used as a donor dataset to infer the legal status of immigrants in another dataset (*i.e.* target dataset). Unfortunately, given the questionable representativeness of the SIPP in terms of the undocumented immigrant population for the time period under examination (the last module containing information on immigrants' legal status refers to 2008), the SIPP is not valid for doing inferences of policy impacts at the local level (Van Hook et al. 2015), as it is the intent of the present study.

[13] About three-quarters of adult unauthorized immigrants have no more education than a high school degree (Passel and Cohn 2009).

[14] See Appendix A for greater detail of each variable.

[15] Undocumented immigrants have never qualified for federally funded assistance. The 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) restricted access for lawfully present immigrants based on their immigration status, date of arrival and length of U.S. residency. PRWORA also set parameters for how states might administer public benefit programs. Some states have chosen to fund federal programs for immigrants. Further, under the Children's Health Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2009 (CHIPRA), states can receive federal funding to provide Medicaid and/or CHIP to lawfully residing youth less than 21 years of age, and to pregnant women. We create a set of dummy variables indicative of whether the states extended TANF, CHIP or Food Assistance to non-qualified immigrants.

[16] This program was formerly known as the Food Stamp program.

[17] Since the ICE website contains only a list of the current active agreements, we review old websites and prior research using these agreements to ensemble a complete dataset spanning from 2004 to 2013. Once we have the start date of each 287(g) agreement, we calculate the period of time during which these agreements have been in place.

[18] It is worth noting that, as with any policy, the same enforcement measure might be applied differently in two distinct MSAs – these are idiosyncrasies that plague any policy analysis and that we capture in the regression analysis through a number of MSA fixed-effects and MSA-specific time trends.

[19] For example, if an MSA is comprised of two counties, the index for each of the *k* enforcement measures being considered (for instance, Secure Communities) in MSA *m* in year *t* would be given by:

$$\textit{Secure Communities index}_{mt} = \frac{Months\_Coverage}{12} * \frac{Cnty1Pop}{MSAPop} + \frac{Months\_Coverage}{12} * \frac{Cnty2Pop}{MSAPop}$$

[20] Where *k* refers to each policy, *i.e.*: 287(g) local, 287(g) state, secure communities, Omnibus immigration law and E-verify. In subsequent analysis, we also experiment with alternative indices that group the various enforcement initiatives according to the entity involved in their application (*i.e.* police-based or employer-based measures). The grouping makes sense since many of the policies, as was the case with the 287(g) and its successor SC program, were designed to progressively replace each other.

[21] Income is not included due to its endogenous nature. Nevertheless, we control for other characteristics potentially correlated with family income, including educational attainment.

[22] Note that with the inclusion of MSA-specific time trends, the vector: $(M'_{m,2000} * t)$ drops from equation (8).

[23] Results also prove robust to clustering at the state level and including state-specific linear time trends

[24] The standard deviation of the enforcement index is 0.93 and, on average, approximately 9 per cent of likely undocumented women gave birth in the past year. Therefore: {[(-0.005)*0.93]/0.09}=0.05 or 5 per cent.

[25] Table B.1 in Appendix B sheds more light on these relationships. Because the typical age-at-migration is in the late teens-early twenties, and most childbearing takes place when women are in their twenties/thirties, it is not surprising to find the curtailing effect of immigration enforcement concentrated in women 25-34 years of age, who have typically been in the United States between 5-10 years and who are less likely to be married than their older counterparts.

[26] With: Prob > Chi2=0.0084 when comparing the estimates from Table 2 and Table 3, and with a Prob > Chi2=0.0716 when comparing the estimates in Table 2 and Table 4.

[27] We cannot identify consistently MSAs due changes in MSA delineations before then.

[28] We exclude from this analysis the MSAs in the state of Florida, which were the only ones that had already implemented tougher immigration enforcement measures (namely the state level 287(g) signed by Florida in 2002). Results do not seem to significantly differ, however, when Florida is included.

[29] Another source of downward bias could be the fact that some of the women whose partners have been deported might have returned to Mexico.

[30] We are using the population in 2000 given that we cannot consistently identify MSAs in 1980 or 1990 with those in 2000 onwards.

[31] We are somewhat limited in the ability to perform this analysis for families in which the partner is missing using the ACS, which does not allow us to identify if the partner is absent unless the couple is married. The resulting sample size of married women with absent spouses is too small to make reliable inferences.

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Table 1: Summary Statistics

Descriptive Statistic:	Mean	S.D	Min	Max	Observations
Panel A: Dependent Variable					
Probability of Childbearing	0.09	0.28	0	1	106,033
Panel B: Individual Characteristics					
Age	32.39	7.73	15	44	106,033
Married	0.57	0.49	0	1	106,033
Number of Own Children Under 5 in the Household	0.4	0.66	0	7	106,033
Years in the United States	13.41	6.31	5	45	106,033
Years of Education	2.77	1.57	0	6	106,033
Married with Spouse Absent	0.08	0.27	0	1	63,775
Likely Undocumented Partner	0.49	0.5	0	1	106,033
Naturalized Partner	0.07	0.26	0	1	106,033
Native Partner	0.04	0.19	0	1	106,033
Single Female Head	0.2	0.4	0	1	106,033
Panel C: Area Characteristics					
TANF	0.56	0.5	0	1	106,033
CHIP	0.84	0.37	0	1	106,033
Food Stamp	0.44	0.5	0	1	106,033
Panel C: Enforcement Index					
Enforcement Index	0.82	0.93	0	5	106,033
Enforcement Index using Historical Location	0.07	0.13	0	1.38	106,033
Police-based/Deportation Policies	0.74	0.79	0	4	106,033
Employment Restrictive Policies	0.078	0.26	0	1	106,033
State Level Policies	0.18	0.53	0	3	106,033
Local Level Policies	0.65	0.67	0	2	106,033

Notes: Sample: Hispanic, non-citizen, low-skilled women with 5+ years of residency in the United States. Data from ACS 2005-2014.

Table 2: Probability of Childbearing of Likely Unauthorized Women

Regressors	Model Specification			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Enforcement Index	-0.002*	-0.005***	-0.005**	-0.005*
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Age	-0.003***	-0.003***	-0.003***	-0.003***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Married	-0.016***	-0.016***	-0.017***	-0.016***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Number of Own Children under 5 in the Household	0.142***	0.141***	0.141***	0.141***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Years in the U.S.	-0.001***	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Years of Education	-0.001	-0.000	-0.000	-0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
TANF	-0.000	-0.007	-0.009	-0.008
	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.021)	(0.020)
CHIP	-0.005	0.037***	0.050**	0.049**
	(0.004)	(0.009)	(0.023)	(0.021)
Food Stamp	0.001	-0.015	-0.012	-0.013
	(0.005)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Unemployment Rate in 2000*Time Trend			-0.002	
			(0.002)	
Share Voting Republican in 2000*Time Trend			-0.001	
			(0.003)	
Share of Hispanics in 2000*Time Trend			0.003	
			(0.002)	
D.V. Mean			0.09	

Observations	106,033	106,033	106,033	106,033
R-squared	0.120	0.125	0.125	0.129

Notes: Sample: Hispanic, non-citizen, low-skilled women with 5+ years of residency in the United States. All model specifications include a constant term. In addition, specification (1) includes individual characteristics and other state welfare programs. Specification (2) includes area and time fixed effects. Specification (3) adds MSA controls measured prior to the implementation of any interior immigration enforcement measures (*i.e.* in 2000) interacted with a time trend to address their variability over time, as in equation (8). Finally, in our most complete model specification – namely, specification (4), we add MSA-specific time trends. Standard errors are shown in parentheses and are clustered at the MSA level. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.

Table 3: Probability of Childbearing of Naturalized Women

Regressors	Model Specification			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Enforcement Index	-0.004**	-0.004	-0.004	0.001
	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Individual Characteristics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Welfare Programs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Area Characteristics	No	No	Yes	Yes
Years FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
MSA FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Area Characteristics 2000-trends	No	No	Yes	No
MSA-trends	No	No	No	Yes
D.V. Mean	0.06			
Observations	19,556	19,556	19,556	19,556
R-squared	0.145	0.164	0.164	0.178

Notes: Sample: Hispanic naturalized low-skilled women with 5+ years of residency in the United States. All model specifications include a constant term. In addition, specification (1) includes individual characteristics and other state welfare programs. Specification (2) includes area and time fixed effects. Specification (3) adds MSA controls measured prior to the implementation of any interior immigration enforcement measures (*i.e.* in 2000) interacted with a time trend to address their variability over time, as in equation (8). Finally, in our most complete model specification – namely, specification (4), we add MSA-specific time trends. Standard errors are shown in parentheses and are clustered at the MSA level. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.

Table 4: Probability of Childbearing of Native Women

Regressors	Model Specification			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Enforcement Index	-0.004***	-0.002	-0.002	-0.001
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Individual Characteristics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Welfare Programs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Area Characteristics	No	No	Yes	Yes
Years FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
MSA FE	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Area Characteristics 2000-trends	No	No	Yes	No
MSA-trends	No	No	No	Yes
D.V. Mean	0.07			
Observations	98,467	98,467	98,467	98,467
R-squared	0.140	0.145	0.145	0.149

Notes: Sample: Hispanic native low-skilled women. All model specifications include a constant term. In addition, specification (1) includes individual characteristics and other state welfare programs. Specification (2) includes area and time fixed effects. Specification (3) adds MSA controls measured prior to the implementation of any interior immigration enforcement measures (*i.e.* in 2000) interacted with a time trend to address their variability over time, as in equation (8). Finally, in our most complete model specification –namely, specification (4), we add MSA-specific time trends. Standard errors are shown in parentheses and are clustered at the MSA level. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.

Table 5: Assessing the Existence of Parallel Pre-trends

Key Regressors	**Coefficient (S.E.)**
Enforcement Index in Prior Years	
4 Years Prior to EI>0	0.003
	(0.006)
3 Years Prior to EI>0	0.001
	(0.005)
2 Years Prior to EI>0	-0.005
	(0.004)
1 Year Prior to the EI>0	0.001
	(0.003)
Enforcement Index	-0.005***
	(0.002)
Individual Characteristics	Yes
Welfare Programs	Yes
Area Characteristics	Yes
Years FE	Yes
MSA FE	Yes
Area Characteristics 2000-trends	Yes
D.V. Mean	0.09
Observations	106,033
R-squared	0.125

Notes: Table 5 reports the results from estimating equation (9) using a sample of Hispanic, non-citizen, low-skilled women who have lived in the United States 5+ years. All model specifications include a constant term. Standard errors are shown in parentheses and are clustered at the MSA level. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.

Table 6: Possible Selection in the Enactment of the Immigration Policies

Panels:	**Panel A**	**Panel B**
Dependent Variable:	**Year when IE First Turned Positive**	**Immigration Enforcement when IE First Turned Positive**
Average Fertility in MSA	-0.318	0.141
	(0.415)	(0.188)
Individual controls	Yes	Yes
Area characteristics	Yes	Yes
State FE	Yes	Yes
Observations	240	240
R-squared	0.803	0.468

Notes: Table 6 displays the results from estimating equation (10) using average MSA level data in 2004. Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the state level. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.

Table 7: Addressing the Non-random Location of Immigrants

Panels:	**Panel A**	**Panel B**
Subsamples:	**Likely Unauthorized using IV estimation**	**Likely Unauthorized Women 'Stayers'**
Enforcement Index	-0.008**	-0.005**
	(0.004)	(0.002)
Individual Characteristics	Yes	Yes
Welfare Programs	Yes	Yes
Area Characteristics	Yes	Yes
Years FE	Yes	Yes
MSA FE	Yes	Yes
Area Characteristics 2000-trends	Yes	Yes
Observations	106,033	91,519
R-squared	0.125	0.121
First Stage Results		
IV	2.243**	
	(0.911)	
R-squared	0.790	
F-statistics	191.0	

Notes: Panel A: Hispanic, non-citizen, low-skilled women who have lived in the United States 5+ years. **Panel B:** Hispanic, non-citizen, low-skilled women who have lived in the United States 5+ years and reporting living in the same location over the past year. Standard errors are shown in parentheses and are clustered at the MSA level. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.

Table 8: Probability of Childbearing of Likely Unauthorized Childless Women and Mothers

Panels:	**Panel A**	**Panel B**
Subsamples of Women:	**LU Childless Women**	**LU Mothers**
Enforcement Index	-0.005**	-0.006**
	(0.002)	(0.002)
Individual Characteristics	Yes	Yes
Welfare programs	Yes	Yes
Area Characteristics	Yes	Yes
Years FE	Yes	Yes
MSA FE	Yes	Yes
Area Characteristics 2000-trends	Yes	Yes
D.V. Mean	0.08	0.09
Observations	103,084	64,067
R-squared	0.030	0.180

Notes: We focus on the abovementioned subsample of Hispanic, non-citizen, low-skilled women who have lived in the United States 5+ years. Standard errors are shown in parentheses and are clustered at the MSA level. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.

Table 9: Average Number of Children of Likely Unauthorized Women 16-45 Years of Age

Key Regressor	**Coefficient (S.E.)**
Enforcement Index	-0.071**
	(0.030)
Individual controls	Yes
Area characteristics	Yes
MSA FE	Yes
D.V. Mean	1.86
Observations	2,253
R-squared	0.347

Notes: Sample: MSAs. Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the MSA level. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.

Table 10: The Impact of Various Types of Enforcement on the Probability of Childbearing of Likely Unauthorized Women

Key Regressors	**Coefficient (S.E.)**
Police-based/Deportation Policies	-0.007***
	(0.003)
Employment Restrictive Policies	-0.002
	(0.006)
Individual Characteristics	Yes
Welfare Programs	Yes
Area Characteristics	Yes
Years FE	Yes
MSA FE	Yes
Area Characteristics 2000-trends	Yes
D. V. Mean	0.09
Observations	106,033
R-squared	0.125

Notes: Sample: Hispanic, non-citizen, low-skilled women who have lived in the United States 5+ years. Standard errors are shown in parentheses and are clustered at the MSA level. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.

Table 11: Probability of Childbearing of Likely Unauthorized Women by Household Characteristics

Regressors	Panel A: By Spousal Presence	Panel B: By Partner Citizenship Status			Panel C: Family	
	Intact Couples	LU Partner	Naturalized Partner	Native Partner	1st Quartile	2nd Quartile
Enforcement Index	-0.007**	-0.008**	-0.005	-0.006	-0.011*	-0.003
	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.009)	(0.014)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Individual Characteristics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Welfare programs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Area Characteristics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Years FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
MSA FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Area Characteristics 2000-trends	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
D.V. Mean	0.08	0.10	0.07	0.11	0.11	0.09
Observations	56,511	53,787	9,628	4,326	25,442	25,442
R-squared	0.180	0.160	0.194	0.228	0.125	0.159

Notes: *Sample: Panel A:* Hispanic, non-citizen, low-skilled women living with a partner and with 5+ years of residency in the United States. *Panel B:* Hispanic, non-citizen, low-skilled, married women with 5+ years of residency in the United States. Controls not listed include those in the most complete specification in Table 2. Standard errors are shown in parentheses and are clustered at the MSA level. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.

Figure 1

Interior and Border Removals



Source: DHS OIS, Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, FY 2010-2013.

Figure 2

Growth Rate in the Number of MSAs Activating Interior Immigration Enforcement Measures

Figure 3

Average Enforcement Index by Nature of the Policy



Notes: Average enforcement index per year.

APPENDIX A

Table A: Definition of Key Variables

Childbearing	Dummy variable 1-Woman reports to have a child during the last 12 months 0-Otherwise
Married	Dummy variable 1-Married woman 0-Otherwise
Number of Own Children Under 5	Number of own children ages 0 to 5 in the home
Years in the U.S.	Number of years of U.S. residency
Age	Woman's Age
Years of Education	Number of years of education
Unemployment Rate in MSA in 2000	Unemployment rate by MSA in 2000
Share of Hispanics Immigrants in MSA in 2000	Share of Hispanics Immigrants by MSA in 2000
Share Voting Republican in the State in 2000	Share of votes going to Republican candidates for the U.S. House of Representatives by state and year. Source: Office of the Clerk, US House of Representatives, http://clerk. house.gov/member_info/electionInfo/index.aspx.
TANF	Dummy variable: 1- State offered TANF for unqualified immigrants 0-Otherwise

CHIP	Dummy Variable: 1- State offered CHIP benefits to lawfully present immigrant children and pregnant women 0-Otherwise
Food Stamp	Dummy Variable: 1- State offered food stamps to unqualified immigrants 0-Otherwise

Table B.1: Probability of Childbearing among Likely Unauthorized Women – Heterogeneous Impacts by Age and Years in the U.S.

Regressors	Years in the U.S.			Age Range		
	5-10 Years	11-15 Years	More 15	15-24	25-34	35-44
Enforcement Index	-0.015**	0.001	-0.005	-0.006	-0.016**	-0.001
	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.010)	(0.007)	(0.003)
Individual Characteristics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Welfare programs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Area Characteristics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Years FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
MSA FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Area Characteristics 2000-trends	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	39,672	36,670	36,531	16,750	35,369	48,741
R-squared	0.132	0.132	0.14	0.148	0.119	0.128

Notes: Sample: Hispanic non-citizen low skilled women living in the United States in excess of 4 years. Controls not listed include those in column 4 Table 2. Standard errors are in parentheses and are clustered at the MSA level. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.