Centre on Migration, Policy and Society

Working Paper No. 108
University of Oxford, 2013

Immigration and Extreme-Right
Voting in France: A contextual analysis
of the 2012 presidential elections

Sebastien Rojon

WP-13-108

This paper is also published as IMI Working Paper No. 79

Abstract

Whereas Realistic Conflict Theory claims that there is a negative relationship between the share of immigrants and the level of support for the extreme-right, Contact Theory claims that the relationship is positive. Using the technique of multilevel modelling, I will challenge these mutually exclusive theories by arguing that the relationship between immigration and extreme-right support is more complex. Instead of working in opposition to each other, Conflict Theory and Contact Theory operate simultaneously but at different levels of aggregation. The focus on immigrants as a contextual factor gives the impression that the Front National is an 'urban phenomenon' concentrated in high-immigration suburbs, however recent headlines suggest that the vote is declining in urban strongholds and spreading to rural areas. In a second analysis, I will demonstrate that the level of support for the Front National is higher in rural communes than in urban communes. Drawing from Social Disintegration Theory, I will argue that the party's appeal to rural areas is a result of: 1) France's agricultural crisis; 2) the growing divide between rural and urban spaces; and 3) the cut-backs on public expenditures.

Author: Sebastien Rojon, sebastien_rojon@hotmail.com

Introduction

Since the 1980s several extreme-right parties in Europe, such as the Front National in France, the Republikaners in Germany, and the Freedom Party in Austria, have made extensive electoral gains. Seeking to understand why people are voting for these parties, scholars have provided individual and contextual explanations. Whereas individual explanations are concerned with the voter's personal interest in a specific issue or their belonging to a socio-economic category, contextual explanations are concerned with the voter's surroundings. In the case of France's extreme-right party, surveys on issue salience and socio-economic background have revealed that despite its xenophobic message and strong stance against immigration, the Front National is not a single-issue party (Mudde, 1999). In IPSOS' survey of France's 2007 presidential elections, voters were asked to pick three themes which influenced their choice of candidate. Although immigration scored the highest (64%), it was closely rivalled by insecurity (62%) followed by maintaining purchasing power (39%), unemployment (29%) and the European Union (23%). Exit poll surveys by IFOP have also revealed that voters come from a variety of socio-economic backgrounds: whereas in 1984 the Front National appealed largely to members of the bourgeoisie, in 1995 the party also began attracting more manual workers, eventually becoming France's number one workers' party (Mitra, 1988).

While individual-level analyses are a useful method for illustrating the diversity of the extreme-right electorate, they are constrained by the fact that not all explanations for the vote are found at the individual level. Because individuals are also influenced by their surroundings, it is possible that some environments are more conducive to extreme-right voting than others. For example, an artisan living in a heavily industrialised area may be more likely to vote for the extreme-right than an artisan living in a rural area because the former faces more competition from big manufacturers. Contextual factors can create regional variations in support which in the case of the Front National are significant: in the 1995 presidential elections, less than 4.6% voted for Le Pen in the department of Corrèze, whereas in Bas-Rhin where the European capital of Strasbourg is located, 26% favoured Le Pen (Lubbers and Scheepers, 2002). The bulk of support for the party comes from a limited number of departments namely, Nord, Pas-de-Calais, Bouches-du-Rhone, Var, Vaucluse, Gard and the departments surrounding Paris. Compared to the rest of France, these areas feature high rates of immigration which suggests at first glance that contact with immigrants leads people to vote for the extreme-right.

Given their strong xenophobic message, extreme-right parties are more likely to attract voters in areas where there are many immigrants. This is the premise of Realistic Conflict Theory which claims that immigrants and natives are in competition for limited resources (Campbell, 1965). Contact Theory on the other hand, claims that contact with foreigners actually reduces intergroup tensions therefore extreme-right parties are less likely to attract voters in areas where there are many immigrants (Allport, 1954). Using the Front National as a case study, I will challenge these mutually exclusive theories by arguing that the relationship between immigration and extreme-right support is more complex. Instead of working in opposition to each other, Conflict Theory and Contact Theory operate simultaneously but at different levels of aggregation.

However, immigration is not the only contextual factor which can help to explain the extreme-right vote. Jackman and Volpert (1996) found that these parties also benefit from high levels of unemployment. Unemployment is tied to immigration through Realistic Conflict Theory: seeing as jobs are one of the limited resources natives and foreigners compete for, natives are likely to blame foreigners for the scarcity of jobs. The overbearing focus on immigration and unemployment in the literature on the Front National suggests that the party is an 'urban phenomenon' rooted in cities where both these factors are intertwined. In a second analysis, I hope to contribute to the literature on contextual factors by challenging this image of the Front National as an 'urban phenomenon'. Drawing from Social Disintegration Theory, I will argue that as a result of: 1) France's agricultural crisis; 2) the growing divide between rural and urban spaces; and 3) cut-backs on public expenditures, the party is appealing to rural areas. Due to lack of data allowing for analysis of both the individual and contextual levels at the same time, this investigation focuses only on contextual factors. Being purely contextual, it does not attempt to make inferences about the voters' political choices based on their belonging to a group. I[1] It aims only to demonstrate that some environments feature a higher level of support for the extreme-right than others.

Theory

There are two competing contextual-level explanations for the relationship between immigrants and extreme-right support. Realistic Conflict Theory, developed by Donald

---

[1] The logical fallacy whereby a researcher or analyst makes an inference about an individual based on aggregate data for a group is known as 'ecological fallacy'.

Campbell (1965), seeks to understand the tensions between groups competing for power and resources in a society. When one group has access to limited resources, the arrival of an out-group will increase demand for those resources, threatening the in-group that originally had access. An increase in the size of the out-group leads to greater awareness of a foreign presence in the community which exacerbates competition between natives and immigrants. Hostility to immigrants is expressed by casting a vote for the extreme-right. The question then turns to the resources that are being fought over. Some studies have focused on basic needs such as employment, education and housing, but competition can also be centred on less tangible resources such as culture and identity. The issue of the 2004 ban on headscarves in public schools is an example of competition over culture and identity in France. Many natives view the headscarf as a symbol of outsiders amongst them, fearing a loss of identity as the population grows. Whether the resources being fought over are materialistic or cultural, the outcome is the same. Thus according to Realistic Conflict Theory, the presence of a significant out-group threatens the in-group's resource pool, encouraging them to vote for the extreme-right (Walchuk, 2011).

An alternative contextual explanation for the relationship between immigrants and extreme-right support is Gordon Allport's Contact Theory (1954), which posits that the size of the out-group actually has a *negative* relationship with the level of support for the extreme-right. This is because it is easier to vilify immigrants when one has little contact with them. As an unknown spectre immigrants can take on whatever characteristics they are attributed, but once a voter comes into contact with a foreigner they are able to make the judgment for themselves and this judgement rarely coincides with the portrayal put forth by the extreme-right (Walchuk, 2011). Williams (1947) points out that most actions undertaken to resolve intergroup conflict rest upon the assumption that increased contact results in personal connections which overcome the competition impulse. McLaren (2003) found evidence to support this theory in the case of European immigration. In her research those who had multiple immigrant friends perceived the immigrant community to be less of threat than those who had no contact with foreigners. Early research on the contact hypothesis suggested that it only applied under certain conditions such as equal status, common goals and support for contact from authority (Allport, 1954), but more recent research has shown that contact can also lead to personal connections outside stringent settings. Using Muslims in Germany as a case study, Pettigrew *et al.* (1998) found that even relatively coincidental contact could result in improved relations between the in-group and

the out-group. Thus according to Contact Theory, greater contact with the out-group diminishes competition, resulting in less support for the extreme-right.

Previous contextual analyses of the relationship between immigrants and extreme-right support in France have yielded mixed results. Using individual towns and neighbourhoods as their unit of analysis, Perrineau in Grenoble (1989), Rey and Roy in Seine-Saint-Denis (1986) and Mayer in Paris (1987) found a *negative* relationship between the share of immigrants and the level of support for the *Front National*. Instead of focusing on individual towns, Lubber and Scheepers' (2002) aggregated their data at the level of the department discovering a *positive* relationship between the share of immigrants and level of support for the *Front National*. The fact that studies focusing on a smaller unit of analysis found a negative relationship whereas those focusing on a larger unit of analysis found a positive relationship suggests that Contact Theory and Realistic Conflict Theory operate at different levels of aggregation, however in the literature a comparison of the relationship between immigrants and extreme-right support at both levels is lacking. Contact Theory is based on personal connections established through immediate contact and interaction, therefore operating at a much lower level of aggregation. Realistic Conflict Theory on the other hand does not require immediate contact with immigrants and can be transmitted through other channels such as the media. Because the media projects images of 'foreign invasions' and high unemployment across the country, natives do not need to interact with immigrants on a day-to-day basis in order to perceive them as a source of competition. In an interview of the inhabitants of Abbeville in the department of the Somme, the French newspaper *Libération* emphasized the irrelevance of physical contact with foreigners for ethnic competition. 'In this town there is no immigration, no one who comes to eat the bread or benefits of the French, and no one who prays to Allah in the streets', said reporter Pascale Nivelle, 'but one of the inhabitants' main concerns is immigration, manifested by a 30% turnout for the *Front National*' (Nivelle, *Libération*, 2011). Although Abbeville has no experience of immigration, its inhabitants are heavily influenced by the debate on immigration in the media and the exposure of the *Front National* on television has made it more acceptable to vote for the extreme-right. 'Little by little, the discourse of Marine Le Pen has become entrenched', reported one of the inhabitants, 'in Abbeville everyone is already convinced that foreigners should be kept out and no one is afraid of saying it out loud' (Nivelle, *Libération*, 2011). As illustrated by the case of Abbeville, Realistic Conflict Theory does not require immediate contact with immigrants and therefore operates at a higher level of aggregation.

The contradictory results found in the literature might also stem from the selection effects caused by residential choices. Xenophobic voters living in urban neighbourhoods where there are many immigrants may choose to move out to semi-urban and rural neighbourhoods that are more homogenous. The exodus of natives to surrounding municipalities creates a halo of extreme-right support around the more diversely populated urban centre. From the perspective of the department, the relationship between immigrants and extreme-right support remains positive because although the xenophobic voters have relocated from one commune to the next, they remain within the same department. However from the perspective of the commune, the relationship becomes negative because the natives have relocated to surrounding municipalities where there are fewer immigrants. Perrineau (1989) has dubbed this phenomenon the 'halo effect'. Selection effects are not only limited to the residential choices of natives, but also apply to the residential choices of immigrants. An immigrant's decision as to where to settle is influenced by the presence of racial or cultural prejudices. It is unlikely that a foreigner would choose to settle in a neighbourhood with a high degree of anti-immigrant sentiment since it would be more difficult to find a job or housing (Halla *et al.*, 2012). In conclusion, because of the selection effects caused by residential choices, and because Contact Theory operates at a smaller level of aggregation, we can expect to find a *negative* relationship between the share of immigrants and the electoral success of the *Front National* at the level of commune **(H1)**. On the other hand, because Realistic Conflict Theory operates at a greater level of aggregation we can expect to find a *positive* relationship between the share of immigrants and the electoral success of the *Front National* at the level of the department **(H2)**.

Alongside immigration, unemployment is another contextual factor of extreme-right support. Jackman and Volpert (1996) examined the conditions that influenced the success of extreme-right parties from 1970-1990. Their analyses indicated that higher rates of unemployment provided a favourable environment for these political movements. However, Jackman and Volpert treated unemployment and immigration as two separate factors, when in fact there is a strong link between the two. According to Realistic Conflict Theory, employment is one of the resources in-groups and out-groups compete for. If jobs are scarce in a neighbourhood where there are many immigrants, then natives might come to the conclusion that immigrants are 'stealing their jobs'. The connection between unemployment and immigration is often made by extreme-right parties in their electoral strategies. The *Front National* in France, the *Republikaners* in Germany and the Freedom

Party in Austria have all been particularly vocal in linking the number of immigrants in their respective countries to the number of unemployed. For example, Jean-Marie Le Pen used the slogan 'two million immigrants are the cause of two million French people out of work' during the 1984 European elections in France (Mitra, 1988). These slogans seem to be explicit appeals to voters who fear that their material well-being is threatened by the influx of foreigners. Although there is little empirical evidence to support the claim that immigration causes unemployment,[2] the electoral success of extreme-right parties does not require that immigration actually causes unemployment, only that people believe that it does (Golder, 2003). Building on Jackman and Volpert's work, Golder (2003) investigated the link between immigration and unemployment by adding an interaction term. He found that the effect of unemployment on extreme-right parties is conditional on the level of immigration. Unemployment only increases the vote-share of these parties when there are large numbers of foreigners in the country. Based on the strong link between both factors highlighted by Golder, we can expect that the level of support for the *Front National* is greater when the presence of immigrants coincides with high unemployment **(H3)**.

A new geography of the *Front National* vote

By focusing on contextual factors such as immigrants and unemployment, the literature on the *Front National* gives the impression that the party is an 'urban phenomenon' rooted in cities where both factors are intertwined, but there is indication that the vote is declining in urban strongholds and expanding to rural departments. In his analysis of the 1984 European elections, Perrineau (1989) was the first to suggest a strong correlation between urbanization, the proportion of immigrants in a community, and the success of the *Front National*. Comparing the party to the former Poujadist movement which achieved its highest scores in France's rural western provinces,[3] he argued that the new extreme-right vote 'expresses the hardships of living in an urban and modern society hard-struck by crisis' (Mayer and Perrineau, 1989: 44). Perrineau concluded that the *Front National* was strongest in large metropolitan centres with a significant immigrant population. Several years later, DeClair (1999) reaffirmed the party's location in urban settings:

---

[2] Studies by Borjas (1994) and Altonji & Card (1991) indicate the immigration does not have an effect on wages or unemployment. Although most of this research has been conducted in the USA, similar studies in European countries by Hunt (1992) and Pischke & Velling (1994) have reached the same conclusions.
[3] The Poujadist Movement, named after its leader Pierre Poujade (b. 1920 – d. 2003), was an extreme-right coalition born in 1956 that was opposed to industrialization, urbanization and American-style modernization, which were perceived as a threat to the identity of rural France.

'Rural France and the long western coastline have not yet become enamoured by the party's political rhetoric. Areas of high population density, suffering from the social ills of economic dislocation, declining industrial capacity, unemployment and the insecurity that comes with the anomie of everyday urban life find solace in the *Front's* parallel messages of anger and hope' (DeClair, 1999: 179).

Contrary to the depiction of the *Front National* as an 'urban phenomenon' in the literature, recent headlines suggest that the vote is declining in urban strongholds despite a blossoming national average (TFI, 2012). In the big cities of southeast France the vote stagnated and the party remained in 2nd or 3rd place. For example in Nice, which has a large community of Pied-Noirs supporters (repatriated Frenchmen who lived in Algeria before independence), the score fell from 29.12% (1995) to 23% (2002) and in Marseille Le Pen dropped from 2nd to 3rd place. In 2012 Marine Le Pen fared the worst in Paris: whereas in 1988 the *Front National* received below 10% in 18 departments, today Paris is the only department where the party claims less than 10%. In communes on the outskirts of Paris such as Clichy-sous-Bois, Grigny and Villiers-le-Bel, where the 2005 riots were started and where one would assume there is a strong relationship between immigrants and extreme-right support, the vote declined by 5-10% (Lamy, 2012).

Anticipating a decline in urban strongholds, Ravenel *et al.* (2004) created a geographic model to test at what distance from a city the level of support was the strongest. They selected 42 cities with more than 200,000 inhabitants and constructed halos around them. Whereas in 1995 the highest scores were concentrated between 15-30 km away from the city centre, in 2002 they were between 30-50 km away and in 2004 they were 30-60 km away. Ravenel *et al.*'s experiment suggests that the *Front National* is moving further away from urban centres and beginning to take root in the countryside. During the 2012 presidential elections, Marine Le Pen gained many new supporters in rural areas previously untouched by the *Front National*, especially in the western part of the country. The vote skyrocketed in departments such as l'Orne, la Loire-Atlantique, les Côtes d'Armor, l'Ardèche, la Haute-Garonne, la Nièvre, la Saône et Loire, le Limousin and la Dordogne. La Dordogne is particularly illustrative of the growing presence of Le Pen in the countryside: whereas in the 2008 municipal elections the towns in this area awarded the *Front National*

with less than 10% of the vote, today the party receives more than 25%. La Dordogne, like many of the other rural departments which have recently joined the party's ranks is not only one of the safest places in France but also has a very small number of foreigners – around 17,000 of which 6,400 are British followed by Portuguese (Lamy, 2012). Based on this mutation of the geography of the vote, I expect that the level of support for *Front National* is higher in rural communes than in urban communes **(H4)**.

In the second part of my analysis, I will investigate the new geography of the *Front National* vote by suggesting that it is a result of: 1) The agricultural crisis; 2) the growing divide between rural and urban spaces; and 3) the cut-backs on public services. Drawing from Social Disintegration Theory, I will argue that these three factors have contributed to a widespread feeling of exclusion from national progress and development in rural areas, creating a more favourable environment for the extreme-right vote. In doing so, I hope to challenge the existing literature's narrow focus on immigration and unemployment as contextual factors for the vote. Some of the earlier work on Social Disintegration was carried out by Arendt (1951) and Bendix (1952). The main assumption of this tradition was that fascism exists and will continue to be successful in societies with little or declining integration. Modernization, industrialisation and urbanization lead to the destruction of social bonds and disengagement with social institutions. This process, referred to by Kornhauser (1950) as 'social atomisation', can also result from an economic crisis. During a crisis there is a declining interest in politics because people become disappointed with existing political parties. 'Socially disintegrated people' are defined as those who are totally isolated from any traditional social support system (Falter, 1991). Arendt and Bendix investigated the connections between disintegration and voting for the National Socialist German Workers' Party in the 1930s and found that the electorate was not typified by any social characteristics but consisted solely of disintegrated individuals out of all strata of society. Similarly, Falter and Klein (1994) found that victims of fast changes are not limited to one socio-economic category but can be found among all classes and groups in society. One reason why disintegrated individuals vote for the extreme-right, is that their longing for 'good old times' coincides with the party's appeal to nostalgia. Another reason is the notion of 'substitute forms of integration' (Werts, 2010). Social Identification Theory tells us that people search for a positive self-identity. Individuals without social participation and social contacts cannot develop a positive attitude toward themselves because they do not receive confirmation from other people. They are forced to find alternative solutions in order to get

rid of their negative self-image and obtain a positive self-identity. This search for a positive self-image makes people vulnerable to manipulation through, among others, symbols and leaders, both of which are typical features of extreme-right parties (Kornhauser, 1960).

The first factor contributing to the social disintegration of rural communes is the agricultural crisis. Over the past 30 years the number of individual farms was halved and the average size of these farms was reduced from 190 to 100 acres. In 2007 the agricultural sector of the economy employed only 6.2% of the working population compared to 12% in 1980. The 2008 financial crisis dealt a massive blow to farmers by increasing the costs of production resulting in a 34% loss of land in 2009 (France Info, 2010). 'Because of the crisis we are losing many jobs in rural areas', said Yves Krattinger, representative for rural areas in Francois Hollande's campaign, 'parents are worried that their children will not find jobs. They do not have a positive vision of society and politics and they think the rural world is not taken into consideration' (Bekmezian, *Le Monde*, 2012). The government set out to tackle the crisis by reforming traditional agricultural modes of production known as the Politique Agricole Commune (PAC), but the regulations were psychologically and ideologically disorientating for many farmers (Ravenel *et al.*, 2004). In Crotoy, a port-town in the department of La Somme, Marine Le Pen was the inhabitants' first choice. 'The fishermen and hunters of Crotoy are fed up with the regulations on fishing, hunting and the environment so they voted for the *Front National*', said Mayor Jean-Louis Wadoux (Grandmaison, *Le* Monde, 2012). Based on individual-level surveys by IFOP and CEVIPOF, the extreme-right vote has more than doubled among farmers, rising from 13% in 1995 to 25% in 2002 (Ravenel *et al.*, 2004). In 2002 Le Pen achieved a 22% score among hunters and fishermen, compared to 10% in 1988. During the 2007 presidential elections, 40.60% of farmers agreed with Le Pen's ideas as opposed to 29.6% for all other socio-professional categories (Lamy, 2012). As a result of the disintegration caused by the agricultural crisis, I expect to find a *positive* relationship between the share of people working in the agriculture, hunting, and fishing sector of the economy and the level of support for the *Front National* **(H5)**.

The second factor contributing to the social disintegration of rural communes is the growing divide between rural and urban spaces. The concept of a new geography of social cleavages which opposes the city to the rural outskirts is gaining force in France (Ravenel *et al.*, 2004). 'There is a dialogue behind the rural-urban divide which pits the losers of globalisation against the winners', explains geographer Christophe Guilluy, 'Marine Le Pen

has seized on this dialogue and speaks to the little villages and zones of de-industrialisation that have been abandoned' (Mestre, 2012: par 7). The physical separation between rural and urban spaces is emphasized by the distance which people have to travel in order to find work. Urbanisation and the cost of living in cities have increased at an alarming rate over the past decade driving former urbanites into the countryside where the cost of living is more affordable. 'The rural underclass is not just agricultural', says Sylvain Crepon, a sociologist who specialises in the French far right, 'there are also commuters who have fled the big cities and inner suburbs because they can no longer afford to live there. Many of these people will have recently experienced living in the *banlieues* (high-immigration suburbs) and have witnessed problems of insecurity' (Schofield, 2012: par. 17). An influx of commuters can be destabilizing for the internal structures and cohesion of rural communes. For example, if they do not seek to integrate into their new surroundings they could create tensions with the local population. Bearing in mind that commuters may perceive their removal to the outskirts of the city as a form of 'exclusion from society', they could also contribute to the widespread feeling of exclusion in rural communes. Therefore, I expect to find a *positive* relationship between the share of commuters and the level of support for the *Front National* **(H6)**.

The rural-urban dialogue reinforces the dynamic of Perrineau's halo effect discussed above. Perrineau suggests that xenophobic voters leave the city in order to live in surrounding areas where there are fewer immigrants. In a similar fashion, former urbanites are forced to leave the city and settle on the outskirts where life is more affordable. In a sense, the removal of former urbanites to the outskirts complements the residential choices of xenophobic voters. Although their reasons for supporting the *Front National* may be different, they are both situated in communes *surrounding* the city. It is not just in isolated fields and pastures hard-struck by the agricultural crisis that people see the appeal of the extreme-right, but also in provincial towns and housing-estate commuter belts being built on the outskirts of the city. Therefore, I expect the level of support for the *Front National* to be higher in communes situated at the periphery of a city than those situated in the centre **(H7)**.

Finally, the social disintegration of rural communes is also a feature of the cut-backs on public services. In an attempt to counter the double onslaught of the agricultural crisis and the 2008 financial crisis, the government introduced the Révision Générale des Politiques Publiques (RGPP), a programmeme aimed at reducing expenditures in rural communes by

cutting back on public services. The RGPP has three main objectives: making sure administrations are better adapted to people's needs; valorising the work of civil servants; and reducing public services by simplifying the functions of the state, for example by combining the gendarmerie and national police. 'Rural territories have lost a lot as a result of the RGPP', continued Krattinger, 'and people in these territories feel excluded from the progress and development of public services, which are slowly receding from the countryside' (Bekmezian, *Le* Monde, 2012). People in rural communes feel the hopelessness of a life in poverty uncompensated for by the traditions and structures that would have made it bearable in the past. Shops are now in vast out-of-town zones; no one goes to church; work is a 50km drive away; and the cost of the two staples, cigarettes and petrol, has shot through the roof (Schofield, *BBC*, 2012). The *Front National* has seized on this lack of infrastructure and is speaking out against the RGPP. In Bailleul, another commune which featured a strong turn-out rate for Marine Le Pen, co-Mayor Stéphane Courtois complained, 'here the school was closed 6 years ago. Then there was the suppression of the gendarmerie. We have lost our liberty because of all these cut-backs' (Grandmaison, *Le* Monde, 2012). Due to the social disintegration caused by the cut-backs of the RGPP, I expect to find a *negative* relationship between the availability of public services and the level of support for the *Front National* **(H8)**.

Data and methods

Whereas previous contextual analyses of the relationship between immigrants and the success of the *Front National* are situated EITHER at the level of the town OR at the level of the department, I will compare the relationship at both levels. For my higher level I propose the 'départment' which is larger than the commune but smaller than the region. In France there are 96 departments of which 5 are overseas. Since the relationship between immigration and extreme-right support is probably different overseas, these 5 departments were dropped resulting in a sample of 91. For my lower level I propose the 'commune' which is the fifth and smallest administrative division in France. Communes are roughly equivalent to townships or incorporated municipalities in the United States. A commune may be a city of two million inhabitants like Paris, a town of 10,000 people, or a ten-person hamlet. In the three biggest cities (Paris, Lyon and Marseilles) the lowest administrative division is not the commune but the municipal 'arrondissement'. Ideally the arrondissements should be treated as individual observations, but unfortunately the election results do not

provide the percentage of votes for each arrondissment, treating the entire city as a single unit instead. The total sample size for communes was 36,200.

The data for the results of 2012 presidential elections (1st round) was obtained from the Ministry of Interior's website (data.gov.fr, 2013). Seeing as this data was published in early 2013, it has not yet been used in an analysis of the extreme-right vote in France. The results provide the percentage of votes cast for Marine Le Pen by commune, which I used as my dependent variable throughout the investigation. The data on the immigration status and employment activity of the inhabitants of each commune was obtained from the National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies' most recent population census (INSEE, 2009). Since 2004, INSEE produces an annual population census by means of a rolling collection method. In this rolling collection, every commune is surveyed once within a five year period which means that the numbers remain fairly constant throughout the years. Both the election results and population census were collected at the level of the commune and each commune has an individual code, making it possible to merge both datasets with Stata.

The first two independent variables created were the share of immigrants (number of immigrants ÷ total population)[4] and the rate of unemployment (number of unemployed inhabitants ÷ total active population 15 years or older).[5] In order to test H3 (the level of support for the *Front National* is greater when the presence of immigrants coincides with high unemployment) an interaction variable was created by multiplying the share of immigrants with the rate of unemployment. Because the size of the population might have an effect on the level of support for the *Front National*, a variable controlling for total population per commune was included.[6] All of the independent variables were then reproduced at the departmental level by aggregating the total number of immigrants and the total number of unemployed across all communes in a department and subsequently dividing by the total population of that department.

---

[4] INSEE defines an 'immigrant' as someone who was born abroad but resides in France which means that the second and third generations do not count as immigrants. Seeing as the majority of issues related to immigration revolve around 'integration', it would be beneficial to have data on the second and third generations, but unfortunately information on race, ethnicity and country of origin are hard to come by in France due to Republican values.

[5] In order to make the coefficients easier to interpret, all rates were converted into percentages (from 0 to 100 instead of 0 to 1), which is also the scale of measurement for the dependent variable.

[6] The variable for population was standardized around the mean since a value of '0' makes no sense.

Table 1: Description of variables

Variables	SD	Mean
Dependent		
% of votes for *Front National*	7.12%	21.35%
independent (commune)		
share of immigrants	4%	4%
rate of unemployment	4%	9%
total population	14717.9	1716.7
share of farmers	31.7	20.74
share of commuters	16%	26%
independent (department)		
share of immigrants	3%	6%
rate of unemployment	2%	11%
total population	461827	658452

The data from INSEE was also used to investigate whether there is a link between the *Front National* and the social disintegration of rural communes. For this I added variables on a) the type of commune – rural/urban; b) share of farmers; c) the share of commuters; d) the location of the commune relative to a city; and e) public services. For the first variable I incorporated INSEE's definition of an 'urban' commune as having a population of more than 2,000 people and belonging to a continuous construction zone where there is a maximum of 200 meters between every building. A 'rural' commune on the other hand does not belong to a continuous construction zone and has a population of 2,000 or less. In order to tie the spread of the *Front National* to the agricultural crisis the share of farmers was generated by dividing the number of people working in the agriculture, hunting and fishing sector of the economy by the total working population over 15 years old. The share of commuters was created by dividing the number of people who travel to a workplace outside their commune by the total working population over 15 years. Location was measured based on whether the commune belongs to a city centre, is situated at the periphery or is isolated. INSEE has singled out three types of cities: big cities (10,000 jobs or more), medium cities (5,000 – 10,000 jobs) and small cities (1,500-5,000). For practicality, I combined the medium and small cities into one category and their peripheries into one category as well. In the end there were 5 categories measuring location: 'big city centre', 'periphery of big city', 'small and medium city centre', 'periphery of small and medium city' and 'isolated' (see figure 1). Finally, the data on public services was obtained from a more recent survey carried out by INSEE in 2011. Public services in France are 'infracommunal' which means that instead of

being rooted in one commune, they are available to several communes. The infracommunal distribution of services produces a much smaller subsample of communes (1,796 as opposed to the usual 36,200). Eight dummy variables representing important day-to-day facilities typically provided by the state were generated: 'job centre', 'treasury', 'banks', 'legal services', 'security', 'funeral homes', 'post offices' and 'garages for automobiles and agricultural equipment'.[7] 'Banks' also includes ATMs. 'Legal services' is a combination of labour courts, commercial courts, courts of appeal and district courts which often do not have direct equivalents in the United States or the United Kingdom. 'Security' is both the police and gendarmerie (see table 2 for distribution of public services).

In order to compare the relationship between immigrants and support for the *Front National* in communes to the relationship in departments, both levels were integrated into a multilevel model using Stata. Multilevel modelling is the most useful method for investigating geographic variations where a smaller unit is nested within a larger one. A normal regression does not take into account the clustering of data at both levels, giving the appearance of reduced variation. By inserting the variables into a multilevel model (command 'xtmixed' in Stata) it is possible to control for the fact that communes are nested in departments, respecting the hierarchy of clustering.

---

[7] Unfortunately, some of the public services typically provided by the state, most notably education, did not feature in the survey by INSEE.

Figure 1: Location of communes

Table 2: Distribution of public services per commune

stats	jobcentre	funeral homes	banks/ ATM	garages	treasury	post office	security	legal services
mean	0.05	2.48	11.73	17.65	0.95	2.06	0.86	0.43
sd	0.43	3.04	19.83	22.33	1.53	2.65	0.92	1.14
min	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
max	20	51	259	424	15	35	14	5

Results

Using the technique of multilevel modelling, seven different models were run. Throughout the entire investigation, the total population of communes and departments was controlled for and in the analysis on social disintegration the share of immigrants and the rate of unemployment were also controlled for. Model 1 tested the relationship between the share of immigrants and the level of support for the *Front National* at the communal level only. The results reveal a negative relationship; as the share of immigrants in communes increases, the level of support for the *Front National* decreases. Population also has a negative effect on the vote. In a multilevel model we can calculate the Intraclass Correlation (ICC), or the

unexplained share of variance situated at the higher level – which in this case is the department – by dividing the variance at the departmental level by the sum of the variances at the departmental and communal levels. The ICC in Model 1 is 0.43 (43%) suggesting that department variables play an important role in determining the level of support for Le Pen in communes.

In Model 2, the departmental variable was introduced. Whereas the relationship between the share of immigrants and the percentage of votes for the *Front National* is negative in communes, the relationship is positive in departments, confirming both H1 and H2. Although the total population of communes continues to have a negative effect on the vote, the population term for departments is insignificant. When the departmental variables are introduced, the ICC remains the same which means that there are other factors besides immigrants which can help to explain the level of support for the *Front National* at the departmental level.

It is possible that unemployment has more force in explaining the vote than the share of immigrants therefore Model 3 tested the rates of unemployment in both communes and departments. Generally, there is a positive relationship between unemployment and the percentage of votes. As unemployment goes up, so does support for the extreme-right. When unemployment is introduced the *direction* of the relationship between the share of immigrants and support for the *Front National* at the communal and departmental level remains the same but the relationship in departments becomes insignificant. In this Model, the ICC drops from 43% to 39.6% which suggests that unemployment has more force in explaining cross-department variation in extreme-right voting.

In order to test H3 (the level of support for the *Front National* is greater when the presence of immigrants coincides with high unemployment), Model 4 was run with the interaction variable. Contrary to H3, the interaction of both factors *decreases* support for the *Front National* in both communes and departments. In communes the negative effect of immigrants is even stronger when there is high unemployment. In departments on the other hand, the positive effect of immigrants suddenly becomes negative when there is high unemployment, suggesting that the effect of immigrants on the vote is attenuated by the presence of unemployment.[8] In conclusion, whereas the presence of unemployment by itself

---

[8] This might be due to compositional effects whereby a large proportion of unemployed voters are also immigrants in which case the interaction term leads to fewer votes for Le Pen because immigrants are unlikely to vote for the extreme-right. Compositional effects will be discussed later on.

leads to more support for Le Pen, the presence of both factors has the opposite effect (for results to models 1-4 see table 3).

The final three models focused on the relationship between the *Front National* and the social disintegration of rural communes. Because of collinearity the variables representing the type of commune (rural/urban) and the location (centre, periphery and isolated) could not be placed in the same command therefore Model 5 was run using the former with 'urban' as a reference category and Model 6 was run using the latter with 'big city centre' as a reference category. Both 5 and 6 also included the variables on share of farmers and share of commuters. Based on Model 5, the level of support for the *Front National* is 1.68 percentage points higher in rural communes than in urban communes, which validates H4. As expected, there is a significant and positive relationship between the share of farmers and the percentage of votes for the *Front National*. However, contrary to expectation, an increase in the share of commuters leads to a decrease in support. When the variables representing the type of commune are replaced with the variables representing location, the direction of the coefficients for share of farmers and share of commuters remain the same. The communes with the least votes for Le Pen are those in 'big city centres' followed by those in 'small and medium city centres'. The communes with the most votes are those which are 'isolated' or situated at the 'periphery of a big city'. These findings support the claim that the level of support for the *Front National* is higher in communes situated at the periphery of a city than those situated in the centre.

Finally, because the survey on public services was carried out on a much smaller subsample, Model 7 focused only on public services. Four out of eight services have a negative effect on the level of support for the *Front National.* Whereas the availability of job centres, banks, legal services and security decreases the percentage of votes for Le Pen, the availability of post offices, funeral homes, garages and a treasury increases the percentage of votes for Le Pen, providing only partial support for H8 (for results to models 5-7 see table 4).

Table 3: Analysis 1 (immigration and extreme-right support)

Variables	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Dependent				
% of votes				
Independent				
share of immigrants (com)	-0.15***	-0.15***	-0.19***	-0.06 ***
share of immigrants (dep)		.12*	0.05	1.24**
Control variables				
rate of unemployment (com)			.16***	.22***
rate of unemployment (dep)			.88***	1.65***
immigrants x unemployment (com)				-.01 ***
immigrants x uenmployment (dep)				-.10**
total population std. (com)	-0.31***	-0.33***	-0.35***	-0.33***
total population std. (dep)		0.44	0.18	-0.14
Constant	21.4***	19.77***	10.21 ***	0.42
random effects parameters				
sd (_cons)	4.29	4.3	3.8	3.54
sd (_residual)	5.82	5.83	5.79	5.78
N	36,200	36,200	36,200	36,200
* p <.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001				

Table 4: Analysis 2 (Front National and social disintegration of rural communes)

Variables	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
Dependent			
% of votes			
Independent			
share of farmers	.01***	.01***	
rural	1.44***		
urban	Ref		
share of commuters	-.05***	-.05***	
big city centre		Ref	-3.60*
periphery of big city		2.34***	-1.72
medium & small city centre		1.62***	-3.60*
periphery of medium & small city		2.24***	Omitted
Isolated		2.38***	Ref
job centre			-.29**
Treasury			0.14
Banks			-0.04**
legal services			-0.69***
Security			-0.12
funeral homes			0.03
post office			0.06
garages			.03***
control variables			
share of immigrants (com)	-.14***	-.13***	-.24***
share of immigrants (dep)	0.00	0.01	.21*
rate of unemployment (com)	.20***	.2***	.49***
rate of unemployment (dep)	.88***	.89***	.87***
total population std. (com)	-.20***	-.15***	-0.16
total population std. (dep)	0.08	0.03	-0.35
Constant	9.96***	8.89***	6.65**
random effects parameters			
sd (_cons)	3.56	3.49	3.05
sd (_residual)	5.7	5.7	3.33
N	36,150	36,150	1,795
* p <.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001			

Discussion

Based on the results we cannot give precedence to either Realistic Conflict Theory or Contact Theory, instead what we see is a combination of both working at different administrative levels. At the level of the commune there is a negative relationship which

suggests that Contact Theory is at work. At the level of the department the relationship is positive which suggests that Realistic Conflict Theory is at work. Whereas Contact Theory is dependent on immediate proximity, Realistic Conflict Theory is not: living in a department with a significant immigrant population is enough reason to vote for the *Front National*. One explanation for this might be the effect of the regional media which spreads images of high immigration, unemployment, and insecurity to other towns within the same department. Another reason might be Perrineau's halo effect which posits that xenophobic natives living in high immigrant areas will move to surrounding municipalities where there are fewer immigrants, creating a network of homogenous communes within a department with a relatively diverse population. The results enable us to compare communes based on their share of immigrants, but they cannot tell us whether these communes are located *within* departments with many immigrants or within departments with few immigrants.

By dividing the share of immigrants into quartiles where the first quartile represents communes and departments with the smallest share and the fourth quartile represents those with the biggest share and subsequently running an interaction in Stata, we can compare different communes within different departments. For example, do communes with the lowest share of immigrants score higher when they are located in departments with the lowest share of immigrants or in departments with the highest share of immigrants? The interaction of the categorical variables at both levels revealed that communes with low levels of immigration are more likely to vote for the *Front National* if situated in departments with high levels of immigration (see table in appendix). This finding in is line with Perrineau's halo effect because it suggests that the dynamics which contribute to a higher percentage of votes at both the communal and departmental level are not independent of each other, but reinforce each other. The positive relationship between immigrants and support for the *Front National* in departments does not contradict the negative relationship in communes, instead it is a combination of both which leads to the highest score for Marine Le Pen. This explains why the highest scores for Le Pen come from communes with very few immigrants situated in departments with many immigrants. In a recently published article, Daniel J. Della Posta performed a similar multilevel analysis comparing communes and departments, but focusing on the 2007 presidential elections. Della Posta found similar results: the relationship was negative in communes and positive in departments. Instead of studying all 36,200 communes, he chose a random sample of 1,450 communes and ensured that each department was represented by at least two communes. The most heavily represented

department (Pas-de-Calais) featured 46 communes while the average number of sampled communes per department was 15.59. Despite selecting a much smaller sample and despite using elections that took place before the 2008 financial crisis, Della Posta's findings match the results of this investigation which suggests that the relationship between immigrants and support for the *Front National* is quite robust.

Compositional effects may provide an alternative explanation to the negative relationship between immigrants and support for the *Front National* in communes. If immigrants are allowed to vote in the presidential elections, then it is no surprise that the level of support for Le Pen is lowest in communes with many immigrants; as immigrants are unlikely to vote for the extreme-right. In order to establish whether there are any compositional effects at play, we need to know whether foreigners are allowed to vote. INSEE defines an immigrant as anyone who was born abroad, regardless of whether they have acquired citizenship which means that a substantial number of immigrants may be allowed to vote. Based on INSEE's population census, there are 43.2 million voters in France of which 8% are born abroad. Half of these 8% are French by birth and the other half have been nationalised. Of the 4% that have been nationalised, only 25% are registered to vote which means that there are 432,000 immigrants registered to vote in France. When compared to a total population of 3.7 million immigrants, this is quite small: only 11% of foreigners vote in the presidential elections (Niel and Lincot, 2012). This number is probably further reduced by the fact that not everyone who is registered to vote ends up voting. Therefore the compositional effects might be very small but in order to be conclusive, further investigation into the candidate choices and turnout rates of immigrants is necessary.

Unsurprisingly, there is a positive relationship between unemployment and support for the *Front National* at both administrative levels. However, when unemployment is interacted with the share of immigrants in Model 4, the relationship at the level of the department becomes negative. This is puzzling given the strong link between unemployment and immigrants created by the *Front National* and given the findings of Golder's (2003) article. In her contextual analysis of the relationship between foreigners and the extreme-right in France, Shvets (2004) also finds that while the share of immigrants at the departmental level bears a positive sign, the interaction term bears a negative sign. When unemployment is high people vote for Le Pen regardless of foreigners and when the share of immigrants is high people vote for Le Pen regardless of unemployment but when both factors are high together, the vote suddenly decreases. Why is it that when both factors are present in a

department, the level of support for the *Front National* decreases? On one hand it might be that the relationship between both factors is spurious: voters do not see immigrants as a source of unemployment and unemployment is not the main reason they dislike immigrants.

Realistic Conflict Theory tells us that in-groups and out-groups are in competition for resources but these resources need not be materialistic; they can also be related to culture and identity. In-groups may perceive migrants as a threat to their culture and identity which is why they vote for the *Front National* regardless the level of unemployment in their department. On the other hand we need to question whether the natives really see immigrants as a source of competition for jobs. Articles by Borjas (1994) and Altonji & Card (1991) on the economic impact of immigration suggest that because the majority of immigrants are low-skilled, only low-skilled natives perceive them as a source of competition in the labour market. In their investigation of the relationship between immigrants and the electoral success of the Austria's Freedom Party, Halla *et al.* (2012) divide immigrants into low, medium, and high-skilled categories. Whereas proximity to low-skilled foreigners encouraged Austrian voters to turn to the far right, proximity to high-skilled voters either had an insignificant or negative effect on the vote. Further contextual analysis could investigate whether the direction of the relationship between immigrants and the *Front National* is dependent on the skills of natives and foreigners. Finally, if a large proportion of immigrants are also unemployed, the negative effect of the interaction term might simply be a result of the compositional effects discussed above whereby immigrants are unlikely to vote against their own interests therefore an increase in foreigners leads to a decrease in support.

It is clear from the results that the *Front National* is not an 'urban phenomenon' but a 'rural phenomenon': population has a negative effect on the vote, rural communes are more likely to vote for Marine Le Pen than urban communes, and communes that are isolated or situated outside a city are those where the percentage of votes is the highest. Whether this is solely a feature of the social disintegration caused by 1) the agricultural crisis; 2) the growing rural-urban divide; and 3) the cut-backs on public services is uncertain. There is only partial evidence to support the social disintegration theory. The relationship between the share of farmers and support for the *Front National* is significant and positive which suggests that communes with more farmers are likely to vote for Le Pen. Contrary to the claim that commuters contribute to the widespread feeling of social exclusion in rural communes, the share of commuters actually had a negative effect on the vote. The

underlying assumption was that commuters are people who cannot afford to live in the city when they might actually be wealthier citizens in search of ample space to raise a family. Four out of eight public services had a negative effect on the vote (banks, legal services, security and job centres) providing only partial support for H8. Some of these services, such as security and job centres, may be more relevant to the extreme-right than others. Ideally, another variable measuring change in availability of services over time would provide a more effective measurement of the RGPP.

Through the use of contextual factors we can prove that communes with a high share of farmers are more likely to vote for the *Front National*, but this does not necessarily mean that farmers are more likely to vote for the extreme-right than any other socio-professional category (or else we would be committing an ecological fallacy), nor can we be conclusive about the reasons why they voted. It is possible that farmers voted for Le Pen because of immigration as well. According to Contact Theory, those who do not have any contact with foreigners are more likely to see them as a threat therefore it is no surprise that farmers living in isolated, rural pastures feel strongly against immigration. In order to truly establish a link between the *Front National* and the agricultural crisis, the contextual factors need to be substantiated by individual-level data or by qualitative evidence. The comments and interviews on <france-ruralité.fr>, a website created by the *Front National* in 2013 as a forum for people concerned by the agricultural crisis, provide such evidence. The website's homepage is covered with slogans such as: 'Frenchmen do not forget your farmers and fishermen', 'proud to work and live in the countryside', and 'with Marine Le Pen we will restore our farms' (france-ruralité.fr, homepage, 2013). In a filmed interview of several farmers from the department of Finistère in Brittany, one farmer complained, 'we work 120 hours a week and make only 500 Euros a month, today we are fed up and no longer want to partake in a system where the number of suicides on farms is on average two a day' (France-ruralité.fr, video, 2013). In response to a video of Marine Le Pen's speech on the agricultural crisis in Chateauroux, one commentator wrote, 'thank you for your speech. I live in a small village in Ardèche where life is not easy. The rural areas are abandoned and at the mercy of big cities [...] during the summer people from the cities invade our countryside and leave their waste behind. They destroy our fences and look down upon us in snobbery' (Frontnational.com, video, 2012). By incorporating these comments into an investigation of the *Front National*'s spread to rural areas, we can be more conclusive about the reasons why people living in the countryside are voting for Marine Le Pen.

The results on location provide strong evidence of a halo effect. Communes situated at the periphery of a city are more likely to vote for Le Pen than communes in the city centre. One reason for this might be the selection effects caused by residential choices. According to Perrineau's halo effect, xenophobic voters move out to surrounding municipalities where there are fewer immigrants. Another possible reason is the increasing rate of urbanisation which pushes former urbanites out to more affordable neighbourhoods. In order to further investigate the city-periphery dynamic, information on the individual arrondissements of Paris, Lyon and Marseille is necessary. The differences in ethnic composition and wealth between the neighbourhoods of these three cities are vast, therefore treating the entire city as a single unit gives an impression of reduced variation.

Finally, given the important role of the media in advertising the success of the *Front National*, a variable measuring exposure to media could be beneficial. Anti-immigrant rhetoric transmitted by the media can increase hostility to foreigners among people who have no contact with them, as demonstrated by the interviews of the inhabitants of Abbeville. Powerful headlines can exaggerate the importance of issues such as immigration by evoking images of an 'immigrant invasion'. Television programmemes generate feelings of deprivation by transmitting images of wealthy neighbourhoods to people living in poorer areas. Surveys by the Conseil Supérieur de l'Audiovisuel (CSA) demonstrate that people living in rural and semi-urban areas have greater exposure to the media than the rest of the population. In 2003, TF1 was the channel most French people trusted. 55% of people living in rural areas said they trusted TF1, compared to only 42% in urban areas. Similarly, 27% of people in rural areas said they trusted the channel France3, compared to only 21% in urban areas (CSA, 2003). Based on these figures it seems that people in the countryside subscribe more to the media than people in urban areas suggesting that the media might be one of the factors contributing to the spread of the *Front National* in rural communes (Ravenel *et al.*, 2004).

Conclusion

The findings of this investigation challenge the assumption that the relationship between immigration and extreme-right support is either a result of Realistic Conflict Theory or a result of Contact Theory. In the case of France, it seems to be a combination of both working at different levels of aggregation that leads to the greatest support for the Front National. There are also elements of a halo effect whereby the selection effects caused by

the residential choices of immigrants and natives create a ring of extreme-right support around a city centre. In a second analysis, this investigation has expanded on the literature about the Front National by suggesting that there are contextual factors other than immigration and unemployment which help to explain the vote. Using the 2012 presidential elections, I have shown that rural communes are more likely to vote for the extreme-right right than urban communes. The appeal of the Front National in rural communes was linked to: 1) the agricultural crisis; 2) the rural-urban divide; and 3) the cut-backs on public services. While there is partial evidence to support these factors, in order to be more conclusive about the reasons why people in rural communes are voting for Le Pen, further investigation should incorporate individual-level data. Individual-level data can tell us about the socio-economic background of the voters and the issues that motivate them to vote for the extreme-right, thereby reducing the potential for ecological fallacy. Multilevel modelling is typically performed with two levels: the individual and the context. What I propose instead is a three-tiered model integrating the individual, the immediate context (commune) and the larger context (department). As this investigation has demonstrated the explanation for the vote lies not only between individuals and their immediate surroundings but also between individuals and their more distant surroundings.

Appendix

Interaction Model (communes within departments)

communes x departments	Coef.
communes in 1st quartile	
x 1st quartile dep.	Ref
x 2nd quartile dep.	2.24
x 3rd quartile dep.	1.27
x 4th quartile dep.	2.4*
communes in 2nd quartile	
x 1st quartile dep.	-0.19
x 2nd quartile dep.	-0.35
x 3rd quartile dep.	0.01
x 4th quartile dep.	0.76*
communes in 3rd quartile	
x 1st quartile dep.	0.14
x 2nd quartile dep.	-1.21***
x 3rd quartile dep.	-0.81**
x 4th quartile dep.	-0.06
communes in 4th quartile	
x 1st quartile dep.	-0.31
x 2nd quartile dep.	-1.42***
x 3rd quartile dep.	-0.77*
x 4th quartile dep.	-0.71*
total population com.	-0.35***
total population dep.	0.4
Constant	19.61***
* p <.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001	

References

ALLPORT, G. W. (1954) *The Nature of Prejudice*, Cambridge, Mass: Addison-Wesley.

ALTONJI, J. and CARD, D. (1991) 'The effects of immigration on the labor market outcomes of less-skilled natives', in (eds.) Abowd, J. and Freeman, R., *Immigration, Trade and the Labor Market*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

ARENDT, H. (1951) *The origins of totalitarianism*, New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc.

BEKMEZIAN, H. and LÉCHENET, A. (2012) 'Pourquoi le FN progresse en milieu rural', *Le Monde*, May 5.

BENDIX, R. (1952) 'Social stratification and political power', *American Political Science Review*, 46(2):357-375.

BORJAS, G. (1994) 'The Economics of Immigration', *Journal of Economic Literature*, 32:1667-1717.

CAMPBELL, D.T. (1965) *Ethnocentric and Other Altruistic Motives*, Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press.

CSA (2003) 'Les Français et les Médias' (survey) available from: <http://www.csa-fr.com/fr/s26/nos-sondages-publies.aspx> (published 4 February 2003, accessed May 12).

DATA.GOV.fr (2012) 'Résultats de l'élection présidentielle 2012, tour 1, par commune' (online) available from: <http://www.data.gouv.fr/DataSet/572126?xtmc=resultats+des+elections+ presidentielles+par+commune+2012&xtcr=1> (published 19 March 2013, accessed 30 March).

DeCLAIR, E.G. (1999) *Politics on the Fringe: the people, policies, and organisation of the French Front National*, Durham, NC; London: Duke University Press.

DELLA POSTA, D. J. (2013) 'Competitive Threat, Intergroup Conflict, or Both? Immigration and the Dynamics of *Front National* voting in France', *Social Forces*, 91(4):1-25.

FALTER, J.W. (1991) *Hitler's Wähler*, München: Beck.

FALTER, J.W. and KLEIN, M. (1994) *Wer wählt Rechts? Die Wähler und Anhänger rechtsextremistischer Parteien im vereinigten Deutschland*, München: Beck.

FRANCE INFO (2010) 'l'Agriculture Française: un secteur en crise', February 25 (online) available from: < http://www.franceinfo.fr/fonds-documentaire-encadre-2010-02-25-l-agriculture-francaise-un-secteur-en-crise-410195-74-141.html> (accessed May 12).

FRANCE-RURALITÉ.fr (2013) Homepage (online) available from: <http://france-ruralite.fr/> (accessed May 12).

__(2013) 'En Bretagne, Marine Le Pen dénonce le scandale des suicides dans l'Agriculture' (video) available from: <http://france-ruralite.fr/1474/en-bretagne-marine-le-pen-denonce-le-scandale-des-suicides-dans-lagriculture/> (accessed May 12).

FRONTNATIONAL.com (2012) 'Discours de Marine Le Pen a Chateauroux' (video) available from: <http://www.frontnational.com/videos/discours-de-marine-le-pen-a-cha%CC%82teauroux/> (uploaded 26 February 2012, accessed May 12).

GOLDER, M. (2003) 'Explaining Variation in the Success of Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe', *Comparative Political Studies*, 36(4):432-466.

GRANDMAISON, E. and BÉAL, J. (2012) 'Un vote « FN des champs » s'invite dans l'Orne et en baie de Somme', *Le Monde*, April 24.

HALLA, M., WAGNER, A.F., and ZWEIMULLER, J. (2012) 'Does Immigration into their Neighbourhoods Incline Voters Toward the Extreme-Right? The Case of the Freedom Party of Austria', CEPR Discussion Papers 9102.

HUNT, J. (1992) 'The impact of the 1962 repatriates from Algeria on the French labor market', *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*, 42:556-572.

INSEE (2009) 'French Population Census' (online) available from: < http://www.insee.fr/en/bases-de-donnees/default.asp?page=recensements.htm> (accessed March 30).

IPSOS (2007) '1ier Tour Presidentielle 2007 : Comprendre le vote des Français', available from : <http://www.ipsos.fr/ipsos-public-affairs/sondages/1er-tour-presidentielle-2007> (published 23 April 2012, accessed 10 April 2013).

JACKMAN, R.W. and VOLPERT, K. (1996) 'Conditions Favouring Parties of the Extreme Right in Western Europe', *British Journal of Political Science*, 26:501–521.

KORNHAUSER, W. (1960) *The Politics of Mass Society*, London: The Free Press.

LAMY, P. (2012) 'Le vote Front National du 22 avril 2012: premières analyses', *Ligue des Droits de l'Homme*, May 20.

LUBBERS, M. and SCHEEPERS, P. (2002) 'French *Front National* Voting: a micro and macro perspective', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 25(1):120-149.

MAYER, N. (1987) 'De Passy à Barbès : Deux visages du vote Le Pen à Paris', *Revue Française de Science Politique*, 37:891-906.

MCLAREN, L. (2003) 'Anti-Immigrant Prejudice in Europe: contact, threat perception, and preferences for the exclusion of migrants', *Social Forces*, 81(3):909-936.

MESTRE, A. (2012) 'Mme Le Pen recueille les fruits des efforts qu'elle a faits en direction des zones rurales', *Le Monde*, April 24.

MITRA, S. (1988) 'The National Front in France – a single-issue movement?', *West European Politics*, 11(2):47-64.

MUDDE, C. (1999) 'The Single-Issue Party Thesis: extreme-right parties and the immigration issue', *West European Politics*, 22(3):182-197.

NIEL, X. and LINCOT, L. (2012) 'L'inscription et la participation électorales en 2012: qui est inscrit et qui vote ?' INSEE.

NIVELLE, P. (2011) 'Abbeville une cité à Front découvert', *Libération*, January 9.

PETTIGREW, T., CHRIST, O., WAGNER, U., and STELLMACHER, J. (2007) 'Direct and Indirect Intergroup Contact Effects on Prejudice: a normative interpretation', *International Journal of Intercultural Relations*, 31:411-425.

PERRINEAU, P. and MAYER, N. (1989) *Le Front National à Découvert*, Paris : Presses de la Fondation nationale des sciences politiques.

PISCHKE, J.S. and VELLING, J. (1994) 'Wage and employment effects of immigration in Germany: An analysis based on local markets', unpublished manuscript, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

RAVENEL, L., BULEON, P. and FOURQUET, J. (2004) 'Le grand péri-urbain, nouvelles terres de progression du vote Le Pen', *Association Française de Science Politique*, September 17.

REY, H. and ROY, J. (1986) 'Quelques réflexions sur l'évolution électorale d'un département de la banlieue parisienne', *Hérodote*, 43:6-38.

SCHOFIELD, H. (2012) 'What's Next for Marine Le Pen?', *BBC News*, April 24.

SHVETS, Y. (2004) 'Immigration Politics in France: the effect of foreigners on electoral results', Senior Thesis, Department of Politics, New York University.

TF1 (2012) 'À Nice, le FN grignote du terrain', April 23 (online) available from: <http://videos.tf1.fr/jt-20h/a-nice-le-fn-grignote-du-terrain-7187355.html>.

WALCHUK, A. (2011) 'Immigration and the Extreme Right: an analysis of recent voting trends in Western Europe', *Inquiry*, 21:24-33.

WERTS, H. (2010) 'Euro-scepticism and extreme-right voting behavior in Europe, 2002-2008', Master Thesis, Radboud University Nijmegen.

WILLIAMS, R. M. (1947) *The Reduction of Intergroup Tensions: a survey of research on problems of ethnic, racial and religious group relations*, New York City: Social Science Research council.