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**How to understand the
outcomes of migration policy?
A study of the return agreement
between Norway and Ethiopia**

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Abstract

In analyses of migration policy outcomes, existing theoretical approaches focus on explaining whether or not migration policies realise their intended effects. Through an in-depth analysis of the bilateral return agreement between Norway and Ethiopia, this paper explores a different avenue for analysing migration policy. By exploring the context of the agreement, this paper discusses what constitutes the diverse effects and outcome of the policy. While focusing on changes in public discourse on migration and changes in the two countries' bilateral relationship, this paper concludes that research on migration policy would benefit from extending its scope of analysis to include other societal effects since these can be as significant as the effect of numerical changes in migration flows. The inclusion of policy effects and the bargaining power of Ethiopia in the analysis, further demonstrates the importance of including the sending state perspective in order to reach more detailed and fruitful research on migration policy and migration policy outcomes.

Keywords: migration policy, policy effects, return migration, Ethiopia, Norway

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Introduction

In January 2012, representatives of Norway and Ethiopia signed a Memorandum of Understanding, where the Ethiopian state agreed to accept both voluntary and forced return of Ethiopian nationals residing irregularly in Norway. After having sought a return agreement for twenty years, the Memorandum (MoU) was regarded as an achievement by the Norwegian government. It allowed the return of more than 700 Ethiopians whose asylum applications had been rejected, and was presented as a mile-stone in the Norwegian government's work to increase the number of bilateral agreements on return (Carlsen et.al 2012 and Ekeli 2012). In the aftermath of the signing, the agreement received massive media attention and sparked controversy. The possibility that returnees could suffer from human rights violations upon their return to Ethiopia was high on the agenda for many civil society organisations. Although the agreement was intended to be effectuated upon signing, the implementation of the new policy on return has been slow. The overall outcome of the policy has been presented positively by the ruling coalition in Norway, whilst being questioned in the media and by political opponents (Anon 2013a and MJPS 2012a) (Informant 10, 18.04.2013).

As the saying goes, 'after a storm comes a calm' and since the beginning of 2013 there has been less controversy surrounding the return agreement. The question on how to regard the outcomes of the new policy has nonetheless remained unanswered. The diversity of effects and the bilateral dimension of the agreement make it an interesting case to analyse. In previous literature on migration policy there is a lack of empirical research on the effects of specific policy change, and most studies assess how migration policies affect migration flows (Czaika and de Haas 2011). While seeking to contribute to fill this gap, this paper will discuss how the outcome of one particular policy can be understood in a variety of ways.

While there is a growing conviction among policy-makers that migration policies do not produce the generally desired outcomes (Jandl 2007), the academic discourse offers two rather dichotomous views on the effectiveness of policies. On the one hand, several academics agree with the hypothesis that migration policies remain inefficient attempts to control human movement (Bhagwati 2003, Castles 2004b, Cornelius 2004, Düvell 2005, Huntington 2010, Jandl 2007, Rudolph 2006, Shanks 2001). Others question the empirical premises of the argument, and highlight that the 'migration crisis' is exaggerated, and that states are in control of migration flows (Brochmann and Hammar 1999, Brubaker 1994,

Freeman 1994 and Zolberg 1999). As some have argued, it may be time to clarify the debate, and consider new conceptual and methodological approaches to understand and measure the role of migration policies (Czaika and de Haas 2011). While examining the outcome of the MoU on return, this paper seeks to complement existing research on migration policies by challenging current approaches of assessing policies' effectiveness. Through an assessment of the diverse effects of the policy, it aims to bring new insights to the discourse on how to analyse migration policy outcomes.

By considering a sending state perspective within the analysis, this paper seeks to broaden the scope of research on migration policy. Most existing scholarly work is focused on the experiences of the receiving states and largely ignores the role and experiences of sending states (Paoletti 2011 and Reslow 2012). The inclusion of the Ethiopian state perspective in this study exemplifies their necessity to obtain a more comprehensive and informed assessment of the outcomes of migration policy.

In order to understand the outcomes of the return agreement between Norway and Ethiopia, this paper will centre around three questions: First, what are the effects of the policy on return? Second, what is the political context of the policy? And third, how may the different states perceive the outcomes of the policy differently? The next section presents the theoretical framework by discussing the definitions of 'effects' versus 'effectiveness' in policy analyses, providing insights to the importance of including sending states' perspectives, and elaborating the methodology of the study. The content of the return agreement is then presented, examining its effect on migration flows, and the changes it brought about in the public discourse on migration. The paper will thereafter examine the domestic contexts and the bilateral relationship as a backdrop for the agreement. Based on this, it will elaborate on how a consideration of the relation between the political context and the policy effects can improve our understanding of the states' different perceptions of the policy outcome. Finally, the last section discusses the findings of the research and concludes.

How to approach an analysis of migration policy?

To analyse migration policy, it is important to assess how multiple actors affect the making of policies, and how migration policy issues relate and overlap with other policy areas. While critically reviewing theories on migration policy, Boswell (2007) demonstrates that migration policies are shaped by a configuration of interests, ideas and institutions. There are several stakeholders who may have different interests in new migration policies, and

these interests may influence policymakers in different ways (Facchini and Mayda 2008, and Freeman 2006). When analysing migration policies, it can therefore be difficult to identify the diverse interests and intentions that different actors may have. As observed by several scholars, it is also important to acknowledge that few policies can be considered in isolation. Policies concerning trade, international investment, national security, foreign aid and migration, and foreign policy all interact with each other (Berthélemy, Beuran and Maurel 2009). Hence, migration policies are made by a multitude of actors with diverging interests and agendas crossing several policy areas (Geiger and Pécoud 2010).

Due to this complex web of actors, research on migration policy becomes a correspondingly complicated affair. This might be one of the reasons that current policy analyses have focused on the receiving states' successfulness in reaching their officially stated aims of regulating immigration. One may, however, question whether such analyses leave out features that are important to include when examining migration policy outcomes. The significance of including sending state perspectives has been highlighted by many, but included in few analyses of migration policies (Reslow 2012). While seeking to fill this gap, this dissertation will include an Ethiopian state perspective, and acknowledge it as one of the key actors involved in the process of policy-making and implementation. Additionally, if the focus of policy analyses is centred on the officially stated aims of regulating immigration, the analyses risk ignoring both the existence of 'hidden' aims that do not appear in the discourse, and unintended consequences that may be part of the policy outcome. This indicates how important the analytical framework is when examining migration policy outcomes, seeing that the findings of the analysis itself will depend on the chosen analytical approach.

These two aspects, the importance of choosing an appropriate analytical framework and the importance of including sending states' perspectives, are central parts of this dissertation's approach to understand migration policy outcomes. The two subsequent sections will therefore elaborate on the value of choosing an appropriate analytical framework when examining migration policy outcomes, and the significance of including sending states' perspectives in migration policy analyses.

The 'effects' versus the 'effectiveness' of migration policy

Studies of migration policies frequently use the term 'effectiveness' to describe the successfulness of policies (see for instance: Brochmann and Hammar 1999, and Ghosh

2000). Yet, what is actually meant by the term itself is rarely defined (see for instance: Castles 2004, Hatton 2004, Hatton 2011, Neumayer 2004, Thielemann 2004 and Thieleman 2006). Quantitative studies often use the term to assess whether or not immigration control policies have led to a significant decrease in immigrant numbers (Hatton 2011 and Thielemann 2004), and the term has been applied as an opposition to 'policy failure', i.e. when a policy do not reach its goal of decreasing immigration flows (Castles 2004a and Castles 2004b).

In 1994, Cornelius and Hollifield developed the 'gap hypothesis'. They theorised that 'significant and persistent gaps exist between official migration policies and actual policy outcomes' (1994:4). Several scholars have supported the hypothesis and are critical to liberal democratic states' ability to manage migration (see for instance: Bhagwati 2003, Castles 2004b, Düvell 2005, Huntington 2010, Jandl 2007, Rudolph 2006 and Shanks 2001). Others have questioned the premises of the argument and reasoned that, on a whole, states are in control of their borders and most migration policies have been effective (see for instance: Brocman and Hammar 1999, Brubaker 1994, Freeman 1994 and Zolberg 1999).

It has been suggested that a part of this dispute can be attributed to the confusion around the different meanings attached to 'effectiveness' (Czaika and de Haas 2011). According to the Oxford Dictionary of English, effectiveness can be explained as '[...] the degree to which something is successful in producing a desired result' (Stevenson 2010). The keywords to observe here are the 'degree to which', and 'desired result'. When creating and implementing migration policies, there is often a range of various actors with different interests involved. In order to examine if the *desired* results of the policy are met, one would have to know all the different stakeholders' different interests and intentions within the policy. This poses a challenge to migration policy researches since it is likely that such information is hard to obtain. In addition, although most policies have officially stated aims, one cannot exclude the possibility that there are other underlying intentions not meant for the eyes of the public, and it would arguably prove even trickier for researchers to get insights to all actors' underlying and/or unofficial goals.

The other challenge presented by the lexical description of the term concerns how to measure the 'degree' to which the desired result is produced. Such a measurement leaves much space for individual judgement since there is no common standard of how to measure the extent of effectiveness. In addition to the challenge of recognising all the various

stakeholders' different intentions, the consideration of the degree to which these objectives are met, will depend on the subjective view of the analyser.

Although migration policies aim to influence migration flows, they may have additional effects that do not only affect the flows per se. Hence, through an analysis of effectiveness, the researcher is restricted to examine the degree to which the produced effects are in accordance with the recognised stakeholders' recognised intentions to influence migration flows. Although this is a valuable form of analysis, it might be beneficial to alter the frame of reference and also include analyses of effects that were not included in the policy objectives.

The Oxford Dictionary of English explains effect as 'a change which is a result or consequence of an action or other cause' (Stevenson 2010). This definition does not refer to any aims, and the floor is open to examine unintended effects. It is nonetheless a problematic term. Since an effect has to be the result of something, causality must be proven, and it may be difficult to ensure that a particular change is the outcome of a particular policy change. Although this will remain a challenge, one can wonder if an analysis of effects is more valuable than one of effectiveness.

Through an analysis of effects, the researcher can reflect on the broader occurrences in the aftermath of a policy change, and the evaluation is not limited to regard effects in the form of changes in the migration *flow*. If a policy change leads to civil disorder, for example a demonstration, the demonstration should be seen as an effect, a part of the overall outcome of the policy. Such an unanticipated effect may influence different actors' perceptions of the outcome of the policy. Although a policy has been effective in reaching intended results, unanticipated effects may affect the overall outcome of the policy change. Additionally, in instances of bilateral cooperation on migration regulation, each state may have intentions that span over several policy areas, not only in relation to migration. Hence they may have different experiences of the effectiveness and/or the unanticipated effects, and different opinions about the outcome of the policy.

This paper argues that such 'alternative' effects of migration policies must be seen as a part of the overall outcome of a policy change. If the purpose of policy analyses is to improve our understanding of migration policies, it is important not to overlook noteworthy effects that might impact the perceptions of the outcome of the policy. With the aim of undertaking an informed analysis of the outcome of migration policy, the MoU between Norway and Ethiopia will be analysed through an examination of its effects. By

effects it refers to any changes that are seen as a result of the policy, including changes in migration flows and changes in the society in general.

The power of the sending state

In literature on migration policies the focus has largely been on the highly developed destination countries in Europe and North America (Collyer 2009 and Hamilton 1997). The discourse has been dominated by the view that the highly developed states persuade developing states to induce control measures to hinder emigration and take responsibility to host and repatriate migrants (Gibney 2004). States in the global South, and in North Africa in particular, are allegedly pressured by European states to adopt migration policies favourable to Europe (Rodier 2006). As such, migration policies have been regarded as reflecting North-South disparities, leaving migrant-sending states as powerless actors (Brown 2001). Even though the focus on sending states has remained in the periphery of scholarship on migration policy, their power should not be overlooked. Sending states have demonstrated interests in affecting migration, and are capable of using the receiving states' wish to control migration as a way to advance their own agendas (Hamilton 1997 and Paoletti 2010).

Although often ignored, arguments concerning the favourable negotiating position of migrant sending states are not new (Hamilton 1997). Research has been conducted where both sender and receiver states' positions have been analysed. Yet, such research has mainly covered the relationships among a handful of states, especially those between Italy and Libya, Morocco and Spain, and Mexico and the USA (See e.g. Briscoe 2004, Carling 2007, de Haas 2008, Paoletti 2010 and Serra et al. 2005). Such collaboration on migration is often interlinked with a range of other political issues, both within foreign policy and at the domestic agenda (Rosenblum 2007). In several cases, both origin and destination countries have used migration policy as a tool to influence the behaviour of their counterpart in relation to other political issues (Paoletti 2010).

In order to understand policy outcomes, it is therefore necessary to consider the context specific backdrop that stimulates the sending states to collaborate on migration regulation (Reslow 2012). Such aspects can be of specific interest when examining outcomes of return policies. Since return migration is perceived as 'notoriously difficult to enforce' (de Haas 2008:1314), it can be argued that it is in the power of the origin state to accept returned migrants (Carling 2011) and thus control the effectuation of the return. In an

international arena where South-North migration is high on the agenda, migrant sending states have increased their bargaining power, and have greater opportunity to affect international negotiation (Ellerman 2008 and Gillespie 2002).

Methodological choices

In order to conduct an informed study, information has been sought through four methods of data collection: a literature review, document analysis, semi-structured interviews, and quantitative data obtained from secondary sources. An extensive literature review was conducted to recognise the different debates within the migration policy discourse, and to fully grasp shortcomings in previous work on the topic. To obtain further information on the selected case and the making of the bilateral return policy, both official documents and documents 'off the record' from the Norwegian Governments archive have been included in the analysis.

The most important prerequisite to understand the outcome of the policy change has been to gather information on the various perceptions of the agreement. To obtain insiders' perspectives, eleven interviews were conducted with four categories of informants within the study's target population: state representatives participating in the process of negotiating and policy making; institutional agencies involved with the effectuation and implementation of the policy; civil society actors engaged with the Ethiopians subjected to return; and academics with expert knowledge of Ethiopian politics as well as intimate knowledge of the return agreement. Since the relatively small target population were likely to know of each other, and thereby know who would have relevant knowledge of the agreement, the informants were reached through snowball sampling. The interviews were conducted from January-May 2013, and due to geographical distances, six of these interviews were done by telephone. The other five were conducted face-to-face at informants' offices in Oslo.

The information provided by informants was diverse, and each actor's understanding and thoughts were biased in accordance with his or her unique frame of reference and/or political agenda. This influenced the reliability and validity of the information, which is accounted for when the informants' insights and viewpoints are mentioned in the analysis. The informants' opinions cannot be used to generalise views of the group they represent, but the information is nonetheless important to establish a general understanding of the diverse experiences of, and opinions on, the return agreement and its effects. A list of informants and further details of the interviews is provided in Appendix I.

Unfortunately, the scope of this research has not allowed for the collection of empirical data reflecting the positioning of the Ethiopian state from its own narrative. This is unfortunate, since it makes it difficult to reach an informed understanding of the effects of the policy in Ethiopia. The information collected from academic experts on the topic has nonetheless been valuable as it provides an, however limited, insight into some of the aspects of the Ethiopian state's relation to the specific agreement, its effects and the countries' bilateral relationship.

It is important to mention the use of quantitative data since it forms the basis of the discussion on the changes in migration flows. Although this paper is a qualitative piece of research, quantitative data from a number of databases has been included in order to reflect on the numerical effects stemming from the policy change. The usage of such data must be carefully considered; the different databases have used various strategies for data collection and different assumptions may be tied to their categorical definitions (e.g. asylum seeker). Although this must be taken into account, the variations in the datasets will not be scrutinised since the information only is used in an exploratory manner.

The bilateral agreement on return

On 26 January 2012 Norwegian and Ethiopian state officials signed a Memorandum of Understanding on the return of rejected asylum seekers. The agreement states its objective to 'lay down the basis for a closely coordinated, phased, dignified and humane process of assisted return of Ethiopian nationals in Norway with respect primarily to voluntary return and the importance of safe and dignified return and sustainable reintegration' (Anon 2012a). Norwegian authorities have also officially stated that they aim to protect the asylum institution through the return of Ethiopians residing irregularly in Norway (MJPS 2012b) (Informant 10, 18.04.2013). Another objective is to decrease asylum applications from Ethiopia to Norway by signalling that Norway is a restrictive state, and not a safe haven for all Ethiopians. While it has been possible until now to stay in Norway without a residence permit, Ethiopians are now subject to deportation if their asylum applications are rejected (Informant 2, 25.03.2013 and informant 10, 18.04.2013). The Ethiopian government has not stated any official objectives.

The obligation of the Ethiopian state per the agreement is to issue travel documents to the returnees who do not hold any, and administer a reintegration programme through the Ethiopian government institution 'the Administration of Refugees and Returnees Affairs'

(ARRA) (Anon 2012a). The content of the reintegration programme is to offer individual counselling and reintegration support such as help to find a job, support to set up a business, or support regarding training courses and other education (Anon 2012a). Norway is solely responsible for the financial costs of the programme, a requirement set forth by the Ethiopian government (Informant 11, 16.05.2013). In addition to a financial contribution to ARRA of NOK 26 000 (£3,000) for each returnee, the programme provides individual financial assistance to the returnees (Anon 2013b) (Informant 11, 16.05.2013). Those who return voluntarily to Ethiopia will receive NOK 15 000 (£1,750) in cash upon return, and ARRA will provide financial support of up to NOK 30 000 (£3,500) at a later point distributed as part of the services provided through the reintegration programme (Anon 2012a). In addition to the travel costs, Norway has a total expenditure of NOK 71 000 (£8,250) for each returnee. It is very unusual for Norway to play such a great financial role in the resettlement of returnees (Informant 10, 18.04.2013).

In mid-May 2013, ARRA's reintegration project was yet to be set up (Informant 11, 16.04.2013). In July 2012 a temporary agreement was made enabling IOM to provide reintegration support in the place of ARRA. This support was based on cash grants, instead of reintegration assistance and job finding (Anon 2012b) (Informant 4, 03.04.2013). Although this agreement was originally intended as a short-term emergency solution (Informant 8, 15.04.2013), it continues functioning one and a half year after the return agreement was made. On 16 May 2013, ARRA established an office to administer the reintegration programme, and the reintegration programme was to be launched 'during this week' (Informant 11, 16.05.2013). This was however, the same message given during an interview in the first week of April (Informant 4, 03.04.2013), and is therefore no guarantee that reintegration of returnees as per the agreement will commence.

At the same time as the agreement was officialised, the Norwegian government announced that all Ethiopians residing illegally in Norway would be offered the possibility to return voluntarily and receive reintegration support if they did so before 15 March 2012. Those who did not apply for voluntary return by that date would be subject to deportation assisted by the police without receiving reintegration support (MJPS 2012b and Strømman 2012). The police had not received any responses or identification documents from the Ethiopian government by 15 March however, and consequently could not start the process of deportation (Heir 2012).

At the time of writing this paper, there has not been any further process in relation to deportation (Informant 10, 22.05.2013). Although the exact reason for the standstill has not been officially confirmed, it has been clearly expressed that the Ethiopian government is unwilling to distribute identification documents. Since these documents are vital to perform deportations, the commencement of deportation solely depends on the action taken by the Ethiopian government (Informant 10, 22.05.2013). Norwegian authorities did not expect such delays with the deportations (Informant 8, 15.04.2013 and informant 10, 18.04.2013), and it seems clear that the cooperation has halted due to the Ethiopian government's lack of interest in deportations.

It is a challenging task to assess which occurrences are direct effects of the new policy. It is therefore important to explain why particular occurrences can be categorised as effects of the policy change. Due to the diverse nature of effects, they are divided in two sets: the first concerning changes in migration flows in the aftermath of the MoU; and the second societal changes, such as the substantial public critique the MoU has encountered.

Changes in migration flows

Through the agreement with Ethiopia, the Norwegian government aimed to increase the outflow of returnees and decrease the inflow of asylum seekers. In the proposed State Budget for 2013, the Ministry of Justice reported that the return agreement had had its anticipated effects. They noted that it had affected 'both asylum arrivals and the number who choose assisted voluntary return'. They further reported: 'after the agreement with Ethiopia was signed, the asylum numbers from Ethiopia decreased' (MJPS 2012a). However, analysis of the migration flows between Norway and Ethiopia, brings this statement into question.


Regarding the number of returns to Ethiopia, it is accurate to say that several persons chose voluntary return after the agreement was signed. While there were between 12 and 35 yearly returns prior to the agreement, there were 54 in 2012. Even though it was a major increase, the number of 54 returnees is subtle compared to the expected outcome of more than 700 if deportations had been carried out as planned. Regarding the monthly numbers of return over time, it appears there was an instant surge in returns in the first months after the agreement was made, however so far in 2013 there has been a decrease in monthly returns to pre-2012 levels (PU Statistical Database 2013 and UDI Statistical Database, personal communication, 2013a). These findings indicate that Norwegian

authorities had poor foundations for highlighting an increase in return due to the signing of the return agreement.

The Ministry of Justice reported that the number of asylum applications from Ethiopia decreased after the signing of the return agreement. By examining the monthly changes in numbers of arrivals since 2007, a sharp drop in March 2012 can be observed, and may be attributed to the immediate signal effect of the new policy. When including the yearly changes in arrivals over the last four years however, the drop is less obvious. Since 2009 the number of Ethiopian asylum seekers to Norway has steadily decreased (UDI Statistical Database 2013b). It is unclear whether the decrease in 2012 should be attributed to the policy's signal effect, or regarded as a part of an overall trend of declining numbers.

To understand the importance of the return policy on overall numbers of Ethiopian asylum seekers to Norway, the trend in asylum applications to Norway can be seen in relation to the trend in Ethiopian asylum applications worldwide (Figure 1). Although data on worldwide applications is only available until 2011, it is interesting to compare the two datasets. One can argue that there are some similarities between the two trends seeing that there was a steadily increase in application in 2005-2009, and then a drop in numbers in 2009-2010. This might support the idea that the context in the country of origin is more likely to affect asylum trends than certain policy changes in the receiving countries. Although numbers decreased in the aftermath of the signing of the MoU, it is questionable if causality between the policy change and the change in asylum numbers can be proven.

Figure 1 (UDI Statistical Database 2013b and UNHCR Statistical Online Population Database 2013)




While examining the effects of migration policy on migration flows, it is important to be aware of potential changes in the direction as well as the volume of such flows (Brekke 2009 and de Haas 2011). In the case of Ethiopian asylum seekers intending to migrate to Norway, the policy change may have impacted their choice of destination, and it is therefore interesting to examine the possibility of 'spill-over' effects in Norway's neighbouring country Sweden. The reason the Sweden is chosen in this comparison is that previous research has revealed that migration policies in one of these two countries may affect the number of arrivals in both. A recent example was when Sweden introduced a return agreement with Iraq in 2008; the number of asylum applications from Iraq to Sweden plummeted, while the numbers to Norway simultaneously increased (Brekke and Aarseth 2009).

The flow of Ethiopian asylum seekers is lower in Sweden compared to Norway, but the pattern of arrivals in Sweden is comparable to the pattern of arrivals in Norway (Figure 2) (Statistics Sweden 2013). The main difference is that while the numbers began decreasing in

Norway in 2009, they continued to increase in Sweden. This increase intensified in 2012, and for the first time the number of arrivals was higher in Sweden than in Norway, with 339 arrivals in Sweden compared to 185 in Norway. Although no causality can be established in this comparison, one cannot exclude the possibility that the policy change in Norway affected the number of arrivals in Sweden.

Figure 2 (Statistics Sweden 2013 and UDI Statistical Database 2013b)



An assessment of numerical changes is most appropriate if done retrospectively, and the relatively short time span since the return agreement was signed makes it difficult to draw conclusions on the relationship between the numerical changes and the policy. However, this exploratory analysis implies that some changes are more linked to the policy change than others. In the aftermath of the agreement, no Ethiopians have been deported as a part of the agreement, while there has been an upsurge in the number of people who return voluntarily. It is nevertheless difficult to assess whether this trend will continue as the rise has begun to flatten in 2013. It has further been observed that the number of asylum arrivals

from Ethiopia decreased after January 2012. The number of arrivals was very low during the spring of 2012, which could support the theory that a country's image affects the asylum seekers choice of destination (Brekke 2004). While regarding the longer trend of asylum applications however, it is evident that the flow of Ethiopian asylum seekers has declined since 2009, both to Norway and globally. It is therefore unclear whether the decrease can be attributed to the new policy, as has been done by Norwegian authorities.

Societal changes: Public discourse and diaspora reactions

Immediately after the return agreement was officialised, there was much publicity concerning the dubious human rights situation the returnees would face in Ethiopia. Numerous humanitarian organisations and asylum interest groups in Norway promptly criticised the new return agreement. Through open letters, meetings with the Ministry of Justice, and numerous publications in major newspapers, several organisations expressed their concerns regarding the agreement. The main argumentation in the critique has been the risk of surveillance, persecution, imprisonment and torture, in addition to the absence of measures to ensure the safety of the returnees in the agreement document (NOAS 2012a).

Individual and political voices also entered the quickly evolving public debate. In local newspapers across Norway, smaller villages demanded protection for their 'own asylum seeker' (Rogne 2013). The return agreement also gained international attention, and in a letter addressed to the Norwegian government on 23 March 2012, the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants in The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) expressed concerns about the agreement, especially in relation to the safety and reintegration of the returned nationals (Crépeau 2012).

The collection of critical expressions created a large public debate on return. The civil society reactions to the agreement have mostly consisted of distrustful notions and queries, and the responses provided by Norwegian authorities have not been satisfactory for the critical opponents. The Ministry of Justice has in overall replied in a very general sense without going into detailed debates about the lacks and consequences of the policy, and the topic of return has become dominant in debates about asylum and immigration (Faremo 2012).

As a response to the return agreement, a group of 340 Ethiopians collectively filed a lawsuit against the Norwegian State in early April 2012. Through a representative action they accused the state of having made invalid decisions regarding their lack of protection-

needs upon return to Ethiopia (*Ethiopians v. Norway* [2012] LB-2012-135549). The Ethiopians demanded preliminary injunction, and prohibition of deportation until the case had been decided, but the District Court rapidly rejected the lawsuit on the grounds that the requirements for representative action were not present. The accusers appealed the decision to the Court of Appeal, but the court upheld the District Court's decision and dismissed the case (*Ethiopians v. Norway* [2012] LB-2012-135549). The accusers, who rose to more than 600 Ethiopians, appealed to the Supreme Court that finally refused to hear the case on the grounds that it did not have enough interest in principle beyond the matter itself.

At the time of writing [17 May 2013], the group of Ethiopians was in the process of applying to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) (Informant 7, 10.04.2013). Although the lawsuit has been unsuccessful in Norway, it is clear that the existence of the case has affected the Ethiopians' situation. As argued by an advisor at NOAS, who is involved with the group of Ethiopians, the lawsuit must be seen as a major setback for the Ethiopians. Although he believed that several of the Ethiopians do have real causes to receive protection in Norway, he underlined that the case harms the Ethiopians since it only keeps them 'lingering' in the same situation (Informant 9, 17.04.2013). An additional consequence of the lawsuit mentioned by several informants is that it has divided the diaspora. Either you are part of the group that contests return, or you are against them. This may have made the situation worse for those who considered voluntary return, since a decision to leave voluntarily can be regarded as a betrayal of those who remain (Informant 1, 04.03.2013, informant 5, 09.04.2013 and informant 9, 17.04.2013).

The lawsuit highlights the Ethiopians' experiences of the policy change and thereby demonstrates how migration policy can affect migrants' actions in different ways. The lawsuit as an effect can also be related to the Norwegian state's repute. While it in Norway only received a few notions in the international media, one might expect more attention surrounding the case if the lawsuit is accepted by the ECHR. If the final case decision should be in favour of the accusers, international condemnation may harm Norway's international reputation.

The sets of effects examined hitherto, demonstrate how the overall outcome of a policy can include various effects, both in terms of changes in migration flows and changes in the society. Not restricting analysis to the policy's intended effect on migration flows, other consequences have been revealed. These effects are important in shaping different actors'

perceptions of the policy outcome, and might again affect the future evolution of the policy implementation and future return agreements. The effects examined must not, however, be seen as the only effects of the agreement since numerous effects may have been overlooked in this examination. This is particularly relevant in relation to the lack of viewpoints from Ethiopian authorities, a shortage that have led to the omission of possible effects within Ethiopian politics and society. The assessment of the abovementioned effects has nonetheless been valuable since it signifies that the migration policy has brought about a diversity of changes.

Policy outcomes in relation to the political context

To understand the overall outcomes of the policy, the examination of the effects should be related to an assessment of the policy's contextual backdrop, namely the domestic political contexts, and Norway and Ethiopia's bilateral relationship. This section examines both countries' political positioning on return, and the historical evolution of the bilateral relationship. This will result in a consideration of how the political context affected the evolution of the policy, and how the policy in turn may affect the countries' bilateral relationship.

The domestic political situations

Upon signing the return agreement, the ruling centre-left coalition in Norway announced that they were 'very happy' with the new agreement, believing it an important step in their efforts to strengthen the asylum institution (MJPS 2012b). In the aftermath of the media uproar however, few voices from the coalition have commented. The critique of the centre-left coalition's choice to sign a return agreement with Ethiopia, has possibly affected the Norwegian political environment.

From a political perspective, the return agreement with Ethiopia should be related to broader political debates in recent years. In the run-up to the 2009 elections, the centre-left government introduced several new measures to reduce the arrival of asylum seekers (The Norwegian Ministry of Labour 2008). The shift towards stricter policies has been attributed to the coalition's desire to demonstrate their ability to control the cumulating inflow of asylum seekers (Yttervoll 2011). Despite these restrictive measures, the centre-left coalition is frequently framed as having too liberal immigration policies, and the right-winged parties dominate the debates on immigration (Hornburg 2012). During 2012, the public debate on

asylum reached new heights and, as state representatives and experts in the field mentioned, the return agreement was thus highly politically motivated (Informant 2, 25.03.2013, informant 3, 01.04.2013 and informant 6, 08.04.2013). Given the political circumstances, the new policy can be seen as the coalition's effort to 'flex its muscles' on asylum issues ahead of the national elections in September 2013 (Informant 2, 25.03.2013). If the government's political goal was to increase the public confidence in its ability to control immigration however, it has not necessarily succeeded. Since no Ethiopians have been deported, the centre-left government has, if anything, only demonstrated a flaw in their system of asylum regulation.

Norwegian efforts to negotiate a return agreement with Ethiopia began in the early 1990s, and Ethiopia remained reluctant until 2012 (Informant 10, 18.04.2013). To understand why Ethiopian authorities recognised the agreement in 2012, one must understand why their prior resistance. There may be numerous reasons, however there is an apparent belief that the importance of remittances constitutes one of the main motivations.

In recent decades, state level diaspora engagement policies have increasingly been used to capitalise on resources that emigrants offer their countries of origin (Levitt 2001). The Ethiopian government has followed this international trend, and their diaspora engagement policies are regarded as some of the most progressive in Sub-Saharan Africa (Kuschminder 2010). According to the First Secretary at the embassy in Addis Ababa and one of the Norwegian actors in the negotiations over return, Ethiopia's lack of interest in a return agreement should be linked to the remittance flow from Norway (Informant 8, 15.04.2013 and informant 10, 18.04.2013). The Secretary underlined that Ethiopians were presumed to be more profitable if they resided in Norway, and the government did not see any gain in resettling returnees who did not want to be there (Informant 8, 15.04.2013).

It is unlikely that remittances remain the sole reason for the Ethiopian government's lack of interest in return, especially when considering the relatively small size of the Ethiopian population in Norway. Although it was underlined that nothing could be officially affirmed, the Norwegian state official partaking in the negotiations, reasoned that the political environment in Ethiopia also affected the government's actions. Since forced return is unpopular among the Ethiopian population, the government risked losing political leverage if they accepted an agreement on forced return with any country (Informant 10, 22.05.2013). As mentioned by an advisor at the UDI, Ethiopian government officials considered

withdrawing from the agreement a few months after the signing unless the media uproar regarding return calmed (Informant 2, 25.03.2013). The government possibly sought to avoid attention regarding return because they risk domestic political disapproval if deportation becomes a topic of discussion in Ethiopia.

Another possible political reason for the Ethiopian government's disinterest in forced return is their position in the bilateral relationship with Norway. Since the Norwegian state has become increasingly interested in return over a long period of time, this has strengthened Ethiopia's position. By demonstrating disinterest in cooperation on return, migration has become a bargaining chip for Ethiopia. If this is the case, the issue of return may have affected the bilateral power dynamics, and as long as Ethiopia did not cooperate on return, it could keep the Norwegian state on a tight leash. Although it is difficult to verify whether the lack of the Ethiopian government's interest has been due to economic or political factors, both must be considered as part of the reason. It therefore becomes interesting to study their change of direction in January 2012. In order to understand why Ethiopia then chose to sign a return agreement with Norway, this paper will turn to the broader context of the bilateral relationship between the countries.

The bilateral relationship as a backdrop for the agreement

In 1995 the relationship between Norway and Ethiopia was strengthened by the first bilateral agreement, the bilateral interactions since is shown in Figure 3. Norway's first presence in Ethiopia was through Norwegian missionary organisations in the 1950s, and throughout the first decades the bilateral interaction centred on aid and state funded development projects (Jakobsen 2006, Simensen 2003 and Sørli 2009). During the Derg regime from 1974 to 1991, Norway did not have any official contact with Ethiopian authorities, but indirectly supported the opposition in Ethiopia, the Tigrayan People's Liberation Front (TPLF), through the work of the Emergency Relief-Desk. When president Mengistu finally fled the country in 1991, the military forces of the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) seized control in Addis Ababa. Since the TPLF constituted the heart of the EPRDF, Norway had indirectly supported the EPRDF both morally and materially when they seized power (Sørli 2009).

Figure 3

Timeline of the Norwegian-Ethiopian bilateral relationship	
1995	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• The Norwegian Royal Embassy established in Addis Ababa• First agreement on bilateral cooperation
1996	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Norway makes Ethiopia a priority partner on cooperation
1998-2002	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Halt in bilateral cooperation and Norwegian development aid due to the Eritrean-Ethiopian war
2005	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Norway concerned about Ethiopian political development• Restrictions in Norwegian development cooperation
2007	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Norway condemns the Ethiopian invasion in Somalia• Norway initiates peace negotiations between Ethiopia and Eritrea• Ethiopia requests Norway to withdraw six diplomats• Norway withdraws NOK 25 million in development aid
2008	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Norway gives NOK 25 million in humanitarian aid due to drought• Ethiopia formally lifts the restrictions• Bilateral relations are 'normalised'
2009	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Negotiations on a return agreement resumed
2011	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Air Services Agreement• Climate partnership between Ethiopia, Great Britain and Norway; Norway will support Ethiopia with up to NOK 360 million annually
2012	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Agreement on return of rejected asylum seekers• Agreement on stronger cooperation and closer bilateral ties

As Norway had supported Ethiopia for many years, the newly established government invited Norway to establish an embassy in Ethiopia in 1995, and the first bilateral agreement on cooperation was made between the two countries within a year (Jakobsen 2006). In 1996, Norway declared Ethiopia to be one of Norway's priority partners, and the Norwegian state aimed to contribute to Ethiopia's own poverty reduction strategy. The bilateral relationship grew stronger during these years.

In protest to the Eritrean-Ethiopian war in 1998-2002, Norway halted all its bilateral relations with Ethiopia, including the Norwegian funded development aid (The Norwegian

Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2001). Business did not continue as usual after the war, and Norway became a strong voice in criticising the humanitarian situation in Ethiopia. The requirements for bilateral aid were rephrased to focus more on peace, democracy and human rights, and the Norwegian government changed Ethiopia's status as a priority partner (The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2002). In the aftermath of the 2005 elections, Ethiopia was internationally criticised for democratic flaws and human rights violations. During this period Norway continued to condemn the Ethiopian regime, and was a stern critic of the Ethiopian intervention in Somalia, something that again challenged the bilateral relationship between Ethiopia and Norway (Sørli 2009).

When Norway initiated peace negotiations between Ethiopia and Eritrea during a United Nations conference in 2007, the Ethiopian government feared Norwegian involvement in the relationship could harm its own position, and requested Norway withdraw six diplomats from its Embassy. This diplomatic crisis strongly deteriorated the countries' bilateral relationship (Sørli 2009), and Norway responded by cutting NOK 25 million (£290,700) of its bilateral aid (Anon 2007). The weakened relationship did not serve either party well, and efforts were made to normalise the relationship. The Ethiopian government formally lifted the restrictions in 2008, but the ties between the two states remained weakened (Sørli 2009).

In the aftermath of these crises, Norwegian authorities have softened their criticism of the Ethiopian government (Informant 3, 01.04.2013 and informant 6, 08.04.2013). An article written in March 2012 exemplifies Norway's softened approach towards Ethiopia, as the minister of International Development underscored Ethiopia's 'tremendous success in recent years', that they had 'come a long way in achieving [some] UN Millennium Development Goal[s]', and that Ethiopia truly was 'an African success story' (Solheim 2012). In 2011, Ethiopia and Norway signed two new agreements; an Air Services Agreement between Ethiopia and the Scandinavian countries in October 2011, and a Climate Partnership between Ethiopia, Norway and Great Britain in December 2012 (Anon 2011a, and Anon 2011b). Where the Air Services agreement was an agreement with the main purpose of establishing scheduled air services between the territories, the Climate Partnership involved greater contribution from Norway to financially support Ethiopia with up to NOK 360 million (£42 million) annually (Fadnes, personal communication, 19.04.2013).

The bilateral relationship's evolution over the last decade is likely to have affected negotiations on return. According to Norwegian state officials, Norway intensified its effort to establish the return agreement when the countries' relationship was re-established in 2009 (Informant 7, 10.04.2013 and informant 8, 15.04.2013). In May 2012, four months after the agreement on return, an additional agreement on 'bilateral political consultation' was formed. This agreement unites all aspects of the bilateral development cooperation, and it promotes stronger cooperation and closer bilateral ties (The Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2012 and The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2012). The return agreement can be seen as one aspect in an overarching process of re-strengthening of bilateral relations. In addition to the specific intentions with the agreement itself, it becomes clear that the MoU on return is interlinked with other issues within the bilateral relationship.

Bilateral repercussions?

Given the complex relationship between Ethiopia and Norway just described, the outcome of the MoU must be considered in light of the evolution of the bilateral relationship. According to state officials of both countries, bilateral ties were strengthened in 2012 (Holmås 2012 and The Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2012). The Ethiopian minister of Foreign Affairs, Hailemariam, has particularly expressed satisfaction with the progress in bilateral relations. During the Norwegian Minister of International Development's visit to Ethiopia in May 2012, Hailemariam underlined the importance of Norway's decision to 'double its development cooperation with Ethiopia and its intention to double it again in the coming years' (The Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2012).

This 'doubling' of development cooperation is the result of the climate partnership signed in December 2011. While including the financial assistance Norway will provide to Ethiopia through this initiative, the total of annual bilateral aid has nearly tripled compared to previous years (Fadnes, personal communication, 14.04.2013). During the period from 2000 to 2011, the total of development aid from Norway to Ethiopia has ranged in between NOK 146.5 million and NOK 268.2 million (£17 million - £31 million) (Norad 2012). When including the financial support provided through the climate partnership, the total of aid in future years will conceivably amount to more than NOK 500 million (£58 million).

The increase in aid can be regarded as a significant act by the Norway and the conclusion that there is a link between the increased aid and the signing of the return agreement has been drawn by many critical voices. This criticism has been related to the

deteriorating human rights situation in Ethiopia, and it has consequently been questioned how Norway can justify an increase in financial support, while other countries decrease their aid (Anon 2012c, Brandvold 2012 and Wright and Zachrisen 2013).

The Norwegian authorities' first response to these accusations was that there was no link between the increased aid and the sudden agreement in the negotiations on return. However, during UDI's conference on return in April 2013, the Minister of Justice, Grete Faremo, stated that the ministry 'explores how aid and development policies can be used to strengthen the efforts regarding return' (Faremo 2013). This statement was uttered in relation to the challenge of cooperation on return with those countries that do not feel obliged to their international legal duty of accepting their own nationals, which has been the case with Ethiopia.

Returning to the literature on the power of the sending state, similarities can be observed between the Norwegian-Ethiopian agreement, and bilateral agreements between Spain and Morocco, and Italy and Libya. It is not in the intention of this paper to make comparative analyses of these examples, but it is nonetheless interesting to use these examples to point out the power of Ethiopia in relation to its negotiations with Norway. As elaborated, migrant-sending states are capable of using the destination countries' wish to control migration as a way to advance their own agenda (Paoletti 2010). In the case of Morocco, it has been highlighted that Morocco received \$390 million from Spain after committing to readmit Sub-Saharan migrants from Spanish territory (Briscoe 2004 and Carling 2007). Whereas in the Libyan-Italian case, Libya aimed at regaining international respectability through the establishment of close bilateral ties with Italy (Paoletti 2010). In the case of Ethiopia, the country has suffered from international condemnation and a decrease in international aid since the 2005 elections. Therefore it is possible, the government is interested in improving its international reputation, and augment the level of foreign investment and aid.

When the Norwegian government intensified its efforts to negotiate return, this may have provided Ethiopia with greater negotiating power on other issues; possibly the financial aspects to be included in the climate partnership. It is difficult to draw conclusions about the extent to which other matters were brought into the discussion surrounding the return agreement. The only actuality that can be established is that after years of decreasing aid and negotiations on return, the MoU was made within six weeks of promises to double aid.

A short time after these agreements were finalised, the abovementioned agreement on Bilateral Political Consultation was signed. In regard to the Ethiopian political context and the government's current lack of international respect, such an agreement can prove to be very valuable. As highlighted by the former First Secretary at the Embassy in Addis Ababa, 'this form of agreements gives Ethiopia recognition as an important regional actor' (Informant 8, 15.04.2013). In this regard the agreement provides Ethiopia with improved international respectability, which can be seen as sorely needed for a government internationally deemed as an 'authoritarian regime' (Aalen and Tronvoll 2009).

Conclusions

To understand the outcomes of migration policy, researchers should examine both intended and unintended effects while including both receiving and sending states' intentions and perceptions of such effects. This study has looked beyond an analysis of the extent to which the receiving state's objective of affecting migration flows has been met, as tends to be the focus of current migration policy analyses.

Through an examination of how the return agreement has led to changes in flows and other societal changes, other outcomes of the migration policy have been revealed. By assessing the contextual backdrop of the agreement from the perspective of Norway and Ethiopia, it has been illustrated how the sender and the receiver states' authorities have different objectives for the same policy, and thus different perceptions of its outcomes.

This paper has demonstrated that the return agreement between Norway and Ethiopia has had a range of effects. Some of which related to the stated objectives of the policy, while others must be seen as unintended consequences. In relation to the official intention of forced return, none of the expected 700 irregular Ethiopians have been deported as part of the agreement. The Ethiopian government remains unwilling to provide identification documents, consequently halting the deportation process. There has been an increase in the number of voluntary returnees, but the reintegration programme has not yet been effectuated. At the time of writing, no returnees have participated in any reintegration activities in Ethiopia, but have been supported financially by receiving cash-installments upon return. With regards to new asylum arrivals, it is uncertain if the policy has led to a decrease in Ethiopian arrivals. Although there was an instant plunge in early 2012, the monthly numbers of arrivals have since assumed pre-2012 levels. It seems more likely that

the general trend of decreasing numbers is dependent on other factors (e.g. the political and humanitarian situation in Ethiopia) than the policy on return.

The return agreement has had two major societal effects; a significant media upheaval that spurred the public discourse on asylum in Norway, and a lawsuit in which more than 600 Ethiopians sued the Norwegian state for violating their rights. This has led to strong criticism of Norway's perceived hypocrisy. When Norwegian authorities changed their rhetoric and pursued a stronger bilateral relationship with Ethiopia, they finally accomplished the goal of signing a return agreement. As many have argued however, this happened at the expense of Ethiopians seeking protection in Norway. Although the policy was initially an attempt to regain political support, it may turn out to be a political loss for the ruling coalition. Additionally, while aiming to 'strengthen the asylum institution', it may be argued that the strength of the institution has been undermined through the absence of any desirable policy effects.

While viewing the outcomes of the MoU in relation to the Norwegian authorities' officially stated intentions, the long stated aim of signing a return agreement with Ethiopia has finally been accomplished. This can be seen as an important symbolic contribution in making the Norwegian government appear as being in control. Indeed, in migration literature it has previously been argued that the main aim of many migration policies is to make a country appear 'tough' on migration (Massey et al. 1998). The signalling effect of migration policies however, is related to the real policies being implemented, and the policy is different in practice to what was initially intended. This is particularly the case in relation to deportation, which was a main objective of the Norwegian government.

From the Ethiopian perspective, it becomes especially important to see the policy outcomes in the context of the bilateral relationship. While Ethiopia was initially uninterested in a return agreement, Norway's interest gave Ethiopia bargaining power on other issues. After being criticised by the Norwegian government and receiving decreased aid since the early 2000s, Ethiopia will now receive double the aid from Norway. Norwegian authorities have frequently highlighted the Ethiopian economic development and the state as "an African success story". These changes must be seen as positive for the Ethiopian government, which after years of international condemnation is likely to be interested in increased aid and renewed international recognition.

As Ethiopia has still not provided identification documents of those Ethiopians subject to deportation, there have only been voluntary, and relatively few, returns. The large majority

of the Ethiopians subjected to deportation are still in Norway, and the size of the remittance sending diaspora has not been largely affected. Ethiopian politicians may have been criticised for accepting returnees, however, as long as deportations are not carried out the government does not risk domestic political condemnation. In a similar vein, the lack of deportations seems to give the Ethiopian government strong diplomatic clout. This demonstrates the ambiguity within which Ethiopia, as a sending state, operates, and by fully collaborating, Ethiopia risks losing diplomatic power.

The agreement and the bilateral relationship must also be seen as interconnected, and the MoU may have led to repercussions with other bilateral agreements. Although both countries have succeeded in re-strengthening the weakened ties that stemmed from the diplomatic crisis in 2007, the future evolution of the relationship is likely to depend on Ethiopia fulfilling its obligations. As expressed by several state officials, the Norwegian government is not content with the current situation, seeing that it is profoundly dependent on Ethiopia to effectuate deportation.

Given only a short time has passed since the MoU was signed, any analysis on the long-term outcomes of the policy change is impossible. It has nonetheless been valuable to conduct this analysis and studying this specific case has shed new light on the debate on how to analyse migration policy outcomes. It has demonstrated that it is vital to include both receiving and sending states' perspectives when assessing policy outcomes.

Nevertheless, the complex nature of migration policy makes it a correspondingly complicated affair to understand policy outcomes. The field of analysis is highly multifaceted, and one may question the achievability of assessing *all* the various effects, and *all* the various actors' perspectives. In this regard, the value of analyses of policy effectiveness must not be ignored. By examining receiving states' successfulness in affecting immigration flows, migration research can contribute to improve those states' policy and goal achievement.

This raises the question what role academic research should play when analysing migration policy outcomes. It is well recognised that the relationship between academia and politics presents a challenge for scholars seeking to strike the balance between achieving understanding, and making a difference (Van Hear 1998). This paper argued that migration policy should aim to do both, and contribute to making a difference *through* achieving understanding. By broadening the scope of migration policy analyses, research will increase our understanding of different aspects of the policies' outcomes, and such knowledge becomes the most powerful tool for improving future policy-making.

This study has moved beyond the conventional analytical framework for examining migration policy outcomes by approaching the policy through an assessment of the multifaceted effects, beyond the effects on migration alone, and by including receiving *and* sending states' perspectives. There are numerous unexplored approaches to understand policy, and migration research would profit from broadening its current scope of analysis. The viewpoints on how to approach an analysis of migration policy presented in this study complement the existing research on migration policy, and it is hoped that the perspectives brought up will add a further dimension to the understanding of migration policy outcomes.

Appendix

List of informants and details of interviews

NR	ORGANISATION/ INSTITUTION	FUNCTION	DATE OF INTERVIEW
1	The Development Fund	Project Coordinator Migration and Development	04.03.2013
2	The Norwegian Directorate of Immigration	Advisory position	25.03.2013
3	Christian Michelsen Institute	Senior Researcher	01.04.2013
4	International Organisation for Migration	Information Assistant	03.04.2013
5	Institute for Social Research	Senior Researcher	09.04.2013
6	International Law and Policy Institute	Senior Partner and Researcher	08.04.2013
7	Endresen, Brygfjeld and Torall Law Firm	Lawyer	10.04.2013
8	Royal Norwegian Embassy Addis Ababa, Ethiopia	First Secretary of Embassy	15.04.2013
9	Norwegian Organisation for Asylum Seekers	Advisor	17.04.2013
10	Ministry of Justice and Public Security	Senior Advisor	18.04.2013 and 22.05.2013
11	The Norwegian Directorate of Immigration	Head of the Return and Reintegration Unit	16.05.2013

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