The controllability of
difference: social solidarity
and immigrant integration

Ellie Vasta

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Abstract

This paper is concerned with the relationship between solidarity and difference in European countries of immigration. Public and policy discourses on immigration and ethnic diversity in Europe have undergone substantial changes in recent years, revealing a shift away from the pluralist and multicultural approaches of the 1970s and 1980s. The new emphasis is on social cohesion and integration into mainstream social and cultural practices, as exemplified by a desire for listing 'core values', 'integration contracts' and citizenship tests. In order to understand the social processes underlying these changes, the article examines some major societal transformations – the techno-science revolution, the re-organization of work, and the process of individualization - that have occurred in Europe over the past half century. These changes have had contradictory effects, highlighting what I refer to as *the coexistence of interdependent contradictions*, creating a new social distance and transforming the collective identities of the past. While in many respects liberating, the changes have not necessarily led to an enduring openness to difference. Finally, I examine current definitions of cohesion and integration and highlight some of the problems, contrasting them with a more feasible set of principles for social solidarity. I show how the new social distancing forms an inherent part of changes in social solidarity and conclude by considering whether the turn from multiculturalism and the new social cohesion is likely to achieve its desired outcomes.

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Introduction

Europeans seem to be increasingly worried about immigration and ethnic difference. From 1945 to the early 1970s, most Western European countries recruited migrant workers (either from former colonies or from the poor European periphery) to fuel economic growth. After the 1973 'oil crisis' recruitment was stopped. Against official expectations many migrants stayed on, brought in their families and settled permanently. Governments and many members of the public saw this as problematic and were concerned about the possible divisive effects on identity and culture. The government approach in a number of countries was the development of assimilation policies. At the same time, the emergence of the new social movements of the 1960s and 1970s ushered in a period of social turmoil and considerable social change. This was a period in which there was relatively full employment and an effective welfare state. There was a sense of organic solidarity through the trade unions and through the new social movements. The New Left, student, women's and migrant 'liberation movements' mobilized around claims for social rights and participation. There was also a growing acceptance of ethnic diversity and of social difference, laying the foundation for multicultural policies of social inclusion for immigrants and minorities. These policies were built on multicultural approaches first introduced in Canada and Australia.

Now this trend seems to be in reverse. Currently there appears to be a pervasive fear that western democratic values will be destroyed by too many immigrants, whose values are thought to be too different or inferior. For some, such values may threaten national identity and damage social cohesion (Alibhai-Brown 2004; Goodhart 2004). The main claim made in policy and public discourses is that immigrants are not integrating and that this is largely their own fault (Ghorashi 2003). Non-integration, in turn, is feared to have an unfavourable effect on societal cohesion. An extreme argument is that multiculturalism leads to 'tribalism' that segregates ethnic minorities and immigrants from the mainstream society (Phillips 2005). There are two parallel though interrelated discourses. The trend in public discourses is anti-immigration and anti-diversity with a desire for homogeneity. Policy discourses have a tendency to eschew multiculturalism and diversity by introducing 'integration and social cohesion'. This shift, both in policy and public discourses on integration and social cohesion, is being engineered through citizenship tests, integration contracts and sanctions in some countries, thus leading to a number of questions: why are we more concerned about setting limits and developing restrictive rules; why is immigrant community formation now seen as an impediment to 'integration and cohesion'; why is immigration fuelling a new round of anxiety about national identity; and why is there a concern to list 'core values'? Diversity now appears as a threat. With some exceptions (e.g. Modood 2007; Parekh 2008; Uberoi 2007) many believe social cohesion is best achieved by abandoning multiculturalism as a model not only for policy but also for how countries of immigration should engage with diversity (e.g. Joppke 2004; Koopmans 2006; Koopmans and Statham 2000).

For many years, there has been a tension between discourses of solidarity and discourses of exclusion. Now, the shift from multiculturalism to integration and cohesion signals a desire in Europe to control difference. It appears that the discourses of exclusion are becoming more prominent, and it is important to ask why. One dominant explanation for the shift away from engaging with diversity in European societies is the resulting insecurity created by globalization, experienced through the restructuring of economies, growing international competition and the continued increase in immigration and ethnic diversity. As a result of such pressures the post-war model of strong national states with broadly-based welfare systems no longer seems viable (Schierup, Hansen, and Castles 2006). This has been accompanied by a shift away from the openness to change of the earlier period, and its replacement by fear of difference, by a desire for closed and relatively homogeneous societies – something clearly hard to attain in the context of the global trend towards economic and cultural connectivity.

This paper is concerned with the relationship between solidarity and difference. Discourses about difference have become more exclusionary and nationalistic while discourses of social cohesion have become more assimilationist. In order to understand the social processes underlying these changes, the article examines some of the broader societal transformations of the past fifty years, to see if they shed light on what Sharp (2006) calls the 'neo-authoritarian drift' that is occurring in many western democracies. If there is such a drift, then we need to ask how can social solidarity or the drive for social cohesion can work in such a social climate? In other words, what has happened to the social solidarity of yesteryear? My argument is that social solidarity has changed over the past fifty years and that these changes need to be taken into account when developing ideas for how our societies can achieve social cohesion and immigrant integration.

In this article I begin by providing a brief account of policy changes in two countries - the Netherlands and Britain. They are used as examples to illustrate the philosophical and ideological changes underpinning these models of immigrant inclusion. In addition, a summary of the public discourses of the past few years is also included.[1] I then explore a number of major social transformations – the techno-science revolution, the re-organization of work, and the process of individualization - that have occurred in Europe over the past fifty years. I explore some of the social impacts and argue that the changes have had contradictory effects, highlighting what I refer to as *the coexistence of interdependent contradictions*, creating a new social distance and transforming the collective identities of the past. While in many respects liberating, the changes have not necessarily led to an enduring openness to difference. Finally, I examine current definitions of cohesion and integration and highlight some of the problems, contrasting them with a more feasible set of

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[1] This paper concentrates on public and policy discourses. The constructive experience of integration and solidarity by immigrants and other groups and organizations at the grassroots level is an equally important topic which cannot be dealt with in this paper. It will be the topic of another paper based on my empirical research.

principles for social solidarity.[2] I show how the new social distancing forms an inherent part of changes in social solidarity and conclude by considering whether the turn from multiculturalism and the new social cohesion is likely to achieve its desired outcomes.

Policy Discourses

Various models of inclusion exist in Europe ranging from variations of assimilation, integration and multiculturalism. Some countries are more exclusionary than others, while there are significant differences between older and newer countries of immigration. In this section I will concentrate very briefly on two examples of change in policy and public discourses - the Netherlands and Britain. In these country comparisons, rather than provide an in-depth overview of the policies I will simply examine some of the philosophical and ideological changes underpinning the models of inclusion adopted by each country.

The Netherlands

The Ethnic Minorities Policy was introduced in the early 1980s and was basically a policy of multiculturalism (though the Dutch did not refer to it as such), concerned with the inclusion of immigrants and ethnic minorities in the legal-political, socio-cultural and socio-economic domains. It was based on the development of social programmes and culturally appropriate services. There were two significant differences from the general understanding of multiculturalism in immigrant countries such as Canada and Australia (see Vasta 2007a). Firstly, there was a carry over of the previous policy of 'pillarization' where minority groups could set up their own institutions to deliver health care, education etc. This was introduced several centuries ago mainly to accommodate differences between Catholics and Protestants. Secondly, language classes to teach migrants Dutch were introduced only in the mid 1990s.

By the early 1990s the Ethnic Minorities Policy was seen as a failure, so an Integration Policy was introduced in 1994. This shift was made to combat the increasing labour market and educational segregation among some ethnic minorities. It was based on the idea of 'mainstreaming', concerned with improving the inclusion of immigrants into mainstream services in order to move away from the ethno-specific provision popularly associated with the Ethnic Minorities Policy. While the same earlier policy dimensions remained, importantly a new direction was taken with more emphasis placed on Dutch language courses, social orientation and vocational training (Entzinger 2003).

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[2] For the sake of clarity in this article, although both terms are generally used interchangeably, the term 'social cohesion' refers to the current public and policy usage of the phrase which concentrates more on the question of commonalities. 'Social solidarity' will be used as a more holistic, scientific term referring to the question of how people live together, including not only commonalities, but also types of solidarity (Durkheim) and dynamics of solidarity (Marxist).

This policy signalled an important ideological shift in the Netherlands. Up to this time, the welfare state had been based on the idea of a general safety net and a notion of communal care. There was now a move away from state protection to an ideology of self-sufficiency and individual responsibility (Blok Report Netherlands 2004). Fitting into the receiving culture was now seen as an individual process. This broader shift was reflected in the move from ethnic minorities policy, which in many ways was a multicultural policy, to integration policy. The ideology behind the change to the mainstreaming of services was more oriented towards individual identities and needs than towards group identities and needs of ethnic minorities (Duyvendak, Pels, and Rijkschroeff 2005; Fermin 1997; Scholten 2003), undermining the significance of culturally appropriate services (Entzinger 2003). The City of Amsterdam, for example, has defined its 'diversity' policy as a 'post multicultural' policy where 'everybody is entitled to participate, not as a member of a group, but as an individual with a multifaceted identity' (Uitermark, Rossi, and Van Houlton 2005, 17-18).

The most significant change of recent times includes the introduction of sanctions for newcomers who might be deprived of their welfare benefits if they failed to take citizenship classes and tests (Blok Report Netherlands 2004). In December 2004, the Dutch Ministry of Justice declared in a press release 'Immigrants required to take the test – especially newcomers - will only be eligible for an independent residence and/or a permanent residence permit (regular or asylum) once they have passed the integration examination' (Dutch Ministry of Justice 2004). The emphasis on compulsion, with the threat of sanctions, rather than on quality and delivery of services reveals a clear shift away from multiculturalism towards an assimilationist approach of immigrant inclusion, based on the idea of a certain end-state where immigrants are fully absorbed into the norms and values of the receiving society (Entzinger 2003).

Ten years after the introduction of Integration Policy, ethnic minority participation remains low in many sectors. For example, ethnic minority youth unemployment rates remain higher than those of the 'native' Dutch. In 2004, unemployment rates (in percentages) among 15-24 year olds varied significantly: Turkish/Moroccan 24, Surinamese/Antillians 23 and 'native' Dutch 12 (Vasta 2007b).

Britain

Britain has had a unique mix of inclusion policies - the *Race Relations* and *Multiculturalism* model in the 1960s which continues to this day; *Integration Strategies* for refugees which were introduced early this decade; over the past five years the notion *Community Cohesion* has been developed through a plethora of reports, culminating with the recent report of the *Commission for Integration and Cohesion* (CIC June 2007) whose *aim it was to recommend strategies for the integration of new immigrants and ethnic minorities* (my italics).

Both the Race Relations Acts and multiculturalism were specifically introduced for ethnic minorities from the Commonwealth. The first Race Relations Acts of 1965 and 1968 were based on the idea that welfare agencies should be set up to help black immigrants with any problems but also to educate white communities about the immigrants. They were also premised on the idea that the state should end racial/ethnic discrimination and promote equality of opportunity through legal sanctions and public regulatory agencies (Solomos 2003). A Commission for Racial Equality (CRE) was set up in 1976 to enforce the Acts and promote positive community Relations. But by 1999 the Stephen Lawrence Enquiry (set up to examine the poor police response to the murder of the black youth) revealed the strength of institutional racism. This led to the Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000 which requires all public bodies to introduce race equality schemes and to work at eliminating racism. The Race Relations approach, despite room for much improvement, is unique in Europe, leading the field in its engagement with racism. The British model of inclusion was based on the idea of high levels of state intervention in line with the then model of the welfare state. Multicultural policies were introduced in the late 1970s and early 1980s in the schools in an attempt to give ethnic minority children language teaching and a culturally relevant education as a way of developing mutual respect and self-esteem in multiethnic classrooms. Some local governments introduced their own multicultural policies, such as labour market training programmes for ethnic minorities.

Nevertheless, Solomos comes to the conclusion that while some local authorities remained uninterested, on the whole, the measures taken, such as some language courses, remained largely symbolic. He states, 'Antidiscrimination legislation has been in place for nearly five decades and yet there is still widespread evidence of a high degree of discrimination in both the public and the private sector' (Solomos 2003, 93). As in the Netherlands, much genuine effort has gone into introducing and refining anti-discrimination and equal opportunity policies. The intentions behind the policies have not been achieved due to the significant gap between the rhetoric and the experience. In the 1990s in Britain, there was a shift away from interventionist anti-racist policies towards a more market-oriented approach. This approach is based on the policy of a de-regulated labour market and on the Thatcherite idea that service delivery is best privatised. Under this model, inequality has increased and certain groups cannot compete.

In the early years of this decade, the then Home Secretary David Blunkett advocated developing 'social capital' and 'community cohesion' as a way of dealing with inequalities and social exclusion. This move was based on the premise that community is a good thing, while often ignoring that communities and networks can suffer from structural inequalities, are very complex and have shifting allegiances (Bourdieu 1997). On an almost yearly basis a new official strategy or commission on 'cohesion' has appeared.[3] Many of the reports state that the white or established communities

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[3] Local Government Association, 2002. *Guidance on Community Cohesion*. London.; Home Office Community Cohesion Unit. 2003. *Building a picture of community cohesion*. London; Home Office.

also need to engage, but how this would work is rarely spelt out. The recent proposed strategy from the *Commission for Integration and Cohesion* (CIC), for example, stresses a more individualist approach - 'getting on well together' and 'adapting to one another', and rejecting multiculturalism which is seen to concentrate too much on difference and not on similarities (CIC June 2007, 46). Though integration is defined as a two-way process, there is some confusion about this process (see further discussion later in the paper).

Inequality remains a key issue in the Britain. In 2001-2, for example, among 16-24 year olds, Bangladeshis (36.9 per cent), Pakistanis (24.9 per cent) and African Caribbeans (23.7 per cent) had rather high rates of unemployment compared with the rate of Whites at 10.9 per cent (Schierup, Hansen, and Castles 2006, 125).

The public discourses

In Europe, the arguments advanced against immigrants and multiculturalism are numerous. They include:

- too much diversity undermines cohesion;
- immigrants do not take the responsibility to integrate;
- the receiving country has been too lenient or generous;
- multiculturalism leads to segregation;
- it leads to welfare dependency;
- multiculturalism, by concentrating too much on ethnic cultures, identities and religions, prevents immigrants from integrating into the dominant culture and national identity;
- multiculturalism undermines western democratic values;
- it allows an inflated 'tolerance' to cultural and religious difference;
- multiculturalism is too focused on cultural rights of groups rather than on the rights of the individual.

These are the main arguments both in public[4] and in some academic debates that call for restrictions on immigration (Vasta 2007a), for the need to abandon multiculturalism in favour of integration and cohesion and, in some cases, to support sanctions (Phillips 2005). Sniderman and Hagendoorn (2007), for example, claim that Dutch government support and official recognition of multiculturalism increased the turn against immigration and diversity. But as Foner states, 'they rail against policies'

2004. *Strength in Diversity – Towards a Community Cohesion and Race Equality Strategy.* London; Home Office. 2005. *Improving Opportunity, Strengthening Society*. London.
[4] Examples of some media headlines in Britain: 'The human tide we can't control *Telegraph*, 03/09/2001; Multiculturalism is making Britain 'a soft touch for terrorists', *Evening Standard*, 15.02.08; Multiculturalism is to blame for perverting young Muslims', *Telegraph*, 15/08/2006; 'Diversity will never unite us', *Telegraph*, 30/01/2007;

that do not (or no longer) exist and they overlook or minimize other factors critical to understanding the recent conflicts over integration and cultural differences in the Netherlands'(Foner 2008, 409) .

One outstanding feature of these debates is that rarely has there been an open public debate about the incessant racism experienced by some immigrant groups, nor about the exclusion and inequality experienced by some groups in the labour market or in educational outcomes (Essed 1991; Essed 2004; see also Goldberg 2002). Much research evidence reveals that the implementation of multicultural (and even integration) policies and programmes vary from their stated goals. Frequently, measures taken to introduce multiculturalism or to combat racism are symbolic gestures, and are inadequate and inefficient (Hermans 2002; Poppelaars and Scholten 2005; Solomos 2003). But the debates reveal there is an appeal to sameness that provides 'for many people an immediate antidote to anxiety that is created by economic and political uncertainty' (Stevenson 2006, 496-7).

Changes in attitudes are evident in attitude surveys and in the election of anti-immigrant parties. McLaren and Johnson's study of the British Social Attitudes Survey reveals that whereas in 1995 around two-thirds of the British population thought the number of immigrants should be reduced, in 2003 the proportion had increased to three-quarters. Moreover, four components of Britishness – being born in Britain, having British ancestry, having lived most of one's life in Britain and agreeing that 'it is impossible for people who do not share Britain's customs and traditions to become fully British' – were strongly related to hostility towards more immigration (McLaren and Johnson 2004, 178). Similarly, in Switzerland, where one in four residents are foreign born, the anti-immigrant People's Party 'had its best showing ever, winning 20 percent of the vote' in the October 2007 elections: 'Its campaign imagery focused on fears about foreign criminals and foreigners' degradation of the Swiss way of life' (Migration Information Source 2007). In Italy, although the vote for the anti-immigration Lega Norda is lower than it was in 1996, it has almost doubled since 2006.[5]

The anti-immigrant and anti-multiculturalism sentiment is reflected in the publications of public figures in Britain who were once on the left and members of the new social movements. Nick Cohen (2007), in *What's Left,* believes these movements and their policy responses privileged immigrants and undermined community bonds. David Goodhart (2006) editor of *Prospect* magazine, has argued that new citizens need to earn their citizenship and should be given longer probationary periods. These ideas have now become important planks of government policy. Gordon Brown, now Prime Minister, has also been talking up the importance of British values for a number of years (Brown January 2006).

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[5] For a breakdown of the votes obtained by the Lega Nord in the 2008 elections, see: http://www.leganord.org/elezioni/2008/politiche/dati_elettorali.pdf

Social and cultural transformations

One of the main explanations for these social changes, for the rise in insecurity and anxiety about difference is generally provided through the complex catchword of 'globalization'. It often refers to global markets and integrated financial systems, corporate networks, polarized market and labour market restructuring, the global media and global cultures. Some observers have outlined the emergence of a dual crisis of the welfare state and national identity which undermines social solidarity and the universalism of rights in Europe (see Schierup, Hansen, and Castles 2006). One significant outcome is the racialization or ethnicization of difference and inequality, through which immigrants and ethnic minorities are blamed for the crisis of European societies and the growing economic and cultural insecurity of their populations. However, what is less clear is how globalization impacts on social and cultural life in our everyday lives. What are the social and cultural transformations of the past thirty to fifty years that will help us understand why there is a shift, in civil society and the state, towards homogeneity, towards the need for conformity, for boundaries and for lists of values? More specifically, as evidenced by the debates outlined above, why is there concern about 'too much diversity' and a fear that immigrants and ethnic minorities have not become like 'us'? And why the perceived shift away from civic identity to nationalism?

To try to understand these trends, I will briefly outline three inter-related major social transformations that have led to what is referred to, by some social scientists, as the new social distancing:

- the techno-science revolution;
- re-organization of work;
- the process of individualization; [6]

These provide pointers to the social and cultural changes that have been occurring over the past fifty years and that are contributing to the racialization and ethnicization of various current social problems. It will help us understand why the shift from multiculturalism towards integration and social cohesion and why there is currently a need to control difference in many western democracies.

One major social transformation is what Hinkson (2006) calls the **'techno-science revolution',** referring to the changes brought about by the telephone, the internet, computers, the mass media and the new technologies in industry. Whilst these new technologies have opened up the flow of information and have increased freedom and choices, they have also created a new *social distance*. For example, the telephone, the television and the internet have all generated 'social

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[6] Some colleagues have suggested that we could consider a fourth transformation, namely changed political opportunity structures. In this case, the media and politicians exploit peoples' anxieties. According to this view it is not so much that people's attitudes have changed, but the strategies of the media and of politicians.

relations that work at a distance'. Now, the 'knowledge 'industry has become more prominent. In some countries, 'whole branches of the economy are being wiped out – for example, mining, textiles and the steel industry…The most prominent feature of this society will be the centrality of knowledge as an economic resource. Knowledge, not work, will become the source of social wealth…' (Beck 2001, 39-40). These technologies of the 20th century are a significant example of the contradictions brought about by change. In western liberal democracies, we cannot imagine life without the telephone or the internet: they have opened up information networks (Castells 1996) and importantly they are time savers. Yet, we are constantly reminded that children spend more and more time on the internet and watching television than spending time in meaningful family and social relations.

A related change is the ***radical re-organization of work***. This has created a growing sense of social distance, influencing the individual's sense of identity and sense of self (Sennett 1999). In the recent past, through Fordism, work was organized around the social hierarchy of workers, bosses and some intermediaries. Although a more rigid work system, there was greater clarity of class boundaries and the trade union movement provided a sense of mutual dependency among workers. Under the new economic order of globalization and restructuring, work is now more flexible with more insecure, short term contracts, though less embedded in hierarchical structures. Sennett (1999) suggests the shift to work teams sounds positive because we think people will be developing good team relations and possibly a sense of community. However, he discovered that people and teams are frequently changed around, so workers do not have continuity with each other and teams do not provide the grounds for developing that sense of solidarity implied in the concept. Instead, he found that specific skills were applied to short-term tasks where worker detachment is valued. Moreover, he suggests that 'a fiction arises in modern teamwork' with the belief that 'employees aren't really competing against each other' (Sennett 1999, 111).

Restructuring of the workplace means that many workers do not relate to each other, creating on the one hand, superficial communal relations and on the other, a sense of anonymity and social distance. Furthermore, the capacity of the global is to produce commodities with an ever-reducing labour force (Hinkson 2006). This has led to growing levels of unemployment among immigrants and ethnic minorities who often bear the burden to a larger degree than other groups. All these changes in the organization of work have undermined the levels of interdependency and reciprocity that once existed. Thus, these recently distanced social relations pose a potential threat to social solidarity. This has become evident in the decline over the past thirty years of the trade union movement throughout many western democracies where membership has fallen substantially. In the1960s and 1970s this trend was counteracted to a degree by the expansion of the new social movements as they attempted to open up the democratic process through demands for equality for women, for ethnic and immigrant rights, demands for the acceptance of ethnic diversity, sexual

diversity etc. As the new social movements swept through western democracies, many people became active in the massive drive for social change. They became the springboard for a different kind of politics that articulated their claims in the language *of rights* and *participation* (Scott 1990), based on a specific notion of solidarity concerned with social inclusion of minority groups and women.

Another useful explanation is that alongside the new social movements, a parallel social process was also at work, namely, the ***process of individualization***. While the sixties and seventies was a period of growing solidarity, it was also a time when traditional social relations were brought into question. The authority structures of the traditional family, of the education system and of work itself were challenged and became less well defined (Beck 1992; 1999). There was a growing emphasis on personal autonomy, on self-realization, on freedom and choice, leading to a 'more assertive life-style' (Komter 2005, 175). This has since been referred to as the rise of the 'me generation'.

There are several inter-related definitions of individualization. Beck and Beck-Gernsheim suggest that on the one hand it means the disintegration of previous social forms such as the family, class, gender roles etc. And on the other hand, the new controls and demands of society have compelled people to look after themselves, thus creating the 'do-it-yourself biography' (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 2001). To this we can add a third definition which is more concerned with changes to the approach to the common good. Sharp suggests that 'Over-emphasis upon material wellbeing, by suggesting that a democratic way of life is primarily concerned with ever-expanding freedom of material choice…is a corruption of the sense of the common good' (Sharp 2006, 29-30). Individualism erodes citizenship and the importance of contributing to the common good, and it contributes to a decline in long-term commitment (Bauman 2001). According to Stevenson, 'the self fostered by neo-liberalism is both open to the culture of the market, while fostering a pervasive sense of insecurity and longing for community'. Yet, 'while uncertainty and insecurity are good for the market, they damage citizenship' (Stevenson 2006, 490).

The escalation in social distance through new technologies and work structures, and through an increase in the process of individualization, has created adverse social conditions for many social groups. The individualized citizen (referred to as the 'neurotic citizen' by (Isin 2004) is 'less concerned with new collective arrangements…and more likely to turn to either authoritarian solutions offered by the Right or the market…' (Stevenson 2006, 491). Individualization can also work in a nationalistic way, with concern about the extent of diversity, concern with borders, mass deportations, and intensified anxieties about asylum seekers (Bauman 2001).

These major social transformations have brought about a number of unexpected and fundamental changes, based on numerous social contradictions. For example, the individualization process has contributed to a growing personal independence and autonomy while at the same time

concern for individual needs over group needs has increased. The welfare state, based on the idea of equality and fair distribution of resources, was meant to provide a safety net for all. Yet global economic forces have increased competition which in turn has put pressure on jobs and on the welfare state, making people more insecure. Similarly, while work structures have become more flexible, and hierarchies have become more flattened, the new work structures have also created more social distance among many workers. Societies are now characterized ever more by diversity and plurality. However, herein lies another contradiction, for the diversity and plurality refers to the individual who has more personal choices. But the desire for more diversity and plurality at the personal level has not necessarily translated into a drive for openness to ethnic and cultural plurality at the societal level, nor for equality and for a fairer distribution of power. These major social transformations reveal a rather complex process of social change, highlighting what I refer to as *the coexistence of interdependent contradictions*. These interconnected contradictions have co-evolved over the past fifty odd years.

Urry suggests that such social phenomena cannot remain bounded for 'Causes are always overflowing, tipping from domain to domain and especially flowing within and across the supposedly distinct physical and social domains. For complexity, the emergent properties are irreducible, interdependent and mobile' (see also Urry 2003; Urry 2005, 8). Nevertheless, it seems to me that the transformations in social relations outlined above, are not necessarily the type that welcomes immigrants and ethnic minorities in the early 21st century.

Over the past fifty to sixty years there has been an increase in the mobility of people into Europe. One argument claims that as societies have become more diverse and more multicultural, there is an increase in uncertainty about the presence of 'strangers'. This is especially the case about the presence of immigrants and refugees. An example of this type of reasoning is to be found in Denmark, where the Danes, who see themselves as a small nation, pride themselves on their homogeneity. According to Hedetoft, the Danes believe that cultural homogeneity and solidarity helped them to deal with the threat of globalization. Now, there is a crisis in their self-sufficient mono-culturalism and they are experiencing a 'loss of home' (Hedetoft 2003; Hedetoft 2007). This reaction is similar to that raised by Simmel in his analysis of the effects of rapid industrialization and urbanization, claiming that 'groups often search for external enemies in order to maintain internal order' (Collins in Crow 2002, 27).

Such self-perception poses an interesting dilemma because immigrants and refugees have been arriving in Europe in large numbers since the 1940s. In the 1960s foreign workers arrived as cheap labour in many European countries, and four decades later these earlier arrivals are seen as superfluous. This raises another contradiction, for while many migrants in Europe may be seen as redundant and self-segregated, many form a reserve army of labour where they are integrated

economically into the labour market and into their local communities.[7] Many experience racism and labour market discrimination, both of which form strong barriers against a 'sense of belonging', which needs to be differentiated from 'integration'. Guarding one's language, culture and religion is one way of dealing with a new social environment, but it also helps immigrants to deal with racism.

Modood claims that ethnic minorities in Britain *are* integrated. This 'is marked by an ethnic assertiveness' in which ethnic minorities have challenged values and identities due to 'the feeling of not being respected or of lacking access to public space' (Modood 2007, 50). Nevertheless, the politics and practices of racism are often underplayed in discourses on integration and cohesion. Social problems, some of which result from globalization, have become ethnicized or racialized. In other words, immigrants and ethnic minorities are being blamed for their high levels of unemployment, for exploiting the welfare state, for not integrating. The insecurities brought about by the processes of social distancing, tend to be blamed on immigrants and ethnic minorities. Finally, the Danish example reveals that over the past fifty years of immigration to their countries, majority populations have not taken the responsibility to accommodate themselves into what are now culturally, ethnically and religiously diverse societies. This calls into question the notion of collective identities.

Change in Social Solidarities and Collective Identities

There is nothing new about changing solidarities and identities. However, understanding how these have changed will provide us with a more in-depth knowledge of the effects of the social transformations outlined above. Durkheim, in *The Division of Labour in Society* (1984), showed how different forms of societal organization have an impact on solidarity, analysing the change from *mechanical solidarity* to *organic solidarity*.[8] Komter suggests that a shift has occurred from organic solidarity to what she calls *segmented solidarity*, although she believes that all three exist, i.e. mechanical, organic and segmented. Segmented solidarity is about 'separate, autonomous social segments, connecting (if at all) with other segments no longer out of necessity and mutual dependency but on the basis of voluntariness' (2005, 211-13). Solidarity itself has become more individualized, more global, more abstract (Komter 2005) and it is more strategic.

We can examine each of these in turn. In this paper I have indicated that there has been a change in what constitutes the collective conscience. I have argued that through a process of *individualization*, group needs seem to have been replaced by individual or personal considerations. Paradoxically, this is not necessarily the situation for immigrants and ethnic minorities who rely

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[7] Thanks to Greg Noble, University of Western Sydney, Australia, for highlighting this point.
[8] Mechanical solidarity referred to homogeneous populations where the division of labour was based on cooperation (cottage industries), shared values and beliefs with little personal freedom. Organic solidarity came with the rise of industrialization, operates within a larger population and a more varied, complex division of labour, allowing more individual freedom.

heavily on their ethnic communities for support and reciprocal arrangements. Although Baumann cautions against using the notion of 'community' too loosely, since immigrant groups experience the same cross-cutting social cleavages, economic, political, cultural and others, as occur in the broader society (Baumann 1996), some immigrant and ethnic minority groups report, despite some ambivalence, a strong sense of community.

Solidarity has become more *global*, as shown by the new global movements. These global social movements, such as the anti-capitalism movements, are sometimes referred to as 'thin solidarity' because people do not necessarily need to have long term commitments or responsibility to their cause. Naomi Klein, for example, claims that many of these movements are not authentic grass-roots movements because they do not engage adequately with the opinions of many of the grass-roots protestors (Klein 2002). Yet there is a contradiction –while these social movements have elevated major global problems onto the world stage, to the consternation of many world leaders, much of the interactions are organized over the web by groups who do not know each other, and where it is impossible to take in all views. These groups are not necessarily organically involved in a long-term or ongoing way. This makes solidarity more *abstract*.

Abstract solidarity means that people can move in and out of commitments. Indeed, in the spirit of consumerism, they can shop for commitments. While there may have been a decline or a change in taking the imaginary position of others, some people are less inclined to take a more participatory role in contributing to or ensuring equality for others. Rather, they are more willing to write cheques. Many people who do have jobs have precious little time to become involved in those forms of solidarity that take up time – such as community meetings and the like. The new technologies have accelerated many aspects of our lives, once again removing the need for face-to-face meetings. Another example of abstract solidarity includes giving to charity or being willing to help migrants in their home countries but not here. Recently, a Dutch taxi driver told me when asked what work I do, that he would prefer to put down his money to keep migrants (namely Muslims) out of his country: 'I don't like them. I don't want them here. We can help them to stay over there, but we don't want them here. We can help them to stay over there'. Thus, solidarity has become more *strategic*.

These changes in solidarity are intimately entwined with changes in our collective identities. Furthermore, individualization is not 'simply a subjective phenomenon concerning self-identities and attitudes alone, but a *structural* phenomenon transfiguring objective life situations and biographies' (Atkinson 2007, 353). Put another way, the construction of identities is a productive process, embedded in change and transformation that entails 'an interchange between the self and structure' (Rutherford 1990, 14). Class identity has provided one of the strongest analyses of the relationship between self and structure, but many now believe that class identities have changed for good. Andre Gorz was one of the earliest social scientists of the post-war years to alert us to the changes in work

relations and collective identities. He predicted that class identities were becoming unimportant as life style, consumption and leisure became more significant. He famously maintained that as new technologies diminished the need for human labour, the work-centred view of society and culture, as a basis of personal and collective fulfilment and social cohesion would no longer be tenable in the foreseeable future (Gorz 1982). The old form of collectivism at work, based on common work experiences and interests have changed (Sennett 2006).

However, Beck (1992) takes this debate to its limit by asserting that class consciousness and therefore class differences are dead; classes are no longer significant social dividers. Capitalists and workers alike, according to him, are all equally exposed to risk (Beck 2001).[9] This claim has been tested by Heath, Curtis and Elgenius who conclude that collective class identities persist, though they seem to have weakened (Heath, Curtice, and Elgenius 2007). Castells, in his research on the network society, explains that the primary struggle has shifted from the factory floor to information technology, that is, to the internet. He claims that collectivist resisting identities are between the self and the net (Castells 1996). Nevertheless, work and consumerism remain part of the modern identity. It would be naïve to think that 'centuries of competitive individualism can be replaced by a sort of spontaneous humanism' (Turner and Rojek 2001, 171). Even so, 'this does not mean that the goal of building solidarity is passé' (Turner and Rojek 2001, 195).

As class identities began to change, the new social movements challenged the idea of the unified (class) subject. The strong collective identity of the labour movement which had existed for most of the twentieth century in many western countries had begun to wane as ethnic, gender and local identities began to flourish. The new social movements filled a void created by the labour movement. At this time, new theories of 'the subject' emerged. Multiple identities were revealed by the allegiance to these new social movements whose aims were to sharpen the relationship between civil society and the state. During this time, new types of 'organic' communities were formed. The women's movement, the ethnic rights movements and other movements created new spaces in which people constructed new collective identities. These movements had been instrumental in creating new 'liberated' identities, but by the 1980s, they were also in decline.[10]

The changing nature of the new social movements and changes in work - the uncertainties of flexibility, the superficiality of teamwork, the diminished sense of self at work - created major unintended consequences. These changes have 'strengthened the value of place [and have] aroused a longing for community…The desire for community is defensive, often expressed as rejection of immigrants or other outsiders…' (Sennett 1999, 138). Amongst dominant and majority groups, there

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[9] For an excellent refutation of 'the death of class' see Atkinson, Will. 2007. "Beck, individualization and the death of class: a critique." *British Journal of Sociology* 58:349-366.
[10] In time, these movements had to deal with their own forms of discrimination. For example, in some places, black women and immigrant women had to confront the racism of a white, middle class women's movements as well as the sexism of the ethnic rights movement.

is a strong desire for community or social cohesion as evidenced in the public discourses and in policy strategies discussed earlier.

In contrast to this defensive notion of community, there is also a trend of continuing cosmopolitanism. Urry, for example, claims that people are becoming more cosmopolitan where 'there is a stance of openness to other people and cultures and a willingness/ability to value elements of language/culture/history of multiple, contested and fragmented 'other' to one's own culture, provided they meet certain global standards' (Urry 2003, 133). However, recent events in the Netherlands, Denmark, France and UK reveal that this is not a general or universal approach to immigration and diversity. Urry suggests that 'Cosmopolitan fluidity thus involves the capacity to live simultaneously in *both* the global and the local, in the distant and proximate, in the universal and the particular. Such cosmopolitanism involves comprehending the specificity of one's local context, to connect to other locally specific contexts and to be responsive to the complex threats and opportunities of the globalizing world' (Urry 2003, 137). I would suggest that this description might better fit migrants who seem to be more adept at living transnational lives than many from the established dominant and majority communities.

Although cosmopolitanism is similar to transnationalism,[11] part of the turn against diversity by majority or dominant populations in Europe is their concern that migrants develop multiple loyalties and identities beyond the boundaries of the nation-state in which they have settled (Portes, Guarnizo, and Haller 2002). It is highly likely that the well-off who have job security and choices, can afford to be 'cosmopolitan' and are in a position to understand the complexities of the globalizing world. Although insecurity seems to be widespread, it appears that many suffer from uncertainty in the labour market and in their neighbourhoods and communities leading to the blaming of immigrants for the changes brought about by globalization at the local level. Just as the neo-liberal state is prevailing over the welfare state, so too are anti-immigration and anti-diversity attitudes gaining force.

Thus cosmopolitanism is in tension with individualized and abstract solidarity which opens up the way for a re-assertion of community as national solidarity. But re-asserting the nation as an 'imagined community' means constituting it as exclusionary – the immigrant, the foreigner, the Muslim, the asylum seeker are threats. Many immigrants and ethnic minorities are being treated as out-groups – in the labour market; in terms of low educational achievement for some groups; in terms of who can stay and who cannot - this includes the draconian policies towards asylum seekers in the UK and the physical removal of established Roma in Italy. And in some countries, immigrants

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[11] Transnationalism can be seen as a process of maintaining and developing personal, economic, political and social relationships across national boundaries, while cosmopolitanism is the philosophy underlying it, see Delanty, Gerard. 2006. "The cosmopolitan imagination: critical cosmopolitanism and social theory." *The British Journal of Sociology* 57:25-47. Transnationalism is generally seen as something that migrants do.

and ethnic minorities are being told they are not taking the responsibility to integrate. Excluding their differences becomes the pre-condition for cohesion.

Social Cohesion and Social Solidarity

Various models of immigrant inclusion have been adopted throughout Europe ranging from assimilation, multiculturalism, race relations model, integration and social cohesion. The development of each country's model of inclusion has been influenced by specific economic and political histories, including colonialism, the post-war economic situation, historical racism, forms of nation building and citizenship (Castles and Miller 2003). Although some countries use a combination of models, currently, all models of inclusion are in a state of flux, though many countries are opting for an 'integration' model. In Britain, 'integration and cohesion' has become the dominant policy approach. In this section I outline some of the differences between cohesion and solidarity and I will briefly summarize some of the problems with the 'integration and social cohesion' approach in British policy discourse. This will be followed by a presentation of a set of guiding principles for social solidarity.

Social Cohesion

Cohesion and integration have become the dominant popular and policy concepts and ideology for immigrant inclusion in the UK. In August 2006, Ruth Kelly, then Minister responsible for the Department for Communities and Local Government delivered a speech to launch the new *Commission on Integration and Cohesion.* She indicated that the Commission would look at how local authorities and community organizations could be encouraged to ensure 'new migrants better integrate into our communities and fill labour market shortages. For example, increasing the availability of English teaching, mapping where local jobs exist, ensuring that migrants are able to develop a sense of belonging, with shared values and understanding, as we underline their responsibility to integrate and contribute to the local community' (Kelly 14 August 2006). These are all very important aspects of settlement and participation. However, the general tenor that came across in her speech was that integration is a migrant issue, a migrant responsibility. It is a migrant problem. In other words, it is a one-way process. Nowhere did she talk specifically about mutual accommodation, about integration being a two-way process in which equality is the bottom line.

In the *Commission for Integration and Cohesion* (CIC) Report of 2007, cohesion has been coupled with integration, where 'cohesion is principally the process that must happen in all communities to ensure different groups of people get on well together; while integration is principally the process that ensures new residents and existing residents adapt to one another' (CIC June 2007, 9). An integrated and cohesive community is based on four key principles – a sense of shared futures, models of responsibilities and rights, civility and mutual respect, and making social justice visible (CIC June 2007, 43). There are many positive aspects to this report such as highlighting the importance of differentiating

policies and programmes according to the specific needs of different groups, and the idea that integration and cohesion is 'everybody's business' (CIC June 2007, 39). The report also stresses the importance of equality, but how this is to be specifically approached remains unclear. The concern with equality or social justice refers to 'tackling myths, engaging the media, addressing perceptions of special treatment among existing communities' (CIC June 2007, 11). Clearly, these issues are important. However, there is a sense in which appearances are more important than working out how to actually tackle significant problems such as inequality.

The Department for Communities and Local Government (CLG) report *Managing the Impacts of Migration: A Cross-Government Approach* (2008) adopted the definitions of integration and cohesion in the CIC Report (CIC June 2007) discussed above. In a box on p38 of the *Managing the Impacts of Migration: A Cross-Government Approach* they set out three foundations and three key ways of living together. On the next page, in the section on 'Improving community cohesion', there seems to be some confusion about the meaning of integration – 'Local people have a unique knowledge and understanding of the area. They and their representatives are best placed to manage the integration of migrants, the process by which new and existing residents adjust to one another' (CLG 2008, 38-39).

In summary, the problems with the 'integration and cohesion model are numerous. Firstly, the demographic, economic and political reasons for immigration will continue with policy and economic forecasts showing that the trend will continue. Secondly, in many public and policy discourses there appears to be more concern for cultural assimilation than for structural integration and there is often slippage between use of the two ideas. Thirdly, as mentioned earlier, there has been a plethora of policy and strategy reports on cohesion in the UK. If we study them closely, there is a definite ambivalence – the rhetoric refers to a two-way process, but in reality it is often implied as a one-way process as revealed in the quote above. There is often a slippage - it is immigrants who have to integrate.

Ultimately, reference to a two-way process becomes a smokescreen for the contradictions within the policy and public discourses. Immigrants and ethnic minorities are expected to integrate, to choose Britishness and to retain their own cultures and traditions, thus developing or maintaining multiple identities. If the same were requested of the 'dominant community', meaning the majority ethnic group (who also have multiple identities), then a genuine two-way process could pave the way for mutual accommodation. Their discourse reveals an openness to diversity, to accommodating difference through the idea that immigrants can develop or maintain multiple identities. However, the contradiction in public and policy discourses arises because the onus seems to fall on immigrants alone when it comes to cultural change. Worley calls it 'a discourse of assimilation, within a framework of integration' (Worley 2005, 489). The other part of the two-way process would require that the dominant, established groups also take the responsibility to integrate into an ethnically and culturally diverse society.

Fourthly, the discourse of 'integration and cohesion' has a tendency to stigmatise difference when, in reality, many immigrants and ethnic minorities are culturally integrated into their communities and localities, even if they don't interact with the majority group. Portes reminds us that 'whatever 'melting' occurs will be decidedly asymmetrical' (2008, 22). Finally, social cohesion is problematic because hegemonic groups are in a privileged position to define the terms and characteristics of social cohesion (Young 2000). A socially cohesive society is often understood to be unified in terms of national identity, based on an underlying set of values and beliefs that are usually those of the majority population. It is concerned with identity and sense of belonging and much less with equality and participation. Policy solutions are being sought through concepts such as social capital, social cohesion and integration, which ultimately provide non-economic solutions to economic and structural problems (Fine 2000). Worse still, within the social capital/social cohesion/integration framework, inequalities are seen as socially rather than politically and economically constructed, aiding 'the shift in responsibility for social inclusion from economy to society, and from government to individual, informing policies that focus on social behaviour' (Edwards, Franklin, and Holland 2003, 9).

Social Solidarity

The recent public and policy discourses and debates on integration and cohesion have set up a false dichotomy between solidarity and diversity. In these debates we have been asked to choose one or the other when, in reality, no society can exist without one or the other. According to Parekh (2008), social solidarity is not a given. It needs to be negotiated and constantly re-created and expanded to incorporate new diversities and changing identities. Thus, we need to develop social solidarity through fair redistribution of power and resources and a process of recognition. These two characteristics also form the basis of multiculturalism.

While social solidarity is a key element of classical sociological theory, there is also an understanding that it can lead to domination or exclusion, with the creation of in-groups and out-groups, and it can lead to inequality. Clearly, we cannot romanticize solidarity, but the cohesionists do not adequately account for differences of class, gender, ethnicity, age, place and other forms of social exclusion. Engaging with economic inequalities and other forms of unequal power relations has to be the bottom line when considering the important question of 'how can we live together'. Unless these forms of social exclusion become part of the equation, social cohesion cannot be achieved. For this reason I prefer to use the term 'social solidarity' in order to differentiate it from the current usage of 'social cohesion' in policy and public discourses. Therefore, I suggest we develop a set of guiding principles for social solidarity *for everyone*.

For it to work, solidarity cannot involve any form of exclusion. It would need to incorporate the following six principles:

- ***The drive for equality and a fair distribution of power***;
- Having the willingness to **subordinate private concerns** to public interests;
- Developing **public rituals of sharing**, including sharing of resources.
- ***Recognition of the other***, or mutual recognition;
- ***Engaging with our differences***.
- ***Duties to outsiders***

First and foremost, solidarity needs to be based on the drive for equality and a fair distribution of power. This needs to be a key principle, and it is the main point that differentiates 'solidarity' from current definitions of 'social cohesion'. In addition, given that individualism is jostling with our sense of collective consciousness, how we subordinate private concerns for *the common good* and engage with civic culture is also important. In part, this means pushing further our practices of reciprocity, but also developing a more enduring notion of responsibility for the other. Concern for the common good would need to be championed and authenticated through public rituals of sharing between states, social groups and individuals. Komter argues that 'Being able to sympathize and identify with the predicament of another person is a key precondition to solidarity…Solidarity presupposes the double capacity to assess and appraise the self as well as to recognize the other, and it is conceivable that the individualization process has contributed to a change in this respect' (Komter 2005, 174).

To engage with our difference and recognise the 'other' would require not an abandonment of multiculturalism, but its expansion. One of the main building blocks missing from current or earlier policies of multiculturalism is *mutual engagement* and *mutual accommodation* which 'involves the adaptation of the inserted group to existing conditions, as well as a change in the structure of the larger society and a redefinition of its criteria of cohesion. Accommodation involves an internalization of difference' (Bauböck 1996, 114). Secondly, *multiculturalism should include the whole society*, not just migrants. By establishing that multiculturalism is for everyone, not just for migrants or ethnic minorities, it provides a basis for the process of 'mutual accommodation'. Pushing this argument further, Uberoi argues for a 'multicultural national identity' (Uberoi 2007). Creating such a space would avoid the fear that multiculturalism is segregationist.

Bhikhu Parekh, through a framework of 'civic' or 'critical multiculturalism', develops his notion of a multicultural society by suggesting the need for a 'common sense of belonging'. We can arrive at this by developing 'a body of moral values which deserve the respect of all human beings' (Parekh 2000, 237-8). In similar vein to Young (2000), he advocates that 'all constituent cultures' should participate in the creation of a climate of equality and they should have the 'ability to interrogate each other'. The outcome cannot be determined (Parekh 2000, 221).[12] Different values

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[12] Chapter 7 provides an in-depth analysis of how to create the possibilities for mutual accommodation.

need to be put to the test through dialogue and a collective language needs to emerge. The likely outcome is a change in societal structures, institutions and identities based on a process of engaging with difference. As Sennett suggests, 'this view of the communal 'we' is far deeper than the often superficial sharing of common values …Teamwork, for instance, does not acknowledge differences in privilege or power, and so is a weak form of community…Strong bonding between people means engaging over time with their differences' (Sennett 1999, 143). Social solidarity cannot work without it.

Nevertheless, our definition of solidarity needs to be global so as to avoid the problem of Eurocentrism. Parekh (2008) proposes three Principles of Global Ethics: the principle of equal worth; the principle of human solidarity; and the principle of respect for difference or plurality. The advantage of these three principles of Global Ethics is that they are relevant to life at the local, national and global levels. While citizens have special ties with their fellow citizens, as globally-oriented citizens, they also have *duties to outsiders*, that is, to foreigners who live in our countries, and we have a duty to human beings in general, wherever they are. Significantly, our actions may affect others and we are responsible for their consequences (Parekh 2008). Parekh's definition of 'common belonging' is instructive because he pushes it beyond the usual understanding of the term in which we include common interests and shared feelings of belonging to a common system of rights and obligations. His definition also includes the idea that we are dependant on each other for our well-being and that this *interdependence* should help us sort out the tensions of sharing a common life. Thus, common belonging requires the expansion of identities as well as a convergence of identities of the various parties that are central to our national identity (Parekh 2008).

Expanded and changing identities and new diversities suggest that not only do solidarities change but there are *different types of solidarities*[13] that need to be considered. For example, if people have multiple identities then it is likely they will have multiple solidarities. Moreover, it is possible that people have 'differentiated unities', that is, they might unite on some issues and not on others. We might unite on some cultural matters but not on political issues. This does not undermine the importance of negotiating principles by which to live together with our differences. Similarly, differences in power relations are likely to create different types of solidarities. Our policies on trade and finance are often the root cause of the immigration that western democratic societies do not want. Recognizing the importance of interdependency and the differences in power relations between sending and receiving countries, for instance, might bring into question how we in the western democratic societies develop our duties to outsiders. Finally, solidarity can mean different things for different groups. What does 'solidarity from below' look like? Solidarity can have different meanings for immigrants.

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[13] Thanks to Nina Glick Schiller for her ideas on different types of solidarity.

Conclusion

The relationship between solidarity and difference remains in constant tension. The drive for community and for solidarity is an important human endeavour; and the desire to shut out difference periodically emerges through insecurity, and through nationalism, racism and other forms of discrimination and exclusion. In recent years, the tendency has been to explain this tension and its emergent problems through the mantra of globalization. The process of globalization has changed the economic, political and social relationships between and within states and the relationship between individuals and groups. Global and state economies are based on structured inequalities and the changes in subjectivities and societal practices have developed from these structured circumstances.

By examining three major social transformations, we have seen how the development of *interdependent contradictions* led to a number of unpredictable outcomes, and how they have had a sustained effect on solidarity. For example, self- actualization was important for many groups who had long been excluded from important societal processes and institutions such as education. But this very self-actualization led to an over-reliance on individual concerns. The tension between individual needs and groups needs have been thrown into sharper relief. And as the welfare state has drifted away from its initial goals, people have become more insecure. Restructuring of the workplace and of work relations has also led to more freedom and more restrictions. Similarly, globalization has opened up the movement of goods and ideas, but the movement of people is blocked by governments. The plurality brought about by globalization and the diversity of choice for individuals has not necessarily translated into finding enduring ways of engaging with ethnic, cultural and religious diversities. Many migrants not considered integrated, are in reality integrated into labour markets. Some migrant groups in particular experience high levels of racism, yet are accused of not integrating. Perhaps the turn against immigrants and against difference is part of an exclusionary discourse contributing to the 'neo-authoritarian drift'.

Similarly, the process of individualization and the related changes in collective identities has led to a longing for community by majority ethnic groups. The move away from multiculturalism and the change in attitudes to diversity exemplifies an inclination for a newfound collectivism: the desire for a notion of community or collective identity to be engineered through limited definitions of integration and social cohesion. Communities, integration and cohesion cannot be manufactured through the likes of list of values, through an entreaty for sameness, nor by blaming immigrants and ethnic minorities, nor through sanctions. The construction of collective identities, of communities, of solidarity requires that we seriously engage with inequality and work at bringing about a fair distribution of power, where immigrants and ethnic minorities become equal participators in all societal institutions and are systematically part of decision-making processes. Rather than drop multiculturalism, we need to expand it. This can be achieved by ensuring that multiculturalism is for

everyone and that diversity becomes a part of our national identity. We would need to develop a process of mutual engagement by setting up mechanisms for dialogue at local, regional and national levels. In a diverse world, solidarity cannot only be based on homogeneities. Paradoxically, solidarity has to be based on difference. Until we seriously and systematically engage with our differences, social cohesion as it is currently defined in public and policy discourses, remains a weak and unattainable form of solidarity.

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