Accommodating diversity: why current critiques of multiculturalism miss the point

Ellie Vasta

WP-07-53

COMPAS does not have a centre view and does not aim to present one. The views expressed in this document are only those of its independent author.
Accommodating diversity: why current critiques of multiculturalism miss the point

Abstract
Some European countries of immigration are currently experiencing a widespread ‘moral panic’ about immigrants and ethnic and religious diversity. This has led to a questioning of policies that recognize the maintenance of group difference and the formation of ethno-cultural and religious communities. Such approaches, which have variously been labelled ‘cultural’, ‘multicultural’, ‘diversity’ or ‘minority’ policies, share important common features concerning group recognition and group-based service provision. A backlash has occurred in policy and in public discourse, with migrants being blamed for not meeting their ‘responsibility to integrate’, hiding behind what are perceived to be ‘backward or illiberal cultural practices’. Such a culturalist approach is blamed for placing collective rights in place of individual rights. In this paper, I will argue that such positions are often based on a disregard of racial, gender and class inequalities. I will briefly examine how the state constructs migrants in multiculturalism and secondly, how immigrants and ethnic minorities are positioned in the public discourse. British and Dutch policy changes are briefly examined and compared with the multicultural policies of Canada and Australia. In Europe, in both policy and public discourses, there has been a shift away from multiculturalism to a demand for integration, cohesion and in some cases, assimilationism. I explore the implications of this change and argue that instead of abandoning multiculturalism, we need to expand it.

Keywords: diversity, multiculturalism, integration, cohesion, Britain, Netherlands, Canada, Australia.

Author:
Ellie Vasta, COMPAS, Ellie.vasta@compas.ox.ac.uk
Introduction

Numerous European countries of immigration are currently experiencing a ‘moral panic’ about immigration and ethnic and religious diversity. Throughout Europe the ideas about how we accommodate difference are being challenged. In many countries there appears to be a retreat from multiculturalism, both in policy and public discourses, and a shift towards demands for integration of immigrants into dominant values, culture and social behaviour. There is a pervasive view that pluralist or multicultural approaches to immigrant inclusion into society have failed and that a large part of the problem lies with immigrants themselves.

A number of concerns have arisen about identity and specifically concerning ethnic or religious identities versus a perceived homogenous national identity. One fear is based on the premise that western democratic values will be destroyed by too many foreigners or by immigrants whose values are perceived to be different or inferior. There is a perception among some that alleged different or inferior values may threaten national identity and have a damaging effect on social cohesion, leading to violence and to a loss of freedom. On the other hand, some contend that immigrants and ethnic minorities have not done what they were meant to do – that is, to become like ‘us’. Many believe that immigrants have not met their responsibility to integrate, thus segregating themselves from the receiving society. An extreme argument is that multiculturalism supports a form of tribalism and that it segregates ethnic minorities and immigrants from the mainstream society.

Multiculturalism frequently elicits a paradox between the need for equality and cultural recognition (which is an important immigrant and ethnic minorities’ position) and, on the other hand, the desire for cultural assimilation (which increasingly has become the focus of numerous European receiving societies). In this paper, I will briefly examine how the state constructs migrants in multiculturalism and secondly, how immigrants and ethnic minorities are positioned in the public discourse. British and Dutch policy changes are briefly examined and compared with the multicultural policies of Canada and Australia. A number of dominant themes in the public
discourse are also examined. In both policy and public discourses, there has been a shift away from multiculturalism to a demand for integration, cohesion and in some cases, assimilationism. I explore the implications of this change and argue that instead of abandoning multiculturalism, we need to expand it.

Models of Inclusion

Over the past fifty years there have been varied official responses to the phenomenon of immigration. Some countries sought immigrants to boost their numbers in the labour market both from their former colonies and from other countries. In many cases, immigrants were expected to return to their homelands when no longer needed. For immigrant settlers, various models of inclusion have emerged over the past fifty years focusing on variations of assimilation, integration and multiculturalism. These include assimilation/republican model (France), guestworker models (Germany, Switzerland, Austria, Netherlands, and more recently the UK with the work permits system), Race Relations (UK), multiculturalism (Canada, Australia, Sweden, Netherlands, Denmark, UK), Integration (Netherlands, Britain, Denmark, Germany). Currently, all these models are in a state of flux. What follows is a brief outline of the central ideas of the three main models.

Assimilation

Assimilation, according to Brubaker, can refer to a process of complete absorption, through policies and programs of forced integration, based on the idea of a certain end-state where immigrants are fully absorbed into the norms and values of the receiving society (Brubaker 2003). Another definition designates a process of becoming similar through a direction of change that includes a degree of choice for newcomers, concerned with the idea of a more procedural notion of searching for commonalities (Brubaker 2003). In general terms, both definitions are problematic because they do not accommodate ‘difference’ adequately, and the discriminatory structures of the receiving society that prevent integration are generally ignored. Consequently, assimilation does not allow for institutional change that would accommodate structural needs of ethnic minorities. The meaning of
assimilation varies. For example, Alba and Nee (1997, 864) state that their definition is rather ‘agnostic about whether the changes wrought by assimilation are one-sided or more mutual’. In their theory, assimilation is neither uni-directional nor is there a sense of compulsion. However, non-American theorists and researchers, although using such terms as incorporation, integration and inclusion, ‘tend to either avoid the word assimilation or are critical of it’ (Kivisto 2005, 21).

In the 1950s and early 1960s, many countries of immigration, including the UK, adopted a policy of assimilation in which ethnic minorities were expected to assimilate into the host culture by shedding their own cultures and traditions. Cultural recognition is anathema in this model. Today, policies geared towards ‘assimilation’ exist in France where the central idea is that immigrants become assimilated into the political community as French citizens. The French believe that through their Republican model of assimilation, they have the capacity for assimilating minorities into a dominant culture based on linguistic homogeneity and civic nationalism. The US has a mixed model for immigrant incorporation. It is based on a policy of ‘benign neglect’ in the public sphere, relying on the integrative potential of the private sphere, such as the family and the community (Castles and Miller 2003, 287).

**Integration**

For some, integration falls somewhere between assimilation and multiculturalism, while for others it is a form of assimilation. There are two main usages or meanings. The first refers to a ‘process through which immigrants and refugees become part of the receiving society. Integration is often used in a normative way, to imply a one-way process of adaptation by newcomers to fit in with a dominant culture and way of life. This usage does not recognise the diversity of cultural and social patterns in a multicultural society, so that integration seems to be merely a watered down form of assimilation’. The second usage refers to integration being ‘a two-way process of adaptation, involving change in values, norms and behaviour for both newcomers and members of the existing society. This includes recognition of the role of the ethnic
community and the idea that broader social patterns and cultural values may change in response to immigration’ (Castles, et al. 2003, 14-15).

One main problem with integration is that it can be a vague concept that can mean whatever people want it to mean. For some it represents a return to the principle of assimilation (Back, et al. 2002; Entzinger 2003; Worley 2005), highlighted by measures to enforce cultural conformity through, for instance, tests of ‘Britishness’ or ‘Dutchness’. For others, it is a genuine process of supporting immigrants to integrate into the receiving society, though one criticism is that support does not go far enough. Supporting immigrants and ethnic minorities to become full participating citizens in the receiving societies’ culture and institutions is an important part of the process, but this is generally the extent of the two-way part of the process. It does not include genuine procedural change in values, norms and behaviour for members of the existing society. How it accommodates diversity is not necessarily a part of the equation. In other words, how a two-way process of cultural recognition would work remains unclear.

**Cohesion**

As with integration, cohesion can be a vague concept that can mean whatever people want it to mean. It is sometimes referred to as social cohesion and at other as community cohesion. It has also been used interchangeably with social capital concerned with social trust, reciprocity between people and ethnic groups, co-operation and civic engagement (Aldridge and Halpern 2002; Putnam 2003). Beauvais and Jenson examine five possible conceptions of social cohesion: social cohesion as common values and civic culture; as social order and social control; as social solidarity and equality; as social networks and social capital; as sense of belonging and identity (in Chan, et al. 2006, 287).

Many people, particularly those on the Left, dislike and avoid the notion of cohesion due to an inherent meaning of social order and social control that appears too similar to ‘assimilation’. Others prefer a pluralist approach to social cohesion as adopted in Canada where it is used to
promote multiculturalism and ‘encompasses a wide range of range of elements, from income distribution, employment, housing, universal access to health care and education systems to political and civic participation’ (Chan, et al. 2006, 278). In Britain, the current proposed strategy stresses a more individualist approach - ‘getting on well together’ and ‘adapting to one another’, and rejection of multiculturalism (Commission on Integration and Cohesion June 2007).1

**Multiculturalism**

Australia, Canada and Sweden, in the 1970s introduced multiculturalism as official policies of immigrant inclusion. Although there are numerous definitions of multiculturalism (Vertovec and Wessendorf 2006), we can generally condense them to two key principles – social equality and participation, and cultural recognition:

- **The first key principle** is that immigrant participation is necessary in all societal institutions, including the labour market, education etc to achieve social equality. This requires firstly, government policies that make sure that immigrants have access to various rights e.g. anti-discrimination, equal opportunity and services delivered in ways that match needs of different groups (according to culture, gender, generation, location etc); and secondly, empowerment in the sense that immigrants need to acquire cultural capital (main language, cultural knowledge, ability to switch codes) and human capital (education, vocational training) needed to participate in the receiving society.

- **The second key principle** is that migrants have the right to pursue their own religion and languages and to establish communities. This is about cultural recognition, and respect for difference. Immigrants and ethnic minorities require social and institutional cultural recognition in order to provide continuity with their past, as a source of group solidarity and as a means of protection against discrimination and exclusion. Ultimately, it is considered necessary

---

1 See section below on Britain for a more extensive description.
for successful settlement. In order to be successful, any policy of inclusion needs to include both principles.

The Politics of Inclusion and Discontent

The development of each country’s models of inclusion has been influenced by specific economic and political histories, including colonialism, the post-war economic situation, historical racism, forms of nation building and citizenship (Castles and Miller 2003). Variants of both principles of multiculturalism outlined above have been adopted in Europe, including the UK, the Netherlands and Denmark. More recently, cities such as Berlin and Vienna have introduced ‘multicultural policies’ in contrast to integrationist national policies. European states have assumed some sort of responsibility to help immigrants settle or integrate. Yet despite their historical, economic and political differences, numerous European countries of immigration appear to be moving towards a desire for cultural homogeneity.

The continuing backlash against immigration and multiculturalism is occurring across countries, despite the adoption of different models of inclusion. There is a general crisis of confidence in all the models of inclusion. In Sweden, despite a policy of multiculturalism and integration, ethnic segregation and high immigrant unemployment persists (Schierup, et al. 2006). The Danes, for example, who have had versions of multiculturalism and integration for at least the past decade, are calling for a policy of inclusion informed by homogeneity (Hedetoft 2003). In France, the republican model insists that ethnic groups do not exist, therefore immigrants are meant to access all rights and services through mainstream services even if the majority of the population in the locality are immigrants and ethnic minorities. Despite tackling problems of inequality through an ideology of homogeneity, France is also facing a failed policy (Simon 2006). Britain and the Netherlands have both had variations of multicultural policies until recently. And in both countries

\[2\] Don Flynn shows how managed entrance policy and integration policies are connected in Britain - Flynn, D. 2003 "Tough as old boots"? Discussion Paper, Immigration Rights Project, Joint Council for Welfare of Immigrants (JCWI).
there has been an ideological shift in policy towards integration, social cohesion and assimilationism.

**Britain**

Britain has had a unique mix of inclusion policies - the *Race Relations* and *Multiculturalism* model\(^3\) which continues to this day; *Integration Strategies* for refugees which were introduced early this decade; and over the past five years the notion *Community Cohesion* has been developed culminating with the recent introduction of the *Commission for Integration and Cohesion* whose aim it is to recommend strategies for the integration of new immigrants and ethnic minorities. Both the Race Relations Acts and multiculturalism were specifically set up for ethnic minorities from the Commonwealth. The first Race Relations Acts of 1965 and 1968 were based on the idea that welfare agencies should be set up to help black immigrants with any problems but also to educate white communities about the immigrants. They were also premised on the idea that the state should end racial/ethnic discrimination and promote equality of opportunity through legal sanctions and public regulatory agencies (Solomos 2003, 80). This model of inclusion was based on the idea of high levels of state intervention in line with the then model of the welfare state. Multicultural policies were introduced in the schools in an attempt to give ethnic minority children language teaching and a culturally relevant education as a way of developing mutual respect and self-esteem in multiethnic classrooms. Some local governments introduced multicultural policies, such as labour market training programmes for ethnic minorities.

Nevertheless, Solomos comes to the conclusion that on the whole, the measures taken, such as some language courses, remained largely symbolic. He states, ‘Anti-discrimination legislation has been in place for nearly five decades and yet there is still widespread evidence of a high degree of discrimination in both the public and the private sector’ (Solomos 2003, 93). The intentions behind the policies have not been

---

\(^3\) In these country comparisons, rather than provide an in-depth overview of the policies I will simply examine the ideological/philosophical changes underpinning the models of inclusion.
achieved due to the significant gap between the rhetoric and the experience. In the 1990s, there was a shift away from interventionist anti-racist policies towards a more market-oriented approach. This approach was based on the policy of a de-regulated labour market and on the Thatcherite idea that service delivery is best privatised. Under this model, inequality has increased and certain groups cannot compete. In the UK in 2001-2, for example, among 16-24 year olds, Bangladeshis (36.9 per cent), Pakistanis (24.9 per cent) and African Caribbeans (23.7 per cent) had rather high rates of unemployment compared with 10.9 per cent of Whites (Schierup, et al. 2006,125).

There has been much debate in the UK about immigrant diversity, multiculturalism, integration and segregation. On an almost yearly basis a new official strategy or commission on ‘cohesion’ has been introduced, for example, Guidance on Community Cohesion (LGA 2002); Building a picture of community cohesion (Home Office Community Cohesion Unit 2003); The End of Parallel Lives report (Community Cohesion Panel 2004); Strength in Diversity - Towards a Community Cohesion & Race Equality Strategy (Home Office 2004); Improving Opportunity, Strengthening Society (Home Office 2005).

Although ‘integration as a two-way process’ is a much advocated concept, there is some confusion about the exact meaning of the process. For example, in 2005 the British Government carried out wide consultation reported in the document Strength in Diversity - Towards a Community Cohesion & Race Equality Strategy (Home Office 2004). The aim was to develop a renewed programme of action across government and more widely, to support immigrant and ethnic minority integration, to build community cohesion and reduce inequalities. It stated that ‘integration in Britain is not about assimilation into a single homogenous culture, it is a two-way process with responsibilities on both new arrivals and established communities’ (Home Office 2004, 4). Importantly, the responsibility of the state in the two-way process is to ‘provide practical support to overcome barriers to integration, both for the individuals newly arrived in Britain and
for the local community into which they are being welcomed’ (Home Office 2004, 18).

The discourse of the ‘two-way process’ sounds most reasonable, appearing in many of the reports. And in numerous documents, as in the *Improving Opportunity, Strengthening Society* (Home Office 2005), there is support for multiple identities (Home Office 2005, 45):

> For those settling in Britain, the Government has a clear expectation that they will integrate into our society and economy because all the evidence indicates that this benefits them and the country as a whole...we consider that it is important for all citizens to have a sense of inclusive British identity. This does not mean that people need to choose between Britishness and other cultural identities, nor should they sacrifice their particular lifestyles, customs and beliefs. They should be proud of both.

Many of the reports state that the white or established communities also need to engage, but how this would work is rarely spelt out. When the responsibilities of the established communities is mentioned, it is usually put in terms of what they are not expected to do – ‘Recognising that integration can mean changes for the established community does not mean abandoning the values that we share as citizens: respect for the law and democratic structures, fairness, tolerance and respect for difference’ (Home Office 2004, 8). The prevailing meaning of the two-way process is that immigrants should integrate into the societal institutions, values, beliefs and social behaviour; the other way is that the state will support their integration. But this is a limited definition for it does not include the idea of ‘mutual accommodation’ when it comes to cultural values and traditions.

Ultimately, this two-way process becomes a smokescreen for the contradictions within the policy and public discourses. Immigrants and ethnic minorities are expected to integrate, to choose Britishness and to retain their own cultures and traditions, thus developing or maintaining
multiple identities. If the same were requested of the 'dominant community', meaning the majority ethnic group (who by the way also have multiple identities), then a genuine two-way process could pave the way for mutual accommodation. Their discourse reveals an openness to multiculturalism, to accommodating difference through the idea that immigrants can develop or maintain multiple identities. But the contradiction in public and policy discourses arises because immigrants are told, through policies of integration and cohesion, that they are expected to take the responsibility to integrate. In this two-way model of integration, everyone is supposedly doing their bit. But herein, lies the problem. While it is important for the state to ensure that immigrants are provided with the necessary resources and rights to 'integrate', this model falls short. Worley calls it 'a discourse of assimilation, within a framework of integration' (Worley 2005, 489). The other part of the two-way process would require that the dominant, established groups also take the responsibility to integrate into an ethnically and culturally diverse society. A genuine two-way process would require a strategy of 'mutual accommodation' which will be elaborated later in the paper.

In Britain, Race Relations remains, but multiculturalism is being replaced by integration and cohesion. Although multiculturalism has been blamed as the cause of social problems by Trevor Phillips, Chairperson of the Commission for Racial Equality (Phillips 2005) and by David Cameron, leader of the Conservatives, it is defended by the Mayor of London, where many multicultural programmes are in place, serving the needs of ethnic minorities and immigrants alike (BBC News November 2006). Nevertheless, in the recent government report of the Commission on Integration and Cohesion (June 2007), multiculturalism is seen to concentrate too much on difference and not on similarities (June 2007, 46). In this report, cohesion has been coupled with integration, where 'cohesion is principally the process that must happen in all communities to ensure different groups of people get on well together; while integration is principally the process that ensures new residents and existing residents adapt to one another' (June 2007, 9). An integrated and cohesive community is based on four key principles – a sense of shared futures, models of responsibilities and rights, civility and mutual
respect, and making social justice visible (June 2007, 43). Integration and cohesion is ‘everybody’s business’ (June 2007, 39). Equality remains an important part of the discourse, but how this is to be specifically approached remains unclear, particularly in this document. Here the concern with equality or social justice refers to tackling myths, engaging the media, address perceptions of special treatment among existing communities (June 2007, 11). This is consistent with the focus of the earlier, interim report which asserted that ‘interaction is key’ in the process of immigrant integration and cohesion (June 2007, 22).

The Netherlands

Over the past sixty years, the Netherlands has adopted successive models of inclusion based on three main approaches (with some overlap) that correspond with specific policies – Pillarization from the 1960s and 1970s. The Dutch tradition of ‘pillarization’ emerged in the 19th century as a means of allowing tolerance for groups who maintained different religious beliefs, especially Catholics and Protestants, by allowing them to create their own institutions. The modern version meant that various societal sub-groups could have their own state-sponsored and semi-autonomous institutions for health care, social welfare, education etc. The Ethnic Minorities Policy introduced in 1983 was developed as a welfare policy for certain segregated social groups (Penninx 2004). It can be seen as a continuation of some aspects of pillarization, which generously funded new ethnic and religious minority communities for their own places of worship and media, and certain types of educational provision on the same basis as pre-existing parallel institutional arrangements. During the 1980s, policy measures were quite substantial particularly in the legal-political, socio-economic, and cultural domains. In many respects this was a multicultural policy though it was not a term used in the Netherlands. Integration Policy was introduced in 1994 in order to combat the increasing labour market and education segregation among some ethnic minorities. It was based on the idea of ‘mainstreaming’- i.e. improving the inclusion of immigrants in mainstream services in order to move away from the ethno-specific provision popularly associated with the Ethnic Minorities Policy. While the same earlier policy dimensions remained,
importantly a new direction was taken with more emphasis placed on Dutch language courses, social orientation and vocational training (Entzinger 2003).

The Integration Policy of the past decade signals an important ideological shift in the Netherlands. Up to this time, the welfare state had been based on the idea of a general safety net and a notion of communal care. There was now a move away from state protection to an ideology of self-sufficiency and responsibility (Blok Report Netherlands 2004, 3). This broader shift was reflected in the move from ethnic minorities policy, which in many ways was a multicultural policy, to integration policy. The ideology behind the change to mainstreaming services in the 1990s was more oriented towards individual than towards group needs of ethnic minorities (Duyvendak, et al. 2005; Fermin 1997; Scholten 2003), undermining the significance of culturally appropriate services (Entzinger 2003). There has also been a shift from state protection towards self-sufficiency of the individual; a shift away from group identity/needs to individual identity/needs. Thus fitting into the receiving culture is seen as an individual process. The City of Amsterdam, for example, has defined its ‘diversity’ policy as a ‘post multicultural’ policy where ‘everybody is entitled to participate, not as a member of a group, but as an individual with a multifaceted identity’ (Uitermark, et al. 2005, 17-18).

The most significant change includes the introduction of sanctions for newcomers who might be deprived of their welfare benefits if they failed to take the classes (Blok Report Netherlands 2004). In December 2004, the Dutch Ministry of Justice declared in a press release ‘Immigrants required to take the test – especially newcomers - will only be eligible for an independent residence and/or a permanent residence permit (regular or asylum) once they have passed the integration examination’ (Dutch Ministry of Justice 2004). The emphasis on compulsion, with the threat of sanctions, rather than on quality and delivery of services reveals a clear shift away from multiculturalism towards an assimilationist approach of immigrant inclusion, akin to Brubaker’s first definition of assimilation. Ten years after the introduction of Integration policy, ethnic minority
participation remains low in many sectors. For example, ethnic minority youth unemployment rates remain higher than those of the ‘native’ Dutch. In 2004, unemployment rates (in percentages) among 15-24 year olds varied significantly: Turkish/Moroccan 24, Surinamese/Antillians 23 and ‘native’ Dutch 12 (Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, Den Haag 2005 in Vasta 2007).

In general terms, the state is often ambivalent about ensuring that policy programmes are adequately funded to produce the required outcomes (Siedenberg 2004). This produces inbuilt failures leaving room to blame migrants for not adequately assuming their responsibilities as ‘newcomers’ or as new citizens. One poignant example is provided by Driessen who in an analysis of intercultural educational (ICE) programs (e.g. multicultural curriculum, combating structural discrimination etc) in the Netherlands concludes that they have ‘simply languished from the very beginning. It is an extremely vague concept receiving absolutely no attention at the schools. The government does not seem to know how to handle it, either’ (Driessen 2000, 67). Similar problems exist with the Integration Policy which compels newcomers to take language lessons in Dutch. Firstly, evaluations of integration and language programmes conducted between 2000 and 2003 found that many of the Dutch language lessons were taught in a uniform way, not taking into account the differing needs of immigrants ranging from people with limited formal education to professionals, and of non-employed women (Siedenberg 2004). Another problem is that ‘whereas originally, the government funded the municipalities to organize the integration courses, the new system will be such that the migrants must bear the full costs and the courses will be privatized’ (Doomernik 2005, 34).

In the new century, policy discourse reflects a neo-conservative ideology that is more restrictive, and a public discourse that has become more inflammatory. Integration is presented as a one-way process – immigrants should integrate into Dutch language, culture and history. Of course, it is not that courses - language training, social orientation, vocational training - should not be made available to immigrants and ethnic minorities. Rather, it is the sanctions, such as imposition of fines,
withholding citizenship and even rejecting applications of would be migrants if they have not passed certain courses that raise contradictions for liberal democratic societies (Entzinger 2003, 80; Ghorashi 2003, 163). This idea of compulsory integration actually goes back to an expectation of old-style notions of one-way assimilation by immigrants into a national culture imagined as homogeneous and superior.

In conclusion, both Britain and the Netherlands have anti-discrimination legislation, though it appears that racism is dealt with in a more forthright manner in the UK than in the Netherlands where the term ‘discrimination’ is preferred instead of ‘racism’ (see Vasta 2006). What is unique about the UK is that through its Race Relations Acts it acknowledges and has attempted to deal with racism in a way that many other countries have not. In the UK, one small step in the right direction is that recently the criminal justice system publicly admitted that institutional racism exists. On the other hand, the Netherlands developed more comprehensive ‘multicultural’ policies through socio-economic, legal-political and cultural programmes for various groups. Neither country, however, systematically included the provision of English and Dutch language teaching for all who needed it, though both have introduced the majority language through their ‘integration policies’, again the Dutch doing so more comprehensively. Both countries have shifted away from multiculturalism, preferring policies of integration and, in the UK, ‘integration and cohesion’.

Further comparisons – Canada and Australia
Canada and Australia are frequently held up as the showpieces of multiculturalism. Both countries developed multicultural policies in the early 1970s at a time when new social movements were struggling for the rights and equal participation of women, ethnic and other minorities. Recently, however, their paths have been diverging. Up until the early 1970s, Australia’s official policy was assimilation. In Canada and Australia, the first principle of multiculturalism, mentioned earlier, covers what is generally referred to as ‘settlement policy’ which is a term for a range of programmes, such as English language tuition, aiming to assist (new) immigrants to participate in the social and economic life of the receiving
country. Although settlement policy is non-negotiable in the sense that it is a basic right for newcomers to receive assistance to settle into the labour market, housing etc, the problem is that in Canada and Australia as well as in all countries of immigration, along with the weakening of the welfare state, there has been a continual cutting back of funding to major programs. However, one outstanding feature of Canadian and Australian multiculturalism has been the availability of language courses for immigrants in the official languages, though this has been considerably undermined in recent years, especially in Australia, due to funding cuts.

The Canadian model of multiculturalism has numerous flaws, not least in terms of labour market integration of some groups, the position of immigrant women and institutional racism experienced by various groups (Bassel 2006; Helly 2004; Omidvar and Richmond 2003). Nevertheless, services have been developed and influenced by a policy of multiculturalism based on values, such as human rights, equality, and the recognition of diversity, perceived as fundamental in the process of uniting Canadians. These foundation principles deal with collective and institutional issues. One outstanding feature of Canadian multiculturalism is that it has been enshrined in the Charter of Rights and Freedom of 1982 introduced into the Canadian constitution. As a result, the government aims to promote acceptance of immigrants and multiculturalism by ‘de-legitimization any idea that the society is based on a single ethno-national community’ and by socializing the community towards accommodating diversity’ (Helly 2004, 6). Importantly, multiculturalism has become a recognised part of Canadian national identity. It concentrates on four areas/principles – combating racism and discrimination; making Canadian institutions more reflective of Canadian diversity; promoting shared citizenship; and cross-cultural understanding.

Unlike in Canada, where multiculturalism is enshrined in the constitution, Australian multiculturalism is somewhat fragile and open to attack. Multiculturalism had its heyday from the early 1970s to the mid-1990s. Since then a conservative government has continually downgraded its importance. The Australian principles shifted from collective issues to
individual reactions and rights, similar to the turn taken in some European countries. By contrast to Canada, the principles of multiculturalism in Australia include - responsibilities of all; respect for each person; fairness for each person; benefits for all (Department of Immigration and Citizenship 2007). The Canadian commitment to human rights and equality are linked to specific legal commitments, whereas the Australian principles, important as they are, are more political platitudes. Worse still, Jayasuriya suggests there are two brands of multiculturalism currently in Australia. One is ‘civic multiculturalism’ based ‘not on shared values but shared identity derived from an acceptance of, and identification with, a common societal cultural ie a common set of social and political institutions’ (Jayasuriya 2005, 2). This type of multiculturalism, existing for three decades from the 1970s to the mid 1990s, was recently adopted by the Western Australian Charter on Multiculturalism and the Victorian Multicultural Act. This is in stark contrast to the multiculturalism pushed by the Federal Government based on the notion of ‘unity in diversity’ where immigrants are entreated to integrate into ‘core cultural values’, ‘all derived from a core of values of the anglo celtic cultural heritage’. This, Jayasuriya indicates, is a return to the cultural assimilation of the 1950s and 1960s (Jayasuriya 2005, 2).

As migratory patterns have become more complex and multi-directional, Australia’s reactions have become similar to those in European immigration countries. Politicians and the public are finding it hard to come to terms with global changes, as the disproportionate reaction to the growth in asylum seeker arrivals reveals. The fears of loss of sovereignty and identity have also spilled over into the social policy area, leading to a questioning of multiculturalism. Today Australia appears fearful and restrictive – a society that fears invasion from the North, and where many see diversity as a threat.

The Public Discourse

Too much diversity undermines social cohesion

In the UK, some people argue that too much (ethnic/religious) diversity undermines social cohesion by challenging western democratic values
such as freedom, and rights. More specifically, the values of some ethnic and religious groups are seen to undermine these democratic values. It is argued that the presence and recognition of such different values or, put another way, the loss of common values, and the promotion of cultural diversity through multiculturalism, will only exacerbate the problem (Goodhart 2004). Earlier, the Cantle report (Cantle 2001) had argued that multiculturalism had failed ‘to assert and prioritize core national values’ (Lewis and Neal 2005, 431). After 9/11 in the US and 7/7 in the UK, there has also been concern that Muslim communities have not integrated. In some countries, part of the debate is characterised by the idea ‘that ‘our’ values and culture are indisputably superior’ (Hedetoft 2003). This debate has varied across countries. In the Netherlands and Denmark, for example, the backlash has been mainly against the ethnic minorities, particularly Muslims who have been there for several decades, and who are seen not to have integrated.

The fear that immigrant/ethnic minority values may have a damaging affect on solidarity and social cohesion in the receiving society is mainly targeted at perceptions of Islamic values. In particular, the concern is that the strong sense of Islamic identity can obstruct integration and social cohesion, leading to violence and to a loss of freedom. Thus, part of the popular and political debate stresses ‘the need to reassert ‘core values’...These values are typically associated with Christian, Western, European liberalism, and contrasted with those thought representative of Islamism: segregation and suppression of women (veiling), forced/arranged marriages, female circumcision, separate education, the power of religious as opposed to secular authorities’ (Grillo 2004, 17). The fear over loss of democratic values makes it easier for policy and public discourses to demand a return to a dominant national discourse of assimilation. Parekh warns that unless diversity ‘is nurtured with the same diligence as solidarity’ it runs the risk of withering away. Alternatively, ‘[d]iversity fosters new sources of energy, creativity and imagination, expands our range of choices, enables us to see the strength and limitations of our own way of life’ (Parekh 2004, 7). The situation in the cities varies

---

4 I use the term ‘cultural diversity’ in a broad generic sense to also include religious, linguistic diversity etc.
largely from the rural areas and from national debates. A city like London, for example, which has been multi-ethnic and multicultural for many decades, is much less concerned about the so-called ill-effects of diversity because multiculturalism runs through the fabric of the city. There, the backlash has more to do with the distribution of resources – it is a class issue (Hewitt 2005).

**Immigrants and ethnic minorities strain the welfare system**

A related theme is that too many migrants will place a strain on social resources or, pushing the argument further, in some countries there is a view that too many immigrants and ethnic minorities have become too dependant on welfare. In the Netherlands, for example, Koopmans suggests that some immigrant groups have become too dependant on welfare and comes to the conclusion that ‘strong multiculturalism’ combined with a ‘strong welfare state’ has contributed to the failure of immigrant integration (Koopmans 2003; Koopmans 2006). Strong multiculturalism is defined as ‘a set of integration policies that sees it as the active duty of the state to promote and protect minority cultures, and sanctifies individuals’ undeniable rights to have social institutions accommodate their special requirements (Koopmans 2006, 23). However, inconsistent development of policies and poor delivery of programmes, as mentioned earlier, are not part of this equation.

On the other hand, in their research Banting and Kymlicka (2004b), listed 8 multicultural policies (MCPs): 1) parliamentary affirmation of multiculturalism; 2) the adoption of multiculturalism in school curriculum; 3) the inclusion of ethnic representation/sensitivity in the mandate of public media or media licensing; 4) exemptions from dress-codes, Sunday-closing legislation etc; 5) allowing dual citizenship; 6) the funding of ethnic group organizations’ cultural activities; 7) the funding of bi-lingual education or mother-tongue instruction; 8) affirmative action. Out of a possible score of 8, countries with strong MCPs (Australia, Canada) scored at 6 out of the possible 8; modest MCPs scored 5.5 (Belgium, Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, Sweden, UK, US); weak MCPs include Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Germany,
Greece, Japan, Norway, Spain, Switzerland (Banting and Kymlicka 2004b, 25). When they compared the welfare states with strong multicultural policies and those who have resisted such programmes, they found no evidence to suggest that multicultural policies erode the welfare state (Banting and Kymlicka 2004b, 32). The authors stress that some countries ‘have managed to combine high levels of immigration and multiculturalism on the one hand and serious commitments to redistribution on the other’ (Banting and Kymlicka 2004a, 1).

\textbf{Immigrants and ethnic minorities have not taken the responsibility to integrate}

This leads into a third theme, that migrants/ethnic minorities have not taken the responsibility to integrate into the receiving country and, by implication, they have segregated themselves. In the Netherlands, some believe that some immigrants haven’t taken the responsibility to integrate because the welfare system and multiculturalism is too generous (Koopmans 2003; Koopmans 2006). In the UK, one argument claims that the maintenance of ethnic identity and targeted social programmes, in other words, multiculturalism, can perpetuate socio-economic disadvantage and lead to segregation (Phillips 2005). Part of the criticism is that ‘...multiculturalism means defining people as different - black, white, Asian, Muslim, Irish and so on - and then treating them differently’ (Casciani 2005). Some policies, such as the provision of public housing for immigrants, have inadvertently caused segregation, though this is frequently seen as immigrants segregating themselves. The marginalisation of various immigrant and ethnic minority groups in education, in the labour market is rarely part of the debate about the reason some groups are not ‘integrating’.

Nevertheless, Ghorashi for example explains that in the Netherlands, ‘the recent discursive assumption has been that the social and economic problems of immigrants will be solved once they distance themselves from their culture and assimilate into Dutch society’ (2003, 165-166). By retaining strong attachments to their cultures, religions, home countries etc, immigrants are blamed for not taking the responsibility to integrate.
into the receiving society. Modood, on the other hand, suggests that ethnic minorities are ‘integrated’. In Britain this ‘is marked by an ethnic assertiveness’ in which ethnic minorities have challenged values and identities due to ‘the feeling of not being respected or of lacking access to public space’ (Modood 2007, 50). Such challenges have provided a means for integration in Britain (Modood 2007, 49):

Ethnic minority self-concepts can certainly have an oppositional or political character but it is not usually at the price of integration per se, illustrating that integration can take different forms. Indeed, political mobilization and participation, especially protest and contestation, has been one of the principal means of integration in Britain.

**The receiving country has been too lenient/generous**

Another notable argument, mainly from the Netherlands, is that the receiving country has been too lenient by not expecting enough of migrants. The line of reasoning adopted by Paul Scheffer, an influential Dutch journalist, and other critics of immigrant integration, is that the Dutch have been benevolent by providing funding and resources to help immigrants integrate while immigrants have not taken their responsibility to integrate (Engbersen 2003, 4; Entzinger 2003; Entzinger 2004). One part of the claim is that members of some ethnic minorities, such as Turks and Moroccans, have not put in the effort to find jobs, and in particular have not learnt the language, culture and history of the Dutch.

Similarly, Koopmans, as noted earlier, maintains that in the strong version of multiculturalism, the Dutch state has been too generous in funding minorities to preserve their languages, cultures and religion, but also, the Dutch have not seen segregation and ‘otherness’ ‘as a bad thing at all’ (Koopmans 2006, 18). However, Duyvendak et al. (2005, 13-14) suggest there is a lack of empirical data to support the claim that Dutch integration policy has failed because the Dutch have been too tolerant of cultural and religious difference. They claim there was too much inconsistency in policy development and delivery. In the public discourse
and in parts of the elite, there is a widespread tendency to blame the migrant. According to Entzinger, the problem with Scheffer’s argument is that it displays a static understanding of cultures and it ignores the immense diversity among immigrants. In addition very few people of immigrant background took part in these debates (Entzinger 2003, 79).

The culturalism in multiculturalism
The shift away from multiculturalism partially entails a move away from ‘cultural recognition’, that is, a move away from the right to pursue one’s own language, traditions and culture in favour of those of the dominant culture. By introducing Britishness and Dutchness tests, by fearing that our democratic values will be swamped by their alleged un-democratic values (as evidenced in the cartoons controversy), their perceived lack of integration is often blamed on their cultures or religions. Part of the problem is that immigrant cultures are seen as fixed and inflexible, with very little understanding of the gradual transformation immigrants undergo when in contact with other cultures. Furthermore, western liberalism becomes the fighting creed, for ‘[o]ther’ cultures will have to adapt to it, because it is simply the way we do things here’ (Tempelman 1999, 22).

Multiculturalism is often blamed for preaching cultural relativism, in that it provides the foundation that all cultures are to be treated as equal. This issue has been considered by Wikan (2002), when she examines a number of case studies describing forced marriages of young Norwegian citizens. The young women who fled were returned, against their will, to their families by social services. Her argument is that cultural rights of the group overrode the individual rights of the young people and that social services were implicated in this state of affairs (Wikan 2002, 145-6). Multiculturalism allowed a certain pandering to collective cultural rights by the state and the social services. Like Okin et al. (1999), by implying the culture/religion is backward and illiberal, she constructs cultures as unitary and fixed. Moreover, by condemning the groups and their cultural practices (Anthias 2002), she has

---

5 This controversy was sparked off when a Danish newspaper in late 2005 published cartoons of the prophet Muhammed, considered blasphemous by Muslims.
also fallen into the culturalist trap which she so strongly condemns. It 
becomes clear that she rests her analysis on a notion of ‘backward or illiberal 
cultural practices’ in order to explain what is essentially a matter of gender 
inequality, a problem prevalent in the society as a whole, not just in ethnic 
minority communities.

A similar argument can be made about domestic violence which, it is alleged, 
appears to be more prevalent in some immigrant and ethnic minority 
communities. Hirsi Ali, originally from Somalia and a member of the 
conservative liberal VVD at the time, gave legitimacy to the exclusionary 
rhetoric that had been circulating in the Netherlands, since the early 1990s, 
based on the perceived need to protect Dutch cultural values and norms from 
invasion, leading to what Ghorashi calls a form of ‘cultural fundamentalism’ 
(Ghorashi 2003, 165). Again, this culturalist or ethnicized position fails to 
explain that violence against women is about unequal power relations 
between men and women and needs to be tackled across ethnicities, 
religions and classes.

Modood suggests we remove culture from the equation (Modood 2007, 
39):

To speak of ‘difference’ rather than ‘culture’ as the sociological 
starting point is to recognize that the difference in question is not 
just constituted from the ‘inside’, from the minority culture, but from 
the outside, from the representations and treatment of the minorities 
in question...

The same goes for multiculturalism in that it is not about culture per se 
but about accommodating diversity and ensuring that immigrants and 
ethnic minorities can enjoy social equality, participation and recognition of 
their cultural difference. ‘This means that multiculturalism is characterized 
by the challenging, dismantling and the remaking of public identities’ 
(Modood 2007, 43). Lewis reminds us that ‘in the current policy universe 
part of the contestation is over how to conceptualize the term culture 
 itself’ (Lewis 2005, 553).
Expanding Multiculturalism

The arguments advanced against multiculturalism are numerous. Multiculturalism leads to segregation; it leads to welfare dependency; it prevents immigrants from integrating into the dominant culture and national identity; by extension, immigrants do not take the responsibility to integrate; multiculturalism undermines western democratic values; it allows an inflated ‘tolerance’ to cultural and religious difference; it is too focused on cultural rights of groups rather than on the rights of the individual. Ultimately, it concentrates too much on ethnic cultures, identities and religions to the detriment of immigrant integration into the language, culture and traditions of the dominant culture. These arguments are mainly concerned with cultural recognition and with national identities. Rarely, do the arguments concentrate on the ongoing inequality experienced by many immigrant groups throughout societal institutions and structures. It is this inequality that acts as a barrier to integration and social cohesion. Furthermore, as too little attention is given to these problems, most European countries of immigration have not fully engaged with ethnic diversity and multiculturalism to make it a genuine and workable process. As noted earlier, the implementation of multicultural (and even integration) policies and programmes vary from the stated goals and strategies.

Social cohesion or immigrant participation cannot be achieved without immigrants and ethnic minorities developing a sense of belonging. But this cannot be engineered directly through the likes of Britishness or Dutchness tests, or a policy shift towards assimilationism. Sense of belonging, shared values and trust can only emerge from the people themselves. In other words, social cohesion cannot be engineered (Amin 2002, 972). The structures and processes of equality need to provide the basis and resources for integration, out of which a sense of belonging is likely to emerge. In order to achieve this, rather than abandon multiculturalism, I suggest we expand it by considering an additional four principles, though the last two simply add emphasis to the two main principles of multiculturalism outlined earlier:

1. Mutual accommodation
2. Multiculturalism that embraces the whole society – it should not refer to only immigrants
3. Equality and full participation
4. Racism - engaging with racism/racial discrimination as a fundamental social phenomenon deeply rooted in the histories, cultures, traditions and institutions of western democracies.

**Mutual Accommodation**

One of the main building blocks missing from current or earlier policies of multiculturalism or integration is *mutual accommodation*. According to Baubock, mutual accommodation ‘involves the adaptation of the inserted group to existing conditions, as well as a change in the structure of the larger society and a redefinition of its criteria of cohesion. Accommodation involves an *internalization of difference*. The collective characteristics of inserted groups become accepted as distinctions *within* social positions and membership groups’ (Bauböck 1996, 114). Whilst mutual accommodation does occur at an everyday level (see Back 2002 on hybridity and syncretic cultures), there is very little debate about the mutual recognition of values, for example, around the family, in relation to women, children etc. in policy and in public discourse.

Some theorists (Sennett 2004; Taylor 1994) emphasize the importance of cultural recognition of and respect for immigrant cultures. To varying degrees, cultural recognition has been taken on board by numerous countries of immigration. But the aspects that liberal democracies find difficult to consider are the granting of cultural rights and changes in the dominant culture (Kymlicka 1995). Baubock states that the ‘norm of recognition involves mutuality’ which requires changes in receiving society structures and institutions (Bauböck 1996, 119). Mutual accommodation is not just about cultural recognition, but about structural changes where necessary and ensuring structural equality for ethnic minorities.

Bhikhu Parekh, through a framework of ‘civic’ or ‘critical multiculturalism’, develops his notion of a multicultural society by suggesting the need for a ‘common sense of belonging’. We can arrive at this by developing ‘a body of
moral values which deserve the respect of all human beings’ (Parekh 2000, 237-238). He advocates that ‘all constituent cultures’ should participate in the creation of a climate of equality and they should have the ‘ability to interrogate each other’. The outcome cannot be determined (Parekh 2000, 221). So, different values, civic and cultural, have to be put to the test through dialogue and a collective language needs to emerge. One important aspect of the civic multiculturalism is the process of dialogue and negotiation. Similarly, Young suggests that ‘the appearance of a shared world to all who dwell within it precisely requires that they are plural, differentiated, and separate, with different locations in and perspectives on that world that are the product of social action. By communicating to one another their differing perspectives on the social world in which they dwell together, they collectively constitute an enlarged understanding of that world’ (Young 2000, 112). The likely outcome is a change in societal structures and institutions based on mutual accommodation. This is indeed, the more relevant meaning of a ‘two-way process’.

**Multiculturalism includes the whole society**

The second additional principle is based on the idea that multiculturalism should belong to everyone, not just immigrants. Iris Young suggests that a consequence of social privilege of dominant groups is that their definition of the common good is expressed as ‘compatible with their experience, perspective and priorities’ (Young 2000, 108). By establishing that multiculturalism is for everyone, a foundation is provided for the process of ‘mutual accommodation’. If multiculturalism belongs to everyone, it undermines the claim that multiculturalism is segregationist and sets up a move away from the arguments that ‘we have been too tolerant and benevolent’ or that ‘Islam is a backward religion’.

Multiculturalism is not about pluralism as in separatism or tribalism. Rather, it is a philosophy and policy that promotes the acceptance of immigration and of cultural diversity by encouraging the recognition of immigrants and their children as legitimate citizens by the society and its

---

6 Parekh’s Chapter 7 provides an in-depth analysis of how to create the possibilities for mutual accommodation.
institutions. This entails an acceptance and affirmation of the fluidity of the national identity which in any case continues to change through the process of globalisation and through the interaction of cultures at the local level. The state can introduce programs that inform the society - established communities and immigrants alike - about cultural diversity. This is the point of pluralism or multiculturalism – that cultural diversity becomes an accepted value.

Multiculturalism can include the whole society through its national identity. In turn, multiculturalism can challenge the perceived homogeneous imagined national identity. Multiculturalism is not antithetical to, but rather is a reformer of national identity (Modood 2007, 148). Modood suggests that we need both strong multicultural and strong national identities (Modood 2007, 149-151):

...it does not make sense to encourage a strong multicultural or minority identities and weak common or national identities; strong multicultural identities are a good thing...but they need a framework of vibrant, dynamic, national narratives and the ceremonies and rituals which give expression to a national identity...And if there is nothing strong, purposive and inspiring to integrate into, why bother with integration?

The idea of a strong national identity needs to be pushed further. A strong national identity in a multiethnic society requires a strong commitment to the accommodation of difference. Given that there is a propensity for lists of what constitutes Britishness, accommodating diversity and the associated symbolism is paramount. If integration policy is to be a genuine ‘two-way process’, then the Canadians offer the best model for integration, through their policy of multiculturalism. This is due to the importance given to the accommodation of diverse ethnic/cultural/religious identities and its symbolic importance for the national identity. Indeed, that integration should be seen as a two-way process becomes irrelevant because first of all, it has become a multi-way process and secondly, because multiculturalism is enshrined in their constitution, it has become a part of the social fabric. If countries of
immigration cannot accept the multidimensionality of the national identity, then they cannot establish the process of mutual accommodation. This inability in turn will prohibit immigrant ‘sense of belonging’.

Equality and Full Participation

This third additional principle – equality and full participation – simply provides an emphasis to the first of the two key principles concerned with social equality and participation. This principle requires more than introducing anti-discrimination laws etc. Rather, there is a need to introduce new structural strategies and practices that deal with long-term inequality in the labour market, education etc that continues into the second generation. By equality we mean equality of access and outcomes. Problems with educational attainment and labour market participation have led to widespread social exclusion and alienation among some immigrant and ethnic minority groups. Immigrants who are economically and socially marginalised and who do not have a voice, are oppressed. Young points to the problem, suggesting that domination suppresses self-determination and that oppression systematically ‘prevents people from learning and using satisfying or expansive skills in socially recognized settings’ and can ‘inhibit people’s ability to express their feelings and perspective on social life in contexts where others can listen’ (Young 2000, 156).

Participation is usually understood as voting rights, being involved in the decision-making process and possessing citizenship. Many migrants do have voting rights, but have little involvement or representation in decision-making processes. Participation should refer to two factors – inclusion into the main societal institutions as well as involvement in associational life. The three main aspects of associational life – private, civic and public – need to be opened up to scrutiny and public debate in order to accommodate migrants. The very basis of these three elements of associational life is likely to change over time when various cultures come together in open discussion. In many European countries, immigrants rarely participate in non-immigrant organisations, although the number of parliamentary representatives from ethnic minority communities is on the rise. There are few structures that would facilitate a sharing of world views, of religious views, of views that
constitute the common good. At the last UK national elections, Yasmin Alibhai-Brown (2004/5):

spent a whole week in Bradford following all candidates in one area. They were all Asian, three were Muslim and one was not, and they were all vying for the same vote...In the week before the election I never saw a single woman at a public meeting. Nor were there any separate meetings organised for women. Every time I asked them, they said there were cultural problems in getting women to come to public meetings. I do not think this is acceptable. Women wanted information, and many of the women’s groups in that area were incensed that no provision had been made for a proper democratic debate with their future representative.

Dialogue and relevant ways of channelling issues and debates down to the grass roots level need to be found. Immigrants need their own collective associations some of which are arranged to defend their rights. Immigrant organisations and associations are important though some communities are not well organised and may need help. Resources need to be allocated to help immigrants, and women in particular, understand their rights and obligations, and this is best done through community and public dialogue. It cannot be achieved through coercion.

**Racism**

My fourth additional principle is that countries of immigration need to come to terms with the existence of **racism** and acknowledge the destructive effects this has on immigrants personally, as a collective and in terms of settlement and inclusion. One of the major barriers to immigrant integration is systemic institutional racism. For example, the large gap in unemployment rates between ‘natives and ‘whites’ and immigrants mentioned earlier in the Netherlands and the UK is frequently put down to cultural factors in the immigrant cultures, lack of effective networks, lack of individual qualifications. But these explanations cannot be justified, for example, for people with higher qualifications who still have higher unemployment rates than the ‘natives’ in the Netherlands. While UK institutions are well aware of
institutional racism, the problem remains (Solomos 2003). In the
Netherlands, where they do not use the term racism, preferring to call the
problem discrimination, systemic racial discrimination remains (Vasta 2007).
Many immigrants and their children remain marginalised whatever the policy
of inclusion.

In democratic societies, people work together to solve collective problems. But immigrants are often forced into mobilizing resources to deal with persistent racial and religious discrimination. Guarding one’s language, culture and religion is one way of dealing with a new social environment, but it also helps immigrants to deal with racism. Ethnic identification and religion often become the strategies with which immigrants and ethnic minorities struggle against racism and marginalization. This is often labelled ‘identity politics’ or ‘segregation’, yet racism and socio-economic marginalisation often force people back into the cultures and traditions that give them a sense of continuity and security. Furthermore, ‘[t]he politics and practices of racism and discrimination are often underplayed in initiatives promoting bonding and bridging capital’ (Cheong, et al. 2007, 33).

Although many countries of immigration attempt to deal with racism by introducing anti-racist discrimination laws etc, more needs to be accomplished as often the political will to bring about real change is lacking. Sivanandan emphasises that ‘it is only in combating racism that multiculturalism becomes progressive. The fight for multiculturalism and the fight against racism go hand-in...’ (Sivanandan 2006). How we define racism is important - it sets up a relationship of power, defining and categorising social groups as inferior on the basis of phenotypical characteristics, cultural or religious markers or national origin. Currently, Islamophobia is a form of racist discrimination. Ultimately, systemic racism creates ongoing alienation and undermines the possibility of community solidarity.

**Conclusion: Multiculturalism or Integration and Social Cohesion?**
In many countries of immigration there is a general shift away from multiculturalism to integration, cohesion and, in some cases, assimilation. Integration signals a move from accommodating cultural diversity, away from recognition of ethnic, cultural, religious and other differences and identities. Multiculturalism refers to the process of accommodating difference. The multi is symbolically important in terms of identity, referring to cultural or ethnic identities, as well as to religious and other identities. While culturally appropriate services and programmes continue in some areas, at the policy level, the discourse of integration places more emphasis on mainstreaming which is the policy response to the idea of incorporating cultural recognition in policy. The public and policy backlash is mainly concerned with the recognition of cultural diversity and, concomitantly, the freedom for immigrants to retain ethnic and religious identities and cultures.

Returning to the latest proposed strategy in Britain as an illustration, ‘integration and cohesion’ is about ‘getting on well together’ and ‘adapting to each other’, and ‘it’s everybody’s business’ (Commission on Integration and Cohesion June 2007). Clearly these are important social factors, echoing my additional principles of ‘mutual accommodation’ and ‘multiculturalism for all’. So why not move to ‘integration and cohesion’ and eschew ‘multiculturalism’ because it seen as segregating and concentrates on difference? There are many positive aspects to this report, not least the wide-ranging outline including the idea that one size does not fit all when developing targeted programmes for change; recommending how local authorities can better understand their communities, the need for intergenerational work etc. Nevertheless, the main focus is on interaction – ‘interaction is key’ (Commission on Integration and Cohesion February 2007). Getting on well together and adapting to each other is an individualized process.

The term ‘integration’ is not concerned with multiple identities nor with mutual accommodation. When we use the term ‘integration’ we usually mean ‘immigrant integration’. In the Commission for Integration and Cohesion report (June 2007), there is a recommendation for a new national body for the integration of new migrants. There is no recommendation for a new
national body for the integration of settled communities into an ethnically and culturally diverse society or communities. Thus, integration is usually understood as a ‘one-way’ process – immigrants do the integrating, ‘while issues pertaining to the problematic construction of White identities remain out of the spotlight of the government’s approach to managing new immigrants’ (Cheong, et al. 2007, 32-33). The ongoing backlash against immigrants, multiculturalism and diversity as illustrated in this paper, does not incorporate the idea of mutual accommodation that requires dialogue which may bring about change to both civic and cultural values and traditions. As a result, we will have to constantly remind the public and policy makers to bring in the ‘multi’ i.e. to acknowledge that cultural diversity has to be included in any policy of integration.

There is also some debate about the use of the term ‘integration’ as opposed to other terms. For some, whatever the rhetoric, it inevitably refers to ‘immigrant integration’ and is seen as another term for assimilation. Others prefer the terms ‘inclusion’, ‘incorporation’, or ‘participation’\(^7\) rather than ‘integration’. Whichever term we use\(^8\), these concepts are subject to political/ideological, historical and academic/disciplinary fashions within specific countries of immigration. Many would prefer the term ‘inclusion’ to integration as it seems not to have the political ‘baggage’ that ‘integration’ has. Appearing as an unquestionably positive social process, inclusion has over time assumed its own political and ideological problems in that it is often understood as the clear opposite of exclusion. But Levitas (1996) suggests that social inclusion can obscure the fact that the positions into which people are frequently included are fundamentally unequal, leading to what Mulinari and Neergard call ‘subordinated inclusion’ (Mulinari 2005; Mulinari and Neergaard 2005).

\(^7\) My preferred concept is ‘participation’ as it is not only an ‘active’ term, but also it is not saddled with past historical and political meanings as are other terms. Having said that, we also need to use the term ‘integration’ as it is a hegemonic notion that requires deconstruction.

\(^8\) For an examination of the ‘pros and cons’ of a list of these terms see Castles, S., Korac, M., Vasta, E. and Vertovec, S. 2003 ‘Integration: Mapping the Field’: Home Office, UK.
Social or community cohesion is also problematic because to return to Iris Young (2000, 108), hegemonic groups are in a privileged position to define the terms and characteristics of social cohesion. A socially cohesive society is often understood to be unified in terms of national identity, based on an underlying set of values and beliefs that are usually those of the majority population. Often, social cohesion is concerned with identity and sense of belonging and much less with equality and participation. Policy solutions are being sought through concepts such as social capital, social cohesion and integration, which ultimately provide non-economic solutions to economic and structural problems (Fine 2000). Worse still, within the social capital/social cohesion/integration framework, inequalities are seen as socially rather than politically and economically constructed, aiding ‘the shift in responsibility for social inclusion from economy to society, and from government to individual, informing policies that focus on social behaviour’ (Edwards, et al. 2003, 9).

Cultural recognition and equality (both are necessary for successful multiculturalism) are pivotal to the crises of the models of inclusion. The two main factors that can impede immigrant integration and damage community solidarity—continuing and rising inequalities, and racism (connected to cultural recognition)—seem to be ignored in the debate. The problems arising from the first principle of multiculturalism, ensuring equal inclusion of immigrants into all societal institutions, have been neglected in favour of the second principle, that of the effects of cultural diversity and cultural recognition on national identity. This is not to say that cultural recognition is not as important as equality. The cultural and social alienation created by long-term structural social exclusion that continues into the second generation has not been part of the backlash debate.

I argue for an expanded multiculturalism because the danger with ‘integration and cohesion’ is that the accommodation of diversity will be lost. Parekh so poignantly reminds us that unless diversity is nurtured, it runs the risk of fading away. Diversity, through multiculturalism, needs to be part of the national policy and public symbolism. The broader national project requires more work on ensuring equality of access and outcomes, making
provisions for cultural recognition, developing foundations for mutual accommodation and ensuring that everyone owns multiculturalism. This would mean that the current forms of and concerns with integration, assimilation and cohesion would be unnecessary. Getting on well together and adapting to each other will be more easily achieved if it is understood as a part of the broader multicultural project. Rather than marginalise it, a critical and expanded multiculturalism is more likely to build up grass-roots solidarity.
References


Alibhai-Brown, Y. 2004/5 'The multicultural excuse', *Connections* (Winter).


— 2004b 'Do Multiculturalism Policies Erode The Welfare State?' Queen's University, Canada.


**Commission on Integration and Cohesion** February 2007 'Our Interim Report': Department for Communities and Local Government. — June 2007 'Our Shared Future': Department for Communities and Local Government.


**Driessen, G.** 2000 'Limits of Educational Policy and Practice', *Comparative Education* 36(1): 55-72.

**Dutch Ministry of Justice** 2004 'New Integration system', The Hague.

**Duyvendak, W. G. J., Pels, T. and Rijkschroeff, R.** 2005 'Beyond the multicultural paradise: How to understand the cultural factor in Dutch integration policies?': Unpublished paper, University of Amsterdam.


**Home Office** 2004 'Strength in Diversity - towards a Community Cohesion and Race Equality Strategy ': Home Office UK.


Phillips, T. 2005 'After 7/7: Sleepwalking to Segregation' Speech at Manchester Town Hall, September 22.


Siedenberg, A. W. 2004 'The Facts, Figures and Adjustements of the Dutch newcomer Integration Act' Integration of Turkish Immigrants in Austria, Holland and Germany, Bogazici University, Istanbul, Turkey.

Simon, P. 2006 'We're not all multiculturalists yet; France's swinging between hard integration and soft anti-discrimination' Reassessing Multiculturalism in Europe: critical debates, changing policies and concrete practices, Compas, University of Oxford: IMISCO International Workshop.


Young, I. 2000 Inclusion and Democracy, Oxford: Oxford University Press.