Political Exclusion and the politics of recognition among the second generation: the Swiss citizenship debate

Susanne Wessendorf
WP-07-49

COMPAS does not have a centre view and does not aim to present one. The views expressed in this document are only those of its independent author.
Political exclusion and the politics of recognition among the second generation: the Swiss citizenship debate

‘No pizza without migrants.’ This kind of slogan was used in a campaign in Switzerland which fought for facilitated access to Swiss citizenship for migrants and their children. Members of the second generation, the children of migrants born in Switzerland, were particularly active in this political mobilisation. By emphasising their contributions and their ‘cultural’ belonging to Switzerland, they essentialised ‘the second generation’ as well-integrated young professionals. Their campaign was countered by right-wing parties with posters showing Swiss identity cards with photos of Osama Bin Laden to demonstrate what kind of people might become Swiss citizens if the laws changed. This article discusses the kind of culturalist discourse used by both those who struggle against political exclusion, and those who promote this exclusion. It takes a historical perspective and shows that culturalist discourses against migrants have been there for a long time, but the content and the arena of contestation change over time.

**Keywords**: citizenship, second generation, politics of recognition, Switzerland, Italian migrants

**Author**
Susanne Wessendorf, DPhil student, Centre on Migration, Policy and Society University of Oxford Email: susanne.wessendorf@anthro.ox.ac.uk
‘No pizza without migrants’. This was the slogan used by a political movement in Switzerland. The movement consists of members of the second generation, the children of migrants born in Switzerland, and it fights for the political integration of the second generation. Such provocative slogans were used during a political campaign leading up to a referendum for facilitated access to citizenship in 2004. The intention of the slogans was to demonstrate that migrants and their children form an integral part of Swiss society, economically, culturally and socially. The slogans were also used in reaction to anti-citizenship campaigns of populist right-wing parties which consisted of, for example, posters showing Swiss identity cards with a photo of Osama Bin Laden. With such images, the populist right pointed to what kind of people might become Swiss citizens if the law changed. Both, the pro and the anti-citizenship campaigns used a similar kind of discourse, drawing on positive or negative stereotypical images of migrants.

This article discusses this kind of public discourse which articulates culturalism and which is instrumental in much political debate surrounding migrants and their descendants across Europe. With increasing migration, paralleled by its growing problematisation in public debate, culturalist discourses against migrants seem to be dominating the media. Hardly a day goes by without newspaper articles, radio reports and television programmes problematising the challenges of, for example, increasing immigration from Eastern Europe, ethnic diversity in schools, or the integration of so-called ‘Muslim communities’. Much of this discourse is concerned with the ‘unintegrability’ of these migrants, emphasising the incommensurability of different ‘cultural identities’. While there seems to have been a proliferation of such culturalist rhetoric since the 1990s, this kind of discourse is not new (Stolcke 1995; Grillo 2003). But the subjects against which this discourse is aimed have changed. Taking a historical perspective, this article examines how the content and the arenas of contestation in such culturalist discourses change over time, and how culturalism can be instrumental in both anti-immigrant mobilisations and in the politics of recognition among migrants themselves.

The idea of culturalism refers to an understanding of culture as a kind of package that presumes the cultural homogeneity of people of a particular ethnic or geographical origin. Culturalism emphasises differences of cultural heritage, and predicts behaviour based on that heritage and suspiciously transmitted
between the generations (Baumann 1996; Vertovec 1996). Such ideas of homogenous and ahistorical ‘cultures’ have also been called cultural essentialism (Spivak 1988; Grillo 2003) or cultural fundamentalism (Stolcke 1995), and they have been and continue to be used by both the political left and the right (Stolcke 1995).

The example of anti-immigrant discourses in Switzerland forms part of a larger criticism of multiculturalism which is taking place across Europe and which has been described as ‘backlash against diversity’ (Grillo 2005; Vertovec and Wessendorf 2006). Much of this discourse is aimed at the descendants of migrants and focuses on events such as the riots in Paris and Birmingham in 2005, or the religious fundamentalism among a minority of British born Muslims. Thereby, unbridgeable ‘cultural differences’ are depicted as primary reason or catalyst for social unrest, and the second generation is described as lost ‘between two cultures’ (e.g. Hämmig 2000).

However, in the context of the Swiss government’s proposal to facilitate access to Swiss citizenship for migrants and their children, the public debate evolved differently. For the first time in the history of immigration to Switzerland, members of the second generation mobilised and managed to provoke a public debate about the second generation and their integration. Rather than focusing on the failures of integration, they strategically used a discourse which emphasised the second generation’s economic success, social upward mobility and, especially, cultural belonging to Switzerland.

In this article, I will show how members of the second generation skilfully raised a public discussion counter to that of the anti-immigrant campaigners. I will argue that by employing a similarly culturalist discourse as that of their opponents, members of the second generation managed to change the negative image ascribed to them. While this kind of discourse was conducive to shedding a more positive light on migrants and their children, it had its pitfalls because it essentialised ‘the second generation’ and hid the structural marginalisation and exclusion of those descendants of migrants who bear the brunt of suspicion and hostility, those of ex-Yugoslavian and Muslim origin.

Second-generation Italians, in contrast, are well accepted by most Swiss, and they were particularly active in the Secondo Movement. This article draws on a larger study undertaken among Italian migrants and their descendants in Switzerland. The research looked at the various forms of second-generation
transnationalism and different kinds of transnational identifications, paralleled by integration (Wessendorf 2007a; 2007b). Here, I will focus on those second-generation Italians who became politically active in the struggle for citizenship rights, which was a minority among second-generation Italians. While the research was based on both participant observation and interviews, this article will primarily focus on the public and political discourse surrounding migrants during different periods of time and, especially, in the recent political debates about citizenship. I will thereby view ‘discourse’ as practice rather than textual unit of analysis, focussing on what discourse does in specific political contexts, and how actors consciously or unconsciously engage in the creation of belonging through specific ways of expression and practice, not only in relation to social life but also to power (Abu-Lughod and Lutz 1990; Baumann 1996).

Swiss citizenship laws and the failed attempts to change them

Swiss citizenship laws are based on Jus Sanguinis. This means that the children of migrants born in Switzerland do not automatically get Swiss citizenship. This not only applies to the children of migrants, but also to the children of the second generation, the grandchildren of migrants. They have to apply for it on the local, the regional and the national level. Naturalisation is conditional on the (vaguely defined) degree of integration, language skills, respect for Swiss law and guarantee of Swiss national security. The naturalisation procedure is a complicated and expensive process, it can take several years and its outcome is uncertain (Marxer 1997). Both the criteria for granting citizenship and the bureaucratic procedures vary according to municipality, a system which leads to rather unjust and unequal chances for getting citizenship depending on the place of residence (Steiner and Wicker 2004). The complicated bureaucratic process and the expenses that come with the application for citizenship have discouraged many migrants and their children from applying.

Swiss citizenship laws affect a large number of people. Apart from Andorra, Liechtenstein and Luxemburg, Switzerland has the highest percentage of immigrants in Europe. With approximately 1.5 million, migrants represent 20.4% of the Swiss population (Wanner 2004; Bundesamt für Migration 2007). Twenty-three percent of these migrants, around half a million or 7% of the total
population, were born in Switzerland and are thus members of the second generation. This number includes those members of the second generation who have become Swiss citizens during the course of their lives, which is about a third (Wanner 2004; Mey et al. 2005).

Most members of the second generation are from European backgrounds. About a quarter are of Italian origin, while 10% come from former Yugoslavia. Members of the second generation of Turkish, Spanish and Portuguese background comprise each about 5% (Mey et al. 2005; Juhasz 2006). In regard to social mobility, various studies have shown that there are large differences among the second generation, depending on the educational background of the parents on the one hand, but also on national origin (Mey et al. 2005). While members of the second generation of Spanish and Italian origin have been upwardly mobile to a higher degree than their Swiss peers of the same socio-economic background (Bolzman et al. 2003), the overall picture in regard to other members of the second generation is rather complex. Studies have shown that members of the second generation encounter disadvantages in terms of the transitions from primary to secondary school and from school to professional training, as well as when looking for work (Lischer 1997; Kronig et al. 2000; Fibbi et al. 2003; Juhasz and Mey 2003; Imdorf 2005; Juhasz 2006).

In light of the large numbers of people who have been born in the country but do not enjoy the rights of political participation the Swiss government proposed a change of citizenship laws in 2004. This was the third attempt since the 1980s to change the laws. In the Swiss political system of direct democracy, every change of constitution is put to vote to the citizens. The two previous attempts to change the citizenship laws, in 1983 and again in 1995, were opposed by the majority of Swiss voters (D’Amato 1997). The revision of the law in 2004 would have led to facilitated access to citizenship which included the possibility to apply for citizenship between the age of 14 and 24 for those with a permanent residency permit and at least five years of school in Switzerland. Furthermore, it included reduced costs and naturalisation procedures only on the regional level. In addition to the referendum regarding the second generation, a second referendum was put to vote which would have led to the automatic naturalisation of the third generation, the grandchildren of migrants (www.auslaender.ch/einbuergerung/revision).
However, despite much political support from the major parties and the mainstream media, 56.8% of the population rejected the referendum regarding the second generation, and 51.6% voted against the automatic naturalisation of the third generation. During the two months preceding the referendum, populist right-wing political parties, especially the SVP (Swiss Populist Party), fought against the new citizenship laws. In their campaigns, they created an ambience of fear by mixing issues of asylum and current immigration with laws of citizenship which affect long established migrants and their children (Avanzino 2005). These campaigns were based on broad assumptions of cultural differences as a threat to Swiss society, and various images which demonstrated the supposed danger of facilitated access to citizenship were used. For example, in addition to the Osama bin Laden poster described above, the campaigners used posters showing a box full of Swiss passports and dark-skinned hands grabbing them. With these kinds of images, they asserted that with easier access to citizenship or, as it says on the poster, ‘Mass naturalisations’, Switzerland would be taken apart by dark-skinned migrants and the country would disintegrate. Much of their campaign was concretely aimed at migrants of Muslim or ex-Yugoslavian origin.

Although right-wing populists described the increase in migration as a current phenomenon and problem, such essentialist campaigning is not new. Rather, the subjects onto which anti-immigrant organisations and parties ascribe their negative ascriptions of cultural difference have changed.

**Culturalist discourses from a historical perspective**

The kind of culturalist discourse against immigrants described above closely resembles earlier anti-immigrant campaigns in Switzerland aimed at migrants from southern European countries such as Italy. Already in the postwar period, southern Italian labour migrants in Switzerland were doomed to be unable to integrate into Swiss society because of cultural differences. Thousands of Italians had come from the very south of Italy to the German- and French-speaking parts of Switzerland as a result of labour recruitment schemes, chain migration and poverty in the rural areas of southern Italy. From the 1950s until the ‘70s, Italians were heavily discriminated against on the housing market, the job
market, and in public institutions such as Swiss sport associations and schools (Seiler 1965; Braun 1970). Although workers were desperately needed to fill labour shortages, many Swiss perceived Italian migrants as threatening the integrity of ‘Swiss culture’, and in various civil protests against immigration, terms such as ‘foreign infiltration’ (‘Überfremdung’) and metaphors such as ‘the boat is full’ were used to emphasise that Italians potentially undermine Swiss values and culture, and that Switzerland could therefore not accept more migrants (Braun 1970; Stolz 2001). In interviews with non-migrant Swiss citizens undertaken in the context of a study on Italian guest workers during the 1960s, Italians were described as seducers of Swiss women, spaghetti-munchers and lazy slackers who did not know better than hanging around at railway stations (Braun 1970). Italians were also described as knife-wielding criminals, an image which not only formed part of public discourse, but was even strengthened with scientific arguments by anti-immigrant scientists (Dohner 2003). Especially in public debates about hygiene, street noise and decency, Italians were ethnicised as sources of degeneracy, and they were depicted as a threat to the cohesion of Swiss society and national culture (Braun 1970; Stolz 2001; Niederberger 2003).

Today, in the same sorts of media, Italians are described as the good migrants and, as an anthropological study of an urban working-class neighbourhood shows, they have become part of the Swiss ‘imagined community’ (Wimmer 2004). This change of public discourse and perception took place in the context of economic growth in Switzerland. While today’s immigrants and their descendants face difficult challenges in regard to apprenticeship schemes and job availability, Italians came to Switzerland at a time when jobs and apprenticeships were easily available. For the first generation, the choices of work were restricted to jobs in the industries or in hospitality and they had few chances to change their professional or class status. But their children managed to be upwardly mobile thanks to education. Although some second-generation Italians were discouraged by teachers from going into higher education, they still managed to be upwardly mobile thanks to the availability of apprenticeships and their high ambitions (Bolzman et al. 2003; Cesari Lusso 2003; Mey et al. 2005). Thus, Italians and their descendants managed to integrate on a structural and educational level. This structural integration and upward mobility has led to the disappearance of Italians in the kind of public discourse which problematises
migration. The arrival of migrants from other parts of the world who were perceived as more different further contributed to the acceptance of Italians as part of Swiss society. Today, Italians are idealised as the good migrants who have made it (Stolz 2001; di Falco 2003b; Wimmer 2004). In fact, Switzerland has even seen a process which could be called ‘Mediterraneasation’ (Blickenstorfer 2002), with everything associated with Italian life-style such as good food or fashion representing a symbol of what enjoyable life is about, especially among the urban middle-classes (Wimmer 2004). In today’s public discourse, there is a notion of ‘what would Switzerland be without ‘the lovely, warm-hearted Italians’. Newspaper articles talk about ‘How we [the Swiss] became little Italians’, about Italians as ‘our favourite foreigners’, and about Switzerland as a country full of ‘Italophiles’ (Blickenstorfer 2002; di Falco 2003a). In the context of this culturalist discourse, Italianità, Italianness, is hip, and it is now described as part of Swiss culture, with Italian food as an integral part of the Swiss diet (di Falco 2003a). While today, Italians are essentialised as ‘model minority’, other migrants, especially those of Muslim or ex-Yugoslavian origin, are subject to discrimination and stigmatisation.

The example of Italian migrants, the dirty, noisy, knife-wielding criminals of the 1950s and 60s, but the warm-hearted, family-oriented and stylish Mediterraneans of the 1990s, shows how culturalist discourses change over time, and that such discourses against migrants have been there for a long time, but the arena and the subjects of the debates have changed. For example, while Italians were criticised as sources of degeneracy in regard to hygiene and street noise, Muslims are criticised for their family and gender relations, and second-generation ex-Yugoslavians are depicted as chronically violent (e.g. Meyer 2005; Der Blick 2006).

Such discourses are particularly prevalent in the context of political debates about regulating migration and defining the status and the rights of migrants, and they have formed part of the debates surrounding such regulations since the beginning of immigration to Switzerland. With the realisation that high numbers of migrants and, in particular, their children who were born in Switzerland and are now adults, have settled for good, debates surrounding citizenship have become particularly important. In 2004, the revision of the restrictive Swiss citizenship laws was once again put to the public vote. However, different to the referendums in 1983 and 1995, the 2004
Referendum was accompanied by the political mobilisation of members of the second generation and by the formation of a counter-movement. Because the children of postwar labour migrants had now reached adulthood and, especially, achieved middle-class status, for the first time in the history of immigration to Switzerland, members of the second generation publicly claimed their rights to political participation.

The emergence of the ’Secondo Movement’

The so-called ’Secondo Movement’ was founded two years prior to the referendum for facilitated access to citizenship. The event that sparked the political mobilisation of members of the second generation was a public statement of the police deputy of the city of Zürich after the May Day demonstration in 2002. In Switzerland, as in various European countries, the 1st of May is a national, political holiday celebrating workers’ rights. The demonstrations on May Day often end with street fights between mostly young protesters from the far left and the police. Most years, the media report on the general criminalisation and decay of youth. However, in 2002, a new angle was put to the cause. The city of Zürich’s police deputy publicly accused ‘secondos’ for the destructions caused during the demonstration. Furthermore, one of the largest national newspapers emphasised the presence of ‘young immigrants with gel in their hair, those who are commonly called secondos’ (Neue Zürcher Zeitung 2 May 2002).

With this open stigmatisation, the term ‘secondo’, drawn from the Italian term seconda generazione and the Spanish term segunda generacion, and referring to members of the second generation, became known to a larger public. In light of media reports about the vandalising youngsters of migrant origin, ‘secondo’ began to stand for badly integrated, violent (mostly male) youngsters of migrant origin who caused civil unrest and endangered social cohesion (Balsiger 2004; Juhasz 2006).

Members of the second generation were shocked about this open stigmatisation and decided to counter this essentialist and negative image ascribed to them by founding the Secondo Movement. The secondos who took up this initiative were mostly young, well-educated and politically aware women and
men. Two organisations were founded in the aftermath of May Day: IG Secondas (Interest Group Secondas) and Netzwerk Secondo (network secondo). Although the two organisations were established independently, the activists’ aims were the same: they wanted to fight against the negative image ascribed to them and change the public perceptions of members of the second generation. The first activity both organisations took up was the printing of t-shirts with the word ‘secondo’ (for men) and ‘seconda’ (for women) as a way to communicate their pride in being members of the second generation and to demonstrate that even if you do not look like a foreigner, you might well be of migrant origin.

One of the founders of the movement describes the idea behind the t-shirts as follows:

We thought that we might as well label ourselves, sort of ... we are secondos, too, but we don’t throw stones. They [media/politicians] said that the secondos and the foreigners are violent and badly integrated, but we didn’t agree, you can’t generalise like this.

Thus, by making their migrant background visible in the form of this open labelling, they showed that without the t-shirt, nobody would even be aware of their migrant background, and they thereby ridiculed the images of the threatening-looking secondo youngsters evoked by the media.

In addition to the successfully sold t-shirts, the secondo activists created webpages which served as information platforms for the general public, the media, and members of the second generation (www.secondas.ch; www.secondo.net). These initiatives were complemented by the organisation of cultural events and public discussions on second-generation issues.

Although the Secondo Movement did not initially emerge in the context of specific political events in Switzerland, activists soon turned to more concrete political aims in order to achieve increased political rights as members of Swiss society (Balsiger 2004). Two events were at the centre of these political initiatives: the national elections in 2003 and the referendum for facilitated access to citizenship in 2004. During the 2003 elections of the regional representatives for parliament, (naturalised) people of migrant origin stood for election in the canton of Zürich. They formed a list of political representatives associated to the Socialist Party (www.secondas-plus.ch). The list was called
Second@s-plus, and the party members presented themselves as representatives of the 1.5 million migrants and the 500,000 members of the second generation in Switzerland. Although they did not gain any seats in the government, they managed to get much public attention with their campaigns. These campaigns were similar to the initiatives taken up in the fight for facilitated access to citizenship one year later, in 2004, which was the next focus of the Secondo Movement’s activities. Although the referendum was rejected, the Secondo Movement gained broad public recognition in the run up to the referendum.

During both the national elections and the debates surrounding citizenship, the secondos managed to launch a public debate about the second generation and create a more positive image of migrants and their descendants. What kind of discourse did they employ in their public representations? How far did they use similarly culturalist discursive strategies as their opponents? And what kinds of people did the secondo activists represent with their discourse?

‘No Pizza without Migrants’: the creation of a culturalist counter-discourse

‘Nothing works without us’
‘No old-age pension without migrants’
‘No successful national football team without migrants’
‘We are here because we are here’.

These are some of the slogans the political activists used in their fight for political recognition. They claimed that the Swiss finally have to accept that Switzerland is a country of immigration and that it must actively begin to include migrants and their children by giving them more political rights. The secondos repeatedly pointed out that Switzerland would not be as economically successful without migrants and their descendants, and that they formed an integral part of Swiss society. On the Secondo Movement’s webpage, photographs of secondos and members of the third generation, the ‘terceros’, eating Swiss fondue and drinking Swiss white wine were shown. With such images, the secondos demonstrated that they were doing the same as the Swiss, eating fondue and drinking white
wine, and they thereby pointed to their cultural affinities to the Swiss.

This kind of discourse was similarly culturalist as that of their opponents, and the strategy of using simplified notions of belonging to ‘Swiss culture’ (by eating fondue and being economically successful) was conducive to the promotion of a more positive image of the second generation.

But the political activists did not only use notions of cultural similarity. They also celebrated the advantages of being of migrant background, referring to a certain cosmopolitan and urban worldliness. Part of this discourse built on the positive (and essentialist) images associated with Italians such as, for example, their skills in making pizza. With second-generation Italians being particularly active in the movement, the political activists capitalised on the positive attributes ascribed to Mediterranean migrants. The emphasis on the positively perceived Latino ‘joie de vivre’ of the Mediterranean secondos contributed to the recognition of the movement in the media. And the media, of course, played a primary role in the publicity and the sudden success of the movement. According to one of the founders of the movement, as soon as they had set up a webpage with contact details of secondo representatives, they were swamped by journalists’ requests for more information. The media seem to have been waiting to address issues of the second generation and citizenship, and many journalists were looking for second-generation representatives with an insider’s view. Thus, not only were issues surrounding citizenship high on the agenda of policy makers and media representatives, but the secondos involved in the movement were also knowledgeable in how deal with journalists and how to successfully reach the cosmopolitan, urban, politically aware Swiss middle classes. The political activists formed part of this very stratum of the society, and they had the cultural and social capital to be successful in it.

In fact, because of their successful and very professional image campaign, and as a result of their cosmopolitan celebration of worldliness, it became ‘hip’ to be secondo (Juhasz 2005). This ‘hipness’ of being secondo was also expressed by an emphasis of the contributions secondos make to the arts and culture in Switzerland, for example in the form of hip-hop and other kinds of popular music. One such CD shows the photograph of a second-generation West African hip hop artist on its cover, the background of the cover referring to the Swiss national flag and consisting of red crosses on black (instead of white crosses on a red background). The album is called ‘My Switzerland’. Another example of the
hipness of being secondo was the fact that in 2003, the winner of the Mister Switzerland contest was of Croatian origin, and he supported the campaign of the Secondo Movement.

However, only very few people of ex-Yugoslavian or Turkish backgrounds were active in the movement, and in fact, some of them did not feel represented by it. Of the second-generation Italians who participated in the research presented here, only those with higher education (a minority) even knew about the movement. Thus, the Secondo Movement primarily consisted of and reached the politically aware, well-educated members of the middle classes who engage in politics.

Although many activists of the movement originally were of southern European working-class origin, they had been upwardly mobile and they now form part of the high-status, well-educated urban middle-class. In their discourse which emphasised economic success and cultural belonging to Switzerland, they essentialised ‘the second generation’ as successfully integrated members of Swiss society. This discourse was coloured by a culturalist stance, celebrating cultural diversity and marketing a cosmopolitan ‘secondo life-style’ as integral part of ‘being Swiss’, while at the same time emphasising the cultural similarities to the Swiss as legitimisation to access to Swiss citizenship. On the one hand, this discourse helped to deconstruct the essentialist images of the violent, vandalising and jobless secondo. On the other, it did not represent those secondos who are structurally less successful and who are repeatedly under attack of right-wing populists. In fact, the problems of the structural and social disadvantages of some members of the second generation were only marginally raised by the movement.

However, highlighting the success of members of the second generation was the main strategy of the movement. The activists of the movement aimed at creating a more positive and different image of the second generation than that of the ‘vandalising secondo’, and they therefore emphasised success and integration rather than structural marginality. To fight the negative stereotypical images, they created the ‘counter-stereotype’ of the upwardly mobile secondo who is successful not only in spite of but because of being of migrant background.

The creation of the label of the successful secondo who has made it and contributes to Swiss society with innovative ideas, ambition and hard work was
happily taken up by the media. The secondos’ message was simple, expressed in an original and unconventional way, and easy to convey to a larger public. With their conscious and playful use of a culturalist discourse which pointed to the secondos’ ‘cultural proximity’ to the Swiss, they managed to paint a more positive picture of migrants and their children, and even if the movement did not represent the wide array of second-generation individuals, it raised public awareness of the fact that Switzerland’s wealth is also based on migrants and their children.\textsuperscript{x}\textsuperscript{i}

However, despite this achievement of adding a different angle to the public discourse about migrants, the secondos did not manage to change the political realities in Switzerland. Their political activism is an example of the divergence between making ones voice heard, and the feasibility of real political change.

Since the rejection of the citizenship referendum, the media attention on the Secondo Movement has decreased, although some of the secondos have continued their political claims-making. Others have continued to be politically active in mainstream parties such as the socialist party, focussing on issues of migration, and yet others are now focussing their activities primarily on cultural events such as exhibitions with the theme of migration.

Unfortunately, the positive picture painted by the secondos which, temporarily, reached a larger public and contributed to a more positive image of the second generation, by 2006 was once again crushed by populist right-wing discourses which ascribe the increasing violence among youngsters in Switzerland to people of ex-Yugoslavian origin. Again, descendants of migrants are used as scapegoats for simplified and culturalist explanations of social phenomena such as youth criminality. In this current debate, too, access to Swiss citizenship is one of the core issues. But this time, the Swiss Populist Party’s claims have gone even further than before. With slogans such as ‘Youth violence is foreigner violence’, they now talk about the ‘denaturalisation’ of Swiss citizens with a migrant background who do not comply with Swiss laws (SVP 2006).

\textbf{Conclusion}

Since the beginning of large-scale migration to Switzerland and other parts of
Europe, political debates about migrants have taken culturalist forms and they continue to do so. During the debates in Switzerland concerned with the introduction of new citizenship laws, members of the second generation developed a powerful bottom-up counter-discourse against the culturalist anti-immigrant campaigns. They took up their own voice and publicly expressed their view on integration, claiming their rights to political participation. During the months preceding the referendum in 2004, they successfully achieved public recognition by emphasising the social upward mobility and professional success of members of the second generation, and by turning around the previously negative term ‘secondo’ into a trendy label which stands for a cosmopolitan, urban lifestyle.

Their strategy to emphasise their socio-economic success and their belonging to Switzerland was a reaction to the negative media accounts which problematised cultural diversity and depicted migrants and their children as incapable of integration. The secondos countered this discourse by essentialising ‘the second generation’ as well-integrated and politically informed young professionals. Rather than emphasising their cultural specificity or difference, they claimed to be united on the grounds of political exclusion. Furthermore, they highlighted their cultural proximity to the Swiss (albeit with a pinch of salt) with symbolic practices such as eating Swiss fondu. Thus, on the one hand, they emphasised their (cultural) belonging to Switzerland, on the other, they also celebrated cultural diversity as integral part of Swiss society. This political and discursive strategy stands in stark contrast with other immigrant youths’ reactions to exclusion and discrimination and to movements which engage in essentialist notions of cultural and religious identity (e.g. Schiffauer 2001).

The secondos threatened notions of cultural purity, and they went beyond ideas of multiculturalism which convey a picture of migrant groups as bounded cultural units within a culturally homogenous majority society. While emphasising that they form an integral part of Swiss society, they also pointed to the advantages of being of a different cultural background. They demonstrated a certain cosmopolitan worldliness and showed that they have made it, but rather than in spite of, because of their migrant background and the multi-cultural competences that come with it. In fact, one of their mottos was: ‘we are the same but different’.

The Secondo Movements’ politics of identity, migrant claims-making
(Koopmans and Statham 2003) or ‘panethnic mobilisation’ (Itzigsohn 2000) were a new phenomenon in Switzerland, and with much media attention, their campaign reached a large part of the Swiss public. Although the movement did not achieve any political changes, it managed to change the negative image of those members of the second generation who are socially and economically established in Switzerland.

However, those members of the second generation who are structurally marginalised and against who the populist right-wing parties had initiated a hate-campaign just before the citizenship referendum were not represented by the movement and their public image has not changed (Juhasz 2006). Since then, segundos of ex-Yugoslavian and Muslim origin have been subject to repeated condemnations by the populist right and the media.

The Secondo Movement is an example of the problems that can arise with attempts to successfully represent a large and diverse minority. The situational success of the movement shows that culturalist counter-strategies can be useful in the political struggle for recognition. However, the story of the Secondo Movement also shows the divergences between influencing public discourse and actual political change.

The debate surrounding Swiss citizenship exemplifies how culturalism can serve different and sometimes opposing purposes and how it can be effective in processes of the political mobilisation of both the left and the right.

Much of today’s public discourse across Europe is dominated by the kind of culturalist discourse which depicts cultural diversity as a danger to the cohesion of ‘a’ national society (Vertovec and Wessendorf forthcoming). This ‘dominant discourse’ (Baumann 1996) is used to define who is a member of a national society and who is not. It provides the framework within and against which other identities are asserted and within which individuals shape their politics of recognition. The secondo project with its culturalist strategy is one of many examples of how people sometimes take up a dominant discourse and use it for their own ends. It shows that individuals are not ‘dupes’ of the dominant discourse (Baumann 1996), but they develop different discursive competences in the context of the social and political facts of every day life. While such discursive competences are expressed in political campaigns like those described in this article, they are also voiced by young artists, especially in the realm of popular music. The following song text perfectly captures the culturalist discourse
described in this article. It is composed by a band in Switzerland consisting of secondos of various backgrounds.

*Bastardistan*

We’re savages / We eat raw flesh / We’re from Mali / Or Bangladesh /
We invade your land / Live off your taxes /
and smash up cars / With battle axes/
We abduct your wives / And haunt your lanes /
Destroy your culture / Swinging rusty chains///

Welcome to dystopia / Welcome to your wildest dreams /
Welcome to the fears / Of a country’s bursting seams///

We roast your children / Over cross bone fires/
And turn your houses into Funeral pyres/
We loot and burn/ Riot like hell
We shoot our enemies / Like William Tell //

Welcome to myopia / We play the roles we get /
You stare at us and see a mask / Be nice or you’ll regret //

White cross / Red flag / Turning brown / Turning black //

We toil / We speak / Your tongue / We sing your songs / And beat the drum /
We pay taxes and sponsor your pension fund /
We run hospitals / And the kitchen of your restaurant /
We take what we get / You like having us around /
We spice up your life / Until you’re spellbound //

White cross / Red flag / Turning brown / Turning black

The example of this song shows that culturalism and counter-culturalism are best expressed by those who are affected by social and political exclusion and who struggle against the political implications of cultural essentialism. It demonstrates that culturalism is a discursive tool that is particularly powerful in the negotiation and the political struggle of who does and who does not belong to Europe’s increasingly diverse societies.
References


Der Blick 2006. Türkin vom eigenen Vater und Mann bedroht.


I would like to thank the participants in this research; Steven Vertovec and Ellie Vasta for support and advice through the course of this project; Anne Juhasz, Kristine Krause and Ali Rogers for comments on the paper; and the Swiss National Science Foundation, the Janggen-Poehn Stiftung, the Freiwillige Akademische Gesellschaft, the International Federation of Women Graduates, the University of Oxford Scattered European fund, the Institute of Social and Cultural Anthropology and St. Antony’s College, University of Oxford, for funding support.

There is not a common agreement on how to define the ‘second generation’. Here, I will use ‘second generation’ to describe the children of migrants born in the country of immigration, and those who migrated during early childhood and attended school in the country of immigration.

Especially since the 1970s, most European receiving countries have conceptualized immigrant incorporation with the term ‘integration’. ‘Integration’ envisages ‘immigrants becoming an integral part of, though not necessarily absorbed by, the receiving society and culture’ (Grillo 1999:11). Integration is often differentiated into social, cultural and structural integration, which are not necessarily parallel processes. Integration is defined as two-way process, requiring adaptation from both the minority and the majority society. For a critical examination of the concept of ‘integration’ in European nation-states see, among many others, Favell (2001), Joppke and Morawska (2003), Heckmann and Schnapper (2003).

The idea of the migrant second generation growing up ‘between two cultures’ originated in the 1970s (Watson 1977) and has been criticised for its focus on the problems rather than the possible advantages of being of migrant origin.

With Ex-Yugoslavia, I will refer to the nations-states which were formerly part of Yugoslavia.
vi Similar processes have been observed in other contexts, for example among Italians in the United States who ‘became white’ over time (Foner 2000).

vii The term ‘secondo’ was first used publicly in 1993, in the film ‘Babylon 2’ by Samir. Some members of the second generation criticise the term because it implies ‘coming in second’.

viii Importantly, this list was not formed by people who were directly linked to the Secondo Movement, but by people of migrant origin who formed part of the Socialist Party and who were sympathetic with the movement. Activists of the movement were then invited to get involved in the party, which some of them did.

ix Conversation with Anne Juhasz, Swiss sociologist and secondo specialist.

x This has changed over time, and those who continued to be active in migration politics now point to structural inequalities and the importance of equal opportunities for members of the second generation (see: secondos-plus.ch)

xi Importantly, some of the media did point to disadvantages and discrimination which some members of the second generation face in the realm of education and access to the labour market. Thus the movement stirred up a broader public debate on the descendants of migrants.