Abstract

This paper presents an original typology of diaspora engagement policies intended to facilitate comparative research. The typology arises from a two part argument: a) that diaspora engagement policies consist of a diversity of measures aimed at (re)producing citizen-sovereign relationships with expatriates, and b) that these measures can be coordinated as part of states’ attempts to manage the scale of their political and economic manoeuvres. By using the typology to systematically review the diaspora engagement policies of over 70 states, the paper questions four key assumptions in existing literature on diaspora engagement policies, establishing that they are compatible with two models of citizenship, and arguing that they are not confined to any one kind of state.

Keywords:

Emigration, transnationalism, diaspora engagement policies, global nations policies, deterritorialized nation-states, citizenship, sovereignty, governmentality

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There is discussion of what are, and should be, the normative mechanisms of migration management around the globe (Hollifield 2004; Martin et al. 2005; Global Commission on International Migration 2005). However, in much of this discourse, migration management equals immigration management, which is only part of the concern of “the emerging migration state” (Hollifield 2004). That the management of emigration is also a fact of daily life for many states is often overlooked – along with many issues concerning migrant-sending countries and contexts (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003a; Xiang 2003, 2004). Nevertheless, relatively recently a discourse has emerged concerning states who manage emigration by reaching out to and engaging with ‘their’ nationals abroad (see Basch, et al. 1994; Smith 2003; Levitt and de la Dehesa 2003; Østergaard-Nielsen 2003a; Bhagwati 2003; Yeoh and Willis 2004). From the range of terms within this discourse, I have chosen the term diaspora engagement policies to denote this type of emigration management.

I would like to highlight four sets of arguments and assumptions within this maturing discourse on diaspora engagement policies. Firstly, there is the assumption that disinterest is the ‘default’ position of home-states with respect to ‘their’ diasporas (Bauböck 2003b: 709; also see Abella 2006). According to this logic, states concerned with immigration management are normal; states concerned with emigration management are abnormal.

Secondly, there is the assumption that states using diaspora engagement policies cluster in geopolitical ‘peripheries’, such as Southeastern Europe (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003a), Africa (Van Hear, et al. 2004), Asia and Asia-Pacific (Hugo 2003; Yeoh and Willis 2004; Ong 1999), and Latin America and the Caribbean (Basch, et al. 1994). This assumption seems to arise from the framing of US and European migration studies discourse “in terms of either a world-systems theory about exploitative relations between ‘core’ and ‘peripheral’ countries or a neo-classical economic theory of diverse labor supplies flowing toward and advanced capitalist formation” (Ong 1999: 8). The nature of the discourse ensures that emigration and diaspora engagement policies are not found – or rather looked for – in the ‘core’ states of Northern and Western Europe, Northern America or the South Pacific.

This is connected to a third assumption: that states using diaspora engagement policies are poor; responding to inferior positions in an asymmetrical world system (Glick Schiller, et al. 1992: 8-9; Smith 1997: 203; Levitt and de la Dehesa 2003: 598-99; Goldring 1998; Itzigsohn 2000). According to this perspective, a connection exists between “the postcolonial predicaments of poor countries, their export of labor to the metropolitan center, and the efforts of poor, exploited immigrants to support “nation-building” projects at home” (Basch et al 1994 summarized in Ong 1999: 9).

Fourthly and finally, it is often assumed that these states necessarily use the ethnic model of citizenship – a pariah of political theory, particularly within the literature on migration
A representative example of this perspective is Nina Glick Schiller’s and Georges Fouron’s assertion that “there are links between…ethnic cleansing and the ideologies of blood and descent that are used to legitimate national identities across national borders (Glick Schiller and Fouron 1999: 358; also see Koslowski 2004: 22-23; Ang 2004: 185). This assumption, that long-distance nationalism and long-distance ethno-nationalism are equivalent, is widespread (also see Anderson 1992; Skrbis 1999).

Underlying all four assumptions is the question of whether or not diaspora engagement policies are, in some basic sense, legitimate. Political theory lacks clear approaches to this question. As Rainer Bauböck notes, normative political theory is a latecomer to the transnationalism literature (Bauböck 2003b). Moreover, it seems unlikely that theoretical approaches can advance further without a more detailed comparative knowledge of states using diaspora engagement policies. And comparative knowledge cannot develop without a common terminology and set of definitions of diaspora engagement policies. Currently, the diverse range of discourses on diaspora engagement policies lacks these basic analytical tools.

It is hoped that the typology presented in this paper, which explicates what diaspora engagement policies are and touches on debates surrounding them, might act as a template allowing the establishment a body of comparative case-studies, which will feed into the development of more robust theories. To demonstrate how the typology may be useful in this respect, I have used it to systematically review the diaspora engagement policies of around 70 states, apparently for the first time, highlighting how such comparative review calls into question the four assumptions about diaspora engagement policies outlined above.

**Diaspora engagement policies: towards a typology**

The typology presented below is based on a broader argument about the nature of diaspora engagement policies, which is advanced in parallel to the critical examination of the four assumptions outlined above. The argument consists of two parts. The first part suggests that diaspora engagement policies should not necessarily be seen as part of a unitary, coordinated state strategy. Rather, they form a constellation of institutional and legislative arrangements and programmes that come into being at different times, for different reasons, and operate across different timescales at different levels within home-states. The term ‘policy’ is therefore applied somewhat hesitantly. This general conclusion about the nature of diaspora engagement policies would seem to lend support to David Fitzgerald’s (2006) approach to analyzing state emigration control from a “neopluralist” perspective, “disaggregating ‘the state’ into a multi-level organization of distinct component units in which state incumbents and other actors compete for their interests.” The second part of the argument is that, whether or not they are coordinated as part of a specific state strategy, diaspora engagement policies (re)produce citizen-sovereign
relationships with expatriates, thus transnationalizing governmentality – the means by which a population is rendered governable, through the construction, machination, and normalization of a set of governmental apparatuses and knowledges (Foucault 1978: 102-103).

At specific moments, a number of states have deliberately coordinated their diaspora engagement policies so as to ‘reinscribe’ (Gupta 1992) the place of the nation as a “transnational social field” (Levitt 2001). These projects are bound up with challenges regarding the “management of [spatial] scale” faced by home-states as a result of international migration (see Rogers 1998). States hope that diaspora engagement policies will help them to manage the scale of their political and economic manoeuvres; both by leveraging powerful expatriates to upscale their concerns into global-scale arenas, and by exerting control on urban-scale transnational dynamics through closer engagement with migrant civil society. For example, the Turkish state has attempted to engage ‘its’ diaspora in order to upscale its political agenda and gain entry to the EU (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003c), while New Zealand ultimately sees diaspora engagement as a device to help it climb its way back up OECD country rankings (L.E.K Consulting 2001; Science and Innovation Advisory Council 2002; Deutsche Bank 2003). On the other hand, a number of writers have suggested that the Mexican state seeks to extend its governance of Mexican nationals down into the urban and community scales of organization, containing and co-opting migrant political activity by inserting state representatives into civic associations.

According to Foucault, the capacity to exercise power consists in three types of relationships: relations of power, relationships of communication, and finalized activities (Foucault 1982). Together, these three types of relationship constitute the ‘disciplinary’ apparatus necessary for the exercise of power. I argue that states firstly aim to produce a relationship of communication at the transnational scale, based around the idea of the nation – a system of symbols and signs within which states can immerse the exercise of power. Secondly, states aim to create objective capacities for the realization of power relations by building diaspora institutions. Thirdly, the “finalized activities”, or “specific effects” of this transnational exercise of home-state power consist of “transnationalized citizenship” (Lee 2004), conceived of here as the extension of rights and the extraction of obligations to non-residents. Furthermore, it is argued that this extension of “thin membership” (Smith 2003) establishes (or attempts to establish), in the absence of coercive home-state powers, what might be referred to as thin sovereignty of the home-state over non-resident members.

On the basis of this argument concerning the transnationalization of governmentality, this paper identifies three higher-level types of diaspora engagement policy:

- capacity building policies, aimed at discursively producing a state-centric ‘transnational national society’, and developing a set of corresponding state institutions
• extending rights to the diaspora, thus playing a role that befits a legitimate sovereign, and
• extracting obligations from the diaspora, based on the premise that emigrants owe loyalty to this legitimate sovereign.

**Capacity Building**

In Foucauldian terms, institution building puts in place the “objective capacities” that make possible the exercise of power, while symbolic nation-building establishes a “relationship of communication” – a system of symbols and signs through which the exercise of power is transmitted (Foucault 1982). To express this in another way: the capacity of a home-state to implement diaspora engagement policies is dependent firstly on the imagined (or discursive) existence of a cohesive transnational community, based around a common, state-centric national identity, towards which policies can be directed (see Gonzalez Gutierrez 1999). Secondly, it depends on the existence of corresponding governmental apparatuses within the home-state system.

Producing the first condition is problematic: diaspora networks involve multiple and diffuse identities which resist homogenization. The second condition is often not satisfied due to dispersal and lack of coordination amongst actors interested in emigration within the state system. The two types of capacity building policies, symbolic nation-building and institution building, allow states to begin the task of transnationalizing governmentality by attempting to produce these two basic conditions.

**Symbolic nation-building**

Symbolic policies discursively attempt to produce a homogenous national ‘diaspora’, with close ties of allegiance to the home-state. They comprise of a broad range of initiatives and programmes to increase emigrants’ sense of belonging to a transnational community of co-nationals, and to boost the profile of the state within this community.

Home-states attempting to engage with their diasporas often make rhetorical or symbolic gestures aimed at (re)including the diaspora within national population that the state claims to represent and govern. On one hand, attempts at (re)inclusion are expressed in high-level rhetoric celebrating emigrants as national heroes, and bestowing them with prizes and accolades. Often this stance represents a sudden or dramatic shift from previously denouncing emigrants as deserters – such as in Mexico (Martinez-Saldana 2003), Morocco (de Haas 2006), and China (Nyiri 2004), though sometimes the rhetorical shift more subtle as in Australia (Fullilove and Flutter 2004) and Malaysia (Bunnell 2004). On the other hand, attempts at asserting representative governance take the form of paternalistic (or maternalistic) claims that expatriates are an offshore part of the national population, or an extra administrative district of the state’s
territory – the most widely cited examples being Mexico (Martinez-Saldana 2003), Haiti (Glick Schiller and Fouron 1999) and Ireland (Levitt 2001).

Some home-states attempt to reinforce claims of shared national identity by establishing or supporting programmes to teach national language and history amongst diaspora populations, and prominently observing national celebrations and cultural events within diaspora communities. Home-states often play a role in shaping expatriate-targeted media, communications and public relations – partly to support these general aims of producing a homogeneous population, but also to send more specific messages aimed at mobilizing expatriates in particular ways, such as to return home, to remit money, or to help advance ‘national interests’ abroad. The forms of such communications may have changed since earlier periods, but much of their substance is familiar from previous eras of long-distance nationalism. Some of New Zealand’s expatriate-targeted marketing campaigns, for example, have often seemed remarkably similar to nineteenth century colonial recruitment campaigns, which sold idealized ‘place myths’ of an unspoilt paradise to potential immigrants and returnees (http://newzealandnow.info). The way many home-states establish, support and exert influence on expatriate-focused newspapers, websites and satellite television channels recalls the role of the Bolletino dell’Emigrazione, published by the Italian Ministry or Foreign Affairs between 1902 and 1927 (Smith 1997: 208).

In many cases, home-states have held large conferences and conventions with a range of purposes in mind: to symbolize a willingness to listen inclusively to ‘constituents’; to meet or appoint diaspora ‘representatives’ and establish patronage relationships with them; to air state concerns and solicit feedback and help; and to broadcast messages at a captive audience. Longer-standing examples include India (http://indiandiaspora.nic.in), Armenia (Panossian 2003) and Cyprus (Demetriou 2003); more recent examples include Ukraine (One Eyed Cat 2006) and Jamaica (www.jamaicandiaspora.org).

Such interactive forums indicate that symbolic nation-building policies include but are not limited to propaganda – they also involve more complex negotiations, through which various actors in the homeland and the diaspora try to reinforce or reconfigure various national symbols in their own image, and introduce their own priorities into public debate. Thus, the transnational public spheres (Smith 1997) that emerge within this mediascape display characteristics of both Habermas’ idealized bourgeois public sphere, in which private citizens debated actively as equals, and his dystopian portrayal of the pacified sphere of consumption that has allegedly replaced it (Habermas 1989 [1962]).

The common thread running through all these policies is the attempt by states to produce a communal mentality amongst non-residents; a sense of common belonging to the home-state (see González Gutiérrez 1999) that renders expatriates governable. The discourse of belonging to a diaspora is crucial in attempts to produce this governable mentality, or
governmentality. Indeed, Francesco Ragazzi has suggested that the word diaspora itself should be considered a ‘state category’ (Ragazzi 2006).

Institution-building

Institution-building policies furnish the state with technologies – systems and institutions – to ‘govern’ diaspora populations. A first step for many states is the implementation of surveillance. Monitoring efforts are typically conducted through the foreign service or the immigration bureaucracy, and aim to collect statistics on which to base strategic orientations towards emigrants. This process is often not merely a way of collecting inert data, but a way of selecting actors whom it would be profitable to deal with and forming long-term relationships with these actors (González Gutiérrez 1993). Of particular interest to states have been relationships with hometown associations that pool remittances to fund hometown development projects and often act as umbrella organizations for a broader range of emigrant associations and groups (see below on remittance capture).

Monitoring efforts frequently stimulate greater state involvement with a wider range of emigrant associations, resulting in increased consular work – in some cases to the extent that state representatives are present at most or all emigrant association events and meetings (González Gutiérrez 1993; Thunø 2001) – and expansion of budgets to cope with this increased activities. Allocation of budget to the expansion of consular activities, like any bureaucratic budget increase, can generate various jealousies. Homeland residents may call foul at government spending on non-tax-paying expatriates. Bureaucracies may feel threatened by restructuring and become protective of their budgets and jurisdictions. Expatriates may resent the home-state’s consultation with and empowerment of particular individuals and groups as ‘representatives’ of the wider expatriate community.

Partly to circumvent existing political tensions within expatriate communities, and partly to contain possible future tensions, home-states often create their own transnational migrant organizations and treat them as consultative institutions. The pros and cons of such arrangements seem similar to those regarding consultative institutions in migrant-receiving contexts. On one side, they ostensibly give expatriates some voice in the home-state and provide a useful channel for expatriate opinions. On the other hand they may be seen to give expatriates too much influence, and they can be accused of inhibiting the independent political activity of emigrant groups – as leaders of these groups are more susceptible to government attempts at coopting and containing such activity (see Andersen 1990).
Dedicated government offices, sometimes with ministerial level competencies, are common to almost all countries on Table 1. These are often created when a critical mass of government activity targeted at expatriates is reached and requires central coordination within the state system. At this point, a number of agencies will typically begin to see an interest in the results of increased monitoring and involvement, and begin to put their hat in the ring for involvement in related policy discussions. This process seems to currently be underway in Australia (Senate Legal and Constitutional References Committee 2005). The institution-building imperative is strengthened by the desire of governments to embed their orientations as deeply as possible within the state system, ensuring that future governments will find them difficult to uproot.

As institutions dedicated to expatriate affairs grow within the state system, a tension sometimes emerges between the powerful agency containing the immigration bureaucracy (often the labour or justice department) and the foreign service. The former tends to claim a traditional stake in anything related to migration policy, while the latter inevitably forms the front line of home-state contact with expatriates. This tension can lead to the transfer of dedicated offices
between agencies (with concomitant political in-fighting), and/or to the emergence of what might be thought of as a ‘front-end and backend’ model, where a dedicated unit straddles the two agencies; the backend taking responsibility for the generation of strategic frameworks in keeping with population planning paradigms, for example, and the front-end taking responsibility for implementing strategies and feeding their results back through to the backend and into the state system. Mexico seems to be among states that have gone through similar processes (González Gutiérrez 1993: 231).

Thus, institution building aims to furnish states with the capacity – in terms of bureaucratic instruments and systems – to upscale their political and economic manoeuvres within global arenas, but it also allows them to manage lower levels of spatial scale, inserting and mobilizing representatives at the scales of local communities and urban municipalities.

**Extending Rights**

In Foucault’s terms, whereas institution building aims to construct objective capacities to realize relations of power, and symbolic nation-building policies aim to produce a relationship of communication, the extension of rights and the extraction of obligations – or the transnationalization of citizenship (Lee 2004) – constitutes the “finalized activities”, or “specific effects” of the exercise of power (Foucault 1982). Insofar as transnationalizing citizenship extends “thin membership” (Smith 2003) to the diaspora, it also extends a kind of thin sovereignty over non-residents.

Marshall’s (1950) classic conception of citizenship as comprising civil, political and social rights remains a touchstone of citizenship theory, and a useful lens through which to briefly assess the extent to which states “transnationalize citizenship” (Lee 2004). States perceive risks in extending Marshallian rights to emigrants. Fear of the exile vote deters many home-states from the extending political rights, financial costs are a disincentive to extending social rights, and fear of interfering in the domestic matters of sovereign host-states makes home-states reluctant to protect ‘their’ emigrants’ civil rights. These fears and deterrents help to explain why these policies are used less frequently than others listed in Table 1.

**Political incorporation of emigrants**

Itzigsohn (2000) and Goldring (1998) both argue that upgraded membership in home-society is a primary incentive for emigrants to become involved in transnational activities. Thus, the rationale behind politically incorporating emigrants is that this upgraded membership status will flatter or appease expatriates, producing goodwill relationships that help to protect steady flows of remittances and investments.
Few states grant unconditional and/or permanent voting rights to emigrants, provide dedicated representation to expatriates in the legislative council, or allow them to run for office (Bauböck 2003a). Rather than fully incorporating ‘their’ diasporas outright, states seem to economize, allowing no more political rights to emigrants than they feel is necessary to achieve the desired result (which, it must be said, is not always clearly conceptualized). Sometimes they grant special membership concessions to emigrants, which confer status upgrades but avoid reconfiguring theoretical/legal definitions of citizenship. These include measures like issuing emigrants with long-term visas or identity cards with attached privileges, or forgiving duties attached to their current membership status, such as compulsory military service (e.g. see Hugo 2003). Other home-states take concessions one step further, extending ‘dual nationality’; that is citizenship without the right to vote or hold office (Martinez-Saldana 2003). Such concessions might be seen as the thin end of a wedge that emigrants hope will eventually open up a route to full extra-territorial membership (Smith 2003).

Moreover, it is crucial to note that statuses and rights granted in principle may not be realized in practice. For example, even states that allow expatriates to vote may resist polling methods that would make expatriate participation practicable – in a number of countries it is compulsory to return on voting day; in others the distribution of embassy voting booths corresponds so poorly to the distribution of the expatriate electorate that turnout is extremely low (e.g. see Østergaard-Nielsen 2003a). Similarly, a status theoretically extended to the entire diaspora may in practice be restricted to certain groups whom the state wishes to engage (Lee 2004: 27-28). The divergence of the theoretical form of membership and its substantive content draws attention to the need to view the transnationalization of citizenship as an instituted process out of which different ‘thicknesses’ of membership arise through civic participation in “transnational public spheres” (Smith 2003).

Much literature either argues or assumes that home-states only transnationalize the ethnic model of citizenship (e.g. Glick Schiller and Fouron 1999; Koslowski 2004: 22-23; Ang 2004: 185). However, diaspora engagement policies are also used by a number of home-states – including Malaysia (Bunnell 2004), Australia (Fullilove and Flutter 2004), and New Zealand (L.E.K Consulting 2001; Gamlen 2005) – which adhere to the civic model of citizenship, based on residence within the territorial borders of the nation-state. That diaspora engagement policies are not confined to states transnationalizing the ethnic model of citizenship suggests a need to revise the assumptions outlined at the outset of this paper.

Transnationalizing the civic model of citizenship is made possible by the adoption of points regimes regulating immigration according to skills and capital ownership. These criteria arise from a neoliberal rationality of government (Ong 1999; Nonini 2004), and can be seen as a set of disciplinary ‘subject-making’ procedures (Ong 1996; Hardt and Negri 2000 cited in Hughes
2004, 197) that precede legal residence, which in turn precedes naturalized citizenship based on the civic model. Thus, although the ideal of the civic model of citizenship is the right to equal treatment based on nothing more than co-residence, the points-based immigration regimes of wealthy receiving states add an intervening neo-liberal principle: the right to residence based on attainment of an entrepreneurial “habitus” (Bourdieu 1983).

It is this set of disciplinary subject-making procedures that facilitates the transnationalization of the civic model of citizenship. Once subjects have jumped through the hoops set up by the points system, they are deemed to have attained a neoliberal habitus that will remain valuable to the state even once they are no longer resident within its territory. Residence is transformed from a necessary condition of membership, into process that – once passed through – provides the subject with a durable and portable form of cultural capital (Bourdieu 1983) that Aihwa Ong has referred to as “flexible citizenship” (Ong 1999).

Civil and social services to emigrants

Ability to guarantee the civil rights of citizens is one of the most central claims to legitimacy that a state can make, and thus a number of states see the extension of civil rights as a necessary part of playing the role of legitimate transnational sovereign with respect to ‘their’ diasporas. The most common set of services are offered to emigrants in the context of deliberate labour export policies, such as those of the Philippines, in which the state manages the recruitment, deployment and protection of overseas workers (Alcid 2003). Protection can involve healthcare and assistance with integration and employer relations, or advocacy in taxation and similar issues. Other types of services identified in this study include the special service centres for emigrants returning on holiday (de Haas 2006). Home-state provision of pensions to non-residents is a key issue in some contexts, but one that has been largely overlooked in mainstream debates on diaspora engagement policies to date – with the result that it has not been incorporated in this review.

However, lacking a monopoly of violence beyond their territories and fearful of their actions being construed as hostile incursions on host-states’ territory, home-states are severely restricted in their capacities to guarantee the civil rights to emigrants. Extending social services to emigrants in their host countries is one of the least developed areas of diaspora engagement policy making (Table 1).

The following quotation from Carlos Gonzalez Gutierrez, sometimes referred to as the architect of the Programme for Mexican Communities Abroad, clearly articulates the sensitive position states such as Mexico and the Philippines have found themselves in with respect to the protection of emigrants’ civil rights:
Most immediate and evident obligation of the Mexican government is to protect the interests of its citizens abroad. Although any state enjoys the sovereign prerogative of controlling its borders, the defense of Mexican immigrants' rights in the United States is a dominant and legitimate concern of their homeland, a goal that Mexico will actively pursue within the limits of international law. When dealing with local authorities, the trick is to be effective without appearing confrontational, since every hostile encounter jeopardizes the long-term relationship that the consulate needs to cultivate with immigration, police, and civil authorities. Mexico's long tradition of consular protection has made the defense of human rights of Mexicans living abroad a part of the country's political culture, and the consuls are held accountable for their ability to perform their jobs on these grounds. (González Gutiérrez 1993: 226-228)

**Extracting Obligations**

States may find the extension of civil and social rights to their diasporas threatening, but I argue that if they fail to do so and expect to leverage shared national identity in order to get something for nothing from emigrants, they are playing against the odds. That is, states may begin by attempting to assert thin sovereignty by extracting obligations without extending rights, but if these attempts are sustained, the extension of reciprocal rights becomes inevitable. The strength of states' claims to legitimately extract benefits from 'their' diasporas arguably flows from their reciprocal provision of benefits. Indeed, this realization seems to underpin both the emerging "co-development" discourse surrounding migration and development (Global Commission on International Migration 2005), and the logic by which Robert Smith (2003) and others observe that "global nations policies" open up transnational public spheres.

Discussion of diaspora engagement policies usually highlights the home-state's extraction of economic and political benefits from the diaspora. The former are extracted through investment policies (Levitt and de la Dehesa 2003), while the latter are pursued by the promotion of external expatriate lobbies. Transnationalization of the home-state's rule of law through extradition treaties and the like is an area that, like expatriate pensions, has been largely overlooked in the literature on diaspora engagement and so is not systematically reviewed here.

**Investment policies**

Mandatory payments. Jagdish Bhagwati's proposed 'brain drain tax' (Bhagwati 1976) seems to have been one of the first theoretical attempts to justify taxation by citizenship rather than residence. Though unpopular when first proposed, the tax is regaining some traction from the argument that the sovereign's provision of rights and the citizen's fulfilment of obligations (most notable of which is payment of taxes) are co-dependent (Bauböck 2003a).

Indeed, a number of countries, including the USA, Switzerland and Libya, levy taxes on expatriates, whilst other governments extract mandatory payments through less formal channels – such as fees for emigrant workers recruited and deployed through mandatory government programmes (e.g. the Philippines (Alcid 2003)), or as emergency measures initially mobilized in
crisis or conflict regions (e.g. Eritrea (Koser 2003)) – which are sometime institutionalized as
time passes.

Remittances and FDI capture. Debate over remittances has been churning over for at
least two decades (Stahl and Arnold 1986; Keely and Tran 1989; Hatzipanayotou 1991; Lucas
2005; International Organization for Migration 2005; World Bank 2005). Analyses have become
increasingly nuanced – particularly those identifying positive impacts of remittances on migrant-
sending contexts and advocating policies targeted at them – although the basic economic points
of contention seem to have been identified at least as early as the mid-1980s (Stahl and Arnold
1986). Table 2 summarizes some of the most significant of these.

Table 2. Pessimistic and Optimistic Perspectives on Remittances

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fears Regarding Remittances (Stahl &amp; Arnold 1986)</th>
<th>Optimism Regarding Remittances</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Distribution of remittances is uneven and increases income and wealth inequalities.</td>
<td>Remittance income is more evenly distributed than both overseas development aid and foreign direct investment (Hugo 2003).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remittance expenditures may result in inflation.</td>
<td>Price gains are mitigated by the allocation of resources to production of higher-priced goods (Stahl and Arnold 1986).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remittances may increase dependency with the risk of sudden decline.</td>
<td>Labour export should be seen as any other export sector which must be carefully managed to avoid dependence (Keely and Tran 1989).</td>
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<tr>
<td>Remittances adversely affect agricultural development by removing incentives to labourers.</td>
<td>Decline in agricultural productivity is due to loss of labour power through emigration, not complacency amongst workers (Stahl and Arnold 1986).</td>
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An impasse seems to have been reached in the debate on the macro-economic impacts of remittances on economic growth. Not surprisingly, it is hard to demonstrate that remittances have a positive effect on development when the underlying assumption is that underdevelopment, emigration and remittances are correlated by definition, and the only countries where remittances are studied are those where it is difficult to demonstrate positive economic dynamics of any kind. Research seems to have overlooked remittances to ‘developed’ ‘migrant-receiving’ countries; for example, it is never mentioned that in 2002 remittances to New Zealand, a “classical immigration country” (Castles and Miller 1998: 5), formed a larger percentage of local GDP (2.24%) than they did in India (1.65%), Turkey (1.06%) and Mexico (1.73%) (IOM 2005: 494). It is no coincidence that the sending states where researchers have studied remittances, and diaspora engagement policies more generally, are those whose emigrants are a cause for concern in host-countries that are wealthy enough to fund research into the ‘problem’.

With respect to the micro-economic impacts of remittances on poverty reduction, the optimists seem to have gained a victory: there is cautious consensus that remittances should be seen as (at least potentially) positive, and that policy makers should find ways of targeting them. In this context, the main question facing policy makers has been whether to simply maximize remittances on the assumption that their net effect is positive, or to channel them into development projects, so as to cut down the risks of adverse macro-economic effects. At the prospect of policies channelling remittances from exiles into the coffers of hostile governments, there has been widespread agreement that remittances should be treated as private funds rather than supplements for development aid.

Current consensus seems to have settled on supporting the expansion of access to remittance-sending infrastructure and the lowering of transaction costs (for example through lowering start-up costs for remittance companies (IOM 2005; World Bank 2005), whilst refraining from interfering with private transfers in other ways, such as trying to force remittances through formal channels and into specific projects or altering exchange and interest rates (Hugo 2003; Lucas 2005; IOM 2005; World Bank 2005).

Nevertheless, numerous policies around the world have targeted remittances with the aim of channeling them into investments. These have ranged from rewards for remitting such as duty free allowances in the Philippines and free passport issuance in Pakistan; to offering preferential interest rates in India and Pakistan; to allowing small-minimum-deposit foreign-currency bank accounts in Nigeria and Ghana and issuing foreign-currency-denominated bonds to expatriates in India and the Philippines (see Hugo 2003; Van Hear, et al. 2004; IOM 2005; World Bank 2005). In some countries, such as China (Thunø 2004), remittance capture measures have been as simple as legalizing remittances. However, the most prominent remittance capture measures have been the ‘matching fund’ programmes such as the Tres Por Uno (3x1)
implemented by Mexico, under which every peso remitted by migrants is matched by three from local and federal governments at home. New remittance-capture policies are constantly being introduced as old ones are discarded; each of these policies has its stories of success and failure and its arguments for and against, which space constraints prevent this paper from reviewing.

In addition to the policies above aimed at channeling smaller remittance flows into larger investments, many countries have incorporated a specific focus on expatriates (either as investors or as bridgeheads) into their broader FDI and development strategies. Attempting to capture larger scale investments from expatriates can be seen as part of what political anthropologist Aihwa Ong calls a “postdevelopmental state strategy” involving outsourcing aspects of national development to the ‘private’ sector. State attempts to attract investments from expatriates are based on the belief that common national identity can strengthen or underlie vital “strategic alliances with corporate actors” (Ong 1999: 21).

Turkey has experimented with expatriate seeded venture capital funds (Faist 2004), while China, Taiwan and India have created special economic zones to attract expatriate investments. Another common approach is the establishment of high-level ‘investor relations’ offices that allow expatriates to bypass bureaucratic red tape associated with large-scale investment (High Level Commission on the Indian Diaspora 2001).

Knowledge transfer programmes. New Growth economic theory posits knowledge as the engine of growth, prompting states to invest in higher education, as well as industrial research and development. Countries with high emigration fear a ‘brain drain’ of the highly skilled, representing both a loss on these investments and forfeiture of future gains through knowledge production. The prospect of mobilizing highly skilled diasporas to increase knowledge production at home is attractive to many states, especially those fearing brain drain.

There are two main types of policy aimed at capturing knowledge transfers from expatriates. The first, which is perhaps most closely associated with the UNDP’s TOKTEN (Transfer of Knowledge Through Expatriate Networks) programme, involves facilitating temporary returns by expatriate researchers for short-term consultancies or fellowships in their home country. The TOKTEN programme has been in operation for three decades and appears to have evolved a set of best practices, although the basic problem of quantitatively measuring the effectiveness of these practices does not seem to have been overcome.

Such problems are even more applicable in the case of the second type of knowledge transfer policy that has received interest among home states: the virtual cluster approach (Rod Oram, cited in Electronic Commerce Action Team (ECAT) 2002). The virtual cluster approach relies on a non-geographical model of industrial clustering. If industrial clusters rely on geographical and institutional proximity (Porter 1990), then expatriates cannot remain overseas and still contribute to the development of national knowledge economies. However, various
writers have suggested that shared enculturation, rather than geographical and institutional proximity, may bind knowledge communities (e.g. Meyer 1999b; Allee 2000).

Shared enculturation may provide an incentive to collaborate, but it does not in itself overcome distance. What is needed is an actual infrastructure to facilitate communication and cooperation – and thus information and communication technologies (ICTs) are inevitably the cornerstone of this approach (see Turner et al, Undated). Organizational structure is also key for such knowledge transfer networks. World Bank economist Yevgeny Kuznetsov identifies three main types of “brain circulation” Diaspora networks: of scientists and R&D personnel; business networks of innovative start-ups and networks of professionals working for multinationals (Kuznetsov 2005). He argues that scientific networks are easier to start than to maintain, while the opposite is true for networks of influential professionals in multinationals, and that top-down networks are not as effective as bottom-up organizational structures “designed in accordance with [their] own nature”. A huge range of home-states have sponsored, supported or developed relationships with web-based “brain circulation” networks, which a number of studies have attempted to survey (e.g. Meyer and Brown 1999a).

These networks simultaneously perform a number of functions relevant to this typology: they can act as expatriate registers contributing to government surveillance, their members can be vetted as ‘representatives’ for consultative institutions, they can disseminate nationalistic messages, and they can seek out potential investors and lobbyists. However, perhaps the key point to note is that this approach is founded on a vision of an emerging future, rather than on a tried and true set of widely available practices. The idea of using virtual clusters and brain circulation networks to develop new, commercially viable ideas to benefit the home-country is itself a new, commercially viable idea that is still in development.

Lobby promotion

King and Melvin (1999) point out that diasporas often assert a direct, active influence on policy through pressure on the host-state, the home-state, or both. Rey Koslowski (2004) refers to this dynamic influence as “the globalization of domestic politics”. This understudied field has direct relevance to diaspora engagement policymaking: as Jose Itzigsohn (2000) suggests, two main incentives for home-states to engage with their diasporas are to contain the impact of diasporas on homeland politics, and to mobilize their support as lobbyists within their host societies. Issues of political containment have been touched upon in the section on political incorporation, so this section focuses on attempts at lobby promotion.

A number of states have implemented policies to encourage or co-opt emigrants – both those who occupy prominent or powerful roles in major host society or transnational corporations, and those who occupy lower rungs of the socio-economic ladder – into the role of
lobbyists or spokespeople in their countries of residence or elsewhere in the diaspora. Occasionally such policies takes the form of specific programmes and initiatives such as conferences or conventions (Demetriou 2003); more often they seem to take the form of overarching strategic orientations that percolate down through all initiatives aimed emigrants. In many cases, there is a fine line between active lobby promotion and what are referred to above as ‘symbolic nation-building’ policies – where the state bolsters nationalistic messages at the same time as tying these messages to particular state strategic objects in the hope that migrants will help to market these messages wherever they go.

Home-states seek the help of expatriate ‘lobbyists’ not only to influence host-state decision makers, but also to gain the ear of capitalist elites, in order to help increase “the proliferation of strategic alliances with corporate actors” (Ong 1999: 216) and attract foreign direct investments as well as technology transfers. These lobbying efforts should be seen as somewhat separate from specific remittance or FDI capture programmes.

**What Kinds of States Use Diaspora Engagement Policies?**

Having presented the structure of the typology, it is now possible to return to the questions outlined at the outset of this paper. Do states using diaspora engagement policies cluster in peripheral regions of the globe? Are they all poor? Do they all use an ethnic model of citizenship? Are they normal or abnormal? In order to address these questions, I have systematically reviewed the available literature on a sample of around 70 states using diaspora engagement policies to varying degrees.

Table 1 lists 15 countries in the sample for which relatively complete data on diaspora engagement policies could be found. Table 3 lists 58 additional countries from the sample for which significant fragmentary data could be found within the literature surveyed.
**Table 3: Countries Using Diaspora Engagement Policies (detailed sources not consulted)**

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<th>Region</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Type of Diaspora Engagement Policy</th>
<th>Capacity Building</th>
<th>Extending Rights</th>
<th>Extracting Obligations</th>
<th>Investment policies &amp; lobby promotion</th>
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The sample of countries presented in Tables 1 and 3 is not random, and is highly skewed. A high proportion of listed countries are concentrated in a few geographical regions and income ranges, and thus at first glance the sample supports many of the assumptions outlined in the introduction. However, the sample of countries is not exhaustive; it includes only states where sources were available. Thus, these geographical and economic concentrations reflect the availability of literature on specific countries and regions and not necessarily a particular intensity of diaspora engagement policy-making in these places. The availability of literature seems more likely to reflect the research interests of countries concerned about inflows from certain regions as it is to reflect trends in diaspora engagement policy-making practices. For example, New Zealand – often thought of as a “classical immigration country” (Castles and Miller 1998: 5) – has a strong tradition of research on immigrant transnationalism but scarce literature on its own citizens’ transnationality, despite that around 20% of them reside abroad (Bedford, Ho, and Hugo 2003), and return at least intermittently (Lidgard and Gilson 2002). It would be interesting see more detailed studies on the diaspora engagement policies of other states where prominent scholars of immigration and transnationalism are based – such as the USA and Britain.

When this skew is accounted for, the most remarkable feature of this sample of countries is its diversity. States using diaspora engagement policies are found in all geo-political regions. They are not all poor, and some of them are transnationalizing a civic model of citizenship. Furthermore, the general impression resulting from this result is that further case studies, using this typology as a template, would reveal both a wider range of diaspora engagement policies in use in many of the surveyed countries, and a wider range of additional countries using policies. On the basis of this sample, it seems best to set aside the assumptions outlined at the outset of this paper when conducting research on diaspora engagement policies.

The typology importantly illustrates that diaspora engagement policies cannot be seen as singular, discrete, or historically sui generis. Rather, they form a constellation of institutional and legislative arrangements and programmes that come into being at different times, for different reasons, and operate across different timescales at different levels within the state. The term ‘policy’ is applied hesitantly, as the nature and degree of intention and coordination between these diverse aspects differs widely not only geographically as demonstrated in this paper, but also historically – which this typology is not equipped to highlight. This general conclusion about the nature of diaspora engagement policies would seem to lend support to David Fitzgerald’s (2006) approach to analyzing state emigration control from a “neopluralist” perspective, “disaggregating ‘the state’ into a multi-level organization of distinct component units in which state incumbents and other actors compete for their interests.”

Nevertheless, the typology seems to suggest that these heterogeneous measures coincide in particular moments to bring about characteristic patterns in overall state orientation
emigrants and expatriates. Moreover, it contributes an analytical tool for studying these patterns. For example, fairly solid colouring in the capacity-building column of Table 1 indicates that most surveyed states have begun to lay the foundations for transnationalizing citizenship and sovereignty. Somewhat more patchy coloration in the extracting-obligations column suggests that, though states are interested in extractive policies, trial and error experimentation has not yet yielded formulae for best practices. The large patches of grey in the extending-rights column indicate that debates over the extension of rights to the diaspora are prevalent, but substantive measures are relatively rare. That this area of diaspora engagement policy-making should be the least developed of all three suggests that many states remain reluctant to extend rights, though they attempt to extract obligations and see capacity building policies as necessary and sufficient conditions for this end. On the other hand, states most commonly identified with diaspora engagement policies over a long stretch of recent history – such as Mexico and the Philippines – seem to have moved past the hope that expatriates will be prepared to deliver a free lunch on the basis of shared nationality, and busied themselves with the business of transnationalizing governmentality through both the extraction of obligations and the extension of rights.

Discussion has so far focused on the question of which types of states use diaspora engagement policies. However, the typology and the accompanying list of countries presented here also points to the importance of asking what types of states use what types of policies. Toward this purpose, the typology may begin to categorization of states on the basis of the patterns of diaspora engagement policies they use. For example, capable states (i.e. those with developed diaspora engagement capacities) might fall into three categories: exploitative states, which extract obligations without extending rights; generous states, which extend rights without extracting obligations, and engaged states, which both extract obligations and extend rights. These categories are preliminary suggestions only, intended to point to further analytical uses towards which the typology might be put.

Conclusions
This article has presented an original typology that allows, apparently for the first time, comparative review of the diaspora engagement policies of over 70 states. The typology arises out of the argument that diaspora engagement policies comprise a diverse array of state measures intended to transnationalize governmentality, and that these measures are often coordinated so as to (re)produce citizen-sovereign relationships with expatriates as part of attempts to enhance the state’s political and economic maneuverability at various scales. Accordingly, diaspora engagement policies can be broken down into three main categories:
• capacity building policies aimed at discursively producing a state-centric ‘diaspora’, and developing a set of corresponding state institutions to govern the diaspora
• extending rights to the diaspora, thus playing a role that befits a legitimate sovereign, and
• extracting obligations from the diaspora, based on the premise that emigrants owe loyalty to their legitimate sovereign.

Necessary conditions for reproducing citizen-sovereign relations with diasporas include the existence of a cohesive, state-centric national society at the transnational scale, with a corresponding set of institutions. Capacity building policies attempt to produce these conditions; firstly, by strengthening the symbolic bases of an imagined ‘diaspora’ community through symbolic nation-building policies, and secondly, by building institutions dedicated to bolstering the role of the state within this community, and subjecting the population to surveillance.

Home-states also seek to create means of empowering these diaspora-oriented institutions with governance capabilities in the absence of territorial monopolies on violence. All three categories of diaspora engagement policy – capacity building, extending rights and extracting benefits – are deeply intertwined and interdependent in the creation of these governance capabilities. Together, they form an important set of instituted processes through which home-states attempt to draw ‘their’ diasporas into a “web of rights and obligations” (Bhagwati 2003), conferring thin membership in order to establish what might be called thin sovereignty as a basis for legitimately extracting benefits. There are clear analogies between this strategy of diaspora engagement that of producing domestic, territorial governmentality by promoting “active citizenship” and “governing through communities” (Jones, et al 2004: 145).

Political theorists often discuss whether or not it is legitimate for expatriates to participate in the polities of their homelands (Bauböck 2003a, 2005; Koslowski 2004: 15); they less often enter into principled arguments over the transnationalization of home-state governance. Political theory seems to lack a distinct discourse out of which transnational governance could legitimately arise. This paper has suggested that states appear to follow a social contractarian logic that emigrants’ acceptance of home-state benefits constitutes a kind of ‘consent of the governed’. This logic can bolster state claims to legitimately extract benefits from ‘their’ diasporas. However, ultimately the question of legitimacy is a theoretical one, and cannot be answered until more robust theories of diaspora engagement exist. This paper provides a typology of diaspora engagement policies upon which further comparative studies might be carried out; it is hope that comparative research will contribute to more lively discussion on these and other theoretical issues concerning relations between states and emigrants.
A first step in this direction is to examine whether or not received wisdom is a satisfactory basis for theory. The received wisdom from existing literature is that home-states which reach out to engage with ‘their’ emigrants are abnormal, poor, spatially clustered in the world’s geo-political ‘ghettos’, and founded on an unfashionable ethnic model of citizenship. The paper set out to examine these assumptions, using the typology to systematically review the diaspora engagement policies of around 70 states through a wide (but by no means comprehensive) range of primary and secondary sources.

The sample of countries in this paper is skewed towards particular geographic regions. I argue that this skew reflects the availability of literature on specific countries and regions, which in turn reflects the research interests of wealthy countries concerned about inflows from these places. When this skew is taken into account, the most remarkable feature of this list of 70+ countries is its diversity – both in geographical and economic terms. Diaspora engagement policies are being developed and implemented fairly extensively in at least 15 countries, and to varying degrees in almost 60 additional countries, spread across all the major geopolitical regions of the globe, in all income strata, using both ethnic and civic models of citizenship.

Thus, the major findings of this study are that diaspora engagement policies do not seem tied to any one kind of state (in geographical or economic terms), and that they are compatible with two models of citizenship (ethnic and civic). The general impression arising from the research is that further case studies, using this typology as a template, would reveal both a wider range of diaspora engagement policies in use in many of the surveyed countries, and a wider range of additional countries using policies. The typology also begins to allow categorization of countries on the basis of their diaspora engagement policies. In particular, it may be useful to help distinguish between exploitative states that attempt to extract obligations without extending rights, and engaged states that do both.

There has been lively debate over whether or not transnationalism is a normative pattern of adaptation among migrants in host countries (summarized in Portes and DeWind 2004: 834-6), and over what are and should be the normative patterns of state adaptation to increasing immigration flows. However, parallel to these debates, there seems to have been less attention to states’ normative patterns of adaptation to increasing emigration flows. It may be that diaspora engagement, rather than disinterest in diasporas (Bauböck 2003b), may now be becoming the norm within the “migration state” (Hollifield 2004).
Acknowledgements:
I am grateful for comments and suggestions on earlier presentations and drafts from Dr Alisdair Rogers, Professor Steven Vertovec and Dr Nick Van Hear. I benefited much from discussions with Dr Hein de Haas, Dr Bridget Anderson, Dr Frank Duvell, and Dr Martin Ruhs. I am also indebted to presenters, chairs, discussants and audience members at the States and Emigrants seminar series convened by Dr Xiang Biao during Trinity Term 2006 at the Centre on Migration, Policy and Society (COMPAS) at the University of Oxford. Responsibility for the contents of the paper is exclusively mine.

1 This draws on previous country-specific or regional typological overviews (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003a, 2003b; Levitt and de la Dehesa 2003; Xiang 2003; Van Hear, Pieke, and Vertovec 2004), as well as the much broader range of primary sources and secondary sources upon which tables 1 and 3 are based. For space reasons, not all of these works are cited.
2 This typology does not discuss the efforts of home-country political parties to canvass votes from expatriates, because these are not strictly speaking 'state' policies. However, it is important to recognize the problematic nature of such a clear distinction between party politics and bureaucratic governance.
References


One Eyed Cat. 2006. Ukrainian Diaspora Conference.


