The Emergence of
Super-Diversity in Britain

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ABSTRACT

Diversity in Britain is not what it used to be. Some thirty years of government policies, social service practices and public perceptions have been framed by a particular understanding of immigration and multicultural diversity. That is, Britain’s immigrant and ethnic minority population has conventionally been characterised by large, well-organized African-Caribbean and South Asian communities of citizens originally from Commonwealth countries or formerly colonial territories. Policy frameworks and public understanding – and, indeed, many areas of social science – have not caught up with recently emergent demographic and social patterns. Britain can now be characterised by ‘super-diversity,’ a notion intended to underline a level and kind of complexity surpassing anything the country has previously experienced. Such a condition is distinguished by a dynamic interplay of variables among an increased number of new, small and scattered, multiple-origin, transnationally connected, socio-economically differentiated and legally stratified immigrants who have arrived over the last decade. Outlined here, new patterns of super-diversity pose significant challenges for both policy and research.

Keywords: diversity; multiculturalism; immigration; United Kingdom; London

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The emergence of super-diversity in Britain

At a Trafalgar Square vigil for the victims of the 7 July 2005 terrorist attacks – in which victims included migrants from more than twenty countries and alleged perpetrators from a further six – Mayor Ken Livingstone stated that in London ‘you see the world gathered in one city, living in harmony, as an example to all’ (in Freedland 2005). The ‘world in one city’ idea was also the title of a special section in The Guardian newspaper celebrating ‘the most cosmopolitan place on earth’ where ‘Never have so many different kinds of people tried living together in the same place before’ (Benedictus and Godwin 2005: 2). The ‘world in one city’ was the title of the Greater London Authority’s analysis of the 2001 Census (GLA 2005a), too, which examined the presence of people from 179 nations within the capital. The successful London bid to host the 2012 Olympics also used the ‘world in one city’ slogan, suggesting that ‘In 2012, our multicultural diversity will mean every competing nation in the Games will find local supporters as enthusiastic as back home’ (www.london2012.org).

To be sure, the ethnic and country of origin diversity of London is remarkable. Such diversity is gradually finding its way to other parts of the country as well. However observing ethnicity or country of origin (the two often, and confusingly, being used interchangeably) provides a misleading, one-dimensional appreciation of contemporary diversity. Over the past ten years, the nature of immigration to Britain has brought with it a transformative ‘diversification of diversity’ not just in terms of ethnicities and countries of origin, but also with respect to a variety of significant variables that affect where, how and with whom people live.

These additional variables, which importantly must be seen as mutually conditioning, include a differentiation in immigration statuses and their concomitant entitlements and restrictions of rights, labour market experiences, gender and age profiles, spatial factors, and local area responses by service providers and residents. Rarely are these factors described side by side, and often issues of ethnic diversity and the stratification of immigrants’ rights are explored separately. In this article I lay out a set of data and issues surrounding such factors. The interplay of these factors is what is meant here, in summary fashion, by the notion of ‘super-diversity’. Super-diversity underscores the fact
that the new conjunctions and interactions of variables that have arisen over the past decade surpass the ways – in public discourse, policy debates and academic literature – that we usually understand diversity in Britain.

Noting similar changes concerning urban social, geographic and economic conditions in North American cities and patterns of diversification among ethnic groups themselves, Eric Fong and Kumiko Shibuya (2005: 286) suggest that ‘theories developed in the past may have only limited application in the study of multigroup relations today.’ The present article follows this view, suggesting some implications that super-diversity has for social scientific theory and method alongside challenges it poses for particular areas of public policy formation and delivery.

**Diversity in Britain**

Extensive diversity itself is nothing new to Britain, of course. Peter Ackroyd’s (2000) monumental *London: The Biography* describes the long history of a city of assorted immigrants. Roman Londinium was populated with administrators, traders, soldiers and slaves from Gaul, Greece, Germany, Italy and North Africa. ‘By the tenth century,’ Ackroyd (Ibid.: 702) writes, ‘the city was populated by Cymric Brythons and Belgae, by remnants of the Gaulish legions, by East Saxons and Mercians, by Danes, Norwegians and Swedes, by Franks and Jutes and Angles, all mingled and mingling together to form a distinct tribe of “Londoners”.’

In the late twelfth century locals throughout Britain complained that all sorts of foreigners were practicing their own customs, and by the early sixteenth century such intolerance saw riots in which shops and homes of foreigners were burnt. In the middle of the eighteenth century diversity fuelled a struggle between people with ‘culturally cosmopolitan’ outlooks and those with populist xenophobic attitudes (Statt 1995). Nineteenth-century poets like Wordsworth described London’s heterogeneity of peoples, while in an 1880 book *The Huguenots*, Samuel Smiles called London ‘one of the most composite populations to be found in the world’ (in Holmes 1997: 10).

Irish in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and Jews from throughout eastern Europe in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries comprised significant immigrant influxes. Yet it was the post-war large-scale immigration of African-Caribbean and South Asian peoples which particularly prompted the
recognition of difference throughout public policy. British policy-makers responded with various strategies for a kind of diversity management strategy that came to be called multiculturalism.

In this way most of the discourse, policy and public understanding of migration and multiculturalism evident in Britain over the past thirty years has been based on the experience of people who arrived between the 1950s and 1970s from Jamaica, Trinidad, Guyana and other places in the West Indies alongside those from India, Pakistan and what is now Bangladesh. These were major inflows from former British colonies, with people subject to initial rights of entry that were gradually restricted during the 1960s and early 1970s until only families of settled migrants could enter. Citizenship and all the civil, political and social rights associated with it were held by most under post-colonial arrangements (Hansen and Weil 2001). Large and eventually well-organized communities were formed, particularly through the establishment of community associations and places of worship.

Multicultural policies have had as their overall goal the promotion of tolerance and respect for collective identities. This has been undertaken through supporting community associations and their cultural activities, monitoring diversity in the workplace, encouraging positive images in the media and other public spaces, and modifying public services (including education, health, policing and courts) in order to accommodate culture-based differences of value, language and social practice. While developed from the 1960s onwards, most of these policies and goals still obtain today. Multiculturalism continues to be discussed and delivered mainly in terms of the African-Caribbean and South Asian communities of British citizens.

New, smaller, less organized, legally differentiated and non-citizen immigrant groups have hardly gained attention or a place on the public agenda (cf. Kofman 1998). Yet it is the growth of exactly these sorts of groups that has in recent years radically transformed the social landscape in Britain. The time has come to re-evaluate – in social scientific study as well as policy – the nature of diversity in Britain today.
New immigrants and the emergence of super-diversity

Over the past ten years immigration – and consequently the nature of diversity – in the UK has changed dramatically. Since the early 1990s there has been a marked rise in net immigration and a diversification of countries of origin. This shift has coincided with no less than six Parliamentary measures: the Asylum and Immigration Acts of 1993, 1996, 1999, the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, the Asylum and Immigration Act 2004 and the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Bill 2005. Throughout this time there has been a proliferation of migration channels and immigrant legal statuses. In addition, this decade was a time when numerous conflicts were taking place around the world leading to a significant expansion in the numbers of those seeking asylum. The various flows and channels have been characterised as ‘the new migration’ and the people involved as ‘the new immigrants’ (see Robinson and Reeve 2005, Berkeley et al. 2005, Kya mbi 2005). Multiple dimensions of differentiation characterize the emergent social patterns and conditions.

net inflows

In 2004 there were an estimated 2,857,000 foreigners (foreign-born and without UK citizenship) living in the UK, comprising some 4.9% of the total population of 58,233,000 (Salt 2004). This number represented an increase of some 857,000 or over 40% since 1993. Data from the Office for National Statistics (derived largely from the International Passenger Survey) comparing 1971 and 2003 shows an overall increase in inflows from 200,000 to 513,000; over the period there were larger outflows as well, from 240,000 to 360,000. Therefore the UK shifted from net outflows to net inflows, a change mainly occurring since the early 1990s (see Figure 1). Annual net inflows of immigrants to Britain peaked at 171,000 in 2000, declined to 151,000 by 2003 then rose markedly to 222,600 in 2004 (Office for National Statistics, www.statistics.gov.uk). More recent figures will certainly show more increases since eight new states acceded to the European Union in 2004.
There are many simultaneous reasons for the increased net inflows. One set of reasons surround Britain’s high economic performance (including low unemployment and job shortages in some sectors) coupled with growing inequalities in many developing and middle-income countries (Hatton 2003). Much of the increase during the 1990s was within the category of asylum seekers: while there have been many accusations that a high proportion of these are ‘bogus’ or ‘really economic migrants’, the increase in asylum-seekers over the past ten years has been demonstrated to be directly linked with forced migration factors and conflict situations in source countries during this time (Castles et al. 2003). Migration flows from Eastern Europe have also increased since the opening of borders after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 (see Kaczmarczyk and Okólski 2005).

**Countries of origin**

One of the most noteworthy features of ‘the new migration’ is the multiplicity of immigrants’ countries of origin. Moreover, most of this new and diverse range of origins are places which have no specific historical – particularly, colonial – links with Britain unlike the countries of earlier waves of post-war migrants.

In the 1950s and 1960s almost all immigrants came from colonies or Commonwealth countries (again, mostly in the Caribbean and South Asia). By early 1970s most newcomers were arriving as dependants of the newly settled migrants. The following decades have seen fairly dramatic change. Alongside
relatively constant inflows of returning British people, in 1971 people from ‘Old’ and ‘New’ Commonwealth countries accounted for 30% and 32% of inflow; by 2002 these proportions were 17% and 20% respectively. EU citizens represented 10% of newcomers in 1971, rising to 17% in 2002; however, those in a broad ‘Middle East and Other’ category have gone from 16% in 1971 to 40% in 2002 (National Statistics Online). Since the beginning of the 1990s alone, the diversity of immigrants’ places of origin has been growing considerably (see Figure 2).

**Figure 2** Total international migration to UK by country of birth, 1993-2002

![Figure 2](image)

Britain is now home – temporary, permanent or one among many – to people from practically every country in the world. As Table 1 suggests, various waves of immigrants from rich, middle income and poor countries have accumulated. All the groups, as well as many individuals within these, have diverse migration experiences in the UK – some over the last decade, others over generations, still others over more than a century. With regard to this dimension of super-
diversity, we should consider how the assorted origins and experiences of migrants condition social relations with non-migrant Britons and with each other.

**Table 1** Foreign nationals living in the UK, largest twenty-five groups, 2004

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Nationality</th>
<th>Number in UK</th>
<th>Per cent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>368000</td>
<td>12.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>171000</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>USA</td>
<td>133000</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>121000</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>96000</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>95000</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>92000</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>86000</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>83000</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>80000</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>73000</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>69000</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>60000</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Former Yugoslavia</td>
<td>54000</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>52000</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>51000</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>48000</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>48000</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>45000</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Former USSR</td>
<td>44000</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>43000</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>40000</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>37000</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>37000</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>36000</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>All foreign nationals</td>
<td>2,857,000</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Salt 2004

In London alone there are people from some 179 countries. Many represent just a handful of people, but there are populations numbering over 10,000 respectively from each of no less than 42 countries; there are populations of over 5,000 from a further 12 countries (GLA 2005a). Reflecting trends in Britain as a whole, 23 per cent of foreign-born people came to London before 1970, 32 per cent between 1970-1990 and 45 per cent since 1990. The 25 largest such populations reflect a wide range of countries, from rich to poor, peaceful to conflict-ridden, European to African and Asian (Table 2). Overall 30% of London's migrants are from high income countries and 70% are from developing countries (GLA2005b)
Table 2  Number of People living in London by Country of Birth outside the UK, largest twenty-five groups, 2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Country of Birth</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>172,162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Republic of Ireland</td>
<td>157,285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>84,565</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>80,319</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>68,907</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>66,658</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>66,311</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>49,932</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>46,513</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>45,888</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>45,506</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>U.S.A.</td>
<td>44,622</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>41,488</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>39,818</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>39,128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>38,694</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>38,130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>33,831</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>32,082</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>27,494</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Hong Kong</td>
<td>23,328</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>22,473</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>22,224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>21,720</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>20,398</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: GLA 2005a

Once more, the above figures for both the UK and London would by now have changed considerably, not least due to the influx of eastern Europeans both before and after EU accession in May 2004.

Foreign-origin populations in London are widespread and unevenly distributed (see Kyambi 2005). The borough of Brent has the highest percentage of its 2001 population born outside the EU, with 38.2% (100,543 people), followed by Newham with 35.6% (86,858 people), Westminster with 32.4% (58,770 people) and Ealing with 31% (93,169 people) (see www.statistics.gov.uk). Within each such area, the diversity of origins is staggering, as depicted by way of example in Figure 3 with reference to Newham.
Such a relatively new and high proportion of immigrants characterizes many places in the UK, but London most. Of the local authorities with the highest percentage of population who are non-EU born, the top nineteen are all London boroughs. Leicester is the highest non-London authority, ranked twentieth with 58,875 foreign-born accounting for 21% of its population. Slough is ranked twenty-third (24,476 or 20.6%), Forest Heath in Suffolk is twenty-fourth (11,400 or 20.5%), Croydon twenty-seventh (61,202 or 18.5%) and Luton twenty-eighth (27,527 or 14.9%)(www.statistics.gov.uk).

While pointing to important indicators of diversity, country of origin data itself, however, may mask more significant forms of differentiation than it reveals. Within any particular population from a given country, there will be important distinctions with reference to ethnicity, religious affiliation and
practice, regional and local identities in places of origin, kinship, clan or tribal affiliation, political parties and movements, and other criteria of collective belonging. Linguistic differentiation, for instance, represents one such important social marker which may lie within one or more country of origin categories.

**Languages**

The growth of multilingualism has been recognized and engaged in various ways by both social scientists and policymakers, although the latter have often arguably failed to respond in positive or adequate ways (Rampton et al. 1997). Still, it is now often proclaimed with pride (for instance in the city’s successful 2012 Olympic bid) that 300 languages are spoken in London. This figure is based on a survey of no less than 896,743 London schoolchildren concerning which language(s) they speak at home (Baker and Mohieldeen 2000). Despite some methodological flaws, this remarkable data source provides an important look into a much under-studied field of diversity in the UK. The study does not take account of languages among groups with few children in schools (for instance because of a high number of young, single migrants in a particular group), which would represent ones like Polish, Czech, Hungarian and other east European languages. Nevertheless, findings like those in Table 3 indicate sometimes surprisingly sizeable numbers speaking particular languages within a divergent range.

The data also show some interesting local configurations. There are predictable groupings of South Asian languages in places of renowned Asian settlement like Harrow, with the top three non-English languages being Gujarati (18.8%), Hindi/Urdu (2.4%) and Punjabi (1.6%). Other places show fascinating conjunctions, such as in Haringey where Turkish (9.9%) is commonly spoken alongside Akan (3.5%) and Somali (2.7%); in Lambeth where Yoruba (6.4%) speakers mingle with speakers of Portuguese (4.1%) and Spanish (2.1%); in Merton where English Creole (29.8%) is common next to Cantonese (2.2%) and French (1.9%); and in Hackney where Turkish (10.6%), Yoruba (6.8%) Sylheti (5.4%) can be heard (Baker and Mohieldeen 2000).

**Table 3** Estimated number of speakers of top 20 languages in London, 2000
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Language name</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>English</td>
<td>5636500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Panjabi</td>
<td>155700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Gujarati</td>
<td>149600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Hindi/Urdu</td>
<td>136500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Bengali &amp; Sylheti</td>
<td>136300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Turkish</td>
<td>73900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Arabic</td>
<td>53900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>English Creole</td>
<td>50700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Cantonese</td>
<td>47900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Yoruba</td>
<td>47600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Greek</td>
<td>31100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Portuguese</td>
<td>29400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>French</td>
<td>27600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Akan (Twi &amp; Fante)</td>
<td>27500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Spanish</td>
<td>26700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Somali</td>
<td>22343</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Tamil</td>
<td>19200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Vietnamese</td>
<td>16800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Farsi</td>
<td>16200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Italian</td>
<td>12300</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Storkey 2000

School districts, health services and local authorities are among those institutions which have to meet the challenges of growing linguistic super-diversity. Many new initiatives have arisen for this purpose. For example, the Language Shop provides a comprehensive translation and interpretation service in more than 100 languages to Newham Council and its partners, such as community groups and neighbouring councils, while Language Line provides telephone or in-person translations in 150 languages to health authorities and other public sector clients.

**Religions**

The religious diversity that migrants have brought to Britain is well documented and is not possible to detail here (see for instance Parsons 1994, Peach 2005 as well as National Statistics Online). On the whole we can say that among immigrants to Britain Christianity is the main religion for people born in all continents except Asia; Asia-born people in the UK are more likely to be Muslim than any other religion, although of course Indians include a majority of Hindus and a significant number of Sikhs. For many, religions tend to be broadly equitable with countries of origin – Irish and Jamaicans are mostly Christian, Bangladeshis mostly Muslim and so forth – but even so these categories often
miss important variations in devotional traditions within each of the world religions.

Taking Islam as example, it is often pointed out that there are several traditions within the faith as practiced by South Asians in the UK (Deobandi, Tablighi, Barelvi, Sufi orders and more; see Lewis 2002). Such variations are multiplied many times when we consider the breadth of origins among Muslims from around the world who now live in Britain (such as Nigerians, Somalis, Bosnians, Afghans, Iraqis and Malaysians). In London Muslims are the most heterogeneous body of believers in terms of ethnicity and country of origin, with the largest group (Bangladeshis) making up only 23.5%. ‘London’s Muslim population of 607,083 people is probably the most diverse anywhere in the world, besides Mecca’ (The Guardian 21 January 2005). Such religious super-diversity has ramifications not least for Muslims themselves, especially in terms of how they reflect upon their own styles of belief and practice. This is because, for a great many if not most, it is only in such a situation of overlapping diasporas that people will meet, for the first time, other fellow believers who have differing modes of belief and practice within the same faith. Such intra-religious contact stimulates processes of self-consciousness, rationalization and change that may bear significantly on religiosity, identity and processes of transformation affecting the religion more broadly – and even in global terms (Vertovec 2005).

Socio-cultural axes of differentiation such as country of origin, ethnicity, language and religion are of course significant in conditioning immigrants’ identities, patterns of interaction and – often through social networks determined by such axes – their access to jobs, housing, services and more. However, immigrants’ channels of migration and the myriad legal statuses which arise from them are often just as, or even more, crucial to: how people group themselves and where people live, how long they can stay, how much autonomy they have (versus control by an employer or principal applicant), whether their families can join them, what kind of livelihood they can undertake and maintain, and to what extent they can make use of public services and resources (including schools, health, training, benefits and other ‘recourse to public funds’). Therefore such channels and statuses, along with the rights and restrictions attached to them (Morris 2002), comprise an additional – indeed, fundamental – dimension of today’s patterns and dynamics of super-diversity.
Migration channels and immigration statuses

Coinciding with the increasing influx of immigrants to the UK in the 1990s, there has been an expansion in the number and kind of migration channels and immigration statuses. Each carries quite specific and legally enforceable entitlements, controls, conditions and limitations (see JCWI 2004). The following section outlines many of the key channels and statuses, particularly with regard to how they have shaped current patterns of super-diversity in the UK.

Workers. Between 1993 and 2003 the number of foreign workers in the UK rose no less than 62% to 1,396,000 (Sriskandarajah et al. 2004: 3). This large-scale increase in workers includes people who have come under numerous categories and quota systems (see Clarke and Salt 2003, Salt 2004, Kofman et al. 2005). These include:

- Foreign nationals who do not need a visa or permit to work in the UK (mainly members of the European Economic Area, EEA). People from other EU countries account for around half of the foreign worker population in the UK. Members of the eight new EU accession states can travel to the UK freely, but should register with government offices if they find employment. By the end of 2005 there were over 277,000 applications under this Worker Registration Scheme;
- Work permit holders. Such permits are applied for and obtained by employers on behalf of non-EEA workers whom they wish to employ. 119,000 work permit holders were admitted to the UK in 2003. Of these Forty-two per cent of these work permit holders and their dependents were from Asia – with India providing the largest number 22,300 (19%) – while 29,300 (25%) were from the Americas (mostly USA), 17,800 (15%) from Europe and 14,400 (12%) from various places in Africa.
- Workers on special schemes, especially the Seasonal Agricultural Workers’ Scheme (SAWS) and the Sector Based Scheme (SBS) directly mainly at the hospitality (hotels and catering) and food processing industries. There were 18,887 SAWS cards issued for 2004 for workers from 48 countries, while the SBS scheme entailed 10,916 workers from some 40 countries in the first half of 2004 alone;
Highly skilled migrants under a programme intended especially to attract workers in finance, business management, information technology and medical services. People from over 50 countries came to the UK under this category in 2003;

Business people and investors. This category was created to encourage entrepreneurs who can start businesses and provide key services. Such visas annually number in the hundreds. Meanwhile there are also considerable number of foreigners who come as corporate transfers, perhaps some 13,000 per year (Salt 2004: 40);

Working holidaymakers. This scheme entitles individuals to come to the UK and work while on holiday (up to two years). In 2003 the 46,505 working holidaymakers in Britain came from over 30 countries (yet more than 90% were from ‘Old Commonwealth’ countries such as New Zealand and Australia);

Special visa holders. These include domestic workers, au pairs, volunteers and religious instructors. There were an estimated 12,000 au pairs admitted to Britain in 2002, largely from eastern European countries.

Students. The number of foreign students entering the UK recently peaked at 369,000 in 2002 before reducing to 319,000 in 2003. Non-EU students accounted for some 38% of all full-time higher degree students in 2003 (Kofman et al. 2005: 20); they numbered over 210,000 in 2004. In this year 47,700 Chinese students came to Britain, marking a seventeen-fold increase from the 2,800 Chinese students in the UK in 1998. The number of Indian students has grown from under 3,000 in 1998 to nearly 15,000 in 2004. The third largest sender is the USA with over 13,000 students in 2004. International students were worth £10.2 billion to the UK economy in 2003 (see www.universitiesuk.ac.uk).

Spouses and family migration. This is an extremely important immigration category, not least since ‘family migration has emerged as the single most enduring, though also restricted, basis for entry of migrants to the UK’ (Kofman et al. 2005: 22). The number of migrating spouses and family members coming to the UK more than doubled between 1993-2003. Furthermore this is a particularly feminised channel of migration compared with others; for instance, of the 95,000 grants of settlement to spouses and dependents in 2004, 20.6%
were made for husbands, 40% for wives and 28.8% children. Their geographical provenance varied significantly, however: the Indian sub-continent was origin to 36% of husbands, 28% of wives and 15% of children; the rest of Asia brought 8% of husbands, 21% of wives and 18% of children, while from Africa there came 24% of husbands, 17% of wives and 42% of children (Salt 2004). Not all have come under the same conditions: within the spouses and family migrant category Kofman (2004) distinguishes a number of types, including family reunification migration (bringing members of immediate family), family formation migration (bringing marriage partners from country of origin), marriage migration (bringing partners met while abroad) and family migration (when all members migrate simultaneously).

Asylum-seekers and Refugees. Throughout the 1990s the number of asylum applications rose considerably in the UK and indeed throughout Europe. Applications (including dependents) in Britain rose from 28,000 in 1993 to a peak of 103,100 in 2002; these amounted respectively to 15.6% and 26.5% of all non-British immigration (179,200 in 1993 and 418,200 in 2002). Applications have since declined significantly: in 2003 the number of asylum applications declined to 60,045 (which is 14.7% of 406,800 total non-British immigrants; Salt 2004: 71) and estimates by the end of 2005 suggest about 40,000. This too is a highly gendered channel of migration: in 2003 some 69% were male. The provenance of asylum-seekers represents a broad range: again in 2003 applications were received from persons spanning over 50 nationalities, including 10% Somali, 8% Iraqi, 7% Chinese, 7% Zimbabwean, and 6% Iranian. Numbers of asylum-seekers from various countries have fluctuated much over the years (see Table 4) reflecting usually the state of conflict in the homeland (Castles et al. 2003). Compared with 2002 figures, these indicate a considerable drop in the number of asylum applications from Iraqis (14,570 to 4,015), Afghans (7,205 to 2,280) and Zimbabweans (7,655 to 3,295) (Ibid.)

Table 4 Applications received for asylum in the United Kingdom 1994-2003, selected nationalities
Many asylum-seekers wait long periods for decisions, many are rejected and leave the country, others are rejected and stay as irregular migrants. It is estimated that some 28% of asylum applicants are granted asylum, extended leave to remain, humanitarian protection or some other category allowing them to stay in the UK (Salt 2004). Cumulatively there were some 289,100 Refugees in UK by the end of 2004 (UNHCR 2005). In 2003 the Refugee Council estimated that there were some 99,000 refugee children of school age in the UK.

*Irregular, illegal or undocumented migrants.* This category, variously termed, pertains to people whose presence is marked by clandestine entry, entry by deceit, overstaying or breaking the terms of a visa. It is not a black-and-white classification, however: Anderson and Ruhs (2005) discuss grey areas of ‘semi-compliance’ under which only some, sometimes minor, conditions are violated. In any case, labour market conditions ensure that irregular migrants are highly sought, if not exploited, by employers (see Jordan and Düvell 2002).

As Pinkerton et al. (2004) describe, it is very difficult to reliably estimate numbers within this category. In 2005 the Home Office offered a ‘best guess’ number between 310,000 and 570,000 irregular migrants in the UK. Without a regularisation exercise, learning the breadth of undocumented migrants places of origin would be even more difficult. In any case, their social and legal position is one of almost total exclusion from rights and entitlements.

*New citizens.* A great many migrants become full citizens. During the 1990s around 40,000 people became citizens each year. This number has risen dramatically since 2000, with 2004 seeing a record number of 140,795 granted British citizenship (*The Guardian* 18 May 2005). According to Home Office

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source: Salt 2004
estimates, 59% of the foreign-born population who have been in the UK more than five years – the minimal stay to become eligible – have indeed become citizens. Citizenship courses and tests have recently been added to the process. ‘It may also be the case,’ suggests Lydia Morris (2004: 22), ‘that, while formal citizenship may still be a realistic goal for many new arrivals, the route to its acquisition has become more demanding and potentially provides yet another instrument for the supervision of immigrant communities.’

In attempting to understand the nature and dynamics of diversity in Britain, close attention must be paid to the stratified system of rights, opportunities, constraints and partial-to-full memberships that coincide with these and other immigrant categories (Morris 2002, 2004). And as pointed out by Lisa Arai (2006: 10),

There is a complex range of different entitlements, even within one migrant status category (e.g. overseas students), and a lack of coherence or rationale to a system developed ad hoc over many years, and which reflects competing pressures, such as whether to provide access to a service because the individual needs it; or because it is good for society (e.g. public health). Or whether to deny a service in order to protect public funds, ensure that access does not prove an attraction for unwanted migrants or to appease public opinion. This means that neither service providers, advice-givers nor migrants themselves are clear as to what services they might be entitled.

Moreover – denoting a key feature of super-diversity – there may be widely differing statuses within groups of the same ethnic or national origin. For example, among Somalis in the UK – and in any single locality – we will find British citizens, refugees, asylum-seekers, persons granted exceptional leave to remain, undocumented migrants, and people granted refugee status in another European country but who subsequently moved to Britain. A simple ethnicity-focused approach to understanding and engaging minority groups in Britain, as taken in many models and policies within conventional multiculturalism, is inadequate and often inappropriate for dealing with immigrants’ needs or understanding their dynamics of inclusion or exclusion.

Immigration status is not just a crucial factor in determining an individual’s relation to the state, its resources and legal system, the labour market and other structures. It is an important catalyst in the formation of social
capital and a potential barrier to the formation of cross-cutting socio-economic and ethnic ties.

Many immigration statuses set specific time limits on people’s stay in Britain. Most ‘integration’ policies and programmes therefore do not apply to people with temporary status. Temporary workers, undocumented migrants and asylum-seekers often only spend short periods of time in given locations, either due to the search for work or relocation by employers or authorities such as the National Asylum Support Service. Short periods of duration may pose difficulties for local institutions to provide services. For example, a report by the Office for Standards in Education (Ofsted 2003) on the effects of asylum-seekers found that half of the schools it surveyed had a high turnover of such pupils, with one reporting that 27 per cent of its roll came and went in a single year; while the pupils themselves had a positive impact on most classes, teachers were frustrated with such brief coming-and-going. And not surprisingly, ‘those with a temporary or precarious status may actually have greater difficulties entering into positive relations with established residents than those heading for permanent residence’ (Rudiger 2006: 2-3)

In order to understand the nature and complexity of contemporary super-diversity, we must examine how such a system of stratified rights and conditions created by immigration channels and legal statuses cross-cuts socio-cultural and socio-economic dimensions.

**Employment**

Migrants, and particularly those from non-‘white’ backgrounds, fare worse in employment terms than non-migrants (Home Office 2002b). This situation has deteriorated over the decade of new immigration. Based on comparative Labour Force Surveys, broadly we can say that new immigrants are more likely to be employed in 2004 than in 1994; however, a higher proportion earn below the median wage than a decade ago (Kyambi 2005). Immigrants with the lowest levels of employment originate from Somalia (12.17%), Angola (30.07%), Iran (31.71%), Albania (31.93%), and Ethiopia (32.28%). In general migrant have significantly lower employment rates (65%) than UK-born Londoners (78%)(GLA 2005b: 2).

Some immigrants may have high employment rates, too – particularly those from higher income countries (75%) compared to those from developing
countries (61%). The highest employment levels are among immigrants from New Zealand (93.56%), Australia (90.57%), the Philippines (85.4%), Canada (82.76%) and Bulgaria (82.58%) (Kyambi 2005).

Immigrants are represented across a wide range of industries in London, but are strongly over-represented in the hotel and restaurant sector where they comprise 60% of the workforce. 10% of all London migrants work in this sector (Kyambi 2005). Variations in occupation are evident with reference to countries of origin. Workers from high income countries are more likely to work in finance and business, while those from developing countries comprise a large part of the retail and wholesale sector (such as 32% of Sri Lankans and 25%, respectively, of Turks, Kenyans and Pakistanis). The health and social work sectors see concentrations of Africans and people from the Caribbean (such as 37% of Trinidadians and 24% of Jamaicans). Yet health and domestic care services draw an enormously wide range of migrants. In 2003 when 42,000 foreign nurses were working in the National Health Service, nurses from sixty-eight different countries could be found in a single London trust (Winder 2004)

In all, the Greater London Authority concludes that ‘country of birth is central to understanding the labour market outcomes of Londoners. Within the migrant population, however, there is enormous diversity and polarity in outcomes’ (GLA 2005b: 5).

**Gender**

In the past thirty years, and particularly by the late 1980s, more females than males migrated to the UK; since about 1998, males have come to predominate in new flows. The reason for this, Kyambi (2005) suggests, may be due to a general shift away from more female oriented family migration to more male dominated work-based migration schemes since 1995. It is likely also related to the inflow of asylum-seekers, most of whom have been male.

There is considerable variation of gender structures among different groups, and this mostly relates to channels of migration and the evolution of migration systems from particular countries of origin. For instance, 80% of Slovakians, 72% of Czechs, 71% of Filipinos, 70% of Slovenes, 68% of Thais and 67% of Madagascars are women (GLA 2005a: 89). They are mostly to be found in domestic or health services. Meanwhile, 71% of Algerians, 63% of
Nepalese, 61% of Kosovars, 61% of Afghans, 60% of Yemenis and 60% of Albanians are males, almost all of whom are asylum-seekers (Ibid.: 90).

Among migrants in London generally, women migrants have a far lower employment rate (56%) than men (75%). Employment rates are especially low for women born in South Asia (37%) and the Middle East and North Africa (39%)(GLA 2005b: 2). However, such figures may reflect childcare responsibilities: overall employment rates for migrant women without children (70%) are closer to those of male migrants without children; for migrants with children employment rates are far lower for women (44%) compared to men (77%)(Ibid.).

Hence many basic features of super-diversity – especially the inter-related patterns surrounding immigrants’ country of origin, channels of migration, employment, legal status and rights – tend to be highly gendered (cf. Kofman et al. 2005).

**Age**

The new immigrant population has a higher concentration of 25-44 year olds and a lower proportion of under-16s than a decade ago, also perhaps reflecting a shift away from family migration (Kyambi 2005). Variance in age structure among various ethnic groups reflects different patterns of fertility and mortality as well as migration (GLA 2005a: 6). The mean age of new immigrants is 28 – averaging eleven years younger than the mean age of 39 for the British Isles born population.

There is a considerable amount of diversity in the proportion of the new immigrant population being in the age group 25-44, which we have considered to be a primary working age. While Cyprus (31.03%), Hong Kong (32.65%), Somalia (37.26%), Germany (37.85%), Norway (38.18%) and Albania (38.56%) have the smallest fraction of their population falling within this age group, they are counterbalanced by Algeria (78.24%), Philippines (74.49%), New Zealand (73.92%), and Italy (70.24%) with the greatest proportions being 25-44 years old. (Kyambi 2005: 133)

**Space/place**

New immigrants often settle in areas with established immigrant communities from the same country of birth. Pointing to this fact, and by way of recognising the boom in migrant-derived diversity, in 2005 The Guardian newspaper
published a special section called 'London: the world in one city' which described and mapped one hundred places and specific groups within 'the most diverse city ever' (Benedictus and Godwin 2005). Another was published in January 2006 called 'The world in one country', repeating the exercise on a national scale. These special sections were revealing and celebratory, but in many ways could be misleading.

The Greater London Authority’s analysis of the 2001 Census shows that there are only a few common country of origin populations that are highly concentrated in the capital – namely Bangladeshis in Tower Hamlets (where 42% of the capital’s 35,820 Bangladeshis live), people from Sierra Leone living in Southwark (26% of 3,647), Cypriots in Enfield (26% of 11,802), Afghans in Ealing (23% of 2,459) and Turks in Haringey (22% of 8,589). The report points out that ‘although there are areas which have come to be associated with particular migrants, nearly all migrant groups tend to live in a number of different boroughs’ (GLA 2005a: 88).

Therefore, while The Guardian wished to highlight the cosmopolitan nature of contemporary London and Britain, it made a mistake in suggesting certain groups are fixed to certain places. Instead, as implied by the GLA analysis and stressed by Geraldine Pratt (1998: 27),

[T]here is deep suspicion about mapping cultures onto places, because multiple cultures and identities inevitably inhabit a single place (think of multiple identities performed under the roof of a family house) and a single cultural identity is often situated in multiple, interconnected spaces.

London is the predominant locus of immigration and it is where super-diversity is at its most marked. But, following Kyambi (2005), we should note that increased diversification (of countries of origin, immigrant categories, etc.) are not a matter of increased numbers but relative change in a given locality. A city or neighbourhood may have small numbers of new migrants but relatively high indices of diversity (cf. Allen and Turner 1989). In terms of numbers of new migrants London still shows the highest degree of relative change followed by the South East, West Midlands, East of England, North West, and Yorkshire and Humberside (Kyambi 2005).

One major avenue by which newcomers have come to places of previously low immigrant density has been through government dispersal. In order to
relieve pressure on councils in London and the south-east of England, since 2000 the National Asylum Support Service (NASS) has made considerable effort to disperse people seeking asylum. By its peak in 2003 the dispersal system had spread 54,000 asylum-seekers to 77 local authorities across Britain, including several in Yorkshire (18%), the West Midlands (18%), the north-west (18%) and Scotland (11%). This has included placing newcomers from all over the world into towns and cities with limited history or experience of accommodating immigrants. Many asylum-seekers have been sent to economically deprived, all-White areas that were poorly prepared to receive them socially or administratively (see Home Office 2005). Many asylum-seekers, however, avoid dispersal in order to stay in areas with people of similar background, or return to such locations once granted leave to remain in the UK (Cole and Robinson 2003).

New immigrants with less established networks and patterns of settlement tend to be drawn to locations with a wider range of employment opportunities – principally to London but also to small towns and mid-sized cities (for instance to work in construction), coastal and other leisure-centred localities (where they might engage in hospitality and catering services) and rural areas (usually for short-term jobs in agriculture and food processing). Wherever they move, Robinson and Reeve (2005: 30) note, most evidence shows that ‘new immigrants, regardless of legal status, migration channel, ethnic origin or cultural identity, typically reside in poor quality accommodation that is often inappropriate to their needs (size, design, location, facilities, services).’

Transnationalism

Perhaps throughout history, and certainly over the last hundred years or more, immigrants have stayed in contact with families, organizations and communities in their places of origin and elsewhere in the diaspora (Foner 1997, Morawska 1999, Glick-Schiller 1999). In recent years, the extent and degree of transnational engagement has intensified due in large part to changing technologies and reduced telecommunication and travel costs. Enhanced transnationalism is substantially transforming several social, political and economic structures and practices among migrant communities worldwide (Vertovec 2004a).
The ‘new immigrants’ who have come to live in Britain over the past ten years have done so during a period of increasingly normative transnationalism (cf. Portes et al. 1999). Today in Britain, cross-border or indeed global patterns of sustained communication, institutional linkage and exchange of resources among migrants, homelands and wider diasporas are commonplace (see for example Anderson 2001, Al-Ali et al. 2001, Spellman 2004, Zontini 2004). This can be observed in the increasing value of remittances sent from Britain (now estimated at up to £3.5 billion per year; Blackwell and Seddon 2004), the growing volume of international phone calls between the UK and various places of migrant origin (Vertovec 2004b), the frequency of transnational marriage practices and the extent of engagement by various UK-based diasporas in the development of their respective homelands (Van Hear et al. 2004).

The degrees to and ways in which today’s migrants maintain identities, activities and connections linking them with communities outside Britain are unprecedented. Of course, not all migrants maintain the same level of kinds of transnational engagement: much of this will be largely conditioned by a range of factors including migration channel and legal status (e.g. refugees or undocumented persons may find it harder to maintain certain ties abroad), migration and settlement history, community structure and gendered patterns of contact, political circumstances in the homeland, economic means and more. That is, transnational practices among immigrants in Britain are highly diverse between and within groups (whether defined by country of origin, ethnicity, immigration category or any other criteria), adding yet another significant layer of complexity to all those outlined above.

The ‘new immigration’ and its outcomes in Britain have entailed the arrival and interplay of multifaceted characteristics and conditions among migrants. This has resulted in a contemporary situation of ‘super-diversity’ – named so in order to underline the fact that such a permutation marks a level and kind of complexity surpassing what Britain has previously experienced. Compared to the large-scale immigration of the 1950s-early 1970s, the 1990s-early 2000s have seen more migrants from more places entailing more socio-cultural differences going through more migration channels leading to more, as well as more significantly stratified, legal categories (which themselves have acted to internally diversify various groups), and who maintain more intensely an array of links with places of origin and diasporas elsewhere. Super-diversity is now all...
around the UK, and particularly in London. It has not brought with it particular problems or conflicts, but it certainly presents some challenges. Such challenges are faced not only by policy-makers but by social scientists too.

**Super-diversity: Social scientific challenges**

The theories and methods that social scientists use to study immigrants still owe much to the Chicago school of urban studies set out in the early and mid-part of the last century (Waters and Jiménez 2005). This primarily entails looking comparatively at processes of assimilation among particular, ethnically-defined groups measured in terms of changing socio-economic status, spatial concentration/segregation, linguistic change and intermarriage.

In many places and times, specific immigrant or ethnic minorities have largely shared such sets of traits, so that analyzing a group at large has indeed demonstrated many significant trends. Elsewhere, however, the array of traits akin to super-diversity has obfuscated attempts discern a clear comparison or relation between groups. For instance, Janet Abu-Lughod (1999: 417) describes how,

> In New York, a city long accustomed to an ethnic ‘poker game’ in which no single group commands most of the chips and where the politically federated system provides numerous entry points, albeit not equally advantageous, the sheer diversity of subgroups – both old-timers and new immigrants, and the criss-crossing of pigmentation, immigrant/citizen status, and religious identities by class and residence – has tended to mute the polarities found along language-descent lines in Los Angeles and along the color line in Chicago.

John Mollenkopf and Manuel Castells (1991: 402), too, have highlighted in New York City the existence of social dynamics marked by ‘an articulate core and a disarticulated plurality of peripheries’ differentiated by variable conglomerations of race, immigration status, gender, economic activity and neighbourhood. Such observations point towards the need to go beyond studies of socio-economic mobility, segregation and such based on ethnic or immigrant classification alone.

There have indeed been inquiries into how best to gauge diversity in ethnic terms, but also with respect to variables such as age, income and occupational types (e.g., Allen and Turner 1989) or how adequately to derive and evaluate measures of multigroup segregation (e.g., Reardon and Firebaugh
The development of quantitative techniques for multi-variate analysis surely have much to offer the study of super-diversity, particularly by way of the understanding the interaction of variables such as country of origin, ethnicity, language, immigration status (and its concomitant rights, benefits and restrictions), age, gender, education, occupation and locality.

Yet there is also much need for more and better qualitative studies of super-diversity. Not least, such a need arises from the Cantle Report into the 2001 riots in Oldham (Home Office 2001; also see Home Office 2004). The Report suggested a now infamous picture of groups living ‘parallel lives’ that do not touch or overlap by way of meaningful interchanges. But social scientists – to say nothing of civil servants – have few accounts of what meaningful interchanges look like, how they are formed, maintained or broken, and how the state or other agencies might promote them.

‘There are plenty of neighbourhoods,’ writes Ash Amin (2002: 960), ‘in which multiethnicity has not resulted in social breakdown, so ethnic mixture itself does not offer a compelling explanation for failure.’ In order to foster a better understanding of dynamics and potentials, Amin calls for an anthropology of ‘local micropolitics of everyday interaction’ akin to what Leonie Sandercock (2003: 89) sees as ‘daily habits of perhaps quite banal intercultural interaction.’ Such interaction, again, should be looked at in terms of the multiple variables mentioned above, not just in basic ethnic categories.

In this way we would benefit from more studies such as Soheila Shashahani’s (2002) regarding a mixed (Shiite, Kurd, Afghani) neighbourhood in Tehran. It demonstrates that where, how and when people encounter one another – by way of their daily travel itineraries, shopping habits, schooling, courteous salutations and other aspect of social life – are very closely defined by the intersection of a range of variables including ethnicity, income, gender, age and locality. Other qualitative studies which importantly point the way towards appreciating the interplay of diverse variables include Rampton’s (2005) socio-linguistic work on everyday practices in mixed contexts, and Baumann’s (1996, 1999) rich ethnographic and theoretical explorations around cross-cutting identifications in multi-ethnic settings.

Social scientific investigation of the conditions and challenges of super-diversity will throw up a wide variety of material and insights with theoretical
bearing. For example, these could include contributions toward a better understanding of some of the following areas.

**New patterns of inequality and prejudice.** The ‘new immigration’ since the early 1990s has brought with it emergent forms of racism: (a) among resident British targeted against newcomers – who may be specifically seen as East Europeans, Gypsies, Somalis, Kosovans, ‘bogus asylum-seekers’, or other constructed categories of otherness; (b) among longstanding ethnic minorities against immigrants – again whether broadly or against specific groups; and (c) among newcomers themselves and directed against British ethnic minorities. The new immigration and super-diversity have also stimulated new definitions of ‘whiteness’ surrounding certain groups of newcomers.

**New patterns of segregation.** Several new immigrants have, as in waves before them, clustered in specific urban areas; others are far more dispersed by choice, by employers or by the NASS dispersal system. While some statistical mapping of new immigrant distribution and concentration has been done (e.g. Kyambi 2005), much remains to be studied in terms of detailed patterns of segregation, housing experiences and residential opportunities.

**New patterns/experiences of space and ‘contact’.** There is a school of thought that suggests regular contact between groups may mutually reduce prejudice and increase respect. Yet ‘Habitual contact in itself is no guarantor of cultural exchange’ (Amin 2002: 969). Indeed, regular contact can entrench group animosities. More research is needed here to test these hypotheses and to identify key forms of space and contact that might yield positive benefits. Further, as Jane Jacobs and Ruth Fincher (1998) advocate, in many cases we need to consider the local development of ‘a complex entanglement between identity, power and place’ which they call a ‘located politics of difference’. This entails examining how people define their differences in relationship to uneven material and spatial conditions.

**New forms of cosmopolitanism and creolisation.** The enlarged presence and everyday interaction of people from all over the world is leading to evidence of multiple cultural competence (Vertovec and Rogers 1995), new cosmopolitan orientations and attitudes (Vertovec and Cohen 2003), the appearance of creole languages (Harris and Rampton 2002), practices of ‘crossing’ or code-switching, particularly among young people (Rampton 2005) and the emergence of new ethnicities characterised by multi-lingualism (Harris 2003).
New ‘bridgeheads’ of migration. As noted earlier, many of the groups which have come to Britain in the past decade originate from places with few prior links to this country. For example, how did French-speaking Algerians or Congolese start coming to UK (Collyer 2003)? We could learn much about contemporary global migration processes by looking at how migration channels and networks have been newly formed and developed.

Secondary migration patterns. It is now commonplace for migrants to arrive in the UK after spending periods in other, usually EU, countries; this is particularly the case with people granted refugee status such as Somalis from the Netherlands or Denmark. Again, research on such migration systems can tell us much about the current transformation of migration systems.

Transnationalism and integration. While much academic work has been devoted to these two topics over the past decade, there has been much less attention on their relationship. Many policy-makers and members of the public assume a zero-sum game: that is, it is presumed the ‘more transnational’ migrants are, the ‘less integrated’ they must be. Such an assumption is likely false, but needs to be contested with research evidence.

Methodological innovation. Research on super-diversity could encourage new techniques in quantitatively testing the relation between multiple variables and in qualitatively undertaking ethnographic exercises that are multi-sited (considering different localities and spaces within a given locality) and multi-group (defined in terms of the variable convergence of ethnicity, status, gender and other criteria of super-diversity).

Research-policy nexus. Social scientists are not very good at translating data and analysis of complexities into forms that can have impact on policies and public practices. Research on super-diversity will provide this opportunity, especially at a time when policy-makers are eager to gain a better understanding of ‘integration’ and ‘social cohesion’. Indeed, as outlined below, there is a range of policy issues raised or addressed by conditions of super-diversity.

Super-diversity: Policy challenges
At both national and local levels, policy-makers and public service practitioners continuously face the task of refashioning their tools in order to be most effective in light of changing circumstances (whether these are socio-economic, budgetary, or set by government strategy). This is equally the case surrounding policies for community cohesion, integration, managed migration and ‘managed settlement’ (Home Office 2004). The following section points to just a handful of possible issues in which super-diversity impacts on the current development of public policies and practices.

**Community organizations.** Structures and modes of government support for, and liaison with, ethnic minority organizations have for decades formed the backbone of the British model of multiculturalism. Especially on local levels, these have indeed often provided important forums for sharing experiences and needs, establishing good practices and providing access to services. However, in light of the numerous dimensions of super-diversity, such structures and modes are inadequate for effective representation. Most local authorities have been used to liaising with a limited number of large and well-organized associations; now there are far more numbers in smaller, less (or not at all) organized groups. In any case, just how many groups could such structures support? And how should local authorities account for the internal diversity of various groups, not least in terms of legal status? Finally, existing minority ethnic agencies often cannot respond to the needs of the various newcomers.

It can take years to develop effective community organizations which can deliver services and impact on local decision-making. ‘Meanwhile, new immigrant populations are effectively “squeezed out” of local representative structures and consequently wield little power or influence’ (Robinson and Reeve 2005: 35). Also, as Roger Zetter and colleagues (2005: 14) point out, ‘In the present climate of immigration policy, there are good reasons why minorities may wish to remain invisible to outsiders and resist forming themselves into explicit organisational structures.’ None of this is to say that community organizations no longer have a place in bridging migrant groups and local authorities or service providers. Such bodies remain crucial to the process, but should be recognized as only partially relevant with regard to their representativeness and scope.

**Public service delivery.** The growing complexity of the population carries with it a range of significant public service implications. Among these is no less
than a fundamental shift in strategies across a range of service sectors concerning the assessment of needs, planning, budgeting, commissioning of services, identification of partners for collaboration and gaining a broader appreciation of diverse experiences in order generally to inform debate.

Such a shift must begin with gathering basic information on the new diversity, since ‘being able to identify new minority ethnic groups is a key factor in distributing resources’ (Mennell 2000: 82). Existing measures are inadequate and may even impair service delivery. As one health expert puts it, ‘the ten census categories for ethnicity do not reflect the diversity of communities in this country, and mask the differences of their health needs’ (Pui-Ling 2000: 83). Institutional solutions will require fresh thinking and innovation. Some might be along the lines of the American examples provided by Elżbieta Goździak and Michael Melia (2005) who suggest how health systems might cope with super-diversity through the establishment of comprehensive international clinics at local hospitals and the use of lay health advisers and promoters from targeted groups. Others such as Joe Kai (2003: 33) propose moving away altogether from longstanding healthcare approaches based on giving practitioners training in, or catalogues purporting to provide, ‘cultural knowledge’ pertaining to a set of immigrants/ethnic minorities:

Clearly no ‘knowledge based’ training can prepare professionals for all the issues that ever increasing diversity creates. Learning generic skills to respond flexibly to all encounters is more appropriate. In other words, responding to each patient as an individual, with individual needs, and to variations in patients’ culture in its broadest sense.

Similarly in schools facing new forms and extents of diversity, while it is impossible to give teachers appropriate knowledge about the language and culture of an increasing breadth of newcomer children, it has been shown that training in methods for the broad appreciation of cultural difference has ‘more than compensated’ and obtained significant results (Ofsted 2003: 10).

A comprehensive examination of super-diversity’s impacts on public services is well beyond the scope of this paper and capability of this author. It seems clear, nevertheless, that most areas of service provision have not caught up with the transformations brought about by the new immigration of the last decade. In one well-informed overview of current institutions, for instance, Anja
Rudiger (2006: 8) concludes that ‘Despite statutory provisions, there is little evidence to date that local authorities are in a position to identify how targets relating to service delivery and economic development intersect with the dynamics of diverse community relationships and networks.’

‘Community cohesion’. Especially since the riots of 2001, the (albeit vaguely defined) notion of ‘community cohesion’ represents a significant concern within both national and local government. This concern has given rise to a special unit in the Home Office, numerous reports, working groups and other initiatives surrounding civil and neighbourhood renewal, diversity and social inclusion (see Home Office 2003). However once again, as Rudiger (2006: 3) reports,

there is little evidence that relations between migrants and established groups currently form an integral part of this mainstream policy agenda. There is also no targeted strategy for promoting good relations with new migrants, and little evidence that a migration dimension forms part of the current community cohesion agenda, which primarily addresses relations with black and ethnic minority groups.

There are certainly policies and indicators directed toward immigrant integration (although various kinds of temporary migrants are left off of this agenda too); however, immigrant integration and community cohesion are usually – and strangely – not often linked in government thinking. Yet if we follow the sensible view that ‘cohesion is about how interactions take place between migrant communities and local hosts, not just the “performance” of migrant communities themselves’ (Zetter et al. 2005: 18), the policy question arises: what kind of forums, spaces and networks should be created and supported to stimulate inter-relationships of newcomers and settled communities?

In order to avoid the conventional trap of addressing newcomers just in terms of some presumably fixed ethnic identity, an awareness of the new super-diversity suggests that policy-makers and practitioners should take account of new immigrants’ ‘plurality of affiliations’ (recognizing multiple identifications and axes of differentiation, only some of which concern ethnicity), ‘the coexistence of cohesion and separateness’ (especially when one bears in mind a stratification of rights and benefits around immigrant categories), and – in light of enhanced transnational practices – the fact that ‘migrant communities, just as the settled
population, can “cohere” to different social worlds and communities simultaneously’ (Zetter et al.: 14, 19).

**Conclusion**

Summarily described here as super-diversity, new features of Britain’s contemporary social condition arise from a convergence of factors surrounding patterns of immigration since the early 1990s. The experiences, opportunities, constraints and trajectories facing newcomers – and the wider set of social and economic relations within the places where they reside – are shaped by complex interplays.

As outlined in this paper, these factors include: *country of origin* (comprising a variety of possible subset traits such as ethnicity, language[s], religious tradition, regional and local identities, cultural values and practices), *migration channel* (often related to highly gendered flows and specific social networks), *legal status* (determining entitlement to rights), *migrants’ human capital* (particularly educational background), *access to employment* (which may or may not be in immigrants’ hands), *locality* (related especially to material conditions, but also the nature and extent of other immigrant and ethnic minority presence), *transnationalism* (emphasizing how migrants’ lives are lived with significant reference to places and peoples elsewhere) and the usually chequered *responses by local authorities, services providers and local residents* (which often tend to function by way of assumptions based on previous experiences with migrants and ethnic minorities). Fresh and novel ways of understanding and responding to such complex interplays must be fashioned if we are move beyond the frameworks derived from an earlier, significantly different, social formation.

A range of existing frameworks, including those which focus on ethnicity as the predominant or even sole criterion marking social processes, should be reshaped and extended. A similar conclusion was recently made by Fong and Shibuya (2005: 299), who stress that contemporary configurations ‘require social scientists to go beyond existing theoretical frameworks and methodology to explore the complexity of the multiethnic group context.’ Such reworking can draw from, and will contribute much to, the anthropology of complexity pioneered by the likes of Fredrik Barth (1989) and Ulf Hannerz (1992) as well as the ‘complexity turn’ in social theory recently expounded by John Urry (2005).
Methodologically addressing and theoretically analyzing processes and effects of super-diversity should stimulate social scientists to creatively consider the interaction of multiple axes of differentiation. This will also help us, thereby, to answer the critical questions posed by Jacobs and Fincher (1998: 9), namely: ‘How does one speak (and write) about such multiply constituted and locationally contingent notions of difference? What are the pertinent dimensions along which different identities are expressed or represented?’

For policy-makers and practitioners in local government, NGOs and social service departments, appreciating dimensions and dynamics of super-diversity has profound implications for how they might understand and deal with modes of difference and their interactions within the socio-economic and legal circumstances affecting members of the population. This will certainly have impacts, for instance, on the ‘community cohesion’ agenda currently driving much public policy. Attention to super-diversity should help them recognize the value of Amin’s (2002: 972) view that,

Mixed neighbourhoods need to be accepted as the spatially open, culturally heterogeneous and socially variegated spaces that they are, not imagined as future cohesive or integrated communities. There are limits to how far community cohesion – rooted in common values, a shared sense of place, and local networks of trust – can become the basis of living with difference in such neighbourhoods.

Discovering and acknowledging the nature and extent of diversity is a crucial first step in the development of adequate policies on both national and local levels. Here social scientific research and analysis can provide many of the key points of information and insight.

Ultimately, however, policy responses to diversification rest on political will and vision. As Leonie Sandercock (2003: 104) suggests, ‘the good society does not commit itself to a particular vision of the good life and then ask how much diversity it can tolerate within the limits set by this vision. To do so would be to foreclose future societal development.’ Indeed, super-diversity looks to be a development that is here to stay and likely to evolve in the future. Similar trends affecting American cities have prompted Roger Waldinger and Mehdi Bozorgmehr (1996: 23) to ask, ‘is today’s diversity a stable arrangement, or is it
simply a stage in the evolution of a new type of homogeneity, in which most residents will be foreign-born?’

Although perhaps rather glib, the concept of super-diversity points to the necessity of considering multi-dimensional conditions and processes affecting immigrants in contemporary society. Its recognition will hopefully lead to public policies better suited to the needs and conditions of immigrants, ethnic minorities and the wider population of which they are inherently part.
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