Trends and Impacts of Migrant Transnationalism

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Abstract

The transnational approach to migration phenomena, despite many critiques, suggests that a variety of institutions are changing, particularly among migrants themselves. How deep-seated and long-lasting are these changes, and to they have implications for broader forms of structural transformation in migration sending and receiving contexts? In this paper, a wide range of studies and materials are reviewed to address this question concerning possible modes of transformation affecting socio-cultural, political and economic transformation. These include shifting patterns impacts of transnational practices on families, norms and modes of perceptual orientation; dual citizenship, homeland politics in diaspora and the ‘identities-borders-orders’ of nation-states; and the sending and use of individual and collective remittances for economic development. These modes or sites of transformation both draw from and contribute to wider processes of globalization.

Keywords: Migrant Transnationalism, Modes of Transformation, Remittances, Dual Citizenship, Telephone calls

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Migrant Transnationalism and Modes of Transformation

The transnational lens on migrant activities shows that some significant things are changing. Notwithstanding certain criticisms of how this lens or research perspective should be fashioned, it is clear that many migrants today conduct activities and orientations that link them with significant others – family, co-villagers, political comrades, fellow members of religious congregations – who dwell in nation-states other than those in which the migrants reside. What kinds of changes are stimulated by these connections? In what spheres of life? How deep are the changes and how long-lasting? These are high among the analytical questions begged by transnational takes on migrant dynamics.

In this paper I suggest that current migrant practices can be seen to involve modes of transformation on different levels of abstraction in three basic domains of activity. These include a kind of perceptual transformation (affecting what can be described as migrants’ habitus) in the socio-cultural domain, conceptual transformation (affecting meanings within the analytical triad ‘identities-borders-orders’) in the political domain, and institutional transformation (affecting forms of financial transfer and local development) in the economic domain. Each set of transformations involves multiple causes, linked processes and observable outcomes.

The paper commences with a view of the transnational approach to migrant practices, including a look at the most common criticisms levelled at the perspective. Thereafter a brief discussion of the concept of transformation is provided in order to set the scene for three subsequent sections on migrant transnational practices and modes of transformation in, respectively, socio-cultural, political and economic spheres of activity.

The transnational lens and its critics

Transnationalism – a set of sustained long-distance, border-crossing connections – is not of course representative of migrant populations alone. Such kinds of connection are to be found within global corporations, media and communications networks, social movements, criminal and
terrorist groups. Structural comparisons between these and migrant forms of social organization have rarely been explored (see Vertovec 1999a, 2003).

Specifically with regard to migrants, over the past ten to fifteen years the study of transnationalism has rapidly ascended within social scientific research on migration. The general perspective is summarized by Ayse Caglar (2001: 607):

Current scholarship on transnationalism provides a new analytic optic which makes visible the increasing intensity and scope of circular flows of persons, goods, information and symbols triggered by international labour migration. It allows an analysis of how migrants construct and reconstitute their lives as simultaneously embedded in more than one society.

Just as in the broader study of migration, the study of transnational connections among migrants also carries sub-themes focusing on important areas such as ethnicity and identity, gender, family, religion, remittances, entrepreneurship and political participation.

Since transnationalism hit the migration studies scene in the late 1980s, however, one of the central questions asked by scholars of the subject is: how is so-called transnationalism different from other aspects of, or takes on, migration?

Gathered from a variety of published articles, conference sessions and workshop debates concerning the transnational lens on migrant communities, a recurrent set of criticisms – ‘the usual suspects’ – are evident. I call these ‘the usual suspects’ by way of two meanings: (a) the same criticisms are persistently repeated (often without taking account of how they have actually been addressed by a variety of scholars), and (b) although purporting to critique ‘the transnationalism literature’, critics (such as Kivisto 2001, Fitzgerald 2002, Nagel 2002) most often focus on specific works by a small set of authors (especially Glick Schiller, Basch and Szanton-Blanc, the contributors to Smith and Guarnizo 1998, and Portes). This latter characteristic is particularly remarkable, since in the last decade ideas around transnationalism and the transnational approach
to migration research have expanded extraordinarily across academic disciplines, spawning a rapid proliferation of publications, PhD theses, seminars, conferences and research projects. It would be difficult for any one bibliography, to say nothing of a single critical review, to account for the current extent and variety of intellectual debate surrounding the topic of transnationalism.

The usual suspect criticisms usually entail one or more of the following issues:

- **conceptual conflation and overuse**: ‘transnationalism’ is often used interchangeably with ‘international’, ‘multinational’, ‘global’ and ‘diasporic’. There is also the problem of suggesting that all migrants engage in transnationalism;
- **oldness/newness**: questions abound as to whether transnational activities among migrants are new, and to how, or to what extent, they are new;
- **sampling on the dependent variable**: researchers have looked for transnational patterns and found them. What about the cases in which transnationalism doesn’t develop, or what conditions particular forms of transnationalism?
- **trans-what?**: research and theory have not adequately problematized the difference between trans-national, trans-state and trans-local processes and phenomena;
- **transnationalism vs. assimilation (vs. multiculturalism)**: false dichotomies between these terms have been posited, rather than a robust account of their inter-relationship;
- **technological determinism**: are contemporary forms of migrant transnationalism merely a function of today’s modes of real-time communication and cheap transportation?
- **not all migrants are transnational**: even within specific groups or local communities, there is great variation in migrants’ border-crossing practices;
• *generational limitation*: are current patterns of transnational participation among migrants going to dwindle or die with the second and subsequent generations?

Of all these critiques, the oldness/newness one is probably raised most often. Questions as to what’s old and what’s new about transnational migrant practices have been ably handled by scholars such as Ewa Morawska (1999), Nina GlickSchiller (1999), Nancy Foner (2000) and Rob Smith (2003). Alejandro Portes (2001) has notably dealt with this issue, too, by recalling Robert Merton’s notion of ‘the fallacy of adumbration’: that is, once a social scientific idea has been formulated, it is easy to find historical anticipations of it. This does not dismiss the idea. As Smith (2003) says, ‘if transnational life existed in the past but was not seen as such, then the transnational lens does the new analytical work of providing a way of seeing what was there that could not be seen before.’ Still, it might be true to say that long-distance connections maintained by migrants one hundred years ago were not truly ‘transnational’ – in terms of one contemporary sense of regular and sustained social contact (Portes et al. 1999); rather, such earlier links were just border-crossing migrant networks that were maintained in piecemeal fashion as best as migrants at that time could manage. Theoretically, it is in fleshing out just such differences between the meaning of transnational practices and migrant networks that research, data, analysis and criticism can importantly contribute to migration studies.

To call the above criticisms ‘the usual suspects’ is not to underestimate their importance. It is indeed true that much criticism of transnationalism often comes by way of tiresome conceptual nit-picking. And none of these critiques, contrary to some critics’ own beliefs, delivers a knock-out blow. The critical assessments outlined above do represent important caveats, problematics and grounds for theoretical correction. Not least since they have been made so recurrently over the past decade, in publications, seminars and conferences, they are all points that have been or are currently being engaged by a wide variety of social scientists, including the usual suspect authors.
It is clear that much more conceptual and empirical work remains to be done with regard to sharpening the transnational approach to migration research and analysis. One way to do this is by better disaggregating and characterizing types and levels of transnational activity (cf. Smith 2001, Levitt 2001a, Riccio 2001, Fitzgerald 2002). There is need for this despite the fact that, as Alejandro Portes (2003) points out, ‘it has been recognized from the start that transnational activities are quite heterogeneous and vary across immigrant communities, both in their popularity and in their character.’ And, if it still needs saying, most scholars recognize that not all migrants develop transnational practices, and many do so only in one sphere of their lives (Faist 2000).

Recently we have seen considerable conceptual tuning concerning modes, levels, extents and impacts of transnationalism. For example, theorists have formulated typologies such as: transnationalism ‘from above’ (global capital, media, and political institutions) and ‘from below’ (local, grassroots activity)(Smith and Guarnizo 1998); ‘narrow’ (institutionalised and continuous activities) and ‘broad’ transnationalism (occasional linkages)(Itzigsohn et al. 1999); ‘great’ (of state and economy) and ‘little’ transnationalism (of family and household)(Gardner 2002); ‘linear’ (including plans to return to place of origin), ‘resource-based’ (linked with labour market position and mobility) and ‘reactive’ transnationalism (especially based on discrimination) (Itzigsohn and Saucido 2002); ‘broad’ (including both regular and occasional activities) and ‘strict’ transnationalism (regular participation only)(Portes 2003); ‘core’ (patterned and predictable around one area of social life) and ‘expanded’ transnational activity (occasional practices in a wider array of spheres)(Levitt 2001a,b).

Such types of transnationalism are variably manifested among different categories of people whose quests for work or ‘mobile livelihoods’ (Sørensen and Olwig 2001) involve them in transnational migration circuits (Rouse 1991) or patterns of circular migration (Duany 2002). These categories include undocumented migrants (Hagen 1994), refugees and asylum seekers (Koser 2002), religious figures (Riccio 1999), highly skilled workers generally (Vertovec 2002) and information technology
workers employed through ‘body shopping’ (Xiang 2001) along with programmes to encourage so-called ‘brain circulation’ of trained occupational specialists between diasporas and homelands (Meyer and Brown 1999).

Arguably, too, each kind or degree of transnationalism differentially affects people (a) who travel regularly between specific sites, (b) who mainly stay in one place of immigration but engage people and resources in a place of origin, and (c) who have never moved but whose locality is significantly affected by the activities of others abroad (Mahler 1998, Levitt 2001b).

The examples of types, specificities and differences surrounding migrant transnationalism are perhaps conceptually burdensome, but arguably necessary, refinements in order to counter the kinds of criticism that the notion of transnationalism has attracted. The refinements provide clearer ways of mapping the infrastructures of transnational relations (cf. Held et al. 1999). Transnational patterns and their impacts naturally vary with regard to a host of factors, including family and kinship structures, conditions in places of migrant origin and reception, transportation or smuggling routes, communication and media networks, financial structures and remittance facilities, legislative frameworks regarding movement and status, and the economic interlinkage of local economies. Such infrastructures have at least two effects on transnational linkages.

Infrastructures may facilitate or constrain the extensity and intensity of global connectedness in any single domain. This is because they mediate flows and connectivity: infrastructures influence the overall level of interaction capacity in every sector and thus the potential magnitude of global interconnectedness. (Ibid.: 19).

Given that migrant transnationalism and its consequences take many forms, how can we begin to think about possible broader social transformations that arise in their wake?
What is transformation?

Most studies of migrant transnationalism describe facets of social morphology (Vertovec 1999a). That is, social scientists in this field tend to research the nature and function of border-crossing social networks, families and households, ethnic communities and identities, power relations surrounding gender and status, patterns of economic exchange, and systems of political organization. Social change, in migrant transnationalism studies, tends to be gauged with reference to the ways in which conditions in more than one location impact upon such social structures and the values, practices and institutions that sustain them. By referring to ‘transformation’ some theorists seek to paint on a wider canvas depicting widespread – indeed, global – shifts in social, political and economic organization.

For instance, in contrast to social change affecting specific institutions, Kenneth Wiltshire (2001: 8) suggests that ‘transformation… describes a more radical change, a particularly deep and far-reaching one which within a relatively limited time span modifies the configuration of societies.’ Neil Smelser (1998) stresses moreover that such profound social transformations develop out of both individual and collective short-term actions within immediate environments, accumulating in often unexpected ways to constitute changes in societies. And Stephen Castles (2001: 14) explicitly links the contemporary study of social transformation to the analysis of transnational connections affecting national societies, local communities and individuals:

The point is that global change and the increasing importance of transnational processes require new approaches from the social sciences. These will not automatically develop out of existing paradigms, because the latter are often based on institutional and conceptual frameworks that may be resistant to change, and whose protagonists may have strong interests in the preservation of the intellectual status quo. If classical social theory was premised on the emerging national-industrial society of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, then a renewal of social theory should take as its
starting point the global transformation occurring at the dawn of the
twenty-first century.

Such an approach to cumulative societal transformation is exemplified by
the work of Manuel Castells (especially 1996, 1997) as he describes the
impacts of various kinds of enhanced computer-mediated communication
on work patterns, collective identities, family life and structure, social
movements and the state.

Held et al. (1999: 15-17) also seek to understand how a constellation of
conditions and parallel processes combine to bring about large-scale
patterns of transformation. They especially concentrate on the following
dimensions that can be analysed both quantitatively and qualitatively: (1)
‘the extensiveness of networks of relations and connections’, or the
stretching of social relationships ‘such that events, decisions and activities
in one region of the world can come to have significance for individuals
and communities in distant regions of the globe’; (2) ‘the intensity of
flows and levels of activity within these networks’ that are not occasional
or random, but somehow regular or patterned; (3) ‘the velocity or speed
of interchanges’ of resources and information that provide immediate
feedback, often in real time. These are all dimensions of transformation to
be found in modes of migrant transnationalism.

What’s not transformative in migrant transnationalism? The widening of
networks, more activities across distances, and speeded-up
communications in themselves might be important forms of
transnationalism in themselves. But they do not necessarily lead to long-
lasting, structural changes in global or local societies. We are back to the
oldness/newness critique: migrants have historically maintained long-
distance social networks, and the fact that messages or visits take shorter
time does not always lead to significant alterations in structure, purpose
or practice within the network.

But sometimes the matter of degree really counts. The extensiveness,
intensity and velocity of networked flows of information and resources
may indeed combine to fundamentally alter the way people do things. As
Patricia Landolt (2001: 220) suggests with regard to migrant transnational
activities, there are times when ‘a quantitative change results in a qualitative difference in the order of things.’ In this field of study we can sometimes observe – following Smelser – how transformation is brought about by numerous individual and collective short-term actions within social environments that span distance locales. As portrayed by Portes (2003):

Despite its limited numerical character, the combination of a cadre of regular transnational activists with the occasional activities of other migrants adds up to a social process of significant economic and social impact for communities and even nations. While from an individual perspective, the act of sending a remittance, buying a house in the migrant’s hometown, or travelling there on occasion have purely personal consequences, in the aggregate they can modify the fortunes and the culture of these towns and even of the countries of which they are part.

In this cumulative way migrant transnational practices can modify the value systems and everyday social life of people across entire regions (see for instance Shain 1999, Kyle 2000, Levitt 2001b).

Processes and practices of migrant transnationalism that can lead to broader transformations take place on different scales in at least three domains of human activity. Of course, as Luis Guarnizo (2003) reminds us, ‘Everyday transnational practices are not neatly compartmentalized, and nor are their consequences.’ Dividing up the discussion in this way is simply for heuristic purposes. That said, in this paper it is suggested that such scales and domains of transformation fostered by migrant transnationalism include basic structures of individual habitus, fundamental political frameworks, and integral modes of economic development.

**Socio-cultural transformation: re-orienting habitus**

As mentioned previously, most work on migrant transnationalism has examined social morphology, or the configuration of social groups as they
adapt to long-distance, cross-border contexts. There has been a considerable amount of research that has detailed ‘the emergence of transnational social practices and institutions that create a field of sociability and identification among immigrants and people in the country of origin’ (Itzigsohn and Saucido 2002: 788). While this approach has certainly been significant and instructive – and there is still much to do, perhaps there has been an overemphasis on the social institutions of transnationalism. To balance the picture we also need to observe transnationalism as it occurs within, and has impact upon, the daily lives of individuals (Voigt-Graf 2002). While actor-centred approaches carry the danger of overlooking larger structural conditions, they have the advantage of emphasizing motivations, meanings and the place of people as their own agents in processes of change.

The following subsections suggest just a few ways through which transnationalism has transformed the everyday social worlds of individuals in both migrant sending and receiving contexts.

**telephone calls**

One of the most significant (yet under-researched) modes of transnational practice affecting migrants’ lives is the ability to telephone family members. This has become a particularly salient feature in recent years through the dramatic fall in the cost of international telephone calls. In many cases calls abroad that used to cost several dollars per minute now cost a few cents per minute. Connected with this fact, throughout the world there was a doubling of the number of international phone calls between 1985-95 (Guillén 2001), and the trend has continued sharply upward. The number of calls made from the USA to other countries increased from 200 million in 1980 to 6.6 billion in 2000 (FCC 2002).

The telecommunications consultancy TeleGeography, Inc. surveys statistical research on global telephone traffic. A comparison of the company’s 1995 and 2001 data, looking at minutes of tele-traffic between specific countries with strong migration connections, suggests a remarkable growth in traffic. In practically all countries examined the total
volume of all international calls originating from that country roughly doubled (i.e. rose 100 per cent) during this period. International calls from Germany to Turkey increased 54 per cent while calls from Turkey to Germany increased 35 per cent, Turkey to the Netherlands rose 58 per cent and Turkey to Belgium 80 per cent. Calls from Pakistan to the UK increased 123 per cent, 141 per cent to Saudi Arabia, and 556 per cent to Canada. Calls from the UK to India swelled by 439 per cent, to Pakistan 390 per cent, and to Hong Kong 292 per cent. Calls from Pakistan to the USA – the destination that comprises over 80 per cent of all Mexican calls abroad – grew by 107 per cent. In turn, calls from the USA to Mexico now account for the largest destination of all outgoing American telecommunications, having increased 171 per cent between 1995-2001. In this same period calls from the USA to the Philippines increased 452 per cent, to India 408 per cent, to Brazil 206 per cent, to the Dominican Republic 189 per cent, to Jamaica 127 per cent, to China 93 per cent, and to Colombia 95 per cent. The TeleGeography figures are highly indicative of the massive expansion marking patterns of transnational communication between specific countries. Of course, we cannot account for the proportion of calls actually made by transnational migrant families; a considerable number of the international calls will be for the business market. Yet it is highly likely that the number of telephone calls between members of migrant families comprise a significant share, and reflect the same extraordinary scale of increase, in each case.

An important factor contributing to the expansion of international telephoning has been the development and spread of pre-paid telephone cards. Use of these cards – which are easily available at gas stations, newsagents and convenience stores in most urban areas – has doubled between the years 2000-2002 alone (Wolfe 2002). Over half of all traffic carried via phone cards is international (Brown 2003). Moreover, industry analysts state that:

It is well known that the main users of prepaid calling cards are first generation immigrants. Their desire to stay connected with family at home, strong networks within their US based community, and the ability to pass the news of a well-priced product help drive the
competition among providers. These ethnic markets, also known as “bodega” markets, require different marketing strategies for different cultural groups. Although producers of prepaid cards have responded to this by creating various pricing patterns in their cards that attract certain ethnic users, success still lies in their placement. Proper distribution is the main factor in their sale. (Mensah and Smith 2002)

One phone card distributor interviewed for a corporate study claimed to sell almost exclusively to ‘the ethnic markets’, saying most of his prepaid cards are currently being sold to Brazilians, then Chinese, Dominicans, various ethnicities from Africa (especially Ugandans, Ghanaians and Nigerians) and the Middle East (mainly from Lebanon, Syria and Egypt)(Ibid.). Other distributors now target specific immigrant communities, such as Chinese in the Pacific Northwest, Israelis in New York, Indians in Silicon Valley and Cubans in Florida (de la Cruz 2002).

The ‘ethnic market’ for long-distance calls is substantial elsewhere, too. In Germany, for instance, Deutsche Telekom lost 190,000 Turkish customers – whose telephone bills are twice as high as the average German household due to calls abroad – to the telephone company Otelo; this has prompted a fierce competition in Turkish-speaking marketing between the two companies (Caglar 2002).

New technologies around telephoning are having impact in less developed contexts where migrants’ families remain. One example is a recently unveiled product that will allow Mexican-Americans to pay for communications services or facilities for family and friends in Mexico. Another product is a 1-800 service that allows friends and family in Mexico to call the United States at rates significantly cheaper than collect calls. Telecommunications infrastructure is developing in poor areas, too, largely on the back of transnational migration practices. In many places one can witness the increasing use of public telephones in village centres, reduced-rate telephone cards and cellular phones, even fairly remote villages. The Dominican Republic represents one case of recent advances in communications infrastructure: now, the ‘teledensity’ (lines per capita) of cellular phones on that country is actually higher than that of main line
phones (Intelecard 2003). In Bangladesh the innovative microfinance institution Grameen Bank has created a telecommunications branch and ‘village phone’ programme providing infrastructure and 950 cellular phones in village and urban areas that give telephone access for 65,000 people (Richardson et al. 2000). By far, most of the uses of the village phones are to talk with migrant relatives overseas – and particularly to discuss remittances (Ibid.).

The personal, real-time contact provided by international telephone calls is transforming the everyday lives of innumerable migrants. Among transnational Salvadorans, for example, new telecommunications infrastructures mean that ‘times have changed; they are still physically distanced, but they can now feel and function like a family’ (Mahler 2001: 584). Non-migrant families commonly have discussions across a kitchen table (e.g., can we buy a refrigerator? what do we do about the teenager’s behaviour? when, where and for how long does someone or all of the family next travel?); now many migrant families conduct the same discussions across oceans. Cheap telephone calls have largely facilitated this. For a single family to be stretched across vast distances and between nation-states, yet still somehow functioning for collective gain, is now a commonality.

There is still a grossly uneven distribution of telecommunications infrastructure in the developing world. Telephone calls can only provide a kind of punctuated sociality that can heighten emotional strain as well as alleviate it. This mode of intermittent communication may add to the stress of marital and family relationships, since it cannot bridge all the gaps of information and expression endemic to long-distance separation (cf. Mahler 2001). Nevertheless, telephone calls are increasingly used transnationally to link migrants and homelands in ways that are deeply meaningful to people on both ends of the line.
families

The everyday provenance of most migrant transnationalism is within families. In many cases family life has been extensively modified in light of transnational practices (see for instance Fouron and Glick Schiller 2001, Gardner and Grillo 2002, Bryceson and Vuorela 2002). Guarnizo (1997) proposes that changes in family and household organization can be approached by way of residential arrangements, budget management and intergenerational cultural reproduction. Yet there are other dimensions of transnational family life that need attention too, such as the nature of parenting, gender relations and the situation of children. As suggested with regard to telephone communication within families, the impacts of transnational practices within many of these dimensions have not been without emotional costs.

‘Long-distance parenthood’ linking ‘fractured families and geographically dispersed homes’ is a common feature characterizing much contemporary migrant experience (Lobel 2003). Within dispersed family structures, practically irregardless of cultural origins of migrants, it is ‘transnational motherhood’ among female migrants which ‘radically rearranges mother-child interactions and requires a concomitant radical reshaping of the meanings and definitions of appropriate mothering’ (Hondagneu-Sotelo and Avila 1997: 557). Such rearrangements are known to cause considerable emotional distress, anxieties, sacrifices, financial pressures and difficult negotiations with caregivers who must often fill-in for distant parents.

Indeed, shifting work and travel arrangements mean that today more than ever, circularly migrating parents often rotate periods of migration to ensure that one of them remains with the children while the other works abroad. The difficulties of juggling the responsibilities of parenting is also related to phenomena surrounding so-called ‘global care chains’ (Hochschild 2000) in which women from developing countries migrate to take care of other people’s children while financially supporting, and needing to find caregivers for, their own children. These and other patterns of transnational family life have necessitated new forms of
managing and coping with mixed motivations, strategies and emotional tribulations among parents with regard to their children ‘left behind’ (Orellana et al. 2001). Such patterns entangle parents’ anxieties over their children’s welfare with the desire to improve the possibilities for their future.

Emotional entanglements do not just relate to children ‘left behind’; they pertain as well to children who accompany their migrant parents and to ‘parachute kids’ – such as Chinese or Korean children sent to the USA or Canada to attend school with the hope of eventually gaining admission to North American universities (Zhou 1997). In each case there is often a feeling of being ‘caught between two nations, educational systems, and ways of growing up, [that] conveys one of the risks of transnational childhoods – feeling marginal in both places’ (Orellana et al. 2001: 583).

Similarly, Cecilia Menjívar (2002) found that Guatemalan ‘1.5 generation’ (born abroad, migrated young) children in the USA only partially inculcated the transnational orientations of their parents. This was compounded by the inability to travel to Guatemala (given the undocumented status of their parents), by poor linguistic competence and by a dearth of community institutions to foster and sustain transnational links.

This does not imply that the children’s lives are played out independent of their communities of origin, because important decisions in their lives often involve families in both places. The children’s ties with the parental homeland, however, depend on the parents’ activities and interests, and the children themselves cannot always make sense of the parents’ efforts to keep them oriented to home. (Ibid.: 547)

The disjunction between parents’ transnational orientations and children’s local ones may lead to exasperation. Marjorie Faulstich Orellana and her colleagues (2001: 581), researching among Mexicans, Koreans and Yemenis, found that ‘Parents expressed frustration that their children [in the USA] didn’t appreciate the things their children back home would never have, and they thought about “sending kids back” to give them
another perspective on life.’ Using ‘back there’ as a reference point for values and behaviour, ‘transnational disciplining’ serves as an important strategy for some parents to control children’s behaviour. But as Guarnizo (1997: 301) points out, when followed through this strategy often backfires because of the wearing down of kin support – a migrant’s ‘most valuable asset in the country of origin’ – and the occasional unwilling return of mothers to take care of forcibly repatriated children.

These developments do not always entail a clash of social worlds, however. Drawing upon a detailed ethnography of Mexicans living between Mexico and New York City, Fernando Herrera Lima (2001: 91) suggests that ‘the transnational family is buffered by its extensive social networks, allowing the transnational experiences to form a fluid continuum, rather than a radical divide compartmentalizing life into two separated worlds.’ Such networks surrounding transnational families allow for the circulation of people, goods, jobs, information as well as for the re-creation and modification of cultural values and practices.

The ‘everyday routinized activities and practices’ within transnational families have obvious significance for gender relations (Al-Ali 2002: 250). Transnational families demonstrate how culturally constructed concepts of gender operate within and between diverse settings. In various related ways, the position of women in households – and thereby daily gender relations – may be fundamentally altered and liberating, especially when it is the wives and daughters who have migrated to become the breadwinners for the families who have stayed (Hondagneu-Sotelo 1994). In other cases a patriarchal grip on women within families may be reinforced due to the perceived threats, posed by transnational existence, to cultural notions of feminine virtue. It should be stressed that the significance of gender manifests in numerous spheres outside of family and household as well, of course, especially in transnational community associations, religious congregations and places of work (see among others Mahler and Pessar 2001, Goldring 2001, Salih 2003).
norms

For many individuals, families and communities in both sending and receiving contexts, transnational patterns of everyday activity, communication and exchange have become normative (Portes et al. 1999). The norms that develop involve what Patricia Landolt (2001: 217) calls ‘circuits of transnational obligations and interests’. Migrants’ social patterns that span borders variously condition people’s everyday expectations (about potentials for migration, work, household development and individual life course), moral duties (for disseminating information to friends and kin, engaging in reciprocal exchange of resources and enlisting in mutual support), institutional structures (including how best to organize or participate in religious communities and hometown associations) and relations to the state (fashioning practices to manipulate it, contest it or avoid it altogether).

Such norms become embedded in a kind of transnational moral economy of kin. This is underlined in Carmen Voigt-Graf’s (2002) study of Punjabis, Kannadigas and Indo-Fijians in Australia. ‘Given that kinship is the organising principle of Indian transnationalism,’ she (Ibid.: 286) observes, ‘the type and regularity of transnational flows depends primarily on what happens within the extended family rather than on the economic or political situation in the home or host country.’ Migration and transnational communication within extended families involve tactics for collective upward mobility, while marriages are arranged to strategically extend a family’s kinship networks. In this way the social capital of families can be transformed into economic possibility if the need arises (also see Ballard 2003).

The norms that manage and sustain migrant transnationalism do not determine individual behaviour nor ensure social cohesion within the migrant group and its extended network in the place of origin. Such norms may in fact stimulate new social tensions, fragmentation and disarticulation within families and local communities. Alison Mountz and Richard Wright (1996) describe how, within a Mexican transnational community, both cultural traditionalists in the home village and a variety
of ‘dissenters’ abroad oppose a number of emergent norms within a transnational community (the latter set includes *los irresponsables* – the irresponsible ones – who fail to communicate or send money, and ‘practical questioners’ who wish to pursue their own goals independently of family and community).

On the whole, one of the strongest set of sustained – and indeed embellished – norms surrounding migrant transnationalism is that concerning migration itself. It is now a rather well-known dictum that, at least for a period, migration leads to more migration: migrants find jobs and send money back, encouraging and facilitating others to migrate. Now many nation-states expect – indeed encourage – migrants to stay abroad permanently and to send money home (see below). Rapid and real-time communication fuels anticipation among would-be migrants. Information about living conditions, job opportunities and people’s experiences circulate widely throughout immediate and expanded social networks. These usually underscore local perceptions in migrant-sending areas that ‘in order to move up you need to move elsewhere’ (Sørensen 2000: 3). Hence, in an increasing number of local communities in developing countries, it is almost taken for granted that certain members of the family will emigrate using pre-existing transnational social networks. Norms around migration and transnational life naturally overlap with, or mutually reinforce, the kinds of social practices already described by way of telephone calls and family concerns. Together, for migrants all of these shape what we might call a kind of transnational *habitus*.

*habitus*

Pierre Bourdieu’s (1977, 1990) concept of *habitus* refers to a socially and culturally conditioned set of dispositions or propensities, acquired by individuals in the course of their life experiences, which generates everyday social practices in the context of immediate circumstances. This repertoire of neither wholly conscious nor wholly non-conscious
perceptions, outlooks, values and points of reference guides personal goals and social interactions.

The power of the *habitus* derives from the thoughtlessness of habit and habituation, rather than consciously learned rules and principles. Socially competent performances are produced as a matter of routine, without explicit reference to a body of codified knowledge, and without the actors necessarily ‘knowing what they are doing’ (in the sense of being able adequately to explain what they are doing). (Jenkins 1992: 76)

Most practices, Bourdieu (1990: 56) posited, can only accounted for by relating them between ‘the social conditions in which the *habitus* that generated them was constituted, to the social conditions in which it is implemented.’ This relation between partially or non-conscious dispositions and contextualized action makes *habitus* a more useful concept than the older, related anthropological concept of ‘worldview’ – described as a kind cognitive map or complex of motivations, perceptions and beliefs (see for instance Jones 1972). While abstract concepts, both *habitus* and worldview manifest themselves in individual narratives and directly observable, daily practices and social institutions.

How does the concept of *habitus* relate to migrant transnationalism? A number of scholars bring into play similar notions to describe the nature and impact of transnational outlooks and experiences of migrants. Smith (2001), for example, invokes such a meaning when he describes the practices and relationships linking home and abroad as a ‘life world’ among immigrants and their descendents. Guarnizo (1997) draws directly upon Bourdieu’s ideas of *habitus*. He suggests we might think of a transnational *habitus* as entailing:

...a particular set of dualistic dispositions that inclines migrants to act and react to specific situations in a manner that can be, but is not always, calculated, and that is not simply a question of conscious acceptance of specific behavioural or sociocultural rules. ...The transnational *habitus* incorporates the social position of the migrant and the context in which transmigration occurs. This accounts for the
similarity in the transnational \textit{habitus} of migrants from the same social grouping (class, gender, generation) and the generation of transnational practices adjusted to specific situations. (Ibid.: 311)

Guarnizo (Ibid.) further writes of how Dominicans retain ‘a dual frame of reference’ through which they constantly compare their situation in their ‘home’ society to their situation in the ‘host’ society abroad. Roger Rouse (1992), too, described the ‘bifocality’ people’s daily rhythms and routines of life joining localities in Michoacán and California. ‘Their bifocalism,’ thought Rouse (Ibid.: 46), ‘stemmed not from transitional adjustments to a new locale, but from a chronic, contradictory transnationalism.’ Sarah Mahler (1998) takes up Rouse’s notion, emphasizing ways in which researchers need to look at the nature of transnational migrants’ ‘lived reality’ to determine whether or how they might be ‘bifocal’ with regard to their social ties and personal outlooks.

The complex \textit{habitus} of migrant transnationalism has been described in other, related ways. In a transnational community spanning ‘OP’ – Oaxaca and Poughkeepsie, New York – Mountz and Wright (1996: 404) describe how members ‘act daily in pursuit of shared objectives and with an acute awareness of events occurring in other parts of [OP].’ Aspects of life ‘here’ and life ‘there’ – whether perceived from the migrant’s starting or destination point – are perceived as complementary (cf. Salih 2002). This relation is clearly conveyed in Katy Gardner’s (1993, 1995) accounts of the interplay between notions of \textit{desh} (home) and \textit{bidesh} (foreign contexts) among Sylhetis in Britain and Bangladesh. While in everyday discourse, \textit{desh} is associated with the locus of personal and social identity and religiosity, \textit{bidesh} conveys material bounty and economic opportunity. Gardner (1993: 1-2) describes a kind of cognitive tension among Sylhetis that likely characterizes the predicament of a great many migrants around the world:

The economic dominance of families with migrant members has meant that \textit{bidesh} is associated with success and power, which \textit{desh} is unable to provide. Statements concerning \textit{bidesh} are therefore part of a discourse about the insecurity of life in Bangladesh and the
continual economic struggle which villagers face. ...Individual opportunism and enterprise are therefore channelled towards attempting to go abroad, leading to dependency on something which for many is no more that a fantasy, a dream-land, which few villagers will ever see.

Co-existing, sometimes uneasily, with this set of images and ideals is the centrality of desh to group identity, and the spiritual powers with which it is linked. There is therefore a constant balancing of the two views, between the economic and political power of bidesh, and the fertility and spirituality of desh. This continual ambivalence, and negotiation of what might appear to be oppositional presentations of the world, is an integral part of migration and the contradictions which it involves.

Ambivalence and negotiation around desh-bidesh are expressed and reproduced in a variety of ways, including the exchange of goods, images and ideas between the two settings. Gardner (Ibid.: 5) further describes desh-bidesh not as polar opposites, but as sites in ‘local mental maps [that] involve a geography of power, in which locations are points along a continuum, with different types of empowerment to be found at each.’

The effects of transnationalism for changing meanings, attitudes and experiences both ‘here’ and ‘there’ are relevant to recent studies concerning migrants and transformations of the meaning of ‘home’ (Rapport and Dawson 1998, Al-Ali and Koser 2002). An illustration of this is provided by Ruba Salih (2002, 2003), who details how Moroccan women in Italy engage in material practices representing the two countries. Whether in Italy or Morocco, the women buy, consume, display and exchange commodities from their ‘other home’ in order to symbolize their ongoing sense of double belonging.

Once such a kind of habitus of dual orientation is constructed and reproduced by migrants, it might have further impacts. For one, it is hard to dismantle. David Kyle (2000: 2) discusses at least one informant who foresees ‘no clear exit strategy from the binational life he had built over eleven years of shuttling back and forth’ between New York City and his
village in Ecuador. Another consequence concerns the transformation of outlook and practice among those closely associated with the transnational migrant. Here, through the experiences of his informants, Kyle came to think of the links between these distinct places ‘as more of an emergent transnational social reality, involving migrants and nonmigrants alike, than simply an international movement of labor’ (Ibid.: 9). The point about nonmigrants is significant: such a transnational social reality incorporates and infuses what we can call the *habitus* of many people ‘left behind’ but whose lives are still transformed by the transnational activities and ideologies among those who actually move (cf. Ibid.: 202).

Relatedly, Rebecca Golbert (2001) documents the case of young Ukrainian Jews who have developed ‘transnational orientations from home’ towards the Ukraine, Israel and other Jewish communities in the USA, Germany and elsewhere. She describes how young Ukrainian Jews undertake the evaluation of everyday experiences, the past, and the future with ‘a double consciousness’ garnered from transnational links and a transnational conception of self. ‘Their daily reality,’ Golbert (Ibid.: 725) observes, ‘is embedded in a transnational frontier of intersecting ideas, relationships, histories and identities; at the same time, transnational practices are localised through intimate and shared experiences.’ Recounting narratives and the sharing of experiences – particularly regarding Israel – Golbert shows how returnees have had a powerful impact even on the transnational orientations of those who have never left the Ukraine. They, too, have a *habitus* re-oriented to more than one locality.

By way of conceptualising transnational experience through *habitus*, social scientists might better appreciate how dual orientations arise and are acted upon. Values, perceptions and aspirations that may be grounded in a pre-migration setting get situated in relation to structural opportunities and constraints (including laws, bureaucracies, labour markets, patterns of racism and sexism) in post-migration settings.

This perspective also has bearing for questions as to how members of second and subsequent generations following the migrant generation are
affected by transnationalism. This is an under-studied area and one that appears on the list of usual suspect criticisms. There is one common view that transnational practices among second generation youth are currently minimal and likely to dwindle further in the course of time. However, another view – and one in line with an understanding on how a transnational *habitus* is shaped and acted upon – suggests that there exist ‘strong influences in the transnational social fields in which the second generation is embedded. This view stresses the importance of the sending-country individuals, resources, and ideas that are a constant presence in the lives of the second generation and holds that even selective, periodic transnational practices can add up’ (Levitt and Waters 2002: 4). Recent research suggests patterns of intensive transnational activism at a particular life-stages among the second generation (Smith 2002, Levitt 2002), as well as a considerable variety of patterns and kinds of transnationalism among different groups of second-generation youth (Kasinitz et al. 2002). In each case there is apparent the interplay of parents’ transnational *habitus*, a host of local conditioning factors, and second generation youths’ own hybrid or multicultural *habitus*. Thus among young Indian-Americans, Sunaina Marr Maira (2002: 23) observes that ‘second-generation youth culture becomes a site of struggles to define notions of authenticity that, while drawing on transnational imaginings of “India,” also work to position these youth in relation to hierarchies of race, class, gender, and nationalism that mark them as “local”.’ Such studies suggest that even though specific transnational orientations and practices of communication and exchange may not be sustained in strong forms by second and subsequent generations, the process of being socialized within a milieu of such transnational orientations and practices will often have a substantial influence on longer-term configurations of outlook, activity and identity.

**Summary**

As Castles (2002: 1158) submits, ‘It is possible that transnational affiliations and consciousness will become the predominant form of migrant belonging in their future. This would have far-reaching
consequences.’ One possible approach to trying to understand such a process and its consequences is to analyze how patterns of immigrant transnationalism are re-orienting individual *habitus* towards ‘bifocality’ or senses of dual orientation in light of shifting conditions. The structure and workings of *habitus* are certainly hard to ‘measure,’ but they are arguably discernable in social practices and conveyed in narratives. The dispositions and practices generated by a transnational *habitus* are not, moreover, evenly spread within a group or family. Yet these are nonetheless not to be underestimated because such dispositions and practices have substantial impact on individual and family life course and strategies, individuals’ senses of self and collective belonging, the ordering of personal and group memories, patterns of consumption, collective socio-cultural practices, approaches to child-rearing and other modes of cultural reproduction. These latter functions particularly concern ways in which the re-orienting of first generation *habitus* conditions that of second and subsequent generations.

**Political transformation: reconfiguring identities-borders-orders**

There is now a very large literature spanning the social sciences in which scholars debate whether or how processes of globalization have affected political structures, particularly the nation-state system (see Guillén 2001). For instance, Martin Albrow (1997) sees the nation-state as an outdated form of social and political organization; Susan Strange (1996) describes the ‘declining authority of states’ while Saskia Sassen (1996) asserts that economic globalization is leading to a fundamental redefinition of nation-state sovereignty and territoriality; Martin Carnoy and Manuel Castells (2001) depict a dramatic decline in nation-state autonomy and nation-states’ rising dependence on globalized processes of production and trade, other states, and lower levels of the state. In probing the concept of ‘cosmopolitanism,’ a range of authors – including Craig Calhoun, David Held, Ulrich Beck, Rainer Bauböck and Mary Kaldor (all in Vertovec and Cohen 2002) – describe how diverse sets of inter-state, intra-state and ultra-state practices test the viability of a
conventional model of the nation-state and the international system based around it.

The conventional model of the nation-state involves borders presumed to ‘contain’ a people characterized by some linguistic, social, and presumed cultural/ethnic identity, who are themselves organized by an ideational, legal and democratic or authoritarian framework. ‘States are institutions, nations are cross-class collectivities which share a sense of identity and collective political fate on the basis of real, imagined and constructed cultural, linguistic and historical commonalities’ (Held et al. 1999: 48).

In some quarters the arguments around globalization and political change have gone to extremes, suggesting we are witnessing the ‘death of the nation-state’. Others point to the continuation, if not strengthening, of the legitimacy and capacity of states to enforce their laws and policies. Whether they are sceptics, hyper-globalists or transformationists (Held et al. 1999), most observers agree that the nation-state has been radically challenged, at least, by processes and phenomena surrounding such things as the emergence of complex global economic patterns, massive and instantaneous international financial flows, an array of regional pacts and multi-lateral agreements (on trade, the environment, crime and terrorism, etc.) and ‘humanitarian’ military interventions – all things which seem to upset longstanding notions of cultural and political sovereignty. While not necessarily dying, the nation-state is transforming into a type of political organization or apparatus involving more multiple and overlapping jurisdictions, sets of identities and social orders that borders no longer really contain (cf. Beck 2002).

The juxtaposition between immigration and the nation-state has long been focus of considerable discussion by sociologists, political scientists and political philosophers (e.g., Soysal 1994, Bauböck 1994, Joppke 1998, 1999). While debates over globalization and political change, immigration and the nation-state continuing to rage, we can see that migrant transnationalism itself does not itself bring about transformations of the nation-state. Such transformations are happening anyway, due to a confluence of processes within global political economy. But debatably,
migrant transnationalism importantly contributes to such significant shifts. In what ways is this happening?

**identities - borders - orders**

Currently within the field of International Relations, one way of attempting to understand broad contemporary political challenges is through the ‘analytical triad’ or ‘dynamic nexus’ between the concepts of ‘identities-borders-orders’ (Albert et al. 2001). The idea here is that, in order to appreciate changes happening in any one of these three conceptual domains, it must be assessed in relation to the other two. Yosef Lapid (2001: 7) writes:

Processes of collective identity formation invariably involve complex bordering issues. Likewise, acts of bordering (i.e., the inscription, crossing, removal, transformation, multiplication and/or diversification of borders) invariably carry momentous ramifications for political ordering at all levels of analysis. Processes of identity, border and order construction are therefore mutually self-constituting. Borders, for instance, are in many ways inseparable from the identities they help demarcate or individuate. Likewise, they are also inseparable from orders constituted to a large extent via such acts of individuation and segmentation. Thus, in any specific case, if we want to study problems associated with any one of our three concepts, we can richly benefit from also considering the other two.

In other words, as with the conventional model of the nation-state, some sense of identity is presumed to characterize a people; this identity/people is believed to be contiguous with a territory, demarcated by a border; within the border, laws underpin a specific social and political order or system; this social order – which is conceived to be different from orders outside the border – both draws upon and reinforces the sense of collective identity. ‘Identities-borders-orders’ are legitimated and
reproduced through a system of narratives, public rituals and institutions, formal state bureaucracies and informal social relationships, written and unwritten regulations, sets of assumptions and expectations of civility and public behaviour (Schiffauer et al. 2003).

Various processes of globalization and the rise of regional, global or ‘cosmopolitan’ structures of governance assail essential components of national ‘identities-borders-orders’ by compounding identities, ignoring borders and over-ruling orders. Migration itself confronts ‘identities-borders-orders’. ‘One reason migration enters political agendas with greater frequency and salience now,’ suggests Martin Heisler (2001: 229), ‘is that, at least in some host societies, it disturbs the sense of boundedness’ (emphasis in original).

The ability to change countries of residence with relative ease and the possibility of reversing the move can vitiate the need to make lasting identitive commitments. Identities can thus be partial, intermittent, and reversible in the modern Western democratic state. Order no longer depends on unalloyed loyalty stemming from immutable national identity – identity for which there is no plausible or legitimate alternative. Countries’ borders are not seen as coextensive with a comprehensive political community. (Ibid.: 236)

Nowadays, Heisler (Ibid.: 237) concludes, ‘migration tends to attenuate territorial sovereignty, monolithic order, and identitive solidarity.’ In various ways, some of which are described below, the political dimensions of migrant transnationalism inherently involve questions of identity (Vertovec 2001) and often raise contentious issues concerning civic order and the cohesiveness of ‘host’ societies (Vertovec 1999b).

With regard to the ‘identities’ part of the analytical triad, politicians contribute to senses of ‘peoplehood’ by enacting laws of membership, determining who is included, who is excluded, and determining what are their respective rights and duties (Pickus 1998). This need not be monolithic of course; recent trends in broadening such a national sense of identity can be seen in contemporary citizenship tests for immigrants and policies crafting multiculturalism. However, what such ‘peoplehood’ means
is also affected by concurrent policies in many states extending and withholding rights, voice and welfare access to immigrants. These effectively create a multiply-tiered sense of membership (Motomura 1998).

With regard specifically to migrant transnational practices, David Fitzgerald (2000: 10) observes that transnational migrants challenge nation-state ideals of belonging in both sending and receiving countries. They do this not least by moving back and forth between states, sometimes circumventing state controls over borders and taxes. 'Transnational migrants often live in a country in which they do not claim citizenship and claim citizenship in a country in which they do not live,' he (Ibid.: 10) points out; 'Alternatively, they may claim membership in multiple polities in which they may be residents, part-time residents, or absentees.' This phenomenon is witnessed in examples of immigrants – even naturalized ones – going 'home' from Germany or the USA to vote in Turkey or Dominican Republic.

Such trends run counter to orthodox assimilation theories that assumed immigrants would be less likely to continue involving themselves in the political concerns of their nation-state of origin. Instead, for many migrants with transnational networks and lifestyles, 'the country of origin becomes a source of identity and the country of residence a source of right... The result is a confusion between rights and identity, culture and politics, states and nations' (Kastoryano 2002: 160). Once more the question of durability enters: are such border-crossing political identities merely an issue for first-generation migrants? Bauböck (2003) addresses this by suggesting that 'even if transnationalism remains a transient phenomenon for each migration cohort, the emergence of new legal and political conceptions of membership signifies an important structural change for the polities involved' (emphasis in original).

With regard to the 'borders' part of 'identities-borders-orders', Sassen (1996) suggests that states are 're-nationalizing' themselves in this area more than others. 'There is a growing consensus in the community of states to lift border controls for the flow of capital, information, and services and, more broadly, to further globalization,' she (Ibid.: 59)
notes; ‘But when it comes to immigrants and refugees, whether in North America, Western Europe, or Japan, the national state claims all its old splendor in asserting its sovereign right to control its borders.’ Almost regardless of global economic flows, inter-state pacts and other sides of globalization, nation-states firmly retain the right to admit or expel aliens, to maintain jurisdiction over what happens within their own territories, and through their border policies to control migration and membership. ‘Territoriality,’ Fitzgerald (2000: 29) contends, ‘continues to define the state even as its citizens cross state borders.’

Although challenging ‘identities’ and ‘orders,’ migrant transnational practices do little to challenge state border controls (other than practices which sometimes seek to circumvent such controls). Indeed, it is usually the other way around: border policies often considerably impact on migrant transnational practices. Jacqueline Hagan (1994) shows how state policies are centre to the formation of migrant communities, their survival strategies and transnational practices. She demonstrates how legal status – a powerful facet of border control – facilitates regular back and forth movement and exchanges, while lack of legal status seriously hinders such transnational practice. This is evident, too, following the recent beefing-up of border control measures in the United States (including, over the past decade, a tripling of its budget and a doubling of the size of the border patrol): these measures have meant that many undocumented Mexicans stay put in the USA rather than move back and forth through transnational circuits (Cornelius 2001).

With regard to the ‘orders’ part of the triad, a broad range of policies surrounding migration and migrants is concerned with reproducing certain legal, social and political systems. In the realm of economic and cultural policy, for instance, ‘migration has transformed the domestic political milieu … the collective strength and pattern of alliances of political actors has changed; and migration has reshaped political interests and perceptions of these interests’ (Held et al. 1999: 322). Perhaps foremost in this field, however, political sociologists and political scientists have been interested in the relationship between migration and citizenship. In much literature nationality and citizenship are treated as co-equivalent
(although some scholars like Michael Jones-Correa [2001] argue that we should differentiate nationality as formal status of state membership, and citizenship as rights and duties within the nation-state). Notions of order, particularly within the identities-borders-orders framework, are severely put to the test by emerging migrant transnational practices around dual citizenship/nationality and ‘homeland’ political allegiances.

**dual citizenship/nationality**

It has been suggested that dual citizenship/nationality represents one of ‘the most fundamental questions about the relation between immigration and citizenship in the next century’ (Pickus 1998: xxvii). Dual citizenship/nationality has a long history that is not always tied to the subject of immigration (see Koslowski 2001). Dual citizenship or dual nationality can be claimed through birth, marriage, claiming ancestral lineage or through naturalization.

Until recently there was a ‘prevalent distaste’ for dual nationality in states around the world; now, particularly post Cold War, that distaste is dissipating and we may be witnessing a long-term shift toward a more universal acceptance of dual nationality (Spiro 2002: 19-20). Long ago the League of Nations emphasized ‘one nationality only’, a platform reiterated in the early 1960s by the Council of Europe Convention on the Reduction of Multiple Nationality (see Aleinikoff and Klusmeyer 2001). By 1997 the Council of Europe set forth its European Convention on Nationality emphasizing that both parents may transfer their respective nationalities to their children (see Faist 2001).

There is now an upward trend in claims for dual citizenship/nationality, produced especially through migration. The loosening of rules concerning dual citizenship represents a global trend, particularly among migrant sending countries (Hansen and Weil 2002). It is reported that at present some eighty-nine countries – about half the world’s countries – have some form of dual citizenship (Fritz 1998, Rogers 2001e). ‘International and regional instruments,’ a United Nations report (UNPD 1998) points out, ‘also seem to be reconciling principles of nationality with the trends
towards multiple identities. This is evident by the reorientation of instruments regarding dual or multiple nationality.’

From an American perspective, Peter Schuck (1998: 153) writes that ‘With current legal and illegal immigration approaching record levels, naturalization petitions quintupling in the last five years to almost two million annually, and legal changes in some of our largest source countries that encourage (and are often designed to encourage) naturalization in the United States, dual citizenship is bound to proliferate.’ It is estimated that more than a half million children born in the United States each year have at least one additional nationality (Aleinikoff and Klusmeyer 2001). Among the one million people that naturalized in the USA in 1996, nine out of ten main countries of origin allow some form of dual nationality or citizenship (Fritz 1998). Similarly in 1996 seven of the ten largest immigrant groups in New York City had the right to be dual nationals (Foner 2000).

In other Western states, official attitudes on dual citizenship or dual nationality vary considerably. The United Kingdom ‘is perfectly indifferent’ while France is tolerant and increasingly liberalising (Hansen and Weil 2002: 6-7). Even in countries like Germany that traditionally do not tolerate dual citizenship, Thomas Faist (2001) points out, about one fourth to one third of all naturalizations from the 1970s to the 1990s resulted in multiple citizenship. Additionally, every seventh German marriage is with a foreigner, leading to two nationalities of the offspring under German law, and the millions of Aussiedler (ethnic German repatriates) were not obliged to give up their Russian or Kazakh citizenship (Thränhardt 2002).

The transnational identities, border-crossings and mixed political orders suggested by dual citizenship/nationality can be posed either as contributing to, or hindering, the integration of newcomers (Faist 2001). Such arguments are taken up by Randall Hansen and Patrick Weil (2002), who discuss five arguments against dual citizenship/nationality: (1) it can produce competing loyalties, (2) it creates a security threat, (3) it impedes immigrant integration, (4) it increases international instability, (5) it violates equality by giving dual nationals a wider range of rights and opportunities. Hansen and Weil engage these arguments by pointing out,
among other things, that: (1) loyalty can indeed be multiple (e.g., the project of the European Union is based on this), (2) the security threat exists independently of dual citizenship/nationality, (3) far from impeding immigrant integration, dual citizenship/nationality furthers it (policies tolerant of dual citizenship/nationality are shown to increase naturalization rates), (4) the instability problem – exemplified in matters of military service, taxation and inheritance rules – is lessening through bilateral negotiations, and (5) equality issues are a concern, but the additional rights and opportunities offered by dual citizenship/nationality are often not much greater than those already extended by permanent resident status.

A kind of watering-down of the meaning of citizenship and nationality is another concern for many as well. ‘A second or even a third passport,’ writes Mark Fritz (1998: 1), ‘has become not just a link to a homeland but also a glorified travel visa, a license to do business, a stake in a second economy, and escape hatch, even a status symbol.’ This is seen by some as promoting a kind of ‘citizenship of convenience’ (Ibid.).

On the migrant sending country side, dual citizenship has been difficult to push through many parliaments since domestic politicians see more disadvantage than advantage in allowing this (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003b). They often feel that emigrant or diaspora participation in domestic politics is distinctly not welcome – particularly absentee voting which might give too much domestic oppositional influence to people actually living outside the country.

In any case, as noted above, the incidence and impacts of dual citizenship/nationality are on the rise around the world, and migrant transnationalism plays a key role in this growth. In addition to shaping actual practices of migrants, such a trend is having important outcomes in government policy. As T. Alexander Aleinikoff and Douglas Klusmeyer (2001: 87) understand it, there is ‘an emerging international consensus that the goal [of state policies] is no longer to reduce plural nationality as an end in itself, but to manage it as an inevitable feature of an increasingly interconnected and mobile world.’
‘*homeland*’ political allegiances

Once more harking back to the what’s old/what’s new question around transnationalism, it is well documented that over one hundred years ago many migrants maintained acute interest in the political plight of their place of origin (see e.g. Foner 2000). Now such interests – and particularly the ability to act upon them – have been heightened due to advances in communication, cheapness of transport and policy shifts such as the extension of dual citizenship/nationality.

Within and around transnational migrant communities, the politics of homeland can take a variety of forms (see Koopmans and Statham 2001, Guarnizo et al. 2003, Østergaard-Nielsen 2003a). Such forms include: exile groups organizing themselves for return, groups lobbying on behalf of a homeland, external offices of political parties, migrant hometown associations, opposition groups campaigning or planning actions to effect political change in the homeland. Some migrant associations also manage to carry out dual programmes of action aimed at both sending and receiving countries (Østergaard-Nielsen 2001). Luis Guarnizo, Alejandro Portes and William Haller (2003) outline two major modes of transnational political participation:

Transnational electoral participation includes membership in a political party in the country of origin, monetary contributions to these parties, and active involvement in political campaigns in the polity of origin. Transnational non-electoral politics includes membership in a hometown civic association, monetary contributions to civic projects in the community of origin, and regular membership in charity organizations sponsoring projects in the home country. Non-electoral activities are political because they influence local and regional governments by determining which public projects receive migrants’ financial support. By so doing, they compel authorities to take immigrant wishes and priorities into account.

‘*Homeland*’ political allegiances may involve additional dimensions, as well, in such highly diverse forms as:
♦ diasporic politics. These include the interests of long-established, subsequent generations stemming from migration (e.g. Irish Americans concerned with the situation in Northern Ireland) or religious/ethnic communities who may have never even lived in a 'homeland’ (e.g. relationships between some diasporic Jews and the state of Israel);

♦ provisions for absentee voting. Examples can be found among overseas nationals returning home en masse to vote in elections in Israel –sometimes with political parties paying for flights, high-profile unofficial polls among expatriate South Africans, and large-scale voting at overseas embassies as in recent Indonesian and Algerian elections (Rogers 1999b);

♦ buying-in to dubious regimes. A prime illustration occurred in 1990 when Croatians abroad paid $4 million towards the election campaign of Franjo Tudjman, and were rewarded with representation in parliament: 12 of 120 seats were allotted to diaspora Croats, more than to Croatia’s own ethnic minorities (The Economist 2003);

♦ key roles in war and peace. For years the financial backing of Tamil and Eritrean migrants sustained the wars in Sri Lanka and along the border with Ethiopia, but now these migrant diasporas are having a role in shaping the peace and facilitating post-conflict reconstruction (The Economist 2003, Koser 2002);

♦ mass protest and consciousness-raising. A successful model of this followed the 1999 capture of Kurdish leader Abdullah Ocalan, when within a day organized mass demonstrations among Kurds took place around the world, bringing Kurdish issues to global attention (Rogers 1999a);

♦ overseas support for insurgency and terrorism. The potential role of migrant communities appears in backing guerrilla movements such as among Tamils or Kurds (Byman et al. 2001) and terrorist actions as among Palestinian or Irish political movements (Hoffman 1998).
The kind and degree of participation in ‘homeland’ politics differs with reference to a series of contextual factors, including the history of specific migration and settlement processes and political conditions in the country of origin. Through a substantial survey a various migrant groups in the USA, Guarnizo et al. (2003) demonstrate that Colombian immigrants are the least likely to take part in homeland politics, while Salvadorans and Dominicans are equally likely to do so. The broadest patterns of political transnationalism, Guarnizo et al. (Ibid.) find, are ‘a product of greater human capital, greater stability and experience in the receiving society, plus strong social connections and enduring moral ties with sending communities.’

At a deeper level, homeland political allegiance and engagement rests on the re-configuration of identities-borders-orders, such that people from a particular place regard themselves as legitimate members of the collective identity and social order of a place even though they are outside of its borders. According to Fitzgerald (2000: 106) such a reconfiguration posits ‘a model of citizenship that emphasizes rights over obligations, passive entitlements, and the assertion of an interest in the public space without a daily presence.’ There is a tension, he goes on to say, between ‘a reconceptualization of the polis as the transnational public space of the imagined community and the assertion that the polis should still be defined as a geographic space where citizens live together.’ Hence governments of countries of emigration increasingly invoking national solidarity across state borders. This was exemplified by Vincente Fox’s campaigning among Mexicans in California during 2000, in which he played upon the broader boundaries of an imagined nation and declared he would be the first President ‘to govern for 118 million Mexicans,’ including 100 million in Mexico and 18 million living outside the country (Rogers 2000; Fitzgerald 2000). Similarly following the Los Angeles riots of 1992, South Korean politicians evoked images of Korean-Americans as a ‘colony’ of the homeland (Shain 1999: 5), while in her 1990 inaugural address as Irish President, Mary Robinson proclaimed herself leader of the extended Irish family abroad. During recent election campaigns in Turkey and the Dominican Republic, candidates when abroad to encourage
support through overseas ‘nationals’. These visions of nationals abroad are akin to the notion of ‘determinatized nation-state,’ in which the boundaries of the nation-state are defined socially rather than geographically (Basch et al. 1994, Glick Schiller and Fouron 1998).

Common rhetoric about extended nations abroad help explain the fact that overseas communities are increasingly engaging themselves in the economic, social and political life of their country of origin while sending states and other political actors ‘are trying to channel this engagement to their own advantage’ (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003b). But although they use the same rhetoric, migrants and their sending states often have different expectation. Eva Østergaard-Nielsen (Ibid.) explains that,

While sending countries are quick to call for their expatriate population’s economic and political contribution to development in the country of origin it is clear that most expatriates and their representative organizations expect this to be a two way deal. Emigrants want their country of origin to support their struggle for equal rights and against discrimination on the labour market. More established migrant and diaspora groups demand more transparency and good governance in order to feel that their remittances and foreign direct investment is spent in the best possible way. And if migrants are expected to be good representatives and do some lobbying for their country of origin abroad, then they would often like some influence on the policies that they are expected to represent.

Ideas, activities and rhetoric find their way into government policies. There are a variety of reasons why specific countries develop certain kinds of policies toward expatriates (Levitt 2003). Policies regarding overseas nationals are usually to encourage a sense of membership (but not return) among sending states toward their perceived national communities abroad (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003b). These include special ministries or government offices devoted to overseas nationals, special investment opportunities, special voting rights and, as we have seen, dual nationality/citizenship. Their effects, however, are broadly similar: 'Such
policies,’ Levitt (2003) believes, ‘are reinventing the role of states outside of territorial boundaries and in this way reconfiguring traditional understandings of sovereignty, nation, and citizenship’

Migrant transnational practices play a direct part in re-configuring identities-borders-orders. However, it is clear that at the same time many basic structures of the nation-state are intact as it continues to exercise sovereignty over populations present on its territory. Ruud Koopmans and Paul Statham (2001) stress that the different ways migrants are enabled, or constrained, to make their homeland (and local) political claims in different countries demonstrate that the nation-state is alive and well and shaping transnational practices. The transnational allegiances and political practices of migrants appear anomalous juxtaposed with the persistent principles of territorially based sovereign rule.

**Summary**

The discussion in this section has endorsed the view, expressed by Held et al. (1999: 9), that ‘the power of national governments is not necessarily diminished by globalization but on the contrary is being reconstituted and restructured in response to the growing complexity of processes of governance in a more interconnected world.’ Political features of migrant transnationalism – particularly surrounding dual citizenship/nationality and ‘homeland’ allegiances – are contributing to a fundamental reconfiguration of the conceptual nexus ‘identities-borders-orders’.

Though conceptual, such reconfiguration has real impacts in policies, legal structures and national imaginaries. This is apparent when we recall what each part of the analytical triad entails. Here, among other things, ‘identities’ concern matters of membership, belonging, loyalty, and moral and political values; ‘borders’ involve territoriality, admission, legal status and deportation; ‘orders’ relate to sovereignty, implications of legal status, civil, social and political rights, obligations, and access to public resources. Migrant’s transnational practices have bearing on each one of these topics – and on more than one at a time, in keeping with the ‘identities-borders-orders’ insistence on mutual consideration of issues.
The challenges that political forms of migrant transnationalism pose to ‘identities-borders-orders’ seem to counter the continuing salience of the nation-state, at least in terms of border control and immigration. A possible way through this seeming contradiction is offered by Bauböck (2003), who proposes that:

A political theory of transnational migration must therefore carefully distinguish two different phenomena: an increasing permeability of international borders for geographic mobility, which does not challenge territorial jurisdictions, and an increasing overlap of political identities and legal statuses between the sending and the receiving polity. (emphasis in original).

**Economic transformation: re-institutionalizing development**

Guarnizo (2003) emphasizes that economic aspects of migrant transnationalism involve multiple economic activities and myriad multiplier effects generated by migrants’ relations with their homelands. Such variety may often be seen within a single group, as shown by Patricia Landolt (2001) when she describes the range of variation of individual and household-level transnational economic activity among Salvadorans, despite common origins and post-migration contexts. Some activities directly involving migrants, such as transnational ethnic entrepreneurship (Portes et al. 2002) or the facilitation of international trade (Light et al. 2002). Others only indirectly involve migrants, especially spin-off industries catering for migrant transnational practices. Indeed, Guarnizo (2003) discerns, ‘some of the fastest segments of the telephone, air transportation, and financial industries are international long-distance calling, ethnic tourism, and the private remittance of money.’ Some industries or enterprises (such as supermarkets or breweries) are based in migrant sending countries but reach out to customers in diaspora. In Ecuador, for instance, hundreds of new business services have been established catering to emigrants, including travel agencies, cyber cafes and companies specialising in shipping abroad traditional Ecuadorian foods and medicinal herbs (Rogers 2001c). Yet other economic facets of migrant
transnationalism involve government schemes to attract migrants’ foreign currency, such as expatriate bonds, high interest foreign currency accounts and tax exemptions for saving and investment.

Economically, by far the most transformative processes and phenomena of migrant transnationalism have concerned remittances, the money migrants send to their families and communities of origin. The following sections consider several significant dimensions of remittances and their transformative effects and potentials.

remittances

‘Remittances have become the most visible evidence and measuring stick for the ties connecting migrants with their societies of origin,’ writes Guarnizo (2003). There are a great many studies probing the volume of remittances, their determinants and impacts (especially their ‘productive’ uses) in migrant sending contexts, and their channels of transference. Remittances are sent by all types of migrant workers: male and female, legal and undocumented, long-term and temporary, manual and high skilled. Money is transferred through banks, agencies of various kinds, directly on-line, through professional couriers or through social networks.

Drawing upon research in El Salvador, Landolt (2001: 234) richly describes some of the ways remittances transform families and communities:

Households that receive remittances demonstrate tangible improvement in their standard of living. Remittance dollars grant access to education and health, and may permit a family to buy agricultural land or make improvements on an existing property. Remittances, combined with knowledge of wages and conditions in Salvadoran settlement cities, may also alter the labourer’s relationship to the local economy. Weighing the value of their labour in transnational terms, workers have more leverage to reject the miserably low wages offered by Salvadoran employers. Entire communities are transformed, as enterprises, land holdings, and
basic survival increasingly revolve around the remittance transfer. In turn, locals inserted in the circuits of Salvadoran economic transnationalism prosper relative to marginal, non-transnational locations, which remain mired in poverty. As they subsidize households and alleviate the worst forms of poverty, remittances finally have the unintended consequence of perpetuating a bankrupt economic system.

As Landolt suggests, remittances have broad effects, including the stimulation of change within a variety of socio-cultural institutions (such as local status hierarchies, gender relations, marriage patterns and consumer habits; see Vertovec 2000). However, it is the economic impacts of remittances that receive most attention.

In numerous settings around the world, remittances have been shown to be directly invested in small businesses such as manufacturing and crafts companies, market halls, bakeries and transport agencies (Taylor 1999, van Doorn 2001). However, various studies show differing proportions of remittances spent on consumer goods versus ‘productive’ investments. Among the reported negative impacts of migrant remittances are the following (Vertovec 2000). Remittances: displace local jobs and incomes; induce consumption spending (often on foreign imports); inflate local prices of land, housing, and food; create disparity, envy between recipients and non-recipients; and create a culture of economic dependency.

However, J. Edward Taylor (1999), among others, has criticized much conventional research on remittances. He points out that common surveys assume a naïve model of remittance expenditure; instead, there is a need to consider whole-household and community economy. Taylor (Ibid.: 64) emphasizes that ‘remittances may reshape migrant sending economies through indirect channels that are missed by traditional research approaches.’ This view corroborates the often-cited research by Durand et al. (1996) demonstrating the multiplier effect of ‘migradollars’. Durand and his associates (Ibid.: 425) argue that work focusing solely on the productive uses of remittances ‘have ignored the indirect effects that consumer spending has on economic production and income.’ Their
research on multiplier effects suggests that, at that time, the $2 billion in remittances that entered the Mexican economy were responsible for $6.5 billion increase in production in agriculture, manufacturing, services and commerce. ‘In short,’ says Taylor (1999: 72), ‘an important channel through which remittances stimulate productive investments may, paradoxically, be though migrant-households’ consumption spending.’

Supporting this view and confirming the data of Durand et al., one study in Bangladesh estimated that remittances of $610 million created demand for $351 million in Bangladeshi goods and services and generated at least 577,000 jobs (in Arnold 1992).

It must be stressed that a large proportion of migrants send money to families for mere subsistence (Suro et al. 2002). Also, schooling and other costs of education are often not factored into studies on the ‘productive’ use of remittances. ‘In any case,’ argues Peter Stalker (2000: 81), ‘it can be argued that many forms of consumption, particularly on housing, better food, education, and health care, are a good form of investment that will lead to higher productivity.’

In order not to paint a misleading picture, it needs underlining that migrants do indeed often channel remittances directly into investment, and that in this field we are not just talking about countries of the South. Throughout Central and Eastern Europe, for instance, thriving remittance systems are in place among migrants. Polish workers in Germany, for instance, send home as much as 80 per cent of their earnings (Vickerman 2002). Recent research suggests that throughout Central and Eastern Europe, moreover, migrants’ money goes more toward investment – especially for establishing small businesses – than it does towards consumption (Piracha and Vickerman 2002).

The sheer scale of contemporary global remittances itself represents a type of transformation. Figures from the annual International Monetary Fund’s report show a massive increase in the amount of formal remittances worldwide, from less that $2 billion in 1970 to at least $105 billion in 1999 (van Doorn 2001). Over 60 per cent of this amount goes to developing countries, and over the last decade remittances have become a much larger source of income for developing countries that official
development assistance (Gammeltoft 2002). Such figures, it is often pointed out, must be taken as merely suggestive, since the categories used to estimate them are contestable. Moreover, these figures rely on official transfers reported by central banks of receiving countries, who in turn rely on reports filed by remittance intermediaries. Therefore the IMF estimates are likely to be considerably short of real remittance values – indeed, it has been suggested that officially recorded remittances represent ‘only the tip of the iceberg’ (Puri and Ritzema 1999: 3).

Beyond official figures, unofficial remittance transfers may amount to another $15 billion (The Economist 2003). As much as 46 per cent of Mexican remittances may be hand-carried to recipients (Lowell and de la Garza 2000). In many African countries it is estimated that perhaps only about 50 per cent of remittances go through official channels (Mohan 2002: 134). One survey in Japan found that 70 per cent of Thai and Filipino workers sent money home by illegal means, while in 1998 Japanese police found underground banks sending up to 176 billion yen ($1.48 billion) in illegal transfers to China, Thailand, South Korea, Iran, Taiwan, Myanmar and Nepal (Rogers 1999c). In Pakistan formal remittances (currently over $1 billion) are thought to represent only a fifth or sixth of all remittances (Rogers 2001d).

Whether through official or unofficial means, remittances mean a lot to the countries – to say nothing of the families and communities – that receive them. In 2000 remittances from abroad comprised more than 10 per cent the gross domestic product (GDP) of countries such as El Salvador, Jamaica, Haiti, Ecuador, Eritrea, Jordan, and Yemen (UNPD 2002). They account for as much as one-quarter of national income of Nicaragua. Remittances have exceeded the total value of exports in El Salvador, and constitute more than half the value of exports in the Dominican Republic and Nicaragua (Orozco 2001). The Inter-American Development Bank calculates that across Latin America the annual growth of remittances is 7-10 per cent: the 2001 figure of more than £23 billion in remittances for this region may be worth more than $70 billion by 2012 (Rogers 2002). Remittances are so important to the current and future economy of many nations that they are now used as a valuation
instrument to upgrade the credit-worthiness of impoverished countries to secure large-scale international loans (Guarnizo 2003).

Still, most experts on remittances argue that recipient groups and countries are not getting their worth. Most formal financial transfer institutions charge a fee from 6 to 15 per cent and additional costs can make the total deduction over 20 per cent (Lowell and de la Garza 2000). Of Latin America’s $23 billion in remittances in 2001, it is reckoned some $3 billion was lost in transfer fees (Rogers 2002). Government investigations, campaigns by non-government organizations (NGOs) and class action law suits have all focused on the often exorbitant fees charged by international transfer agencies like Western Union and MoneyGram. The high and uncertain costs of transfers are known to be the most serious concern voiced by remitters (Suro et al. 2002).

It is widely believed that the value of remittances would be much higher if the cost of transferring money was lower. A study of over seventy remittance companies demonstrates that improved and increased competition in the financial transfer sector will drive down the level of fees (Orozco 2002). Within Latin America, it is estimated that reducing the transfer costs to 5 per cent would free up more than $1 billion a year for some of the poorest, migrant background households in the USA (Suro et al. 2002). Some agencies are considering moves toward a flat fee rather than percentage. There are currently a number of moves within government (such as the Wire Transfer Fairness and Disclosure Act of 1999), among NGOs and in financial institutions themselves to create more transparency in pricing and greater consumer awareness.

More money, effectively transferred, should have considerable consequences for those who get it. Given that recipients of remittances are largely in underdeveloped contexts, how can remittances contribute to development?

...and development

It is widely recognized that remittances by themselves are not a panacea for impoverishment. Indeed, ‘remittances flowing to emigration areas
often wind up producing what John Kenneth Galbraith called “private affluence and public squalor,” or new homes reachable only over dirt roads. What is clearly needed is some way of harnessing some fraction of the remittances in order to develop the infrastructure that can help a region develop economically’ (Widgren and Martin 2002: 223). Some advisers have suggested that migrant-sending countries could earmark, perhaps through an import tariff, a portion of remittances for a specific development fund. Only South Korean has successfully implemented such a scheme, while there have been failed attempts to create such funds in the Philippines, Pakistan, Thailand and Bangladesh (Puri and Ritzema 1999). It is likely most migrants themselves are or would be sceptical of such schemes: this is due not only to anxieties over possible corruption, but to past experiences and frustrations with the ineffective, preferential or nonexistent development programmes of national governments and international agencies.

Susan Martin (2001: 5) asks, ‘to what effect can the multiplier effect of remittances be increased by initiatives to encourage local purchase of locally-produced goods’? Perhaps a more laissez-faire policy climate will suffice, such that migrants and their families can find themselves the right ways to develop their communities themselves, albeit perhaps with some NGO advice, appropriate banking schemes and government support (but not control). Schemes and initiatives of these kinds are described below.

The multiplier effect involves a tricky equation, however. It is never so clear as to what counts as costs, and what as benefits, and what as ultimately productive spending of remittances. For instance, remittance investment in housing is said to generate more multiplier effects than any other industry (Taylor 1999). But in Ecuador, for example, where some 95 per cent of remittances are spent on new housing, this expenditure fuelled substantial inflation in land prices and construction costs that impacted negatively on most of the local population (Rogers 2001c). In Egypt remittances are often used to purchase gold, which has a high cultural status value. This would appear to be a fairly non-productive use without multiplier effects. Yet in Egypt and many other settings, gold is locally regarded as a kind of insurance – something that will retain financial value
in times of uncertainty and high inflation, which can be advantageously
cashed in at a later date (Fouad Ibrahim, personal communication).

It should be born in mind that ‘development’ should include not only
matters of economic growth, but social (including gender, health, and civil
and democratic), environmental and technological issues. In many places
one of the most common and extensive uses of remittance money is
toward health care expenses (DeSipio 2000). Some NGOs are developing
schemes to creatively use remittances to provide regular transnational
health care coverage. A different kind of multiplier or ‘protective effect’
concerns the general development of health profiles among remittance-
points to a direct correlation indicating that infants in migrant-sending
families are less likely to suffer infant death or to be of low birth weight –
a key determinant in health outcomes later in life. Remittances offset the
effects of poverty by raising standards of living, improving nutrition and
facilitating access to medical care. It is conjectured that financial
remittances are also likely to flow alongside what Levitt (2001b) calls
social remittances (values and behaviours) – in this case health
information and practices. Frank and Hummer (Ibid.: 761) conclude that
more attention should be given to ‘how transnational activity affects the
relationship between health and migration and in what ways.’

To more fully appreciate the impact of remittances on development, it
must also be recognized that the implications of migration and
remittances for development vary according to level of analysis, from
individual to community, nation or state (Skeldon 1997). A kind of level or
institutional structure linking these other levels can be found by way of
migrant associations.

...and hometown associations

There is a long history of migrant associations sending money for
collective benefit in the home town or village. Nancy Foner (2000: 171-2)
illustrates this by pointing to how, between 1914-1924, New York’s Jewish
landsmanshaftn or home town associations sent millions of dollars to their
war-ravaged home communities. Yet now ‘we are seeing a very specific type of home-town association, one directly concerned with socio-economic development in its communities of origin and increasingly engaging both governmental and civic entities in sending and receiving countries in these projects’ (Sassen 2002: 226).

There has been a marked growth in the number and function of migrant hometown associations (HTAs) throughout the 1990s (see for instance Orozco 2000a, 2001, Lowell and de la Garza 2000, Alarcón 2001). A concomitant change in HTA structures and roles has been observed as well (Mahler 1998, Goldring 1998, Alarcón 2001, Martin 2001, Levitt 2001a). Their significance should not be underestimated. One study in Los Angeles found that ‘HTAs are clearly the most numerous and ubiquitous form of voluntary organization among first generation immigrants’ (Zabin and Rabadan 1998: 1). Furthermore, HTAs represent the clearest form of institutionalisation of transnational ties (Orozco 2001).

Manuel Orozco (2000a) contends that HTAs exhibit at least four features. They conduct a range of activities, from charitable aid to investment; their structures vary; their decisions depend on factors such as resource base, organizational structure and relationship with hometown; and they tend to have a small economic base. HTA activities embrace charitable work such as donating clothes, goods for religious festivals and construction materials for repairing the town church. They raise money for improving infrastructure such as sewage treatment plants and health care facilities. They support educational institutions, such as providing scholarships and library books. Yet another kind of HTA activity involves managing collective capital investment for income-generating projects in sending contexts that are often co-managed by locals and migrants (Orozco 2000b, World Bank 2001). HTAs also play a significant role in organizing disaster relief following catastrophes such as Hurricane Mitch in Central America in 1998 and the earthquakes in Turkey in 1999 and in Gujarat in 2001 (Rogers 2001b).

HTAs are not of a single kind, nor are they the only mode of migrant transnationalism involved in collective remittance sending. Caroline Ndofor-Tah identifies a range of diasporic organizations involved in African
development, including hometown associations, ethnic associations, alumni associations, religious associations, professional associations, investment groups, political groups and supplementary schools (in Mohan and Zack-Williams 2002). Their activities include community-to-community transfers, identity-building, lobbying in current home on issues relation to homeland, trade and investment with homeland, and payment of taxes in the homeland. Whatever the form of collective remitting, Alejandro Portes and Patricia Landolt (2000: 543) conclude, ‘Life conditions in municipalities that receive grassroots transnational aid confirm the relevance of this collective remittance strategy. Towns with a hometown association have paved roads, electricity, and fresher painted public buildings. The quality of life in transnational towns is simply better.’

‘Consider the Salvadoran “United Community of Chinameca”: their first largesse was $5,000 to build a school, and then they built a septic tank worth $10,000. Later they constructed a Red Cross clinic at a cost of $43,000, and bought an ambulance worth $32,000’ (Lowell and de la Garza 2000: 2). Hagan (1994) likewise describes how a hometown group in Houston, calling themselves Amigos de San Pedro, organized and paid for medical supplies and a health clinic in San Pedro, Guatemala. They also established organization linkages and exchange programmes with American health workers. Another noteworthy case is the University of Hargeisa, established in 1998 in Somaliland (Mohan 2002). This was made possible by transnational networking of Somalis in Australia, Italy, Sweden, Kuwait, Canada, the USA and Britain. While local businesses in Somaliland took responsibility for rehabilitating a dilapidated, government-owned school building, Somalis in Sweden provided 750 chairs and tables and Somalis in Kuwait provided computers. The Somaliland Forum, an Internet-based diasporic network, raises money, maintains email groups and forms taskforces to support the University.

Such forms of migrant transnational organization are so importantly engaged in local development that, Smith (1998: 227-8) believes, they are generating ‘parallel power structures’ and ‘forcing the state to engage them in new ways, either in kind or degree, but engage the state they must.’ Some state and local governments match the funds raised by HTAs
in order to magnify their impact (Martin 2001). Since 1993, one of the most noted programmes of this type has been the ‘two for one’ initiative of the Programa para las Comunidades Mexicanas en el Extranjero (PCME, Program for Mexican Communities Abroad; see Smith 1998, Goldring 1998, 2001, Mahler 2000). The programme operates through a network of 42 consulates and 23 institutes or Mexican cultural centres in the USA (Orozco 2001). The idea of ‘two for one’ is that for every dollar raised by a hometown association abroad, the state (e.g., of Zacatecas) and the federal government each put in a dollar for a community project. In 1995 in Zacatecas alone the ‘two for one’ programme added to the HTAs’ $600,000 to provide $1.8 million towards 56 projects in 34 Mexican towns (Mahler 1998).

‘Two for one’ was subsequently extended to a ‘three for one’ programme, in which each migradollar is matched with one dollar from the federal government, one from the state government and one from the municipal government. Between 1999-2001, migrants invested $2.7 million into such programmes (World Bank 2001). Despite some limitations, these initiatives in Mexico ‘have produced a deep impact in the local communities and have been recognized as new and effective forms of public-private collaboration’ (Ibid.: 6). The ultimate objective, according to World Bank analysts, would be ‘to develop a self-sustainable private system for the development of projects and local programs financed totally or partially with remittances and savings from the Mexican community abroad. Available funds of international cooperation could be used for supporting some of the initiatives’ (Ibid.: 7).

HTAs are not the only players in these kinds of schemes. Financial services firms such as Raza Express have joined in, contributing $0.75 to the collective funds for each $300 sent through their company. In this way Raza Express has contributed more than $50,000, alongside $500,000 from the government of Jalisco, in schemes creating 15,000 jobs (Orozco 2001).

The collective remittance work of HTAs for development is not entirely rosy, however. Disagreements on how to use the funds raised by HTAs are endemic. For example, the association from Jalpa, a town of 13,500 in the
state of Zacatecas, raised $2 million, but got into a serious dispute over how to spend the money in Jalpa (Migration News, December 2002). Sarah Mahler (1998) and Luin Goldring (2001) both emphasize that while HTAs enjoy a veneer of altruism and democratic structure, they often significantly exclude women, reinforce existing power relations within a community, sometimes promote projects which are not the most needed but which generate the most symbolic power, and may be open to cooptation and exploitation by government.

The relationship between HTAs and the state of origin are not unproblematic, either. HTAs might be ‘left doing the lion’s share of the government’s work’ in development while the government itself steps back from this responsibility (Levitt 2001a: 209). Mahler (2000) predicts that in Central America the region will see an ever-increasing amount of government activity concerning emigrants abroad, particularly regarding their remittances. ‘While such efforts are comprehensible,’ she (Ibid.: 32) says, ‘they are drawing increasing criticism because they place responsibility for Central America’s economic stability disproportionately on the shoulders of migrants.’ Moreover, the more governments attempt to control and channel remittances, the more migrants are pushed toward remitting via unofficial means (Meyers 1998).

In proportion to total remittances sent through families, collective remittances channelled through HTAs and other migrant transnational frameworks are small although likely to increase (Orozco 2001). Despite this fact, and that of the sometimes problematic nature of such organizations and their relationship to the state, the forms of institutionalisation they represent have much valuable potential for effectively directing remittances to highly needed and effective forms of local development. Other, newer forms of institutionalisation in the shape of micro-finance present important possibilities as well.

...and micro-finance

Taylor (1999: 74) usefully proposes that ‘Migration is likely to have a larger effect on development where local institutions exist to gather
savings by migrant households and make them available to local producers – that is, where migrants do not have to play the simultaneous roles of workers, savers, investors, and producers.’ National governments have sought to establish economic schemes, such as special investment funds or savings accounts, to channel remittances and encourage business development. These have met with very mixed results (Puri and Ritzema 1999).

Microfinance institutions (MFIs) offer prospects for channelling migrant remittances in ways similar to those suggested by Taylor. The idea of MFIs began in the 1970s but took off among development agencies and researchers throughout the 1990s. More recently there has occurred what Marguerite Robinson (2001) describes as ‘a paradigm shift’ in microfinance development strategies, from government- or donor-subsidized credit delivery systems to self-sufficient institutions providing finance on very local levels. MFIs have the potential to meet a massive global demand for local banking services that many governments and donor agencies increasingly recognize as a priority (Ibid.; also see www.microfinancegateway.org).

A core function of MFIs is to provide small, low-interest loans (microcredit, e.g. from $10 to $3,000) and savings services to poor families – and often specifically to women, who ordinarily do not have access to formal financial institutions. Such loans are to help people engage in productive activities (involving, for instance, small farms, petty trading, craft enterprises or local business). MFIs offer credit, savings and insurance in often remote rural areas. They also may give financial and business advice and training. Many MFIs are non-profit NGOs, credit unions or cooperatives while there are also new commercial MFIs. Currently augmented by new information technologies, MFIs are growing in number, extent and function throughout the developing world.

One critical problem facing ‘the microfinance revolution’ is scarcity of capital (M. Robinson 2001). Therefore channelled remittances – especially pooled funds represented by HTAs – can go a long way toward supporting the establishment and work of MFIs. In contrast to rural credit programmes which earlier absorbed large sums of money over several
decades, many relevant agencies – such as the International Labour Organization, the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank – are increasingly interested in the potential interface between remittances and MFIs. The Multilateral Investment Fund of the Inter-American Development Bank promotes and funds initiatives that will allow emigrants to invest their money in development projects in places of origin. In 2001 the Fund extended a grant of $1.1 million to support projects in Mexico facilitating the linkage of remittance transfers, local financial services and productive investments by migrants and their families. A further six such projects have been developed in 2002.

At one workshop on these issues convened by the International Labour Organization (ILO 2000: 15), it was agreed that microfinance institutions ‘appear particularly well suited to capture and transform remittances for several reasons: (i) they deal with small-scale transactions where personal relations were important, (ii) they extensively involve groups and associations of intermediaries and (iii) they integrate the formal and the informal sector practices.’ The ILO workshop group also advocated a number of additional factors that should contribute to the successful linkage of MFIs and remittances, including the provision of a large number of local contact points, a wide range of financial services products at the local level, and the widening of partnerships between micro-finance institutions and other organizations. The ILO group also believed that governments should at best mainly observe, but also act to create a positive regulatory framework and ideally provide matching funds to stimulate the use of MFIs for routing remittances for local community development.

Shivani Puri and Tineke Ritzema (1999: 25) suggest in a report to the ILO that,

rather than focussing on ‘migrant-specific’ investment programmes, labour exporting countries might wish to induce micro-finance institutions to capture remittances. The basic idea would be to design policies to transfer funds of the migrant workers through to entrepreneurs. Savings and credit schemes and investment
instruments specifically designed to suit migrant workers’ risk profiles could be important vehicles.

Puri and Ritzema emphasize that labour-exporting countries would benefit from policies and programmes that enable micro-finance institutions that are trusted at the village level to play a key role in directing remittances, thus ensuring that families have access to safe and secure savings and credit schemes as well as business skill development programmes.

One of the best ways to achieve remittance-MFI benefits may be through credit unions, who would use any transfer fees to reinvest in community development (Martin 2001). Especially in comparison to banks and financial transfer agencies, credit unions are shown to offer some of the best practices in remitting opportunities to migrants (Orozco 2002). In fact, the World Council of Credit Unions has recently established the International Remittance Network, or IRNet (Grace 2001). Set up originally in cooperation with the Mexican government, this should enable credit union members to use IRNet’s money-transfer services to 41 countries at one-third to one-half the commercial cost (Rogers 2001a). Indeed, IRNet charges less than $7 for most transactions. The use of credit unions can also provide needed access to savings, loans and insurance services, as well as broadly to ‘increase the culture of banking’ in both migrant sending and receiving countries (Grace 2001.: 4). This may represent a particularly significant transformation, as research shows that many if not ‘most remittance senders and receivers do not currently have bank accounts of any sort and probably never have’ (Suro et al. 2002: 17).

Another set of proposals seeks largely to cut out the financial middleman altogether. In 2002 the Bank of America began a low-cost service that allows people to use tellers, phone calls or the Internet to send money to relatives in Mexico, who in turn can get cash from any of the 20,000 automated-teller machines throughout the country (Wessel 2002). Naturally, this idea is only good for those with realistic access to such machines. A further idea is that of creating ‘telecenters-cum-microbanks’ in an array of village localities (S. Robinson 2001). In this way, it is proposed a collectively managed and secure system of digital remittance
pooling through Internet satellite facilities could considerably lower the transfer cost (from currently sometimes 20 per cent down to perhaps 5 per cent) while providing rural areas with microcredit and banking services. These centres might be appendices to established credit unions or local savings and loan institutions. ‘On the back side of each village microbank is a telecenter – a public, low-cost access point for Internet and IP services, including telephony’ (Ibid.: 4). These could have a role in local institutions and training programmes, especially as auxiliaries to schools, continuous education colleges, and health clinics.

Bangladesh’s Grameen Bank is often regarded as an exemplary MFI (cf. Robinson 2001, Jain and Moore 2003). Grameen services 2.4 million borrowers – 95 per cent of whom are women – through 1176 outlets. In recent years the bank has branched into a variety of enterprises, including telecommunications (and the ‘village phone’ programme mentioned earlier). The combined facilities for micro-banking, overseas transfers and international telephony have great development potential, as concluded by one report for the Canadian International Development Agency:

The Grameen Bank’s long-term focus on providing electronic communication facilities between its head office, zonal offices and branch offices, together with the telecommunication infrastructure of GrameenPhone, are important steps in enabling it to provide safe electronic banking services that could assist with channelling remittances from overseas workers to their relatives in villages (Richardson et al. 2000: 28).

MFIs are certainly not a solution to all economic problems in developing countries, and they are not without their problems and failures (cf. Jain and Moore 2003). Nevertheless MFIs and the innovations in technology surrounding them have much transformative potential steering remittances – perhaps particularly collective ones – toward optimal development outcomes.
Summary

Drawing on a variety of studies for the Inter-American Development Bank, Orozco (2001: 36) observes that ‘The links established through remittances suggest radical changes are remaking the look of countries’ economies.’ Migrant sending countries themselves certainly recognize this. Consequently many have introduced policies to maximize their benefits; in this way, ‘Cooperation to increase remittances, reduce the cost of transferring money, and matching that share of remittances that are invested could open a new era in cooperative economic development’ (Widgren and Martin 2002: 223).

This section has focused on means through which patterns of immigrant transnationalism are re-institutionalising (or have the potential to introduce) new local and national structures of development. Throughout many periods of migration hometown associations have sent money back to villages for the repair of schools and churches. Now the sheer scale, kind and degree of institutionalisation (increasingly involving the sending state) and use of advanced telecommunications and cheap travel has meant that remittances can transform the nature and pace of local development in migrant-sending areas.

Several significant questions continue to concern the place of remittances, including how long remittances will continue to flow, and whether high levels of international migration are needed to sustain remittance levels. Most remittances worldwide continue to be sent by individuals, and these may indeed tail-off over time. Although this source of remittances diminish, HTA or other forms of institutionalised collective remittance-sending – particularly utilizing micro-finance institutions – may be better posed to persist and provide the broadest benefits.

Conclusion

The ties between the kinds of migrant transnational practices and modes of transformation suggested in this paper reflect the progression of changes considered by Portes (2001: 191):
Once migrant colonies become well established abroad, a flow of *transnational* economic and informational resources starts, ranging from occasional remittances to the emergence of a class of full-time transnational entrepreneurs. The cumulative effects of these dynamics come to the attention of national governments who reorient their *international* activities through embassies, consulates, and missions to recapture the loyalty of their expatriates and guide their investments and political mobilizations. The increased volume of demand created by migrant remittances and investments in their home countries support, in turn, the further expansion of the market for multinationals and encourage local firms to go abroad themselves, establishing branches in areas of immigrant concentration. (emphasis in original)

These and other processes described in this paper will carry through into the near future. Many patterns of migrant transnationalism and their associated modes of transformation are likely to widen, intensify and accelerate. The governments of migrant sending and receiving states will continue to address a range of migrant transnational practices with greater attention and policy intervention. Technological changes (especially the building and extension of infrastructures in developing countries) will make it ever easier and cheaper to communicate and exchange resources, including remittances, across borders and at long-distance. Hometown associations and other such diasporic organizations have become institutionalised to a degree that they will likely be sustained, and probably enhanced, over the next several years. Individuals within post-migration second and subsequent generations will probably not maintain the everyday orientations and practices of their migrant forebears, but such orientations and practices will continue to have an enduring impression on their identities, interests and activities.

Each set of processes, it has been suggested, entails small-scale and everyday practices of individuals and groups. Incrementally and cumulatively, these practices may produce far-reaching modes of transformation affecting migrants, their families and communities in
places of origin, and wider populations surrounding transnational networks.

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60


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