

The Politics of Mainstreaming Immigrant Integration Policies

Case study of the United Kingdom

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Chapter 1 Introduction

This report is part of the EU-funded research project Upstream. The title of this Work Package is ‘The politics of mainstreaming’, and this report will explore the mainstreaming of migrant integration policies in the United Kingdom. It will, in doing this, address three central questions:

- **What** forms of mainstreaming can be identified in the United Kingdom?
- **How** have these mainstreaming policies come about? What factors contributed or obstructed the mainstreaming of integration governance?
- **Why** has or has not integration governance been mainstreamed in the various cases? What explanations can be found for the mainstreaming of integration governance?

In the following chapters these questions will be discussed in relation to the more recent British migration and integration history, and they will subsequently be pursued with particular reference to the policy areas of ‘education’ and ‘social cohesion’. In answering these questions, we have focused on England and Wales, as integration and education policy have been devolved competences for much of this time in Scotland and Northern Ireland, where there have been some departures to the general picture in England and Wales. In order to set the scene for the next work package, which will address the local level, we will also outline the policy areas in relation to two selected local government authorities in England – the London Borough of Southwark (LBS) and Bristol City Council (BCC). LBS is an inner-city borough in London, the UK’s capital city, characterised by a long history of immigration, and with the White British population constituting less than 40 per cent of the 288,000 inhabitants. A port city in the West of England, Bristol has also been a destination point for a long time, but the demographic profile is, with 77.9 per cent of its 428,000 population categorised as White British, altogether much more similar to the UK average.

Mainstreaming in the UK

The notion of mainstreaming as a process in relation to integration holds rather limited currency in the UK. With *mainstream* referring to ‘chief direction’ or ‘trend’, discussions can focus on ways of integrating specific groups into *the mainstream* – most commonly seen with reference to how children with Special Educational Needs (SEN) can be integrated into mainstream education. Rather than specifically mainstreamed, integration policy discourse has been perceived as implicitly mainstreamed, or rather underpinned by a strong 1970s equality legislation framework, most recently updated with the 2010 Equality Act. At the same time, however, events in the wider society – most notably riots in the early 1980s, in 2001, and 2011 – have led to renewed discussions over the nature and direction of integration policy, as well as the coordination mechanisms across different levels and sectors of government.

Chapter 2 Country context

‘We are the World’

(*The Sun*, front page 12-12-2012)

Apart from a ‘pledge’ to what is arguably the biggest possible mainstream, the front page of popular tabloid *The Sun* provided one of the reactions to first batch of the 2011 British Census data, published the previous day. Perhaps uncharacteristically positive for a British tabloid, the front page can also be seen as a reference to how diversity increasingly is becoming a signature of British society. The aim of this chapter is to provide a short outline of main drivers behind this diversity and explore some of the key aspects of British integration policy.

2.1 Brief sketch of UK migration history

British immigration trajectories are closely entwined with its colonial history, and when mass labour migration gained pace post-WW2, the main sending countries were New Commonwealth countries, most notably South Asia and what was then known as the West Indies. In the 1970s, an additional influx of South Asian immigrants arrived, expelled from Uganda, and migration from other parts of Africa gained pace in the 1980s. But there has over the past decades been an increase in ‘new migration’, largely triggered by three factors: an unprecedented rise in spontaneous asylum seekers; economic migration facilitated by increasing global mobility; and EU policies relating to the free movement of labour, in particular in relation to the new accession states, the so-called A8 and A10 countries (Zetter et al 2006), with 15 per cent of the foreign-born population in 2011 deriving from EU accession states (ONS 2012). Also new is the wide-spread nature of short-term and circular migration; of all immigrants arriving in Britain in 1998, only 25% remained in 2008 (Finney et al 2009).

Table 1 2011 population by ethnicity (percentage point change from 2001 in brackets)

	England	Bristol	Southwark
White British	79.8 (-8.19)	77.9 (-10.5)	39.7 (-12.4)
White other	5.7 (1.77)	6.1 (2.3)	14.6 (3.8)
Mixed	2.2 (0.9)	3.6 (1.5)	6.2 (2.4)
Black African	1.8 (0.83)	2.8 (2.2)	16.4 (0.3)
Black Caribbean	1.1 (-0.04)	1.6 (0.13)	6.2 (-1.8)
Black British	0.5 (0.25)	1.6 (1.41)	4.2 (2.4)
Asian	7.7 (2.68)	5.4 (2.1)	9.5 (3.6)
Others	0.9	1.0	3.1
Total	99.7	100.0	99.9

Source: ONS 2012.

As it is apparent from table 1, there have been significant changes in the composition of the British population in the period 2001-11, with a significant decline in the ethnically White British proportion of the population. Whereas the profile of Bristol is relatively similar to the national picture, the London Borough of Southwark (LBS) does stand somewhat – as does London at large. Similar to other destination countries, there is a significant geographical concentration in the bigger cities, in particular London, with less than half the 2011 population of London categorised as White British. In

Southwark, these trends are even more pronounced, as parts of Southwark has been a destination point since WW2, resulting in a local concentration of black minorities – first Black Caribbeans, but since the 1980s increasingly Black Africans. There is, accordingly, no straightforward correlation between ethnicity and migration status. In 2011, 37 per cent of all residents in London were born outside the UK, with half of all foreign-born residents arriving 2001-11 (ONS 2012) ¹.

The British ‘mix’ is thus increasingly, and more so than most other European countries, characterised by a proliferation of differences which lends itself to a description of Britain as superdiverse. Although super-diversity remains part of a vocabulary largely used in academia, only slowly finding resonance in policy discourse, we can track a reconceptualization of integration in response to it. But whereas Steve Vertovec’s path-breaking introduction to ‘Super-diversity and its implications’ operated with a broad-brush approach, using national level quantitative data to demonstrate ‘...a new kind of complexity surpassing anything the country has previously experienced’ (Vertovec 2007: 1024), in a British context it typically small inner-city areas with long histories of migration settlement that are described as super-diverse.

2.2 Background of UK migrant integration policies

‘Migration integration policy’ can, in a British context, be considered a somewhat oxymoronic term, as debates typically have focused, on the one hand, on strong borders to keep newcomers out and, on the other, on equality policies for minorities within. At the same time, the responsibility for migrants and integration has typically fallen between different government departments. It is, accordingly, the Home Office that is charged with immigration and border control, whereas the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG) is in charge of community cohesion.

Resulting from the strong historical links with the Commonwealth, and the British tradition of conferring citizenship by birthplace (*jus soli*), policymakers have for many decades considered the country’s population of migrant origin as ethnic minorities rather than migrants. The rights of minorities have been recognised through equality legislation, most notably the *1976 Race Relations Act*, protecting people from discrimination on the basis of national origin, and the *2000 Race Relations Amendment Act*, placing the general duty on public authorities to actively promote equal opportunity. Existing anti-discrimination laws were in 2010 mainstreamed into the 2010 Equality Act, bringing together previous pieces of legislation².

This equality legislation has, however, co-existed with deep-rooted practices of racial discrimination and racial screening. Most note-worthy, perhaps, is the enquiry into the police handling of the racially motivated murder on Stephen Lawrence in 1993, with the final report (known as the

¹ Indicative of the ‘new migrants’ and the emerging relevant categories is the research project commissioned by LBS in 2011 to explore five different ‘new population’ within the borough. The five new populations were: French-speaking sub-Saharan Africans; Bangladeshis; Arab speakers; Nigerians; Sierra Leonians (Pharaoh et al 2013). Accordingly, three groups were identified on the basis of nationality, one on language (and ‘Arab’ as an emerging census category), and the final referring to a geographical area characterised by a particular colonial history.

² The act covers nine characteristics which cannot be used to treat people unfairly. These are: age, disability, gender reassignment, marriage and civil partnerships, pregnancy and maternity, race, religion or belief, sex, sexual orientation (Home Office 2010).

MacPherson report) concluding that the Metropolitan Police Force was ‘institutionally racist’ (MacPherson 1999). Whereas the findings of the report resulted in significant changes within the police, there is nevertheless persistent evidence of racial ‘screening’ in different contexts. An example is the crime-fighting weapon known as ‘stop and search’. Here, black youths are six times more likely than white youths to be subjected to ‘stop and search’, and with Asian or other ethnic minority groups twice as likely to be searched (Hurrell 2013).

There has, in a UK context, been some correlation between, on one hand, occasions where tensions in inner-city urban areas have escalated into ‘riots’ or ‘uprisings’ and, on the other hand, major ‘integration’ policy developments, to some extent developed in response to the events. Accordingly, multiculturalism emerged as part of a policy response to uprisings taking place in Brixton, Bristol and other cities in 1981. Over the next two decades, up to the disturbances in northern England in 2001, a policy model evolved that respected and promoted minority cultural identity and difference, thus enabling plural identities and helping ‘Britain adjust to the presence of minority citizens whose difficult life experience could not [...] be adequately contained under the heading “immigration”’ (Gilroy 2006, in Hickman et al 2012: 32). What was to become known as the Parekh Report, titled *The future of Multi-Ethnic Britain*, aimed to take stock of this development and inform a move from a *laissez faire* ‘multicultural drift’ to a ‘purposeful process of change’ (Parekh 2000: 11). In suggesting a re-imagined, post-national Britain, based on a ‘community of communities, the report distinguished itself from cruder versions of multiculturalism. But it was in its attempts to engage critically with national identity, arguing that ‘Britishness as much as Englishness has systematic, largely unspoken racial connotations’ (ibid: 38), that the Parekh Report met with serious opposition both in parliament and from a powerful conservative press³.

But it was the civil disturbances in northern English towns in late 2001, in particular in areas with high proportions of Muslims British Asians, and the resulting ‘Report of the Independent Review Team on civic disturbances in Burnley, Bradford and Oldham in 2001’ (Home Office 2001) commissioned by Home Secretary John Denham, that triggered the gradual process whereby national and local authorities increasingly replaced multiculturalism by community cohesion, the promotion of stronger bonds and shared values at the local level. The community cohesion umbrella has, however, given rise to a diverse range of local policy responses which exemplify a place-based framing of UK social policy, with social problems associated with particular types of localities.

This move towards community cohesion has been referred to as a ‘mainstreaming in discourse’ (Ali and Gidley 2014). But it has also been argued that in practice, and within the broader context of events at the national and global level, the findings of the report allowed for a ‘ring fencing’ of perceived dysfunctional communities – inward looking, generally Muslim, ethnic enclaves – and, subsequently, policy initiatives targeting the integration of these communities (Hickman et al 2012). Furthermore, such targeting served to reify communities defined on ethnic and religious ground, thus to some extent obscuring a broader understanding of the impact of high levels of socio-economic deprivation.

³ A *Daily Telegraph* headline the day before the Parekh Report was published: ‘Straw [the then Home Secretary] wants to re-write our history: British is a racist word’ (*Daily Telegraph*, 10 October 2000, in Hickman et al 2012: 35)

But at the same time as politicians were focusing on settled Muslim minorities, new migration was increasing dramatically, with inner cities becoming increasingly diverse and previously relatively homogenous areas seeing significant migrant settlement for the first time. The uneven geography of super-diversity was emphasised in the work of the Commission on Integration and Cohesion, constituted, under Ruth Kelly as Secretary of State at the Department of Communities and Local Government, in response to terrorist bombings in London in July 2005, which explicitly cited Vertovec's research. Both Ruth Kelly and her successor Hazel Blears stressed the importance of the report's analytical framework in establishing the Migration Impact Forum and the Migration Advisory Committee, which aimed to better understand and plan for the local impacts of new migration (DCLG 2008). The superdiversity framing was central to drafting new guidelines for the management of diversity at local governance level, in establishing new funding streams of central government support directed at the integration of new migrants and in the recognition of new diversities that incorporated both older models of 'race relations' and new associational forms such as diasporic religious faith and transnational connection. These principles have also been articulated by some local authorities, such as the London Borough of Hackney or the city of Birmingham but are also implicit in some policy statements of both Southwark and Bristol (Ali and Gidley 2014).

A final episode of unrest was the 'riots' taking place in London and other English cities in August 2011. Though initially triggered by reactions to the police shooting of a Black Caribbean man in North London, ethnicity was not seen as a major driving factor⁴.

The policy framework for integration in Britain, developed in 2012 by the Department for Communities and Local Government, was entitled 'Creating the conditions for integration'. More than anything, this title signals a re-positioning of the role of the central government, as the document also states: 'Instead of large-scale, centrally led and funded programmes, we want to inspire and enable civil society and local areas to take action on integration issues that are important to them' (DCLG 2012: 19). Although the statement is extremely un-programmatic, DCLG identifies five factors that will contribute to integration:

Common Ground	A clear sense of shared aspirations and values, which focuses on what we have in common rather than our differences.
Responsibility	A strong sense of our mutual commitments and obligations, which brings personal and social responsibility
Social mobility	People able to realise their potential to get on in life
Participation and empowerment	People of all backgrounds have the opportunities to take part, be heard and take decisions in local and national life.
Tackling intolerance and extremism	A robust response to threats, whether discrimination, extremism or disorder, that deepen division and increase tensions.

Source: DCLG 2012, p4-5.

As it is evident, the first four factors reiterate the emphasis on individual agency and responsibility. As no further strategy and funding were made available, the role of the central government was clearly seen as limited. But the *Creating the conditions* document also complemented the government's socially mobility strategy, titled *Opening doors, Breaking Barriers*. A much broader

⁴ Interview #2, Greater London Authority official, 09.06.2014.

theme, cutting across the policies of the coalition government, social mobility provided a strong framework for vertical and horizontal coordination across different parts of government. But similar to the social inclusion agenda pursued by the previous Labour governments, the social mobility agenda was rolled out, but kept separate from the immigration debate, thus providing a good example of mainstreaming (Ali and Gidley 2014).

Politicising integration

Within the context of national level politics and political campaigning, central concerns have been with immigration rather than integration, and driven by a politics of populism. The January 2009 pledge of the then prime minister, Gordon Brown, to secure ‘British jobs for British workers’, resonated with significant segments of the electorate. Under the present Coalition government, policy measures have largely been concerned with a tightening of immigration control, with David Cameron pledging, prior to the general elections, to cut levels of net migration ‘from hundreds of thousands to tens of thousands’⁵. An aggressive Home Office campaign in the summer 2013, where ‘Go Home’ bill boards were driven around areas of London with high immigrant population, contributed to the general tightening. While targeting illegal immigrants, the campaign also served to alienate legal immigrants and settled minority groups, contributing to what has been described as a ‘culture of disbelief’ surrounding the legal status and entitlements of immigrants in general.⁶

Whereas there has been over the past years a reduction of third country immigrants, it is the increase in immigration from Eastern European countries that has emerged as a contentious issue in the political arena, even more so after the success of the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) in the 2014 European elections, fuelling ongoing discussions of Britain’s EU membership. Most recently, in late July 2014, the British prime minister announced measures to tighten EU immigrants’ access to welfare benefits, most notably cutting the time that EU citizens can claim Jobseekers Allowance or child benefits from six months to three months, and in essence echoing Gordon Brown when concluding that there is a need for ‘... an immigration system that puts Britain first’.⁷

But the political focus on tightening of immigration rather than more clear-cut integration policy measures may also have long-term implications. As the black and minority ethnic (BME) population constitutes an increasing proportion of the British electorate, it is a concern for the Conservatives that its policies have so limited resonance among minority groups. In the 2010 general elections, the Conservatives secured 16% of the BME vote, compared with 68% for Labour.

⁵ The Telegraph 2010 <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/6961675/David-Cameron-net-immigration-will-be-capped-at-tens-of-thousands.html>

⁶ Interview #11, with Southwark civil society organisations, 25.07.2014.

⁷ The Telegraph 2014 <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/immigration/10995875/David-Cameron-Were-building-an-immigration-system-that-puts-Britain-first.html>

2.3 Conclusion

Consequently, we can broadly characterise British integration policy in the following way, drawing on the typology developed in earlier work packages of the Upstream project (van Breugel, Maan and Scholten 2014).

Situating the mainstreaming of integration policies in the UK

Cultural model

Policies	Specific	Monistic <u>Differentialism</u> Multi-faith agenda 1997+: Role of faith schools and other forms of de facto segregation	Pluralistic <u>Multiculturalism</u> Since 1970s, declining after 2001: Ad hoc practices in schools and local authorities, including Black History Month, celebrating diversity, multicultural food days and festivals
	Generic	<u>Assimilation</u> Emphasis on common values implicit in cohesion agenda, especially in 2001+ period and 2014.	<u>Interculturalism</u> Emphasis on contact and interaction in 2001+ period: Big Lunch type initiatives, local festivals focusing on shared future.

Multiculturalism, although often seen as the “UK model” was only unevenly and locally developed, primarily in inner city areas, by a limited number of local authorities, local education authorities and schools, largely without national support. Although there was a marked turn against pluralism around 2001 at a national level, many frontline bureaucrats in local authorities, schools and civil society institutions have remained ideologically committed to it, and we can still see several residual instances of multiculturalist approaches at local level.

The turn away from multiculturalism in 2001 did not, however, go in a single direction; as we shall show in this report, elements of the subsequently dominant “community cohesion” policy paradigm have oscillated between *differentialist*, *assimilationist* and *interculturalist* modalities at different times and places. The *differentialist* modality is most visible in the policy around faith schools originating under New Labour and the strong articulation of Britain as a multi-faith society under the Coalition. The *assimilationist* modality was present in the emphasis on shared values under Labour Home Secretary David Blunkett and has re-appeared more recently with Conservative ministers emphasising ‘British values’. Finally, the *interculturalist* modality was present in the emphasis on shared spaces, informed by contact theory, promoted by the 2002 Cantle report and re-emerging in the localist approach to integration under the Coalition.

The full range of these four typological modalities of integration policy can be seen in the policy fields of education and cohesion in the UK, and the remainder of this report describes these two fields in more detail.

Chapter 3 Thematic analysis: Education

3.1 Policy background

In a political arena that throughout most of the 20th century has been defined by a struggle between the two dominating parties – Labour and the Conservatives – the nature and control over educational provision has been one of the main areas of contestation, with educational attainment increasingly seen as one of the key markers of difference in a class-divided society.

However, there has been broad continuity in policy in the period after 1997, when New Labour came into power, and after 2010, under the Coalition government. The trends have been: a targeting of socio-economic disadvantage through social inclusion policies (Labour) and social mobility policies (Coalition), with Free School Meals as a much more significant category than English as Additional Language (see text box) and (between 1997 and 2010) initiatives focused geographically on schools in disadvantaged areas (such as Excellence in Cities, discussed below); an increasing pluralisation of the education sector in the name of parental “choice”, including a steadily increasing role for private providers and faith-based schooling; a rolling back of the role of the state and the local authority in educational provision, with increased responsibility and accountability invested in the governing body of the individual school.

This has resulted in a steadily increasing number of academies – starting under New Labour and continued by the present Coalition government – and the emergence of ‘Free Schools’ as one of educational flagships of the government.

Table 2 Types of schools in England

Type	
Maintained schools	Schools run by Local Educational Authorities.
Independent schools	Private schools run by private individuals or organisations.
Academies	Independent schools based on a contract between the proprietor and the Secretary of State for Education, based on the Academies Act 2010, previously Education Act 1996. In 2000s, maintained schools with low educational attainment were forced to become academies. Since 2010, there has been a much broader DfE push, with financial incentives, for maintained schools to become academies
Free school	Type of academy, funded by DfE, but created from ‘fresh’ – typically by parents or other local stakeholders
Faith schools	This can refer to maintained or independent schools or academies which are associated with a particular religion, and typically characterised by specific admission criteria.

English as an Additional Language (EAL)

EAL is the language-based category most commonly in both political and public discourse used when referring to the BME and immigrant pupil population in primary and secondary schools. It is a very broad category as it refers to all children exposed to more than one language (which may include English) during early development – in other words, both British-born children and very recent arrivals. Its scope was originally restricted to address the needs of immigrants from the New Commonwealth countries, but in 1993 it was extended to include all ethnic minorities. EAL funding is allocated by the central government, but EAL pupils have, since 2012, only been eligible for funding for a maximum of three years after they enter the compulsory school system (DfE 2012).

Free School Meals (FSM)

In the UK, a free school meal (FSM) has been an entitlement since the 1944 Education Act, but since 1980 local authorities have been obliged only to provide meals to pupils whose parents or carers were recipients of one or more qualifying benefits. In January 2013, 18.3% of pupils in state-funded schools were claiming FSM, as opposed to 14.3% in 2004. With FSM children thus an indicator of potentially deprived children, the attainment of FSM pupils is monitored closely by the school, and the proportion of a school's pupil population that qualifies for FSM is used as an indicator of area-based deprivation. (However, some categories of migrant children, through particularly deprived, do not count in FSM data because, due to immigration status, they have no entitlement to recourse to public funds. This can create pressures on schools – often in super-diverse areas – with high numbers of children in this category but no additional resources to meet their needs.) But as of September 2014, the FSM category will become obsolete, as all children in reception and school years one and two will be entitled to FSM.

The Free School Meal (FSM) category has been central to policy development over the past governments⁸. Most recently, a report by the Commons education committee found that white British children from deprived areas appear less resilient to the effects of poverty than other ethnic groups, who perform better at school despite similar levels of deprivation. According to the report, just 32 per cent of poor, white British children pass at least five GCSEs with C grades or above – compared with 42% of black Caribbeans and 61% of Indian children (House of Commons Education Committee 2014).

⁸ But it is hardly a new concern. Harrison argues, based on research in two schools in the London Borough of Hackney, that educational attainment relates to housing and local economy of the area: The family is a more potent influence than the primary school, the street is more potent than secondary school, television is more potent than either level. The poor neighbourhood is itself the principle school for its children, its inhabitants are the chief instructors. It is a disastrous environment for learning or discipline (Harrison 1988:298).

Tab 3 UK pupil population by ethnicity and schooling stage

Year	Primary		Secondary		Total
	Number of EAL pupils	EAL pupils as proportion of total (%)	Number of EAL pupils	EAL pupils as proportion of total (%)	
2000	311,512	8.7	255,256	8.0	566,768
2005	395,270	11.6	299,200	9.0	694,470
2010	518,020	16.0	378,210	11.6	896,230
2013	612,160	18.1	436,150	13.6	1,048,310

Source: NALDIC 2014 <http://www.naldic.org.uk/research-and-information/eal-statistics>

As shown in table 3, the number of EAL students has increased significantly since 2000, with a proportional increase that is significantly higher at primary than secondary school level. Obviously these national figures also mask some very significant variations at the local level, with EAL students now constituting a majority in one in nine schools in England. It should be emphasized that EAL only provides a crude categorisation, the qualifying criteria based on exposure to more than one language during early development. Similarly, figures do not distinguish between foreign-born children whose first language is not English and children born in the UK who are either bilingual or whose first language is not English. Furthermore, effective provision and targeting is somewhat complicated by the fact that none of the languages most commonly spoken by EAL pupils represented more than two per cent of pupils.

3.1.2 Policy content and analysis

There is, within this broader picture, only limited historical and present emphasis on education as a means of integration and on educational provision for minority and migrant immigrant pupils. The British Nationality Act of 1948 had given Commonwealth citizens recognition as British subjects, entitled to live and work in Britain. Funding provided by the Government to help meet the linguistic needs of children and adults for whom English is not a first language was initially introduced in England under the Local Government Act of 1966, as Section 11 funding, a recognition of the need for specific rather than simply generic support for migrant children. There was, until the mid-1960s, no central government policy on the education of immigrant children, and the main concerns were to teach English to non-English speakers and to disperse immigrant children. The latter move was motivated by the aim of ensuring that individual schools didn't have to cope with large numbers of immigrant pupils and in order to facilitate their assimilation into British society. This dispersal policy was, however, rejected by a number of local education authorities (LEAs), most notably the Inner London Education Authority, and it was ruled illegal in 1975.

Towards the end of the sixties, we can see a shift in policy frame under the influence of Labour Home Secretary Roy Jenkins and his advisor Anthony Lester. 'Assimilation' was replaced by 'integration' in policy statements, which began to refer to diversity, tolerance and equal opportunity and attempted 'to give at least some recognition in schools to the backgrounds of ethnic minority children' (Swann 1985:191). It was becoming clear that not only migrants but also settled minority ethnic children had specific needs.

Many of the key tenets that continue to underpin what would now be called BME educational provision can be traced back to a subsequent shift in policy frame encoded in the so-called ‘Swann Report’, published in 1985 (against a backdrop of incidents of urban unrest, including in South London and Bristol) and commissioned in response to findings from a 1977 report titled highlighting concerns about the underachievement of West Indian (later known as Black Caribbean) children in schools, with the recommendation that the government should institute a high level inquiry into the causes of this underachievement. The Swann Report stressed that a good command of English was the first priority of all pupils in language learning. Whereas the needs of learners of English as a second language could be met by provision with the mainstream school, the report did not see Mother Tongue Provision as a responsibility of maintained schools (Swann 1985: 771).

From a mainstreaming perspective, the Swann Report proposed *generic policies within an explicitly pluralistic framework*. In outlining its key concept ‘education for all’, the Swann Report stressed the need to recognise that the problem facing the education system is not how to educate children of ethnic minorities, but how to educate *all* children, and, in doing that, enable them to understand what it means to live in a multiracial and multicultural society. With more than a nod to a disputed interim report⁹, the Swann report stated that ‘...it is necessary to combat racism, to attack inherited myths and stereotypes, and the ways in which they are embodied in institutional practices’ (ibid: 769).

‘We believe that unless major efforts are made to reconcile the concerns and aspirations of both the majority and minority communities along more genuinely pluralistic lines, there is a real risk of the fragmentation of our society along ethnic lines which would seriously threaten the stability and cohesion of society as a whole (Swann 1985:7).’

It is, however, questionable to which extent such efforts actually came about. As the report was published during the heyday of “Thatcherism,” it has been argued that the idea of multicultural education was largely ignored by central government and only patchily experimented with by some local authorities and schools¹⁰.

Nonetheless, the key mainstreaming principles of the Swann Report still underpins the provision of teaching, as stated in a recent brief summary of government policy in relation to EAL Learners, ‘...all newly-arrived bilingual learners have a right to access to the National Curriculum, and [...] provision for newly arrived EAL learners is not separate but integrated into all subject areas’ (Overington 2012: 2). And while the government recognises the potential benefits deriving from minority languages, the teaching of mother tongue is not a consideration for state-maintained schools (ibid).

⁹ A controversial interim report, ‘West Indian Children in our Schools’, was published in 1981, concluding that the main problems were low teacher expectations and racial prejudice among white teachers and society as a whole. Published in the aftermath of the 1981 Brixton riots, the report was rubbished by most of the media and badly received by the Conservative government.

¹⁰ It is ironic then that the Swann Report was also responsible for contributing significantly to a high profile academic debate concerning the relative merits of multicultural and antiracist education. Indeed, a peculiar feature of the British context is the degree of animosity exhibited between proponents of multicultural and antiracist education throughout the 1970s and 1980s, and into the 1990s. This animosity, in turn, led to a bipolar construction of multicultural and antiracist education that has only recently begun to break down (Modood and May 2001: 308).

English for Speakers of Other Languages

As noted, the Swann Report had articulated the importance of English language acquisition and rejected the teaching of community languages. The period after 2001 saw the rejection of the multicultural policy frame associated with Swann, and the emergence of a policy frame focused on community cohesion – but there was considerable continuity in practice on the ground.

Attitudes to English language provision illustrate some of the paradoxes of the community cohesion policy frame. On one hand, by the 2000s the evidence was clear that language acquisition is fundamental to integration across multiple domains; this was affirmed in the evidence base for the 2004 Commission on Integration and Cohesion. Consequently, a civic republican streak within British integration discourse – exemplified by the influential philosopher Bernard Crick's contributions to debates on citizenship and citizenship education (Crick 1998) - stressed language acquisition as *facilitating* integration.

On the other hand, many politicians, including Crick's former student, the Labour Home Secretary David Blunkett, emphasised the *duty* of migrants and minorities to learn English: a punitive and conditional approach to integration, rather than an understanding of its dynamic, two-way nature. This punitive, assimilationist side emerged especially after 2001 mill town riots, after which the 'problem' of integration was discursively attached to second generation British South Asians. This 2002 speech by Blunkett illustrates this ambiguity: 'I have never said, or implied, that lack of fluency in English was in any way directly responsible for the disturbances in Bradford, Burnley and Oldham in the summer of 2001. However, speaking English enables parents to... participate in wider modern culture. It helps overcome the schizophrenia which bedevils generational relationship' (Blunkett 2002).

The same ambivalence was evident in the wake of the Commission on Cohesion and Integration, reporting in 2007, which argued that: 'English is both an important part of our shared heritage, and a key access factor for new communities to the labour market and wider society. It binds us together as a single group in a way that a multiplicity of community languages cannot.' The Commission therefore recommended *both* increased support for English for Speakers of Other Languages (ESOL) learning provision *and* that translation into community languages should only be used in rare circumstances.

The government response was indeed to strengthen ESOL support. In January 2008 the Department for Innovation, Universities and Skills published the consultation document 'Focusing English for Speakers of Other Languages (ESOL) on Community Cohesion' (Department for Innovation, Universities and Skills 2008), refocusing ESOL provision on cohesion rather than more functional aspects of integration. And at the same time, DCLG published *Guidance on Translation for local authorities* (DCLG 2007), which aimed to ensure that translation was only provided where it is necessary and where it acts as a stepping stone to speaking English, reinforcing the punitive strand in cohesion thinking. Meanwhile, as much ESOL funding came from the Home Office rather than the Department for Education and Science, ESOL was framed as a 'social problem', related to immigration, rather than primarily an educational issue.

Under the Coalition government, politicians have continued to stress migrants' duty to learn English, in speeches framing lack of English as a social problem (often associated with settled Muslim minorities). However, despite increased demand in an era of mass migration, investment in and access to ESOL has been severely reduced. The Coalition strategy for further education, *Investing in skills for sustainable growth*, signalled changes to eligibility rules in 2011 which effectively served to restrict access to some of the most vulnerable and disadvantaged groups. These included people who had applied for asylum or 'failed' asylum-seekers who had signed up for Section 4 support. Furthermore, restrictions on fee remissions meant that low-paid workers and others not in work would be expected to pay higher fees. Critics argued that '...rather than consolidating the position of ESOL in the further education mainstream, or addressing the notable gaps in provision, the new strategy threatens to undo the achievements of the past ten years and push ESOL back towards the educational margins of under-resourced provision, with volunteer-run classes for under- and non-funded groups' (Kofman et al 2011).

However, there have been two key shifts of emphasis under the 2010 Coalition government, and particularly the education minister Michael Gove constituting the sixth major policy frame for integration within education. Thus for example, DfE is encouraging schools to lead the way in driving up the attainment of their underperforming groups. The second shift of emphasis, to which we shall turn in a subsequent section, has been a move *from polycentric to centric regulation of the curriculum*.

Funding streams : from specific to generic

A key shift of emphasis under the 2010 Coalition government has been a shift *from centric to polycentric approaches to school governance*, with increasing empowerment of individual schools rather than local authorities, at the same time as reducing the requirement on schools to target the needs of specific groups, thus '...freeing schools to develop local solutions to local issues' (ibid), as part of the Coalition's broader commitment to localism.

Section 11 funding, dating back to the Local Government Act of 1966, was in 1999 replaced by the Ethnic Minority Achievement Grant (EMAG). Ring-fenced and distributed through the School Standards Fund, the purpose of the grant was two-fold: To enable strategic managers in schools and Local Educational Authorities to lead whole-school change to narrow achievement gaps and ensure quality of outcomes; to fund some of the additional support needed to meet the specific needs of bilingual learners and under-achieving ethnic minority pupils (Overington 2012). However, consultations carried out in 2003 and 2004, as part of the 'Aiming High' national strategy, found that whereas the introduction of EMAG represented a move towards a needs-based funding formula, the use of the funding did not reflect differential needs. Furthermore, EMAG was increasingly used to meet the needs of newly arrived asylum seekers rather than raising the achievement of British-born minority groups.

The changes to funding structure occurring during the first year of the Coalition government testify to shifts away from ring-fenced funding as well as a move towards increased room for manoeuvre at local school level. EMAG was mainstreamed into the wider Dedicated Schools Grant in April 2011. So whereas the funding was maintained, the explicit ring-fencing for EAL provision was removed, giving schools greater freedom to respond more flexibly to local needs (Overington 2012).

Furthermore, a ‘Pupil Premium’, championed in particular by Lib Dem Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg, was introduced as part of the equality strategy launched by the Coalition government in 2010 in order to ‘enable the poorest children to receive the support they need to reach their potential and incentivise good schools to take on pupils from more disadvantaged backgrounds’ (HM Government 2010: 14). Pupil Premium was allocated to children from FSM-eligible low-income families, and children who had been looked after continuously for more than six months. In 2012-13, eligibility for the Pupil Premium was extended to pupils who have been eligible for FSM at any point in the last six years. Schools also receive funding for children who have been looked after continuously for more than six months, and a smaller amount for the children of service personnel. According to the Lib Dem Integration minister Stephen Williams (who represents a Bristol constituency), the Pupil Premium exemplifies the use of generic approaches to meet the needs of specific groups (include ethnic minorities) who are being left behind, without compromising the principle of localism¹¹.

The transition from education to employment

With issues relating to EAL provision increasingly mainstreamed away from the national policy agenda, it is in the transition from education to employment that inter-ethnic disparities have increasingly become apparent. This concerns the so-called NEET category – NEET referring to ‘Young People Not in Education, Employment or Training’. In the first quarter 2014, 975,000 young people aged 16-24, or 13.5 per cent of the total, were NEET – with the highest proportions in the West Midlands, the North West and the North East.

The issues were laid bare in a 2012 House of Commons debate on youth unemployment. Citing findings from the Runnymede Trust, 55 per cent of economically active black men aged 16-24 years were unemployed, as compared to 20 per cent of the White British population in the same category. Furthermore, the figure had almost doubled since 2008. A range of different reasons were cited, including discrimination, attending less prestigious universities and residence in areas characterised by high levels of unemployment (Runnymede Trust 2011).¹² While acknowledging that the unemployment rate among young black men was much higher than for the economically active youth population, the Department for Work and Pensions pointed to characteristics other than ethnicity, such as low educational attainment and location of BME populations in areas characterised by high levels of deprivation. Accordingly, government policy was, at a general level, to mainstream provision and support in this area while also allowing local providers to tailor group-specific interventions if and when necessary – for example by allowing job centres to use Flexible Support Funds. (This policy area fell within the Coalition’s broader emphasis on social mobility, led by the Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg, and therefore cuts across ministerial departments.)

But youth unemployment is also a category that is highly sensitive to economic cycles. So in difficult economic times employers tend to keep hold of experienced staff, with entry level recruitment scaled back. It was thus in response to the challenge of youth unemployment that the Coalition government in November 2011 introduced its ‘Youth Contract Scheme’. With the broad objective of

¹¹ Personal communication.

¹² On discrimination, research by the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) found that if you have an African or Asian sounding surname you need to send approximately twice as many job applications as someone with a traditionally English name to get a job interview. The same research found that public sector employers had a discrimination level of 4% while private sector employers had a discrimination level of 35% (DWP 2009).

making young people more appealing to employers looking to recruit, and explicitly focusing on sustainable employment in the private sector key elements of the Youth Contract, to be rolled out over 3 years, included: 160,000 incentive payments to employers recruiting unemployed 18-24 year-olds; and additional 250,000 work experience places; 20,000 extra apprenticeship grants; more flexible advisor support through local job centres.

Faith schools and the 'balkanisation' of education

In one sense, the British education system has always been structured in a differentialist way – i.e. in a way that recognises and institutionalises differences, approaching different groups through specific and separate policies – in that the school system has been segregated denominationally. Although the state began to fund education from 1833, within two decades 'taxpayers' money was being used not only to support Church of England schools (voluntary schools, as they became known) but Catholic, Wesleyan and Jewish schools as well' (Feldman 2012). Since the 1870 Education Act, the Church of England has controlled most rural elementary schools as well as many urban ones, in the immediate post-WW2 period providing what amounts to a third of all school places, what has been characterised as the '...epitome of low-level mass education' (Jones 2003: 18). The 1902 Education Act, which determined that secular education in these schools would be paid for by the rate-payers, effectively rescued Church of England schools at a time of diminishing denominational affiliation, but extending the same support to Catholic and Jewish schools (Feldman 2012). Historian Feldman names this settlement 'conservative pluralism'.¹³ He argues that 'The implications of this pluralism are doubly conservative, for it not only carries a strategy of governance but also has weighty implications for the communities who are incorporated in this way', by binding them to the authority of hierarchal leadership within faith communities.

The Education Acts of 1902 (Balfour) and 1944 (Butler) redefined the relationship between church and state: 'a measure of independence was exchanged for the comparative security of financial support from the public service' (Brooksbank and Ackstine 1984: 21). By 1997, 25 per cent of English primary schools and 5 per cent of all secondaries were run by faith groups, almost exclusively Church of England or Roman Catholic. But as the Blair government was concerned that a system which gave state funding to thousands of Christian schools, but hardly to any other schools, was inherently discriminatory and not in line with New Labour's commitment to multiculturalism. So in 1998, the first state-funded Muslim schools opened, followed by state-funded Jewish schools and a Sikh school the year after. Having thus demonstrated its commitment to a range of faith groups, the government then announced that it wanted a hundred new Church of England secondary schools opened within five years (Gillard 2007).

This was part of a wider commitment from Blair's government – also seen in neighbourhood policy, where faith-based civil society organisations was heavily empowered and funded to deliver services, especially to migrant and minority groups – to giving the faith sector a major role in civic life.

Overall, the promotion of faith-based schools attracted wide-spread criticism, and the question that remains is whether this stated commitment to multiculturalism actually has resulted in a move towards differentialism. This concern was flagged early in the process, with the Chief Inspector of

¹³ In the typology we are using in the Upstream project, we describe differentialism as a monistic rather than pluralist model, because it maintains groups' separation rather than includes them in a plural society. However, Feldman's 'conservative pluralism' can be defined in essentially the same way.

schools advising that ‘...the growth in faith schools needs to be carefully but sensitively monitored by government to ensure that pupils at all schools receive an understanding of not only their own faith but of other faiths and the wider tenets of British society’ (*The Guardian* 18 January 2005). The trend to faith schools was in many ways at odds with the discourse of community cohesion dominant after 2001 which, as we shall see in Chapter 4, emphasised shared culture and criticised the de facto segregation (‘parallel lives’) created by parallel educational experiences. More recently, Ted Cante, the architect of British cohesion policy, has described the diversification of forms of schooling as the ‘Balkanisation’ of our education system (Cante 2014).

After 2010, the Coalition government intensifying the New Labour policy of extending parental choice by diversifying the forms of educational provision – leading to faith-based Free Schools and an increased number of academies managed by faith-motivated private sector companies. By 2014, around one-third of all state-funded schools were schools ‘with a religious character’ – the legal term for faith schools. Of these, the vast majority were Church of England (71 per cent), and Roman Catholic (27 per cent), with only a very limited number of Muslim, Jewish and Sikh schools.

Again, this has been in parallel to the assertions by Conservative Party politicians (mainly Christian, but also the Muslim Baroness Warsi) that Britain constitutes a *multi-faith* and not a multicultural society: a resurgence of the ‘conservative pluralism’ Feldman identified in the DNA of the British settlement with religious minorities. For example, the *Creating the Conditions* strategy on integration from the Coalition government in 2012 emphasises the role of faith communities as platforms for civic activism (giving the examples of Near Neighbours, a Church Urban Fund project to bring faith groups together; the Faith-Based Regeneration Network; Interfaith Week and faith-based Free Schools); it emphasises faith as a plank in Britain’s common culture; and in articulating the need to reject intolerance it exclusively discusses intolerance of Muslim and Jewish faith groups.

Of more recent prominence, however, has been the perceived infiltration of a number of Birmingham academy schools by religiously conservative Muslims, in media coverage and popular discourse referred to as ‘The Trojan horse affair’. The first report into the ‘scandal’ has uncovered evidence of ‘co-ordinated and sustained action to introduce an intolerant and aggressive Islamic ethos into some Birmingham schools’, including, for example, stricter gender segregation and enforcement of modes dress codes. The government response to this has been to step back from the differentialism implicit in the multi-faith model, and instead call for a reassertion – through the curriculum of ‘British values’. This reassertion of ‘British values’ marks the high tide mark of a trend which has paralleled the previously described policy frames: a trend from polycentric to centric approaches to the design of the curriculum, embodied in the National Curriculum implemented under the previous Conservative government in 1988. This trend has intensified under the Coalition, and especially under Education minister Michael Gove, who has consistently emphasised the need to teach a common ‘island history’ and British rather than international literature, marking a return to assimilation.

3.2 Education in Bristol

3.2.1 Policy background

Overall, the BME population made up 16.2 per cent of the population in Bristol in 2011 – with ‘White other’ (in particular Polish migrants) constituting another 6.1 per cent. This is a doubling since 2001, and in particular the period 2004-09 saw very high numbers of new migrants – with 24,390 migrants arriving, as compared to 8,885 in the period 1991-2000¹⁴. The change in particular reflects large growing Somali and Polish populations in Bristol. The period 2001-11 saw an increase in the concentration of the BME population in inner-city Bristol (exceeding 60 per cent in several super output areas), and an extension of the BME population towards the north east of the city.

Table 4: Bristol school population by ethnicity (percentages)

	2007	2012
White British	75.4	68.0
White Other	3.3	4.2
Black Somali	2.9	4.9
Black African	1.3	1.7
Black Caribbean	2.2	2.2
Pakistani	2.7	3.1
Indian	1.7	2.1
Mixed	6.4	7.7
Others	4.1	6.1
Total	100.0	100.0

Source: School census 2012, in Bent et al 2012.

In 2005, BME and immigrant populations made up 21.6 per cent of the pupil population in Bristol. But in 2012, these groups made up one third of all learners. The geographical distribution has changed as well. Where a report in 2005 referred to a distinction between ‘white’ and ‘BME’ schools (Comedia 2005), and a concern of a 2009 report was the degree of pupil segregation by ethnicity (ICOCO 2009), 2012 figures indicated how schools across the city had become much more ethnically diverse and ‘multicultural’, with school census figures indicating how long-established minorities – like Black Caribbeans and Pakistanis – were characterised by less clustered residential geographies.

The flip side of this demographic shift is that a small number of schools have become dominated by a single BME group. Furthermore, the inner-city schools where the BME proportion has been consistently high are also the ones first affected by new in-flows – previous years saw an influx of Roma pupils and, most recently, Syrian refugees. There is also considerable socio-economic diversity within the BME population, with 60 per cent of Somali pupils FSM eligible, as opposed to 7 per cent of pupils of Indian heritage. Significant across ethnicity was, however, a correlation between FSM status and low educational attainment (Bent et al 2012: 6).

In terms of the standard of educational provision, Bristol schools went through what was characterised as ‘bruising times’ in the early 2000s. Maintained schools were not doing well, and

¹⁴ This refers to the number arriving in UK 2004-09 and living in Bristol on the day of the census.

many, in particular secondary schools, were forced to become academies. More recently, the Free School policy has opened up for yet another parallel strand of educational provision, with a total of four Free Schools in Bristol in 2014.

In terms of the structures for the management of educational provision, Bristol City constitutes a Local Educational Authority (LEA) in its own right, with the advantage of continuous liaising with other BCC departments¹⁵. But over the past years, one of the challenges to the position of the Local Educational Authority (LEA) has been the proliferation of alternative forms of educational provision, first and foremost the growth of academies. Out of a total 150 primary and secondary schools, one third is academies. In reality, the majority of secondary schools have converted into academies, while two thirds of all primary schools still are LEA maintained. Whereas academies are accountable to the Department for Education, and thus outside LEA control, LEAs nevertheless still have statutory safe-guarding duties,

3.2.2 Policy content and analysis

Central to the nature of, and control over, educational provisions for EAL pupils has been the streamlining of the Ethnic Minority Achievement Grant into Dedicated Schools Grant in 2011, providing the governing bodies of schools with more decision-making power. This, together with general budget cuts, has resulted in a scaling down of LEA services, with more emphasis on statutory duties. But the Bristol LEA still operates an EAL unit, as this service is requested, and resourced, by local maintained schools. Accordingly, funding provided directly to schools is being de-delegated to the LEA. Separate from this, academies can purchase EAL services from the LEA.

While there is thus an established demand for EAL provision, the nature of such provision is part of an ongoing dialogue over the overall structure of future educational provision in Bristol. With the school 'landscape' undergoing significant changes over the past decade, it has been an LEA priority to 'rally everyone around a table' and build a coalition around 'Bristol issues for Bristol children'¹⁶. The ambition is not for Bristol LEA to lead the development, but rather to re-design services in a manner that recognises the strengths of individual schools. Schools can be recognised as 'teaching schools' and thus lead in different areas, with other schools purchasing their services.

In addition to these broader structural developments, a number of initiatives are in place that addresses specific issues. These include:

- The Avon Consortium Traveller Education Service, first established in 1987, and helping schools to engage with Roma pupils, parents and the wider Roma community. The support is provided through a consortium of local authorities – Bristol, South Gloucestershire, North Somerset, Bath and North East Somerset.
- *Support Against Racist Incidents* (SARI) is a community based service commissioned by BCC to provide assistance and guidance to schools.

¹⁵ Interview #9, BCC Service Director, Education & Skills, 23.07.2014.

¹⁶ Interview #9, BCC Service Director, Education & Skills, 23.07.2014

ESOL provision

The provision of ESOL services have, over a number of years, been based on an understanding of English proficiency as closely related to other policy areas, with interventions underpinned financially by a successful bid for Migration Impact Funding:

- **Community Cohesion:** adults who are isolated in their communities and who are not able to access information, advice and services, including newly arrived asylum seekers and refugees ; people affected by racist abuse/crime; offenders; people with mental health difficulties
- **Employability:** adults and young people who want to work, or who want to progress in work, but who face language and other barriers, including discrimination and lack of recognition of previous qualifications and skills
- **Parenting Support:** parents/carers who do not use English as their first language whose children are at risk of poor outcomes, particularly in relation to achievement and health

With the Migrant Impact Funding coming to an end in 2011, and in recognition of cuts to government funding to ESOL, the BCC scrutiny commission recommended that BCC should make a formal declaration recognising that ‘...access to language skills is a fundamental right and an essential means of participation in community life for all residents of Bristol, including those with temporary status’ (BCC 2012). The commission proposed a *Language for rights* framework, recognising ESOL and literacy as key components in accessing rights and responsibilities of citizenship, and emphasizing their relationship with child poverty, community cohesion and social cohesion. Within this framework, a range of ‘language for rights’ activities were developed. These included: Informal, community based ESOL programmes; ESOL volunteer programmes – volunteer tutors, champions and mentors; migrant worker support programmes.

3.3 Education in Southwark

The London Borough of Southwark (LBS) constitutes a Local Educational Authority (LEA) in its own right, and the Southwark Children’s & Adults’ Services thus constitutes the intermediate body, between the Ministry for Education and the maintained local schools.

There are a total of 71 primary schools (Reception to Year 6) and 18 secondary schools (Year 7 to Year 11) in Southwark. Of these, three primary schools and the majority of secondary schools are academies, thus cooperating less closely with the LEA.

3.3.1 Policy background

It is a reflection of Southwark’s significance as a long-term immigrant destination point that diversity can be described as mainstream. As mentioned previously, the White British proportion of the total population of Southwark has dropped significantly in the period 2001-11. But whereas the total number of Reception Age children in all major ethnic groups increased in the period 2010-13, the proportion of White British reception age children is only just over half the Southwark total.

Table 5 Reception age children 2013, by ethnicity (percentages)

	Reception age children (aged 4-5)	Southwark total
White British	21.5	39.7
White Other	9.3	14.6
Mixed	10.2	6.2
Asian or Asian British	7.8	9.5
Black or Black British	45.8	26.8
Others	5.4	3.2
Total	100.0	100.0

Source: Southwark 2013

But the major ethnic groups only constitute a poor indicator of the scope of diversity in Southwark schools. Whereas Southwark's BME population up to 20-30 years ago was dominated by 3-4 main groups, with Black Caribbeans as the largest one, the picture of today is very different, with Black Africans as the biggest ethnic category – and Nigerians as by far the biggest country of origin, constituting 11.8% of the total pupil population for this cohort. For the same year group, a total of 128 languages were recorded (Southwark 2013). Whereas 58.4% gave 'English' as the main home language spoken, only 10 of the languages were spoken by more than 1% of the pupil population. It is worth pointing out that the proportion of pupils giving 'English' as the main home language – including many of Caribbean, West African background or from long-settled BME backgrounds – is far larger than the White British proportion of the pupil population. There is, accordingly, no straightforward correlation between ethnicity and language proficiency.

But Southwark's pupil population is increasing both in diversity and size, with the number of Reception Age children increasing by 19.9% in the period 2010-13. In that sense it was argued that the stereotype had been turned upside down. In the past, BME status was seen to equate social deprivation. But a much more nuanced overall picture has emerged, with immigrant populations often well-resourced and interested in the schooling of their children¹⁷. Similar to findings from other parts of the country, it is in particular white working class boys who are falling behind in terms of educational attainment.

In summary, education is, in the broader Southwark context, a policy area where diversity is a characteristic of the mainstream rather than a set of exceptional circumstances. Similarly, the demands of EAL students are not seen as detrimental to educational attainment, as observed by a policy official:

'I don't believe now that the schools will say to you "oh well, 75 per cent of my population have come from overseas, this is the reason why we are not achieving very well". You wouldn't hear that in a Southwark school. But years ago, you know, you probably would have done, it would be an indicator that the school was going to be in challenging circumstances, but not now, because it is the norm in Southwark'¹⁸.

¹⁷ A recent study found that 51% of Nigerians in Southwark (sample size 208) are educated to university level (Pharaoh and Hopwood 2013).

¹⁸ Interview #6, LBS Head of Early Help Services, 15.07.2014.

Among LBS policy officials the feeling was that ‘this diversity has had a positive impact on educational standards. So the fact that there are so many children in schools, for whom English is a second language, is by no means a negative influence on learning and standards. In fact, it is a positive’¹⁹.

3.3.2 Policy content and analysis

The education policies implemented in Southwark should be understood within the broader context of education in inner-city schools, and LSB policy makers pointed to the *Excellence in Cities* initiative as a turning point for educational provision in state-maintained schools in the borough²⁰. With attainment dropping in the 1990s, the *Excellence in Cities* (EiC) initiative was introduced in 1999 in order to improve educational achievement and promote social inclusion in disadvantaged areas²¹. It was thus one of the measures set out in the new Labour government’s 1997 white paper, *Excellence in Schools*, and it built on the lessons learnt from an earlier Education Action Zone programme, with its three strands concentrating on defined areas of need: The learning mentor strand deals with social exclusion; the gifted and talented strand targeting underachievement; and primary learning support units support pupils with behavioural problems. Overall, as the policy document argues, the programme ‘...starts with the needs of the individual child and the challenges they face’²². Though the BME group constituted 46.7 per cent of the total pupil population in EiC schools (as opposed to a national average of 17.8 per cent), EiC emerged as an initiative within the social inclusion policy umbrella, without particular policy emphasis on BME/EAL students.

The measurable impact of EiC first only emerged slowly in Southwark. In 2006, LSB was 143rd of 150 LEAs at the Key Stage 2 (the end of primary school), but the borough had climbed to 88th in 2008, and by 2014 LSB was above the national average – a success story, but also a development similar to other inner London boroughs where educational attainment standards have more rapidly than in other parts of the country.

In terms of the structure of EAL provision, the role of Southwark’s LEA has changed significantly since the mainstreaming of the Ethnic Minority Achievement Grant (EMAG) in 2009. Up to then, LBS operated an Ethnic Minority Achievement Unit as part of its Children’s Services Department Management Team, with the remit to support primary and secondary schools in the borough. With EMAG financial resources since 2009 managed directly by the governing bodies of the local schools, the LEA key responsibilities relate to its statutory safe-guarding and oversight obligations. For this purpose, a number of units had been put in place, some of them operating through neighbourhood based teams – but, according to the Head of Early Help Service, ‘...our services are not put in according to where people come from’.²³

¹⁹ Interview #6, LBS Head of Early Help Services, 15.07.2014.

²⁰ Interview #6. LBS Head of Early Help Services, 15.07.2014.

²¹ EiC was launched in 1999 as a three-year programme involving 25 local education authorities (LEAs) and 438 secondary schools. Funding was expanded subsequent years, to a total of 1,159 primary schools, with the allocation of funding based proportion of pupils eligible for FSM (Ofsted 2004: 4-5).

²² Ofsted 2004, <http://www.ofsted.gov.uk/resources/excellence-cities-primary-extension-real-stories>

²³ Interview #6. LBS Head of Early Help Services, 15.07.2014.

The view from outside the Southwark LEA was that the local authority managed its role well. There was an effective system of support to schools and head teachers, as well as good systems for the sharing of information and networking among LEA schools²⁴. But it is also a structure contained very much within LBS administrative borders, with limited policy coordination and cooperation with neighbouring boroughs.

There overall impression at policy level was that local schools generally were well-resourced. As the government funding allocated to schools is based on a headcount at each school, an increase in pupil population translates directly into additional, school-specific funding. Accordingly, incoming immigrant children were thus contributing to high funding levels, as pointed out by LEA policy officers: ‘Even though people sometimes talk about immigrants as a burden on public services, these families actually keep the schools viable’²⁵. In addition, pupils eligible for FSM releases pupil premium, in 2014 approx. £2,600 per pupil. In 2012, 29 per cent of LSB primary school pupils qualified for FSM, compared to 32 per cent in 2008²⁶.

The text box below provides an example of the specifics of an intervention at a LSB primary school experiencing a recent influx of Romanian children. Whereas the emphasis on the inclusion of the child in mainstream learning processes reflects the broader policy priorities, there is still scope and resources for interventions that address the needs and opportunities of the individual child.

Text Box Provisions for newly arrived Romanian pupils at Peter Hills Primary School, Southwark

- Contact with the previous school in Romania in order to get an idea of educational history of the child
- Provision of peer buddy of Romanian origin
- Family member who is fluent English speaker invited to attend school for limited time period during settling period
- Additional English home work provided
- Computer package translating from Romanian into English
- In the long term, provision of Romanian-speaking teaching assistant to support language development

²⁴ #4.Southwark head teacher’s association, 26.06.2014.

²⁵ #6 LBS Head of Early Help Services, 15.07.2014.

²⁶ As one of the first local authorities, LBS had in 2011 opted to provide FSM for all children in Early Years. By tracking the National Insurance numbers of parents, the LEA was still able to determine which children were eligible for pupil premium.

3.4 Conclusions

We can summarise the processes relating to the mainstreaming and non-mainstreaming of education policy as follows. There have been five main policy frames in post-war Britain affecting integration in the field of education.

1. The 'conservative pluralist' educational infrastructure into which post-war migrants were inserted nevertheless assumed a monocultural understanding of Britishness and assimilation was the de facto norm. Here, migration itself, and the perceived alien cultures of immigrants, are defined as social problems.
2. In the 1960s, Roy Jenkins articulated a turn to integration. This policy frame was precipitated by 'race riot' incidents in the late 1950s. Here, it was unequal opportunities and discrimination experienced by migrants and minorities that was perceived to be a problem, but also 'race relations'.
3. A multiculturalist policy frame subsequently tentatively emerged, most fully articulated in the 1985, and although this was discursively rejected at the national level after 2001 its ideas linger on in local practices. This frame unfolded against the backdrop of incidents of urban unrest, with a 1977 report laying bare major educational acting as a key decision point. Here, increasingly unequal outcomes were the social problems policies needed to address.
4. After 2001, precipitated by incidents of urban unrest in the North of England, there was a turn to a cohesion policy frame, including elements of differentialist (multi-faith), interculturalist (common spaces) and assimilationist (British values) approaches. Key actors included prime minister Tony Blair, ministers John Denham and David Blunkett, as well as the authors (including Bernard Crick, Ted Cattle and the Commission on Integration and Cohesion). Here, a lack of cohesion (parallel lives) was the problem defined.
5. After 2010, localism and social mobility have become key policy frames, with differentialist and assimilationist approaches alternately emphasised within this. The key decision moment here was the 2010 election, and the ideological change in its wake. Key actors included prime minister David Cameron, Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg and ministers Michael Gove and Sayeeda Warsi. Here, those unwilling or unable to integrate, including particular minority groups who do not share 'British values', who are seen as the problem.

Chapter 4 Social cohesion thematic analysis

4.1 National case

4.1.1 Policy background

Social cohesion policy in the UK both reflects and departs from a wider European agenda. When the Council of Europe adopted Recommendation 1355 ('Fighting against social exclusion and strengthening social cohesion'), the promotion of cohesion as a rights-based objective was not supported in UK policy-making²⁷. Here, rather than *social* cohesion, *community* cohesion has been promoted as a process of developing social relationships, community bonds and a 'common stake in British society' (Home Office 2005: 43).

It is important to note that whereas community cohesion and social cohesion share some explanatory territory, community cohesion has been characterised as a 'culturally based' integration process, with the onus placed on the excluded to join in. It has been suggested that while the concept of 'community' is highly ambiguous, talking about 'communities' allows for language to become deracialised. In contrast, more recent conceptualisations of social cohesion acknowledge the presence of intra- as well as inter-community divisions, based on, for example, gender and generation, and it concerns this ongoing negotiation of difference: 'Many people have an understanding that pluralism necessarily entails conflict and that the goal sought is agreed means of resolving conflict rather than a mythical harmony based on common values. Social cohesion, in other words, is not about avoiding conflict; it is about resolving conflict' (Hickman et al 2012: 13).

Whereas community cohesion constitutes a well-defined policy agenda, social cohesion is, in a British context, more of an 'umbrella', comprising community cohesion policies as well as a range of civic engagement and inclusion policies. In their summary of the discussions of integration and cohesion, Saggat et al argue that a 'race relations' model is no longer appropriate: 'Instead, there are a number of policy measures that might be bundled together, such as the expansion of human rights and equalities legislation; a formal refugee integration strategy; community cohesion strategy (2001-2010); elements of counter terrorism strategy post-2005; citizenship policy and legislation; and additional funding programmed for minorities' (Saggat et al 2012: 17). Furthermore, and reiterating the previously mentioned local framing of social problems, cohesion is also a concern for local authorities who define the term according to local concerns and challenges.

4.1.2 Policy content and analysis

In their review of UK social cohesion developments, Zetter et al (2006) identify two central issues. One concerns the perception that new trends in migration may challenge notions of a cohesive 'national identity'. This relates to the challenge of both accepting and celebrating differences while at the same time helping different faiths, cultures and ethnicities build on shared goals rather than focusing on differences. In their analysis of cohesion policies of the early 2000s, with particular reference to citizenship and integration programmes, Zetter et al argue that cohesion policy has

²⁷ See Zetter et al (2006) for a more detailed analysis.

been mainstreamed ‘...firmly in the direction of inclusivity and assimilation as the instruments of social cohesion for new (and indeed settled) migrant communities’ (Zetter et al 2006: 5). The other issue concerns the framing of social cohesion in material terms – through factors such as income differentials, employment opportunities, and housing conditions. This direction was, in particular, pursued by the previous Labour government, through their social inclusion agenda, with a strong focus on geographically targeted, needs-based policy initiatives (see below).

Area-based policies

Rather than a ‘replacement strategy’, with group-based policies replaced by needs or area-based policies, area-based policies would seem to belong to governmental technologies described in the mid-1990s as ‘government through community’ (Rose 1996). Based on a framing of neighbourhood as community, community became, in the 1990s, a new spatialization of government. Accordingly, the design of urban renewal programmes that ‘attempt to ‘empower’ the *inhabitants* of particular inner-city locales by constituting those who reside in a certain locality as ‘a’ community’, subjected to community development plans, managed by community workers, policed by community police (Rose 1996: 336).

This place-based focus became part of the social inclusion policy agenda pursued by New Labour from 1997. This led to the creation of nation-wide anti-poverty programmes that combined thematic and geographical targeting, and articulated in the action plan ‘New Commitment to Neighbourhood Renewal’ (Cabinet Office 2001). With the aim of ‘...creating a society where no-one is disadvantaged by where they live’ (ibid: 63), the vision of the strategy was reflected in two long-term goals: In all poorest neighbourhoods, to have common goals of lower worklessness and crime, and better health, skills, housing and physical environment; to lower the gap on these measures between the most deprived neighbourhoods and the rest of the country’ (ibid: 8). Policy initiatives included Sure Start programmes (focusing on child poverty), Health Action Zones, and Education Action Zones, as well as a National Strategy for Neighbourhood Renewal²⁸, as well as the Excellence in Cities programme already discussed. The indicative 2001-02 Neighbourhood Renewal Fund (NRF) allocations for Bristol and Southwark were respectively 0.891£m and 1.978£m. With Southwark’s population significantly smaller than Bristol’s, this also serves as an indication of more prevalent pockets of deprivation in Southwark.

Though not in any way made explicit, these measures would target BME populations and immigrants disproportionately, as BME populations in England were more likely to live in deprived areas than the White British population (JRF 2013). The only specific reference to BME and immigrants populations was, however, the commitment that made it a clear responsibility of newly formed neighbourhood renewal units to ensure that neighbourhood renewal benefits ethnic minorities (Cabinet Office 2001: 66)

Big Society

The Big Society was, in particular in the first years of the 2010 Coalition government, part of a localism agenda that indicated a shrinking state and an empowerment of civil society to deliver

²⁸ Since 2000, a multiple deprivation index has been used to identify the most deprived areas. The criteria used are: Income; employment; health; education; housing; access; child poverty. In order to target as precisely as possible, England has since 2007 been mapped into ‘super output areas’ (of up to 3,000 inhabitants, but mostly much smaller) in order to identify pockets of deprivation more precisely.

services at the local level²⁹. Though not clearly defined and not embodied in legislation, the Big Society philosophy can be traced in other policy areas, most notably ‘Creating the conditions for integration’. But as the launch of the Big Society philosophy has coincided with austerity measures, many civil society organisations, that ideally would be carrying the Big Society banner, have found themselves struggling with new funding regimes. The dilemmas around the Big Society agenda were highlighted by the director of Bede House, a Southwark NGO:

‘I think the idea of a big society is absolutely right and lets never lose sight of that [...] we’ve got a right and a duty in terms of the community that’s around us, and one of the ethos principles behind Bede is that we believe everybody has something to offer as well as something to receive from being part of community however we might define that [...] a lot of people have perceived the Big Society rhetoric in the context of the cuts that are happening and the impact that has on peoples’ ability to earn a living and sadly it is a discredited term but still a valuable one to allow us to talk about what’s important in terms of a strong community’.³⁰

Cohesion by group measures

With cohesion not easily defined, cohesion policies that target specific groups are, accordingly, not easy to pin down as such either. Furthermore, policies targeting groups may seem antithetical to the generic mainstreaming that is a characteristic of area-based programmes. Likewise, relevant categories can be defined extremely differently – for example according to age, religion, immigrant status. There is here a distinction to be made between cohesion as a specific target and the implicit cohesion that may be an outcome of group-based targeting.

An example of targeted works with an explicit cohesion goal would be a series of faith-based programmes from 1997. Not unlike its approach to faith schools described above, the 1997 Labour government had already moved towards a much more pro-active role when evaluating its relationship with faith communities. Referring to previous developments as ‘piecemeal’, a 2004 report encouraged a constructive approach towards dialogue with faith communities at all levels of government, in particular policy areas such as urban regeneration, tackling exclusion and encouraging community cohesion and integration. This was put into practice in 2005 in *Improving opportunity; strengthening society*, the government’s strategy on race equality and community cohesion. In order to underpin initiatives, the Faith Communities Capacity Building Fund was launched the same year. Whereas an evaluation of Round 1 of the funding programme acknowledged the overlaps between the government and the faith sector in areas of key values, including a shared commitment to community participation, the evaluation also highlighted the perception commonly held in the faith sector, ‘...that it was engaged with in a tokenistic and top-down way by the government’ (Fentener et al 2008: 8).

Similar, but less specifically faith-based initiatives were framed through the *Near Neighbours* programme, implemented with the ‘Church Urban Fund’ in 2010, and aiming to develop positive relationships in multi-faith areas, and encourage people of different faiths and no faiths to come

²⁹ Gov.uk (2010) *Building the Big Society*, Cabinet Office policy paper <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/building-the-big-society> (accessed 13.05.2014)

³⁰ Interview carried out 07.06.2013 as part of the EUMIA research project, see Jensen 2014.

together for initiatives that improve their local neighbourhood. The project-based initiative, with up to £5000 available per project, entered its second stage in early 2014, with an additional allocation of £3million³¹. These initiatives, broadly continuous between Labour and Coalition governments, have been interculturalist in their intent, informed by contact theory, but remain under a differentialist shadow in maintaining people in discrete faith groups.

Post-2001, with the promotion of stronger local bonds and values increasingly replacing multiculturalism and equality as the main focus of cohesion discourse, local authorities were, as a rule, required to avoid group-specific funding, with the latter requiring specific evidence-based justification. The cohesion agenda unfolding in this period explicitly rejected multiculturalism in favour of an interculturalist approach.

But the 2005 ‘London bombings’, carried out by what has been referred to as ‘home-grown’ Muslim youth, led to an entanglement of cohesion with policies around homeland security and counter-terrorism, leading to the stigmatisation of certain groups. The ‘Preventing Violent Extremism’ Programme was one of four planks of the ‘Contest’ agenda on terrorism, emerging as a response to the 2005 London bombings, with counter-radicalisation among Muslim youths as a concrete goal. Initially led by DCLG, funds were allocated to local authorities with significant Muslim populations. But critics of the programme argued that it blurred the line between, on one hand, integration and cohesion and, on the other, surveillance measures, and this served to stigmatise Muslim communities, generating an atmosphere of distrust and disengagement, reproducing some of segregationist implications of earlier multiculturalism. In 2011, the government refocused the policy. Now led by the Home Office, this involved a widening of the scope to include ‘all forms of terrorism, including far right extremism and some aspects of non-violent extremism’, and with the flexibility to ‘prioritise our work according to the risks we face’ (Home Office 2011).

In contrast, an example of group-focused work where cohesion is an implicit outcome rather than explicit goal may be the emergence of youth as a central focus of the flagship social mobility strategy, *Opening doors, breaking down barriers*. Initially launched as part of the Big Society agenda, the National Citizenship Service was introduced in order to ‘...give 16 year olds a chance to develop the skills needed to become active and responsible citizens, mix with people from different backgrounds, and start getting involved in their communities’ (HM Government 2010). The three week programme, offered in cooperation with local service providers, was first piloted in the summer 2011, with approximately 8,500 participants, and in the summer and autumn 2012, with 26,003 participants. Following a positive evaluation, the plan was to scale up to 90,000 participants in 2014³². This kind of approach can again be seen as an example of interculturalism, although the Coalition’s preference for working with traditionally monocultural mainstream providers such as Scouts, the military and church groups sometimes gives it a more assimilationist accent. It can also be seen as a polycentric approach, with a diversification of provision away from the state.

Given the range of different approaches which have co-existed, then, it is hard to sustain a coherent narrative around the policy frames governing the cohesion field.

³¹ <https://www.gov.uk/government/news/multi-faith-communities-to-benefit-from-new-3-million-grant>

³² NatCen Social Research 2013.

4.2 Social cohesion in Bristol

Similar to the broader, national level, policy initiatives within the cohesion realm were event-led in Bristol. In response to the 2003 summer disturbances in the Barton Hill area, a Race Equality and Community Cohesion Plan was developed in order to tackle tensions caused by rapid local population change, more precisely a growing Somali population in a predominantly white working class neighbourhood. This led to the development of two sets of community cohesion strategies (2006-09 and 2010-13), identifying key priorities and action plans. The 2010 Community Cohesion Action Plan took stock of existing actions which largely consisted of initiatives specifically targeting immigrant and BME communities. The priorities identified in the Action Plan involved a mainstreaming review of community cohesion across Bristol City Council as well as the development and delivery of cultural competence training across the city (BCC 2009: 16). Significantly, it was largely a view of cohesion as a package of initiatives largely targeting immigrants and BME communities, with limited focus on the majority population. This is, however, a perspective that has shifted significantly in the intervening years, with several interviewees pointing to the need to engage much more with the white working class population.

A related issue is the access to housing in Bristol. With the social housing stock decreasing from 50,000 to 28,000, and 13,000 on the waiting lists in mid-2014, there was a consistently high demand for social housing. Though not addressed in the community cohesion strategy, the access to social housing constitutes a key area of tension, with BCC housing officers attempting to contain a white backlash in certain neighbourhoods against perceived prioritisation of certain minority groups.

Central to an understanding of cohesion measures in Bristol is the relationship between Bristol City Council, local neighbourhoods, and a broad range of civil society organisations. A 2006 study on inter-cultural relations in Bristol concluded that whereas the city was characterised by strong neighbourhoods and a vibrant activist environment, the local government authority did not appear to be playing a role of leading on a strategic agenda for the identity and future of the city (Comedia 2006: 11). While this was a characteristic recognised by a number of interviewees, it was also noted that it very much contrasts the present situation, with BCC taking a leading role in the re-development of the city's vision and objectives, as well as a comprehensive re-structuring of service delivery, which takes place against the background of significant austerity measures.

The driver behind this process was the 2012 election in 2012 of Bristol's first elected mayor, George Ferguson. An independent candidate, Ferguson was not constrained by party politics, and he moved on to lead the work to identify policy priorities and redesign the relationship between local government authorities and the public. Important here is the synergy between elected democracy and participative democracy, and it is a priority to make policy making more transparent by bringing decisions closer to those they involve and impact and, in doing so, bring community information to the heart of design and delivery of public services. It was pointed out that whereas there was much

local influence *in theory*, i.e. ‘local people know best’. In reality, the experience had been that ‘...local people know best – they select me (the councillor), and then I make all the decisions’³³.

Central to the emerging corporate plan (2014-17) are initiatives to address inequality and sustain prosperity (BCC 2014), with the policy development informed by public consultations and partnerships with civil society organisations, businesses and local universities. In terms of integration measures, the corporate plan can be characterised as a generic mainstream approach, emphasizing ‘inequalities of health, wealth and opportunity’, and foregrounding the treatment of vulnerable groups as the ‘acid test’ of the plan, but without any direct reference to population groups identified on the basis of race, ethnicity or immigrant status.

Neighbourhood initiatives and structures for civic engagement

As mentioned previously, BCC was one of 88 most deprived local authority areas targeted under the National Strategy Action Plan for neighbourhood renewal, developed by the Labour Government in 2001 (Cabinet Office 2001). In the summary of good practices, the Easton area of Bristol was highlighted as a good example of addressing social, economic and environmental problems. Here the refurbishment of houses and the development of a community safety partnership, combined with improved shopping areas and improvement to road safety, were seen as contributing to higher levels of local pride and improved safety in the area (ibid: 108).

In order to target neighbourhood renewal funds, a Bristol Neighbourhood Action Plan was developed, covering the period 2001-08 and aiming to promote social and economic inclusion in five of the most disadvantaged communities in Bristol, and operating with a total investment package of £30 mill, of which £10.6mill. were EU structural funds. Similarly Barton Hill, the scene of the 2003 disturbances, has been targeted through long-term, multi-agency community development, involving a new lettings policy as well as cooperation with the local primary school and a Somali resource centre, thus – in the words of the BCC Service Manager for Housing Solutions – becoming a success story where ‘... it is not about leaving anyone behind, but lifting up the entire area’³⁴.

Neighbourhood partnerships: Since 2008, the city of Bristol has been divided into a total of 14 neighbourhood partnerships, developed by local government authorities. A neighbourhood partnership, constituted by local residents and associations as well as locally elected councillors, meets approximately four times per year. The neighbourhood partnerships remain a central part of the BCC corporate model: ‘Neighbourhood Partnerships have established their position within the local democratic framework by delivering locally driven projects and co-ordinating resident influence and engagement across the city’ (BCC2014a). In order to bolster the standing of the partnerships, various grant-funding opportunities are also made available. As part of the restructuring, however, a number of area managers have been appointed, each responsible for 3-4 partnerships. Another recent addition is a city-wide community development team, which is meant to be mobile and move into situations of crisis/tensions.

³³ Interview #8, BCC service director, neighbourhoods, 23.07.2014.

³⁴ Interview #17, BCC Housing Solutions Service Manager, 31.07.2014.

Neighbourhood Forums constitute a less formalised, more local organisational body, operating at ward level, with a more community-based agenda. The issues raised at neighbourhood forum meetings subsequently feed into the agenda of local Neighbourhood Partnerships.

‘Bristol City of Sanctuary’: With inspiration from Sheffield, where the first UK City of Sanctuary was established in 2007, the first meeting took place in Bristol in 2008, spearheaded by the Refugee Week Steering Committee. In 2011 BCC voted to give its support to the City of Sanctuary movement in Bristol in a statement, in which the council ‘...recognises the contribution of asylum seekers and refugees to the city of Bristol and is committed to welcoming and including them in our activities’ (BCC 2010). This involves the development of positive relationships in the workplace, schools and wider community in order to help tackle discrimination. More recently, Bristol became the second city in the UK (after Glasgow) to take a stand against asylum destitution. In January 2014, BCC passed a motion condemning the UK border agency’s policy of forcing asylum seekers into destitution.

‘Integrate Bristol’ is a grass-root, issue-led charity established in 2009. With a broad mandate to facilitate integration and participation of refugees, immigrants and minority groups in Bristol, the impetus behind the movement was, first and foremost, the taboos surrounding female genital mutilation (FGM), in particular in relation to the Somali population in Bristol. The initiative was designed in 2005 by local teachers and Somali students in response to apathy and inaction among educational and health providers in Bristol, the campaign has grown into an NGO, ‘Integrate Bristol’. The campaign gained considerable global recognition and national strength, winning the support of the then education secretary Michael Gove who met demands to write to all teachers in England and Wales in order to raise awareness about FGM.³⁵

4.3. Social cohesion in the London Borough of Southwark

4.3.1 Policy background

The textbox below lists the 10 ‘Fairer future promises’ that were approved by the newly constituted LBS cabinet in July 2014. Significant here is the emphasis is on improvement of mainstream material circumstances of residents in the borough, based on a broad assessment of needs in relation to, for example, housing or education. There are here interesting similarities between the priorities of the (then Labour-led) LBS Cabinet and the social inclusion agenda promoted at national level by previous Labour governments, with significant emphasis on a improvement of mainstream services, targeting age-defined categories³⁶.

#	Content
1	Value for money: Continued low council tax by delivering value for money
2	Free swimming and gyms: free swimming and gyms for all residents
3	Quality affordable homes: improvement of housing standards and the building of new council homes

³⁵ The Guardian 2014.

³⁶ Though it can be argued that these overlay ethnic categories, ie. a high proportion of the elderly population is white, while BME population constitutes a significant proportion of the young proportion in the borough.

4	More and better schools: More primary and secondary school places, improved educational standards
5	Nurseries and child care: Investments in children's centres, opening of two new community nurseries
6	A greener borough: More than 95% of waste diverted away from landfill, doubling estates receiving green energy
7	Safer communities: Increased CCTV, more estate security doors, a Women's Safety Centre.
8	Education, employment and training: Education, employment or training for every school leaver, support to 5,000 more local people into jobs, 2,000 new apprenticeships.
9	Revitalised neighbourhoods: Regeneration of Elephant and Castle, Aylesbury, and Old Kent Road
10	Age friendly borough: Delivery of ethical care charter and old people's centre of excellence.

Source: Southwark council 2014.

But it is also a list that reflects the needs of borough still characterised by pockets of deprivation as well as high levels of inequality. This was highlighted in a series of consultations taking place in Southwark after the August 2013 'riots'. Here, a number of key issues were identified: Wider societal problems, in particular young people feeling increasingly marginalised and disempowered; a lack of personal responsibility as those involved believed that there would be no negative consequences; in addition, the general state of the economy increased the likelihood of disorder. But there was, significantly, only very limited inclination among respondents to categorise the disturbance as a race issue (Southwark Council 2012).

Significant here is also the, with the provision of housing historically at the top of the LBS political agenda – LBS being historically the biggest social housing landlord in Britain. This close association between social cohesion and housing is also reflected in the LBS organisational structure where neighbourhood management is integrated in the Community Engagement Division, which in turn is part of Housing and Community Services. The bulk of neighbourhood engagement is carried out by designated Tenants and Residents Organisation Officers.

Neighbourhood renewal and structures for civic engagement

The notion of revitalised neighbourhoods constitutes a significant shift away from the neighbourhood renewal agenda that was prominent a few years ago. In 2010, 33 per cent of all LBS super output areas fell within the category of the 20% most deprived nation-wide. This was a marked improvement from 48 per cent in 2007, and the borough also compared it standing in comparison to other London boroughs, moving from the 6th most deprived borough in 2004 to 12th in 2010³⁷.

From the late 1990s onwards, a number of neighbourhood renewal projects were carried out in parts of the borough, mostly under Commitment to Neighbourhood Renewal action plan presented previously. An example is the Bellenden Renewal Scheme in Peckham, central Southwark, a 10 year scheme which targeted a total of £12.42mill towards housing, environmental and social concerns in the area (Southwark Council 2005). The South Bermondsey Partnership (see text box) provides an example of how a nation-wide policy initiative has been framed locally and, over a 10 year period,

³⁷ Southwark Council 2010.

turned into a partnership. Significant is here the manner in which the role of the local authority has shifted from key implementing partner in the South Bermondsey Partnership to a largely advisory role in relation to the new partnership and the implementation of the Big Local.

Community councils: Community councils emerged in 2003 as a result of the devolution of LBS authority into a total of 8 community council areas. The councils are propagated as part of the decision-making process in the borough, with approximately eight annual community council meetings constituting a platform for civic engagement and consultation. All meetings are attended by the locally elected ward councillors as well as relevant LBS officers. A designated community council officer organises the event and coordinates with local organisations in order to identify relevant themes for discussion. But whereas the meetings are open to the public, the profile of participants does not reflect the local areas, and meetings are typically characterised by a ‘diversity deficit’ – as recognised by the community council officer in Bermondsey:

‘That is a big issue. We are not reaching them (ethnic minorities) as much as we should. But we are making lots of efforts, so by talking to groups and members, trying to find out what it is that they want from it [...] I don’t know, there are lots of issues, about language, about culture, you know [...] it is a very slow process.’³⁸

South Bermondsey Partnership

In 2003-04, South Bermondsey was identified as one of 35 Pathfinders, areas selected UK-wide in order to test how new models of neighbourhood management could lead to improved community cohesion. In a review of experiences, South Bermondsey was one of five pathfinders selected for a review of how issues of ethnicity, race and culture affect community cohesion. Significantly, the review concluded that cohesion in South Bermondsey is as much to do with territorial insularity and age as ethnicity (Communities and Local Government 2008: 23). Succeeding the Pathfinder Programme and set up within the framework of the Neighbourhood Management Programme, the South Bermondsey Partnership was part of an the initiative specifically targeting super output areas falling within the 3% most deprived according to the 2004 Index of Deprivation. Implemented in the period 2004-11, initiatives were designed by a small locally based team, working in close cooperation with local partners and stakeholders. This included the establishment of local organisational platforms – for example Bermondsey Youth Forum and Bermondsey Business Association – as well as activities aimed at improving inter-group relations on specific estates. The seven-year government funding for the South Bermondsey Partnership came to an end in March 2011, but funds from the ‘Big Lottery Fund’ - £100,000 per year over a 10 year period – had been secured in order to continue the partnership under the auspices of two local organisations, Bede House and Time and Talents¹, but also building on cooperation with a wide range of local organisations, statutory agencies, religious communities and the local business community.

³⁸ Interview exert from previous study in Bermondsey (Jensen, Jayaweera & Gidley 2012).

Celebrations and belonging: Though a borough characterised by very high levels of diversity (based on ethnicity, race, class and so on), this diversity is not problematised in policy discourse. Accordingly, the 2014 'Vision for Southwark' states that 'this is not a borough where cultures clash, but where by coming together Southwark residents create a strong sense of community' (Southwark Council 2014). This 'coming together' is encouraged through a wide range of public event in different parts of the borough – some of them related to nation-wide initiatives, and other with local origins.

It is a reflection of the potential difference between national level policy discourse and local policy implementation that the Prevent funding, made available post-2005, in Southwark was used to support community development and cohesion work, bringing the heterogeneous and comparatively small Muslim population inside the existing associational structure. This involved both working with Muslim youths and work with police and other mainstream services in order to increase awareness of local Muslim communities (Ali and Gidley 2014: 26).

Black History Month: While originating in USA in 1976, Black History Month was first observed in Britain as part of the African Jubilee Year in 1987. Subsequently, the Association of London Authorities decided to make the Black History Month an annual event, celebrated every year during the month of October. In Southwark, Black History Month has been observed since 1993, under LBS auspices, in order to '...recognise the rich cultural diversity and heritage of our communities and help to celebrate the huge achievements of black people and their lives in Southwark over the centuries'. During the month a wide range of events take place all over the borough, raising awareness of the nature and contribution of the black population in Southwark.

St George's Day: St George's Day, 23rd April, is the feast day of St George and the national day for England – though not celebrated as a national holiday. St George's Day events are staged in different parts of Southwark, usually staged by local schools and civil society organisations, involving bands and various activities, typically targeting children. It is part of the bigger narrative that the English public over recent decades has had an uneasy relationship with the St George's flag, as it typically has been associated with sporting events and manifestations of the extreme right in British politics. For this reason, the St George's Day celebrations are part of a process of mainstreaming the English flag by reclaiming it from far-right political parties, most notably the British National Party (BNP), and associating it with celebration and inclusion at neighbourhood level³⁹.

Citizenship ceremonies: Attending the citizenship ceremony and being presented with a British Naturalisation Certificate is the final step of becoming a British citizen. This ceremony has, in Southwark become tied in with the role of the mayor. While traditionally a non-political figure head of the borough, taking part in a range of public events, the role of the mayor has, in recent years become increasingly linked to community cohesion and civic engagement. Of particular importance was the role in relation to the citizenship ceremonies that take place every other Saturday at Southwark Registry Office⁴⁰. When discussing the significance of the ceremony, the mayor stressed

³⁹ For a short documentary focusing on the St George's event in Bermondsey in 2013, and a broader context of community development, please see <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A4ClCoDmaxs>.

⁴⁰ Please see this link for video recording of citizenship ceremony at Southwark Registry Office <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FbqZhXODMnY>

importance of emphasizing the responsibilities, which should be part and parcel of the citizenship, as well as the experience, on part of the applicant, of feeling valued⁴¹.

4.4 Conclusions

We can summarise the processes relating to the mainstreaming and non-mainstreaming of cohesion policy as follows. There have been five main policy frames in post-1997 Britain affecting integration in the field of cohesion.

1. With antecedents in the earlier area-based inner city policy interventions from the late 1960s (such as the Urban Programme), the 1997 Labour government developed a **neighbourhood renewal policy frame**, articulated most clearly in 'A New Commitment to Neighbourhood Renewal' (Cabinet Office 2001), bending mainstream instruments to intensively intervene in deprived areas, which disproportionately benefited minority populations as these are disproportionately represented in such areas. Key actors included Labour leaders Tony Blair and Gordon Brown, with several think tanks and governmental units playing a key supporting role. The policy problem addressed by this policy frame was social exclusion. This policy frame was not precipitated by specific incidents, but the key decision moment was the 1997 election, bringing to power a government who had in opposition incubated a coherent agenda around social inclusion. A key element of this policy frame was civic renewal: the development of participatory platforms for local civic engagement, which included an emphasis of engaging the faith sector. This policy frame continues to inform practice at a local level, among local authorities and their civil society partners.
2. In parallel to this, the early years of the same government saw the development of **sophisticated multiculturalist and anti-discrimination policy**, articulated in the Parekh and Macpherson reports, emphasising a more capacious and inclusive understanding of British belonging and a strong commitment to equality, with lingering racism (such as that which motivated the murder of black teenager Stephen Lawrence in the early 1990s) and institutional racism (such as that which prevented the adequate investigation of his murder) as the key problems being addressed. Although this policy frame was rejected at the national level in 2001, this policy frame continues to inform practice at a local level, among local authorities and their civil society partners.
3. As discussed in the previous chapter, from 2001 a dominant policy frame, again running parallel to the neighbourhood renewal frame, was that of **community cohesion**. Precipitated by incidents of urban unrest in the North of England, community cohesion included elements of differentialist (multi-faith), interculturalist (common spaces) and assimilationist (British values) approaches. Key actors included prime minister Tony Blair, ministers John Denham and David Blunkett, as well as the authors (including Bernard Crick, Ted Cattle and the Commission on Integration and Cohesion). Here, a lack of cohesion (parallel lives) was the problem defined, sometimes (as with the Prevent programme) linked to home-grown terrorism.
4. After 2010, **the Big Society** became the dominant policy frame, strongly associated with the Prime Minister David Cameron (influenced by a number of intellectuals both within and outside the Conservative party) but also clearly articulated in the *Creating the Conditions*

⁴¹ Interview #5, Mayor of Southwark, 05.07.2014.

strategy on integration produced by the DCLG under the Communities minister Eric Pickles. There are some continuities with the earlier neighbourhood renewal frame (including a strong role for faith groups) and the decision moment informing the turn from neighbourhood renewal to Big Society was the 2010 election.

5. In parallel, a policy frame around **social mobility**, championed by the Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg but not always clearly articulated in government rhetoric, has unfolded over the same period. After the incident of the urban riots of 2011, the problem of NEETS became prominent, making youth social mobility in particular a more prominent policy area.

Chapter 5 Conclusion

This chapter addresses the ‘why’ question; why has (or has not) integration governance been mainstreamed (in specific areas and on specific levels). It brings together empirical findings from chapters 3 and 4 and connects them to some of the background factors identified in chapter 2.

5.1 Trends and patterns of mainstreaming applied

It is useful to emphasize two key structural aspects to the governance of migrant integration in the UK. One is that it is a policy area that historically has fallen between different government departments, with the Home Office leading on most work on migrant integration in the 1990s and 2000s. DCLG has, since 2010, has been responsible for integration measures, whereas immigration and border controls are resorts that belongs to the Home Office. The other aspect is that the British system of governance is characterised by institutional pluralism which translates into a wide range of local approaches to policy questions.

The potted history of mainstreaming of UK integration policy concerns respectively a *mainstreaming in policies*, based on strong anti-discrimination legislation first developed in the early 1970s, and, after 2001, a *mainstreaming in discourses*, with emphasis on bringing communities together. Whereas this can be interpreted as a (rhetorical) move towards interculturalism, the resulting policies (in practice) very much focused on British-born Muslim communities and their responsibility to integrate.

The policy flagships of the last two governments – social inclusion (Labour) and social mobility (Coalition) – can both be characterised as generic mainstream policies, addressing socio-economic inequalities and not explicitly targeting BME and immigrant populations. Whereas the focus on neighbourhood renewal constituted a central part of Labour’s social inclusion agenda, it is important to emphasize that rather than a *replacement strategy* (i.e. group-based policies replaced by needs or area-based policies), policy discourse around neighbourhood renewal emerged around attention to inner-city deprivation, and targets were thus identified on the basis of deprivation indicators, which had the effect of disproportionately benefitting minorities even though they did not have that intent.

A significant trend is the shift of emphasis from national to local authority level. It is a shift that comes out clearly in both the ‘Creating the conditions for integration’ policy framework, launched by the Coalition government in 2012, with much emphasis (but less funding) on the role of local stakeholders. A similar shift towards increased local responsibility can be traced in educational policy, with the onus for EAL provisions resting with the individual school. But at the same time, changes in the wider policy environment have resulted in significant challenges to local structures of inter-school learning and exchange. This altogether points to the local level as the ‘coal face’ of mainstreaming in a UK context, thus underlining the relevance of the local governance policies as the focus of analytical enquiry in the next work package.

In addition to the established model of mainstreaming of immigrant policies, the effects of the campaign against FGM in Bristol may provide an example of *mainstreaming from below* – as opposed to mainstreaming as policy processes ‘owned’ and designed by local and national governance structures. Here, a grass root movement challenged a ‘taboo-ed’ theme and – over time

and in cooperation with local partners – had it mainstreamed into a child protection policy area, and thus a police concern. This contributed, after a meeting with the then Minister for Education, to a UK-wide mainstreaming of FGM awareness, under DfE auspices, and finally, in July 2014, to legislation that committed health professionals to report suspected instances of FGM.

Social cohesion

The terrain of cohesion in the UK has been marked by the ambiguity between the larger, ill-defined policy field of social cohesion (as noted above, underdeveloped in the UK) and the more narrowly focused field of community cohesion (arguably over-developed). The policy focus on shared, British values and a national identity has been promoted at a national level, in particular during the early of 2000s and again in 2014 in the wake of the ‘Trojan Horse’ school scandal.

A key area of inquiry in the next work package will be the extent to which the ideological commitments encoded in the turn to mainstreaming can be evidenced in local implementation.

Education

Though dated, it can be argued that key strategies of the educational provision for BME and immigrants children derive from the 1985 Swann Report. In outlining its key concept ‘education for all’, the Report stressed the need to recognise that the problem facing the education system is not how to educate children of ethnic minorities, but how to educate *all* children, and, in doing that, enable them to understand what it means to live in a multiracial and multicultural society. From a mainstreaming perspective, the Swann Report proposed generic policies within an explicitly pluralistic frame.

Overall, funding for EAL provision within mainstream education remained ring fenced up to 2011 when it was mainstreamed into the more generic Dedicated Pupils Grant, with government funding overall shifting towards socio-economically disadvantaged pupils (determined according to access to FSM). As these funds were made directly available to the governing bodies of schools, this led to a strengthening of the role of the individual schools. But as this development coincided with a DfE-led promotion of academies outside the control of local educational authorities, the result was a weakening of the role of the latter as platforms for inter-school coordination and learning. In Southwark, the changes to funding structure resulted in the cease of the EAL unit coupled with a stronger emphasis on the statutory safeguarding duties of the LEA. In Bristol, a level of EAL services has been maintained as a result of de-delegation of funding from local schools, and BCC LEA is slowly re-establishing a platform for Bristol schools.

Successive governments have worked towards a scaling back of the role of the state in educational provision. One aspect of this strategy concerns the expansion in faith-based schooling which was first pursued by New Labour as part of a multicultural agenda. Continued by the Coalition government as part of its Free School policy, the promotion of faith-based schooling has been criticised as a move towards differentialism. Most recently, this criticism has been sustained through the recent, highly publicised chain of events – referred to in the media as a ‘Trojan horse’ scenario – where the governing bodies of a number of Birmingham schools have been construed as being at risk from being taken over by governors with strong Islamist sympathies.

As with the social cohesion field, a key area of inquiry in the next work package will be the extent to which the ideological commitments encoded in the turn to mainstreaming can be evidenced in local implementation.

5.2 Analysis of integration governance

In this final section, we attempt to account for the shifts, drawing on the typology of factors – *problems, policies, politics* – developed in earlier work packages of the Upstream project (van Breugel, Maan and Scholten 2014). We present this first in a schematic form in the following grid, then explain in more detail.



Problems

Broadly speaking, the shift towards certain patterns of mainstreaming in the UK has followed from the mainstreaming of demographic diversity itself. As discussed in chapter 3, the shift in the 1960s from assimilation to integration and then the encoding in the Swann Report in the 1980s of a version of multicultural education that used generic mechanisms to address specific needs can both be seen as a recognition that diversity was not simply an issue of immigrants but increasingly of British-born minorities. Meanwhile, a robust body of anti-discrimination law emerged with the recognition that these minorities were here to stay. However, these policy frames operated within a paradigm of “race relations” that understood Britain’s minorities as a patchwork of discrete, homogenous entities arranged around a White British mainstream.

The shift towards a more explicit model of mainstreaming in the 2000s, particularly as articulated by the Commission on Integration and Cohesion, marked a partial turn away from this race relations model, driven by the realisation of the fact of super-diversity and by the uneven geography of the new reality: increasingly complex migration-driven demographic change creating new zones of encounter in previously relatively homogenous parts of the country while intensifying and multiplying diversity in the old urban contact zones.

Nonetheless, as we have suggested in this report, the securitisation of integration problems – with the continued emphasis on Muslim minorities – has meant that the rhetorical mainstreaming of the community cohesion policy frame (and its increasingly assimilationist turn under the rubric of “British values”) paradoxically serves to discursively target Muslim minorities even when the accent is on the mainstream.

Policies

Some factors from the policy context itself also explain mainstreaming in the UK. One instance of this is the incremental development of race relations legislation into anti-discrimination and equality legislation, with the principle of a public duty to promote good relations, a development around which there has been broad cross-party consensus and which has been driven by civil society and the legal profession rather than by politicians. Another instance is the fiscal austerity implemented after the financial crisis, which has dictated the cutting of funds from municipalities to “single group” services, the reduction in the discretionary budgets local authorities can bend towards the specific

needs of vulnerable groups, and the trimming of non-mainstream policy areas. Mitigating against this sort of mainstreaming at a municipal level are the path dependencies built up during the multiculturalist period through the creation of multi-faith forums, multicultural festivals and other institutions which continue to ensure some targeting of services locally.

Politics

The shift from assimilation to integration, accompanied by strong anti-discrimination law, was partly driven by the politics of British black communities, under slogans such as “here to stay, here to fight”, establishing their status as black British rather than migrants. But fear of the effects of poor “race relations” were part of the equation too: the “race riots” of the late 1950s in Nottingham, London’s Notting Hill and elsewhere were essentially racist riots against black presence, and the spectre of urban violence drove the same Labour government that introduced strong equality legislation to also attempt to curtail immigration.

The acceptance (albeit uneven) of multiculturalism within local authorities and educational settings was the apotheosis of the politics of “here to stay”. The populist backlash against multiculturalism began immediately, articulated by a powerful nativist tradition (associated most of all with Enoch Powell) influential on the Conservative Party. In Chapter 2, we discussed the politicisation of integration, whereby this nativist tradition helped set the agenda for both Labour and Conservative governments in the mass migration period of the 2000s, for instance in the Labour slogan “British jobs for British workers” and in the Conservative net migration cap. These concerns were intertwined with the politics of the war on terror and its focus on Muslim minorities, which profoundly shaped the community cohesion policy frame after 2001 in what we can conceptualise as a form of non-mainstreaming. This same nativist tradition and populist politics has also played a role in eroding one core aspect of mainstreaming: the whittling away under the Coalition government of equality law and its implementation.

Conclusions

The last noted point – the erosion of equality law – shows that at a national level a rhetorical commitment to mainstreaming can sometimes have the paradoxical effect of hindering the development of effective mainstream policy in practice. Our civil society interviewees for this project pointed to several instances where a rhetorical commitment to localism and universalism meant that governments avoid accounting for the effects of policy change on migrants and minorities. For example, changes in the way welfare benefits are paid are bringing large numbers of long-settled migrant women (often with little English) into Job Centres for the first time through the introduction of Universal Credit – but the commitment to universalism means no additional support or guidance is created for these service users. Similarly, there is evidence that some programmes designed to facilitate social mobility are not reaching minority populations (25% of applicants for apprenticeships, one of the flagships of the Coalition’s youth social mobility programme, are black or minority ethnic, but only 10% of those awarded go to these groups) but there has been no policy response to this mismatch.⁴²

Changes to mainstream policies completely outside the policy field of integration can have disproportionate effects on migrants and minorities and on their integration processes and

⁴² Interview #13, Director Runnymede Trust, 30.07.2014.

outcomes. Positively, area regeneration strategies and urban-focused educational improvement programmes under Labour and the Pupil Premium under the Coalition have almost certainly disproportionately benefited migrant and minority populations. Negatively, Coalition welfare reform and changes to electoral legislation have both been evidenced to have disproportionate negative effects on these populations, impoverishing them and disenfranchising them respectively.⁴³ The introduction of long-term residence requirements in social housing (driven by the Coalition's localism agenda but implemented by local authorities under conditions of austerity) and in legal aid (driven partly by austerity, partly by politics) will both have negative effects for migrants.

A “smart” approach to mainstreaming would monitor these effects and where necessary seek to adjust them. However, the kind of monitoring that might make that possible at a local level, as well as the implementation of some of the public duties associated with equality legislation, have also been victims of austerity since 2010. It is, though, at the *local* level that the real results of these policy changes will be visible, as will the extent to which local agencies themselves monitor and mitigate disproportionate effects and do or don't ensure that vulnerable groups benefit from rather than lose out to mainstreaming. In our next work package, we hope that our detailed case studies in Bristol and London will reveal this empirically.

⁴³ Interview #13, Director Runnymede Trust, 30.07.2014

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Annexe 1 List of abbreviations

BCC	Bristol City Council
BME	Black and Minority Ethnicity
BNP	British National Party
DCLG	Department for Communities and Local Government
DfE	Department for Education
DWP	Department for Work and Pension
EiC	Excellence in Cities
EAL	English as Additional Language
EMAG	Ethnic Minority Advancement Grant
ESOL	English for Speakers of Other Languages
FGM	Female Genital Mutilation
GLA	Greater London Authority
GCSE	General Certificate of Secondary Education
LBS	London Borough of Southwark
LEA	Local Educational Authority
LibDem	Liberal Democrats
NEET	Not in Education, Employment or Training
SARI	Support Against Racist Incidents
SEN	Special Education Needs

Annexe 2 List of interviews carried out for Upstream research project, WP3

#	date	Name	Role
1	24.03	Darryl Telles	LBS Neighbourhood Manager
2	09.06	Roudy Shafie	Greater London Authority policy officer
3	20.06	Linda Zimmerman	Chair, Integrate Bristol
4	26.06	Yolanda Houston	Southwark Head Teachers Association
5	05.07	Sunil Chopra	Mayor of Southwark
6	15.07	Pauline Armour	LBS Head of Early Help, Education, LBS.
		Neil Gordon-Orr	LBS Planning, Policy & Performance Manager
7	16.07	John Denham	MP (Labour)
8	23.07	Di Robinson	BCC Service Director, Neighbourhoods
9	23.07	Paul Jacobs	BCC Service Director, Education and Skills
10	23.07	Brenda Massey	BCC councillor
11	25.07	Focus group	Directors of six Southwark-based voluntary sector migrant services
12	9.05/ 23.06	Don Flynn	Director, Migrant Rights Network
13	30.07	Omar Khan	Director, Runnymede Trust
14	31.07	Michele Farmer	BCC Service Director, Policy, Strategy & Communications
15	31.07	Clare Campion-Smith	BCC councillor
16	31.07	Gillian Douglas	Service Manager, Housing Solutions
17	16.09	Stephen Douglass	LBS Head of Community Engagement
18	18.09	Mark Sims	Ofsted national lead on EAL and ESOL