An evidence base on migration and integration in London
ESRC Centre on Migration, Policy and Society, University of Oxford
AN EVIDENCE BASE ON MIGRATION AND INTEGRATION IN LONDON

ESRC CENTRE ON MIGRATION, POLICY AND SOCIETY, UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD

JULY 2010

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Introduction

_London Enriched_ (2009) is the Mayor of London's refugee integration strategy, setting out a vision for refugee integration in the capital, focusing on the right of refugees to live in dignity and security, sharing with other Londoners the same life chances and opportunities to contribute. The strategy recognises that other migrants faced some of the same challenges, have similar impacts on the settled community and might be affected by similar policy interventions. In Year 2 of the strategy, the Mayor and the London Strategic Migration Partnership are reviewing _London Enriched_ to consider migrants in general, including but not exclusively refugees. This document presents an evidence base brought together by COMPAS, the ESRC Centre on Migration, Policy and Society at the University of Oxford, to inform that work programme.

In this report, we use a broad definition of migrants, following the Greater London Authority’s Data Management and Analysis Group: ‘The term ‘migrant’ is used throughout this report to refer to all those born outside the UK. It therefore relates to migrants in the very broadest sense, ranging from those whose residence is temporary (as the term is often taken to imply), to people whose settlement is long-term and permanent.’¹ That is, this definition includes people who were born abroad but have already lived in the UK for many years. However, some of the different data sources we have drawn upon use the term in different ways; we have made it clear where this is the case. As will be shown in the report, we are referring to a highly diverse population, and sections 3 and 4 explore some of the differences within that population. In particular, refugees and asylum seekers have very different experiences than many other migrants. Also, it is important to recognise that many long established migrants are British nationals, with similar entitlements to UK-born British nationals.

This report has the following structure. The report begins with a literature and demographic review presenting a picture of migration in London and the key issues around migrant integration. This draws together the state of the academic and policy literature with as recent as possible primary data provided by the GLA and UK Border Agency and original data analysis conducted by COMPAS. The work was conducted over two months in Spring 2010. We present the broad contours of the contemporary migration landscape in London, before looking at each of the Mayor’s integration strategy core themes in terms of barriers and factors to successful integration and policy implications arising. We conclude with a framework of interventions, noting the policy priorities arising from the evidence for each of the themes. Appendix 1 is a list of the main possible migration statuses in the UK today. Appendix 2 is a concise mapping of the broad policy context for each of the themes. Appendix 3 gives the list of references.

A note on data sources

This study was conducted at a time in which the gathering of statistical data around migration is undergoing major review at both a local and national level. The significant gaps in and problems with both the collection and analysis of migration data are widely acknowledged.² Change is underway in response to the 2006 Inter-Departmental Task Force and subsequent reviews, but it is clear that the substantial improvements required to
address the ‘fundamental weaknesses’ of international migration statistics will take some considerable time and resources to put into place.\textsuperscript{3} Therefore, the demographic data we draw on represents \textit{the best available picture rather than the full picture, and the data sources drawn on each need to be used with caution}. To take just one example, Workers Registration Scheme (WRS) data gives numbers of migrants from certain Eastern and Central European scheme registering in their place of work, it gives no information on where they live, or if they are leaving the UK, and cannot capture the numbers of those who do not register. Thus, although the demographic review was designed to contribute to filling this knowledge gap, it should be noted that our ability to provide robust regional data was constrained by some of these issues. The project’s timescale also limited our ability to access and triangulate all of the possible data sources. Finally, it was not always possible to access data at the best geographical scale.

Acknowledgements

The literature review element was primarily written by Ben Gidley, the demographic review by Hiranthi Jayaweera. Support was given at every stage by Vanessa Hughes, Sarah Spencer and Michael Keith. In the literature review, we drew on some other reviews conducted at Compas, which are fully cited in the references, although some are unpublished. For the demographic review, we are grateful for the data and help provided to us by the GLA’s Data Management and Analysis Group, especially Gareth Piggott, Baljit Bains and James Gleeson, and by the UK Border Agency’s Analysis, Research and Knowledge group. We also benefited from the support and advice of Roudy Shafie, Dick Williams and Amna Mahmoud of the GLA’s Diversity and Social Policy Team and by the participants from migrant and refugee community organisations in a GLA stakeholder consultation session held during our research period.
1. Executive summary

The nature of contemporary migration

- Migration to the UK today is significantly different from that in previous periods, due both to global features and to the expansion of the European Union, although the migration flows of workers from the new EU states peaked in 2007 and have been declining since then.

- Barriers to integration vary across the country with differing groups of migrants and differing opportunities open to them, so that priorities for an integration strategy may differ leading to more sophisticated strategies being developed at regional level.

Divergences and convergences: moving from refugee integration to migrant integration

- There are a number of different categories of migrant in London today, including refugees and asylum seekers, who make up a small proportion of London's migrant stock and of new residents, but also labour migrants, family reunion migrants, overseas students and irregular migrants, who can face different but also similar barriers to integration. There are also key differences between ‘old’ and ‘new’ migrants – the former arriving with Empire and Commonwealth connections to meet post-war labour demand or for family reunification, the latter associated more often with the labour market demand in the economic growth period from the early 1990s to 2008. Many in the former category have similar entitlements to the UK-born population.

- London’s migration picture is characterised by polarity: many at the top end of the scale in terms of income and skills, and many among the most disadvantaged. Although much of the literature on integration focuses on the more disadvantaged, it should not be assumed that those at the top end are able to participate fully at all levels.

- There has been less policy attention so far on the integration of some groups who can face significant challenges: low skilled workers, family migrants, irregular migrants and students.

- Key groups for policy intervention include the newly arrived and the most disadvantaged.

London’s demographic landscape

- London stands out from the rest of the UK in a number of key ways. In terms of stock (the numbers of migrants – those born outside the UK including those resident in the UK for many years), London has a larger migrant population than the rest of the UK: 34 per cent of London’s resident population.

- A quarter of these migrants arrived in the last five years. Among recent migrants, the overwhelming majority are of working age.
• London’s migrant population is both younger and longer established than the migrant population in the rest of the UK.

• In terms of flows, more migrants arrive in London than the rest of the UK and the majority of A8 workers registering with the Workers’ Registration Scheme came to London.

• London’s migrant population differs in some ways from London’s population as a whole. In terms of stock, the migrant population is younger than the total population in London, especially in inner London. Migrants in London are more likely to be married or cohabiting, with dependent children, than are all residents in London.

• Large proportions of London’s migrants, particularly from the New Commonwealth, have British nationality, demonstrating their settled residence here. But migrants from EU15/EEA countries including Accession (A8 and A2) countries are less likely to have become UK nationals. The peak period of arrival in the UK for the migrants with permanent residency now in London was the 1990s and early 2000s, dropping off since then.

• Within London, there are key differences from borough to borough and between inner and outer London. There is a varied pattern of population turnover at borough level but generally internal population changes are high compared to international turnover, with most inner London boroughs experiencing greater internal and international churn than most outer London boroughs.

• All boroughs have seen an increase in proportions of non-UK born people within the population stock in the past four years, but in (mainly outer) boroughs with lower population turnover this change may appear more evident.

• In terms of the population stock, migrants make up a greater share of the resident population in inner London (40 per cent) than in outer London (30 per cent). In Westminster, Newham and Brent, over 50 per cent of the population is born outside the UK. However, nearly half of the migrant population in Brent, and over a third in Newham and Westminster have British nationality. Outer London boroughs have a larger proportion of longer established migrants, including EU/EEA migrants (but not A8 or A2 migrants), compared to inner London boroughs. Overall, around two fifths of migrants resident in London have British nationality.

**What is integration?**

• Integration involves engagement by both migrants and by individuals and institutions of the receiving society.

• It is a series of dynamic multi-dimensional two-way processes of interaction and participation which begin the moment someone arrives in a place, whether they are staying for months or for life. They occur in different domains, economic, social, cultural, civic and in relation to identity, each of which is related and which need to be considered together and not in isolation.
• Different legal frameworks for migrants’ rights and entitlements, as well different national, regional and local policies, and the tone of political debate on migration, can impact positively or negatively on these processes.

The Mayor’s integration themes

ESOL and English language

• Language acquisition is absolutely central to integration, but not alone. There is both significant resource allocation to ESOL and huge unmet demand.

• The evidence is not clear on what works best and what provides value for money. Some elements, however, stand out: access to classes in places and at times migrants can attend, rooting of programmes in local communities, enhancing pedagogy by building in personal and community development, good contacts with employers, and gearing learning towards facilitating integration processes, including labour force integration and social interaction. Clearly, this is a priority area for London, but a more sustained analysis is required in order to set out clear policy interventions at a London level.

Housing

• The available evidence shows that widespread perceptions of asylum seekers and other migrants jumping the housing queue are unfounded: migrants have limited access to social housing and are concentrated in the private rented sector. Perceptions of migrants jumping the housing queue are related to wider shortages in the housing market.

• Migrants are also more vulnerable to homelessness and to poor accommodation conditions in the rented sector.

Employment, skills and enterprise

• At a national and regional level migrants contribute positively to the economy and to income levels, while at the local level in areas where there is a low skills base (as in the more deprived parts of the capital) migration may have a slight negative impact on job vacancies and wages.

• Overall migrant employment rates do not differ considerably from non-migrants, but some groups are disproportionately unemployed or under-employed due to barriers to full labour market participation, while others face high levels of exploitation and vulnerability in the labour market. Action on exploitation and vulnerability is therefore required, as is the right sort of employment support for the most disadvantaged.

Health and social care

• Migrants face health inequalities because of the barriers they experience in access to health care, including restrictions on their entitlements, institutional barriers, language barriers and (for irregular migrants) avoidance of contact with officialdom. Underpinning many of these is a lack of clarity around entitlements, on behalf of both migrants and health professionals.
Community safety and community cohesion

- The evidence on community safety and community cohesion points towards the need for policy intervention around reframing the immigration debate, and tackling negative public perceptions of new migrants, through a strategy that is sensitive to local issues, takes people’s concerns seriously, and considers the potential capacity of the media, especially local media, to make a positive difference. The Mayor and GLA group, with a leadership role in the capital, have the potential to be central to this.

Children and young people

- One in ten Londoners under 16 was born abroad, including 10 per cent of the A8 population. There are 5000 unaccompanied asylum seeking children in the capital, and estimated 111,000 children in undocumented migrant households (including 61,000 UK-born).
- There is some evidence of barriers to accessing education. There are examples of good practice on working with refugee children, but examples for non-refugee migrant children are less well-documented.

Community development and participation

- Community development is key to migrant integration across a number of domains, including the work of migrant and refugee community organisations and the work of mainstream community development providers.
- Evidence shows that a number of stakeholders have ability, skills and experience to offer migrant integration, including local authorities, the voluntary and community sector, community development organisations across sectors (and especially locally embedded community anchor organisations), as well as trade unions and employers; these remain to be fully mobilised.

Cross-cutting themes

- Equal life chances for all and partnership working are two key strategic issues cutting across the Mayor’s core themes. Partnership working is essential in facilitating integration processes across the domains of integration.
- A framework of equal life chances is also central; achieving this means balancing the universal entitlements to which all migrants have a right, regardless of status, with a sense of fairness at the local level. The restriction of entitlements may have negative impacts on integration and a long-term negative effect beyond the sphere of integration, for instance on the public purse, but there is a need for more systematic evidence on this.

Intervention framework

Interventions aimed at migrants themselves

- Targeted ESOL provision, based on review of the available evidence and on best practice, at the times and in the locations best suited for those who most need it.
- Clear information and advice on entitlements to housing, health and other social goods and on responsibilities.
• Targeted employment support, based on best practice, focusing on skills, employment sustainability and combating under-employment.
• Evidence based planning for health needs of migrant populations, particularly in mental health and maternity care.
• Supporting migrant community organisations and the involvement of migrants in mainstream community and civic structures.

Interventions aimed at structures or agencies in the receiving society
• Robust regulation of standards in private rented sector housing and in the areas of employment where migrants are concentrated, based on the use of existing regulatory frameworks and the promotion of best practice through kitemarking.
• Focus cohesion and public communication in areas of the labour and housing market where migration impacts are likely to be felt: low skills areas and outer city ‘new contact zones’.
• Identify pathways back to legality for undocumented migrants, and the promotion of a living wage for all Londoners.
• A strong communication strategy around migration including sophisticated myth-busting.
• Embracing migrants within implementation on public bodies of the statutory duty to promote racial equality and good race relations (and from 2011 the broader equality duty).
• Harnessing the potential of partners in civil society, including businesses, the media and trade unions, to facilitate integration.

Interventions that need further consideration
• A stronger evidence base on migration and integration, including a review of where restrictions to entitlements negatively affect integration and have negative fiscal impacts.
• A stronger evidence and intelligence base on the impacts of restricting migration on London’s economy, including labour markets.
• Consideration of the integration processes related to students.
2. The nature of contemporary migration in London

Migration to the UK today is significantly different from that in previous periods, as a result of the global rise of population movement due to conflicts and natural disasters, globalisation, as well as to the eastern enlargement of the European Union, as well as labour demand in the UK, although the migration of workers from the new EU states peaked in 2007 and has been declining since then. Migration is experienced differently in different parts of the UK and therefore is an issue for local and regional government.

Migration to the UK in the early twenty-first century is significantly different from that in the periods preceding it. Britain historically has been a country of net emigration – more people have left than arrived, with the Old Commonwealth (Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa) as major destinations, contributing to a decline in Britain’s population. This trend was only reversed in 1983, when Britain became a place of net immigration (more people arrived than left), but barely. Only in the 1990s did significantly more people start to arrive than leave.

At the same time, the migrants’ countries of origin were changing. Previously, main places of origin were countries tied to Britain through its imperial heritage – in particular the countries of the Old and especially New Commonwealth. From the 1980s, conflicts drove the global rise of mass population movement, and asylum became the main pathway to settlement in the UK, with war-torn countries such as Sri Lanka, Vietnam and Somalia beginning to feature more heavily in the arrivals. Further changes occurred as a result of the European Union. The most significant such change was the accession in 2004 of eight central and eastern European countries to the EU, with legal right to settle and work here for their citizens. The term super-diversity is used to describe the new forms of demography that characterise the UK in this period.

The evidence base on the issues facing this new migrant population and the development of policy frameworks for addressing these issues have both been slow in catching up with the new situation. Since 2006, there has been considerable growth in the evidence base and body of practice, but it continues to lag behind the reality.

During the recent period of economic growth which saw the UK shift to being a country of net immigration, considerable evidence emerged that migration has clear economic benefits at the national level. However, the evidence showed that the social cost of increased migration was borne at a local level, and unevenly across the country. The Audit Commission’s 2007 Crossing Borders report in particular identified a series of challenges including unexpected numbers of East European children in schools, overcrowding in private rented accommodation posing health and safety risks, and communication barriers faced by local services in meeting the needs of newcomers. These local costs have also led to local issues around integration and cohesion, as populations with different demographic history experienced the new situation in different ways – and in some areas tensions have arisen.

Local authorities have expressed concern that they had been given insufficient resources to address these issues, as did other local service providers such as the police, in part because
the data on local population numbers on which eligibility for funding is based does not take account of recent and rapid changes arising from migration. The Audit Commission’s report contributed to a government decision to allocate additional funds to local service providers in areas experiencing recent migration. The Commission itself is now working with the agency which advises local government, the Improvement and Development Agency (I&DeA), to promote good practice in addressing these issues, including guidance on producing local welcome packs and on addressing tensions between migrants and other residents, as will be discussed further in later sections of this report.10

Meanwhile, especially since the economic downturn, the nature of migration in the UK has changed. For instance, during the long economic upturn from the mid-1990s, there was a recognised demand for labour in a number of economic sectors,11 while from 2008 unemployment has been rising and labour migrants are leaving.

The new migration has impacted differently in different regions of the UK and in different neighbourhoods within each region. In section 4, we will present a snapshot of the situation in London, and how it differs from the rest of the UK. Before that, however, in the next section, we will introduce the different categories of migrants in the present moment.
3. Divergences and convergences: moving from a refugee integration strategy to a migrant integration strategy

There are a number of different types of migrant in London today, including refugees and asylum seekers, who make up a small proportion of London's migrant stock, but also labour migrants, family reunion migrants, overseas students and irregular migrants, each with different experiences and different integration challenges. London’s migration picture is characterised by polarity: many at the top end of the scale in terms of income and skills, and many of the most disadvantaged. Migrants are a highly diverse population, and there is evidence of the contribution made by this diverse population, but uneven life chances, with some migrant groups held back and their contribution limited, due to factors that include limits on entitlements and the absence of strong enough support for the processes of integration. Although most of the literature on integration focuses on the more disadvantaged, we do not assume that those at the top end have no integration-related needs. Among the more neglected groups in policy terms are: Low skilled workers, family migrants, irregular migrants and students.

As noted above, London Enriched recognised that other migrants faced some of the same challenges as refugees, have similar impacts on the settled community and might be affected by similar policy interventions, and the Mayor and London Strategic Migration Partnership are therefore building on it to consider migrants in general rather than refugees in particular. This evidence base is brought together to inform that review. Therefore, it is important to start with some of the divergences and convergences between the refugee population and other migrant populations, showing how different categories of migrants face different needs and issues in some cases, but similar ones in others.

The key way in which different migrant experiences can be categorised is by the different immigration statuses migrants hold, which in turn rest on different pathways or routes to settlement here. Asylum is one of the three main legal routes to migration to the UK, alongside labour migration and family reunification. This section will look at each of these routes in turn, and the categories of migrants that enter via these routes, before turning to other routes, and then to other factors, such as age and gender, which make a difference to the migrant experience and therefore must be taken into account in a comprehensive strategy. The key point is that migrants are a highly diverse population, and there is evidence of the contribution made by this diverse population, but uneven life chances, with some migrant groups held back and their contribution limited, due to factors that include limits on entitlements and the absence of strong enough support for the processes of integration.

Refugees and asylum seekers

Refugees and asylum seekers have constituted a relatively small proportion of Britain’s immigrants until intensified conflicts across the world and new forms of transport and communication flows led to a rapid upturn in the late 1980s and early 1990s, described in
the evidence base for *London Enriched* 2009 as a turning point for migration to the UK. In the same period, refugees came from increasingly diverse places of origin.

While the numbers increased, a hostile climate developed in the national media around asylum seekers, with an increased focus on bogus claimants to asylum, and successive governments from the 1990s increased restrictions, upped the number of claims rejected, and sought to otherwise prevent applications or remove refused applicants. Application refusals have grown from around 50 per cent of claims made in the early 1990s, to around 70 per cent for the period between the 1997 election and the 2002 Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act, peaking at nearly 90 per cent in the three years after it. Numbers have continued to fall year on year since then. For several reasons this asylum influx was disproportionately located in the capital, including proximity to the point of arrival, the existence of social and family networks, a voluntary sector infrastructure and access to lower-cost private rented accommodation. Another element of the government response, then, was to promote a policy of dispersal to ease what was seen as acute pressure on the capital’s resources. A third element was to withdraw the right to work for asylum seekers awaiting decision.

**Figure 1**

![Regional distribution of supported asylum seekers, including dependants, at end December 2008](source: Home Office. Calculated from Table 2p in Supplementary Tables, Control of Immigration: Statistics United Kingdom 2008. [http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/immigration-asylum-stats.html](http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/immigration-asylum-stats.html))
London was the region with the second largest population of supported asylum seekers in the UK (5,160) at the end of 2008 (figure 1). The numbers include asylum seekers supported in dispersed accommodation and those with subsistence only support. However, unaccompanied asylum seeking children (UASCs) supported by local authorities are excluded from these numbers. The Home Office gives the estimated number of UASCs supported by local authorities nationally as around 4,500 at the end of 2008. At the end of December 2009, 68 per cent of asylum seekers receiving subsistence only support in the UK were to be found in London. There is wide variation by borough, with Newham followed by Ealing home to the largest numbers. With reference to asylum seekers supported in accommodation by local authorities, some boroughs (Haringey, Enfield) have far greater numbers than do others. For example, Newham has the largest number of asylum seekers with subsistence only support, but has relatively very few of those with accommodation support. These varied patterns of support across boroughs for asylum seekers need to be considered in relation to the circumstances of asylum seekers in local areas, housing structures and variations in local governance.

The evidence base for *London Enriched 2009* set out most of the key issues relating to refugee integration, including the main national places of origin of refugees and the immigration statuses refugees might hold, which include those of: asylum seeker, granted refugee status (either, in a minority of cases, before entry, through the Gateway Protection programme or, in most cases, granted after arrival in the UK), humanitarian protection (HP) or discretionary leave (DP), as well as those whose claim has been refused but who have not yet left the country. Each of these statuses is accompanied by different entitlements, from the more or less full entitlements of those with refugee status to the almost no rights on the part of those seeking asylum or denied it. All entitlements are temporary, unless granted indefinite leave to remain (ILR), which is in a small minority of cases. The immediate families of those with refugee or HP status can apply for family reunion, and can then receive the same entitlements.

Labour migration

Levels of labour migration fell from 70,000 in 1970 to 29,000 in 1993. The long period of economic growth from the mid-1990s saw a resurgence in labour migration, partly in response to skills shortages. By 2004, the annual number of work permits issued was over 181,000, and on the eve of the A8 accession (see below), there were around 1,396,000 foreign workers in the UK. During the mid-1990s upturn, the government developed a policy of managed migration to channel labour migration into key skills gaps. There were specific schemes for seasonal agricultural workers, highly skilled migrants and particular labour-hungry sectors, such as hospitality and food processing; these have been replaced by the points-based system discussed in Appendix 1.

In the mid-2000s, four in ten migrant workers came from within the pre-accession EU, with Ireland representing the largest group. Europe was followed by the Indian sub-continent, the USA and Australasia. Smaller but significant numbers came from other areas, such as over 20,000 nurses from the Philippines. As these migrants were overwhelmingly English-speaking, had cultural ties to the UK, and had ready access to the labour market, they have
tended not to feature in the academic or policy-based integration literature; attracting more attention have been the migrants from central and eastern Europe arriving since 2004, who we turn to in the next section.

London has a strong high skills sector; the skills level of London’s working age population is higher than in other international cities; research has shown that the availability of high quality and well qualified staff is a key factor in global businesses located here. ‘London’s competitive strengths relative to those of other UK cities and regions have a number of roots, including first-mover and cultural/language advantage in a number of advanced service sectors, strong international links, and the sheer range of specialised suppliers and partners available within a large, diverse and competitively-oriented agglomeration. The one which has acquired a more conspicuous importance over the past quarter-century is, however, that of access to strong pools of skilled labour for specialist service roles which require highly qualified staff with access to state-of-the-art knowledge.’ This high skill workforce is produced by both internal and international migration to the capital, and London is a major destination for highly skilled workers from within the UK and from abroad.

Since 2008, the government’s managed migration policies have focused on encouraging the in-migration of highly skilled workers, and limiting that of lower skilled workers. A points-based system (PBS) was introduced in 2008 to facilitate this, as described in Appendix 1. Tier 1 is for highly skilled workers, who must hold a Masters-equivalent qualification and a salary of at least £20,000. This replaced the Highly Skilled Migrants Programme (HSMP, introduced in 2002), which had aimed to attract highly skilled migrants to the UK by offering them the opportunity to move to here without having a prior job offer. At the time of writing, the government has announced an interim cap on non-EU migrants, aimed at skilled migrants entering the UK through the Points Based System. Consultation is underway on a more long-term cap. It is too early for the impact of any such cap to be clear, but as highly skilled workers are heavily concentrated in London, any effects are likely to impact disproportionately on the capital.

Among migrants coming to work in the UK under the points-based system, people of Indian nationality make up nearly two fifths of skilled workers with a job offer coming to London and the South East (Tier 2), and just over a tenth of students coming to the same area (Table 1). Wealthier countries (e.g. USA, Australia, Japan, Canada) are more likely to supply skilled workers than students, but China, like India send migrants of both categories. The presence of high numbers of highly skilled migrants in London, including many in highly paid categories, is an indicator of the polarity of London’s population, which includes both high numbers of deprived and destitute migrants, but also some of the world’s richest people.

Table 1: Applications for Tiers 2 and 4 of the points based system by nationality, London and South East, 2009 (Top ten nationalities)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tier 2 Nationalities</th>
<th>per cent</th>
<th>Tier 4 Nationalities</th>
<th>per cent</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>15</td>
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<tr>
<td>United States of America</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>6</td>
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More detail on the economic activity of migrants is given later, in section 6.3, on employment, skills and enterprise.

A8 citizen migrants

Although there is no UK or EU policy framework for their integration, one of the most significant migrant populations in the current period is that of citizens from the enlarged European Union, and specifically from the A8 countries, the eight Central and Eastern European countries that joined the EU in 2004. These migrants have been the subject of considerable public and media attention, due to their visible presence in key economic areas, and have also been the subject of a considerable body of academic research, which is referred to in this report. As we show in Section 3, the arrival of A8 migrants began in large numbers immediately after accession in May 2004, continued to rise through to 2007, coinciding with a period of sustained economic growth, after which it began to decline, corresponding with the economic downturn.

The arrival of A8 workers – over 750,000 between May 2004 and December 2007 – is a significant feature of the current migration moment. In general, this population is young, quite highly educated, economically active, and dominated by single people rather than families. As our demographic review (Section 3) explores in detail, London remains the dominant destination for labour migrants in general but there is some evidence that London was somewhat less affected by the arrival of A8 migrants than some other regions – both because proportionately there were already many foreign-born people in the capital than elsewhere, but also because the absolute numbers may have been lower than in some areas.

There has been a decline since 2007 in the number of A8 migrants coming to the UK along with large numbers returning. This is caused by four factors: developments in sending countries, such as stronger economies back home; diversion to alternative destinations – as other EU member states loosen their restrictions on A8 workers and at the same time recover faster from the recession; demographic patterns in member countries – as a consequence of declining birth rates the pool of potential migrants to the UK is actually getting smaller; and devaluation of the pound. This decline has led to some concern that key skills and labour market gaps filled by A8 migrants are starting to open up again. However, this is an issue less likely to affect London than some other regions, as the employment sectors most dependent on migrant workers from Eastern Europe are largely the sectors overrepresented in rural areas.

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Philippines</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>Colombia</th>
<th>4</th>
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<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>South Korea (Rep. Of Korea)</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
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<td>Thailand</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zambia⁵</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

²Tier 2 - skilled workers with a job offer to fill gaps in the UK labour force. ³Tier 4 - students ⁵Among those applying to Tier 2, Nigerian and Malaysian nationals also made up 2 per cent each.

Source: calculated from points based system data provided by UKBA²⁹
Other European citizen migrants

Bulgaria and Romania are known as the A2 states; they acceded to the EU only in 2007. Nationals from the A2 states (Bulgaria and Romania) are subject to a slightly different Worker Registration Scheme, and are not be eligible for housing assistance unless they hold an accession worker card or a seasonal agricultural work card. When an A2 national completes 12 months of employment under the Worker Authorisation Scheme, s/he is no longer required to register under the scheme, and has exactly the same rights as workers of EEA states with full rights. These transitional arrangements are due to end by 2012.

Malta and Cyprus, which joined at the same time as the A8 states, and with them make up the A10 states, tend to be treated separately in the academic and policy literature. Their populations have a similar socio-economic and educational profile to the rest of Western Europe, the EU15 category, whose citizens have the same rights as UK nationals.

There are also three states in Europe - Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway - which are not members of the EU but are members of the European Economic Area (EEA) whose citizens here tend to have a similar profile to those from the EU15.

Overseas students

One key category of migrants which is relatively under-represented in the literature and policy discourse is overseas students, who constitute one of the largest single groups of foreign nationals residing in the UK, with London being a key site of concentration. The Mayor’s strategy for migrant integration defines migrants as those who have come to London from abroad to stay for over a year for reasons other than study, tourism or visits to families and friends. Nonetheless, overseas students constitute a large proportion of the overseas population in London, and many chose to stay in the UK after completing their study, including those who gain residency rights by marrying while here, and therefore it is important to include them in this evidence base.

A growing perception that student visas have been heavily abused as a route to irregular residency has led to a tightening of the oversight over the process in 2009 and subsequently to new rules further restricting student entry. Overseas students have limits on their entitlements (e.g. on the hours they can work and on their participation in electoral politics); these limits have become stricter under rules announced by the UK Border Agency early in 2010 for the points-based system.\(^{35}\)

Overseas students bring significant spending power to the UK, both in terms of the higher rates of fees they pay at educational institutions and in their disposable income while here. Universities UK figures show that in 2007-08, there were 229,640 students in the UK from outside the European Union, compared with 117,290 in 1998-99. With the weak pound widely believed to be a factor, UCAS figures released in March 2010 show that applications from overseas student have risen by 21 per cent in the current academic year, but from within the EU have risen more sharply, by 33.6 per cent, with Accession states heavily represented – e.g. those from Romania are up by more than 70 per cent.\(^{36}\)
The UK is the major European provider of higher education to international students generally, but not to those from Europe (where it is exceeded by Germany), and overseas students make up 13 per cent of the full-time student population in the UK, with 36 per cent of postgraduate research students in the UK being international students. 37 China remains the most significant provider of students to UK higher education across most levels of study, India features very strongly among taught postgraduate students, and students from the United States are also prominent among research postgraduates. Countries of the Middle East and South Asia feature prominently among postgraduate research students. 38

In London, there are especially high concentrations of overseas students. 39 In the most recent year for which data is available, 2007/8, 93,000 overseas HE students were registered in London, accounting for 23 per cent of the total London student population and 25 per cent of all international students in the UK. 40

According to Universities UK, fees for overseas students ranged from about £8,500 to more than £32,000, depending on the course, with average fees for undergraduate courses now between £9,300 for standard courses and £11,500 for laboratory-based courses. EU students pay domestic fees, which are subsidised by the taxpayer.

The economic impact of this is significant. The British Council in 2009 estimated that overseas students are worth £8.5 billion to the UK economy. 41 As Policy Exchange report, ‘Overseas students contribute £4 billion a year in fees, according to the UK Council for International Student Affairs (UKCISA). More than 8 per cent of the total income of UK universities comes from overseas student fees, and in 2007/08 international students provided a bigger source of income for UK universities than government grants for research.’ 42 This creates a certain dependency in the sector on these students, which has impacts on universities’ institutional culture, but this entails risks as other global regions begin to compete in the same market. Policy Exchange and Universities UK conclude that the UK’s market position could be seriously damaged by the introduction of Tier 4 student points-based visa system, on top of recent rises in visa costs. 43

Despite the contribution overseas students make, and despite the fact that they tend to come from wealthier and more cosmopolitan backgrounds (and therefore are sometimes assumed to have less integration-related needs), the small body of evidence there is, led by the UK Council for International Student Affairs (UKCISA), shows that international students are often not welcomed by communities in the UK. Although none of this research was carried out in London, it suggests that overseas students should not be neglected in thinking through integration policies. 44

Family reunification

Family reunification has become the main route to legal settlement in the UK; by 1993, ‘eight out of ten grants of settlement in the UK were for some kind of family reunification (34 per cent for wives, 22 per cent for husbands, 15 per cent for children and 8 per cent for other dependants).’ 45 Although other routes to settlement now outweigh family migration, absolute numbers have increased, more than doubling between 1993 and 2003. 46
The enduring importance of family reunification as a pathway to settlement has been reflected in increasing attention to the integration needs of this group, e.g. through projects and programmes funded by the European Integration Fund. In particular, wives joining their husbands are commonly identified as not arriving with the English language skills that will enable them to fully participate in the economic and civic life of the UK, sometimes leaving them trapped in the home and/or dependent on relatives for their interaction with the receiving society.

Irregular or undocumented migrants

As well as the categories of migrants described above, other migrants either enter the UK or remain through irregular or illegal routes. This is the most contentious and complex category of migrant in the UK. Although some discourse talks about illegal immigrants, this term is highly problematic, not least because it blurs together the different ways which migrants might come to have an illegal status – for instance, those who enter illegally, those who enter legally but overstay their status, those who have an ambivalent status, and those who are here legally but the lack the correct documentation to prove this. The terms irregular or undocumented will be used in the remainder of this review.

There are different degrees of clandestinity, along a spectrum which goes from total regularity to total irregularity, as well as from compliance to non-compliance via the large and complex category of the semi-compliant (e.g. legally resident but working in violation of some/all conditions of immigration status).

There are two broad categories within this. First, ‘irregular or undocumented residents are defined as residents without any legal resident status in the country they are residing in, and those whose presence in the territory – if detected – may be subject to termination through an order to leave and/or an expulsion order because of their status.’ Among this category are failed asylum seekers either awaiting or evading removal (a large number due to the growth in asylum application refusal noted above, as cases are assessed increasingly stringently); these include those imprisoned in detention facilities. Irregular residents include various types of overstayers: those who enter on tourist or student visas, for example, and remain in the country after these expire.

‘Irregular entrants are persons who cross an international border without the required valid documents, either un-inspected over land or sea, or over ports of entry.’ This category includes those who enter via document fraud, via clandestine entry (e.g. as stowaways) or with unfounded asylum claims. Among irregular entrants, the term trafficked is generally used to refer to those who cross borders irregularly against their will, while smuggled refers to those who voluntarily submit to parties who facilitate their irregular transit. However, the distinction can be blurry, as false promises and false expectations, incurring unpayable debts or sexual and other forms of exploitation and abuse within transit are common.

The scale of this population is by definition impossible to measure. Globally, according to the UN’s population division, undocumented migration is ‘one of the fastest-growing forms of migration in the world today.’ In the UK, the most reliable estimate of the irregular migrant population is 725,000 (based on range of 524,000 and 947,000) for the year. There is some evidence that the economic importance of irregular migrants is enormous,
with some low-pay sectors relying heavily on their labour, usually through gangmasters or other sub-contracting arrangements. Recent research and campaigns, for example, have highlighted the reliance on irregular labour within institutions like London’s higher education sector, NHS and transport system.\textsuperscript{59}

Other factors

In addition to the differences in terms of immigration status, integration of migrants can be affected by different factors. These include gender, age, ethnicity and disability.

\textit{Gender}

While post-war labour migration to the UK from the Empire and Commonwealth was disproportionately male, the period when family reunification was the main route of migration (especially the 1970s) meant a wave of women arriving to join their husbands, especially from the Indian subcontinent, a spike which is still reflected in London’s demographic profile, as shown in Section 3. Refugees were disproportionately male, but recent decades saw some gendered forms of violence accepted as grounds for asylum. However, London’s A8 migrants are disproportionately female, as shown in Section 3.

The experience of migration and of integration differs greatly by gender. There is considerable evidence, for example, that women arriving in the UK are less likely to speak English, and that migrant women face greater barriers to access to the labour market.\textsuperscript{60} Migrant women are found disproportionately in certain sectors, such as the caring profession, whereas men are found disproportionately in dirty and heavy unskilled manual sectors.\textsuperscript{61}

\textit{Age}

Most migrants to Britain are of adult working age. As Section 3 shows, there is no significant difference between age-related activities among the migrant population and those of the London population as a whole, although young migrants are slightly more likely to be in full-time education or economically inactive. A number of issues face children and young migrants specifically, and section 6.2 below is devoted to these issues.

\textit{Ethnicity}

Country of origin and ethnicity do not necessarily map directly on to each other, and many migrants struggle with the categories of ethnicity which dominate UK policy discourse, particularly around equalities.\textsuperscript{62} Many key migrant groups have trouble self-identifying according to Census categories\textsuperscript{63} and are therefore hidden in much equality data, and different local authorities and other agencies have developed uneven, ad hoc ways of classifying their client groups. There is an enormous body of literature on the life chances of different ethnic groups\textsuperscript{64}, on ethnicity in London\textsuperscript{65}, and on specific ethnic populations in London\textsuperscript{66}. In general, the key points emerging from this literature and relevant to this review is the continued existence of racism, but its shifting nature; different patterns of racism in inner and outer London boroughs; the growth of cosmopolitan and intercultural
sensibilities and patterns of socialising in the capital, especially among young people and especially in inner London; and great divergence in life chances and socio-economic profiles of different ethnic groups. Many groups (including people of Bangladeshi and Pakistani origins and many black groups) continue to experience lower education attainment, higher unemployment, lower incomes, worse health, and shorter life expectancies, but some groups (notably those of Indian origin) are experiencing a closing gap and in some cases outperform the white British population.
4. London’s demographic landscape

A third of London’s population was born overseas, and in some areas the proportions are higher. Around a quarter of these migrants came in the last four years. This section presents a demographic picture of London today, and of its migrant populations. It is based on new analysis of primary data, as described in the introduction, and is subject to the caveats noted in the introduction above. Further points to bear in mind when reading this section are that refugees and asylum seekers tend not to be separated out from other migrants in most of the data sources we draw on here; that long-settled UK citizens born outside the UK tend not to be separated out; that many of the categories we use here (e.g. those born in Africa) are internally extremely diverse categories; and that we have not presented a picture of patterns below the level of boroughs, where there are great variations from neighbourhood to neighbourhood. In short, we are presenting the broad, general picture of the key issues and trends, and more detailed data would often show a more complex pattern than this is able to present.

Key points

- Migrants – people born outside the UK – make up 34 per cent of London’s resident population.\(^\text{67}\)
- In 2008, the majority of long-term migrants\(^\text{68}\) coming to the UK came for employment (38 per cent) or to study (32 per cent). Compared to 2001, a relatively smaller proportion of migrants now come to work or to join families and a relatively larger proportion come as students.
- More long-term migrants – 28 per cent of the total – come to London than to the rest of the UK. But over the past few years there has been a drop in the proportion of people giving London as their area of destination compared to the rest of the UK, from 34 per cent in 2001 and from 31 per cent in 2004.
- Among long-term A8 migrants arriving in the UK in 2008, 21 per cent gave London as their area of destination. This proportion is lower than that among migrants from Commonwealth countries (both Old and New) giving London as their area of destination.
- There are higher proportions of migrants from many different parts of the world, in London compared to the rest of the UK. This is particularly the case for people born in Africa (8 per cent of London’s population compared to 1 per cent in the rest of the UK) and the original EU/EEA countries (6 per cent of London’s population compared to 2 per cent in the rest of the UK). A8 migrants make up 2 per cent of London’s total population compared to 1 per cent of the population in the rest of the UK.
- More men and more people aged 25-44 tend to come to London compared to other English regions.
- The gender distribution of migrants in London is similar to that of all residents. But over age 16, migrants have a younger age distribution compared to all residents, especially in inner London. Both male and female migrants are more likely to be married or cohabiting, with dependant children, than are all residents.
Non-UK born children under 16 are most likely to come from African and EU/EEA countries.

- Relatively large proportions of migrants, particularly from the New Commonwealth, have British nationality, thus demonstrating their settled residence in the UK. But migrants from EU15/EEA countries and also from Accession countries are less likely to be UK nationals, possibly because of their less restricted work and welfare rights and/or relatively recent or temporary migration trajectories. Overall, around two fifths of migrants resident in London have British nationality.

- The peak period of arrival in the UK for migrants resident in London was the 1990s and early 2000s. Since then, there has been a drop in proportions migrating among both men and women. Nearly three quarters of migrants in London arrived more than 5 years ago. Among recent migrants – that is, those who have arrived since 2004 – the overwhelming majority of both men and women are of working age.

- Overall most migrants in London are longer established than are migrants in the rest of the UK. Post-2004 migration, largely from EU Accession countries, is more visible in the rest of the UK than in London. However, in the last quarter of 2009, the majority of workers from A8 countries arriving in the UK and registering with the Workers’ Registration Scheme came to London.

- There is a varied pattern of population turnover at borough level but generally internal population changes are high compared to international turnover. Some outer London boroughs, particularly those with relatively small migrant populations, have relatively stable populations overall as well. Inner London boroughs like Westminster and Kensington & Chelsea have relatively high international turn over compared to Newham in inner London and Brent in outer London, which appear to have more stable, established large migrant populations.

- All boroughs have seen an increase in proportions of non-UK born people within the past four years, but in boroughs with lower population turnover this change may appear more evident.

- Migrants make up a greater share of the resident population in inner London (40 per cent) than in outer London (30 per cent). In Westminster, Newham and Brent, over 50 per cent of the population is born outside the UK, but relatively large proportions of migrants – nearly half in Brent, and over a third in Newham and in Westminster - have British nationality. At the other end of the spectrum, outer boroughs like Havering and Bexley have only around one tenth of its population born outside the UK. Outer London boroughs have a larger proportion of longer established migrants, including EU/EEA (excluding A8 and A2) migrants, compared to inner London boroughs.

- Proportions of births to mothers born outside the UK are higher in boroughs that have the largest proportions of migrants, and there is an increase in proportions
of births to non-UK born mothers between 2001 and 2008 in most boroughs. The most common countries of births of non-UK born mothers living in the boroughs appear to have remained fairly stable over time.

- There is a great polarity of migrant intake and stocks: London is the home to the vast majority of those at the top end – the skilled workers on high salaries and higher qualifications than the national average – as well as to the most disadvantaged.

The following sections present the details of this demographic picture, starting with the broad picture of migrants to the UK, moving on to the flows and stocks of London’s migrant population, a comparison between London and the rest of the UK, and finally some detail on differences between boroughs, showing the broad patterns that contrast inner and outer London.

**Migrants to the UK**

There has been considerable change in numbers of migrants, sending countries and reasons for migration to the UK over the past decade (see Section 2). Recent trends for the UK as a whole can clearly be seen by examining migrant flow data (Figure 1). In 2001 an estimated 372,000 long-term migrants defined by the United Nations (UN) as those ‘who change their country of usual residence for a period of at least one year’ (Office for National Statistics (ONS), 2009), arrived in the UK according to International Passenger Survey estimates. The corresponding number in 2008 was 538,000. Figure 1 compares reasons for migration in 2001 and 2008. It can be seen that in each country category there have been changes. For example, more migrants from the pre-accession EU countries are now coming to seek work rather than having the certainty of a job, compared to 2001. More migrants from Old Commonwealth countries (e.g. Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa) are now coming for reasons other than work; and there is less family related migration now among people coming from New Commonwealth countries (e.g. the Caribbean, Indian subcontinent) and more migration of students from these countries.
In 2001, the category ‘Other’ in countries of last residence included A8 and A2 countries.

*Source: International Passenger Survey: annual data, 2001 & 2008*

Data on patterns and trends relating to asylum seekers coming to the UK are published separately by the Home Office. The number of asylum applications as well as the number granted settlement as refugees have been falling over the past decade. In 2008, there were 31,315 asylum applications, including dependents. Considering principal applicants only, there has been a drop of nearly two thirds in asylum applications since 1999. At the same time since 1999 the number granted asylum has halved, and represents 20 per cent of decisions in 2008 down from 36 per cent of decisions in 1999.

Demographic patterns among migrants in London

**Migrant flows**

London receives the largest proportion of international long-term migrants arriving in the UK. In 2008, an estimated 28 per cent of the total came to London. However, over the last few years there has been a reduction in the proportion of people giving London as their area of destination: the proportion was 34 per cent in 2001 and 31 per cent in 2004.

Currently, proportionately more people coming from Old and New Commonwealth countries choose London compared to those from A8 and from other countries (Figure 2). Among people arriving from A8 countries nearly four fifths went to an area in the UK other than London in 2008. London also receives more men and more people aged 25-44 than do...
other English regions (Figure 3). Generally, the age distribution of migrants coming to London is slightly more skewed towards the younger working age range than is the case in other regions.

**Figure 2**

Percentage of people entering the UK giving London as area of destination, by country of last residence, 2008


**Figure 3**


**Migrant stock**

Perhaps a more accurate profile of London’s *resident* migrant population can be gained by looking at the share of London’s population who are migrants.73 We define migrants in the broadest sense as the population in London that was born outside the UK. This definition includes people who have been living in the UK for a long time as well as new arrivals; and temporary residents as well as those who are permanently settled in the UK74. It is important to recognise that many long established migrants are British nationals, with similar rights and entitlements as UK-born British nationals.
While most migrants who arrive in the UK continue to come to London (even though there are variations in their composition), as we have seen in the flow data above, London also has the highest proportion of non-UK born residents in its population (34 per cent)(Figure 4). Within London the proportion of migrants is higher in Inner London than in Outer London.

**Country of birth: London and the rest of UK**

A little over a third of London’s population was born outside the UK, in comparison with under a tenth of the population in the rest of the UK. London also represents considerable country of birth diversity compared to the rest of the UK (Figure 5).
Figure 5


Gender, age, and family status among migrants in London

Table 1: All residents, and population born outside the UK, by gender, age, London, 2008-2009

<table>
<thead>
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<th>All residents, London (per cent)</th>
<th>Born outside UK, all London (per cent)</th>
<th>Born outside UK, inner London (per cent)</th>
<th>Born outside UK, outer London (per cent)</th>
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<td>65+</td>
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There is little difference in the distribution of men and women among all residents in London, and among migrants, as can be seen in Table 1. There are, however, clear age differences, with larger proportions of migrants in the younger part of the working age range living in London as a whole, and particularly in inner London. This pattern fits in with the information from migrant flow data set out earlier (Figure 3). Both male and female migrants are more likely to be married or cohabiting with dependent children than are all London residents, and there are proportionately fewer single men and women of working age with no dependent children. Clearly, this information cannot be interpreted without considering length of residence of migrants, as the APS sample includes both recent migrants and established residents.

There is little difference in the distribution of country of birth according to gender. However, where age distribution is concerned, the 25-34 and 35-44 age ranges contain the most migrants, and the top geographical origins for these age groups are Africa (a very diverse population), the pre-accession EU/EEA countries, A8 countries, India and South East Asian countries. Non-UK born children under 16 are most likely to originate in African countries and in the pre-accession EU/EEA countries. At the other end of the age spectrum, those aged 65+ are most likely to be born in EU/EEA countries, the Caribbean, Africa and India.

**Live births to mothers born outside the UK in London boroughs**

Births to women born outside the UK are not only an important indication of the size and demographic make-up of a local area, they are also important for providing information for planning local services, particularly maternal and child health care, and longer term planning such as in educational provision. Several interesting patterns can be seen in London. In almost all boroughs there has been an increase in proportions of births to non-UK born mothers, in some cases proportions have doubled – for example, in Bexley, Havering, Barking & Dagenham. Bexley and Havering in particular have relatively low percentages of non-UK born people in their population generally (see Figure 12 below), but this finding needs to be set in the context of an increase in the proportion of migrants over time in all boroughs. The three boroughs in which there are the largest proportions of migrants – Newham, Brent and Westminster - also have the largest proportions of births to non-UK born mothers (70 per cent or more). In general the number of births in an area depends on the fertility rates as well as the size and age structure of the female population in that area. Tromans et al point out that while a large proportion of the rise in births since 2001 can be attributed to women born outside the UK mainly as a consequence of the increase in size of the non-UK born population in the UK:

‘Yet since 2004 rising fertility rates among UK born women has been the largest single factor increasing the overall number of births. However, due to decreasing numbers of UK born women at the peak childbearing ages, births to UK born women have only risen by a small amount.’ [emphasis added]

Clearly, the increase in the proportions of non-UK born populations in London boroughs and the younger age structure of the migrant population compared to all London residents and the UK born are factors that affect patterns of birth, but it is beyond the scope of this paper to examine in detail the underlying causes of trends.
Ethnic group distribution in London’s non-UK born population varies considerably from that in the London population as a whole (Figure 6). Among ethnic groups that have a significant presence in the migrant population compared to within London’s entire population are the Other White, Indian and Black African categories. It is also worth noting that a significant proportion, around 10 per cent, of London’s non-UK born population is white British by ethnicity.

Within the very limited ethnic group classifications used in the APS as in most other official classification systems, there is considerable correspondence between country of birth and ethnicity for some groups - for instance, 97 per cent of people born in Bangladesh classify themselves as of Bangladeshi ethnicity, 95 per cent of people born in Pakistani as of Pakistani ethnicity and 84 per cent born in A8 countries as other white. But there is considerable ethnic diversity among people from African countries, again as expected given migration patterns from Africa (see Section 2), with 14 per cent identifying as Indian, and 52 per cent identifying as Black African. These patterns do not begin to capture the complex relationships between national origins and self-defined ethnicity that are found in London, as discussed in Section 2.
Nationality among migrants in London

Figure 7

Proportion of migrants and UK born population with UK nationality, London 2008-2009


As figure 7 shows, large proportions of migrants from different parts of the world hold UK nationality. This includes 70 per cent of Caribbean born people, 67 per cent of people born in Bangladesh, 53 per cent of those who are born in India and 38 per cent of people born in South East Asian countries. However, relatively small proportions from EU/EEA countries, including Accession countries, are UK nationals. This is probably related to less restrictive employment and welfare rights applicable to EU citizens (reducing the motivation to apply for citizenship), and the relatively recent migration of people from A8 countries, but may also be an indication of the more temporary nature of (mostly labour) migration among Europeans compared to migrants from non-EU countries. Overall, around two-fifths of all migrants resident in London have British nationality.

Date of arrival in the UK among migrants in London

More migrants came to London between 1990 and 2003 than they did to the rest of the UK (Figure 8). However, post-2004 migration, which was dominated by large-scale migration from Accession countries, was proportionately greater in the rest of the UK compared to London.
Analysis by gender shows that the peak period of arrival in the UK for both male and female migrants to London was between 1990 and 2003. Nearly three quarters of both male migrants and female migrants in London arrived more than five years ago, and could thus be considered to be established residents.

If we look at the age distribution of the most recent migrants to London according to gender (Figure 9), we can see that more than half of both men and women are aged 25-44. Among men, 86 per cent and among women, 85 per cent are of working age (16-64 for men and 16-59 for women).

**Figure 9: Age distribution* of most recent migrants†, men and women, London 2008-2009**

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*Age at time of survey, † Arrived 2004 onwards.
Diverse time trajectories are apparent for different country of birth groups arriving in London (Figure 10, see also Section 3 above). Migration from Caribbean countries is apparent before 1960, similar to migration from the pre-accession EU/EEA countries, but whereas the bulk of migration to London from the Caribbean occurred before the 1990s, there has been a steady arrival of people from EU/EEA countries spanning several decades. Apart from A8 and A2 countries, recent migration is most likely among relatively economically advantaged countries (USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand). Migrants from South Asian countries tend to be longer established residents, although around a fifth to a quarter arrived in the UK from 2004 onwards.

Borough level demographic patterns among migrants in London
There is great variation between the London boroughs. However, there are also some broad patterns which make inner London distinct from outer London. It is in inner London that we can most vividly see the polarity of London's migrant population, with both the most wealthy, often from wealthier regions of the world, and the poorest, often from poorer global regions. In the demographically less diverse outer boroughs, there are far fewer migrants and the migrant population is more stable, reflecting earlier patterns of settlement, but proportional changes due to recent migration are more dramatic. These patterns have policy implications to which we will return in later sections of the report.
Population churn in the boroughs

In this section we consider in more detail demographic patterns among migrants within London – inner and outer London, and in individual boroughs. First we look at population turnover (churn) in London boroughs during the time period January to December 2008 (Figure 11). According to ONS, compared to net migration statistics – that is, the difference between in and out migration – the volume of migration based on the sum of in and out flows provides a better indicator of movement in areas with high levels of both in and out-migration, as is the case in many London boroughs. It can be seen in Figure 11 that internal population churn at borough level (including both migrants and people born in the UK) is high, relative to international population churn (that is, those coming in from abroad, and leaving the UK, for at least 12 months). At the same time, there are differences between boroughs. For instance, the boroughs with the most stable populations overall are the outer London boroughs of Havering, Bexley and Sutton. Comparatively high international population turnover can be found in the inner London boroughs of Westminster, Kensington & Chelsea, and in the City. Kensington & Chelsea is interesting because it has a high international population turnover rate compared to its rate of internal population churn. Below, we will consider these patterns of population churn in the London boroughs in relation to the stocks of migrants resident in the boroughs.
*The turnover rate is calculated by ONS as the sum of in and out migration per one thousand resident population in the time period covered (Jan-Dec 2008).
Source: adapted from ONS Local Area Migration Indicators and Annual Population Survey, 2008-2009

**Migrant residents in the boroughs**

There is wide variation in the way the resident migrant population is dispersed across boroughs (Figure 12). Over half the population in the inner boroughs Westminster and Newham, and in the outer borough Brent, is born outside the UK. At the other end of the
range, Bromley, Bexley and Havering, all in outer London, have a relatively small proportion of migrants in their populations. At the same time, there is an increase in the proportion of migrants resident in all boroughs over the past few years. In 2004-2006, the proportion of non-UK born people in Westminster and Newham were respectively 52 per cent and 44 per cent, in 2008-2009 these proportions had increased to respectively 55 per cent and 54 per cent. A similar pattern is apparent at the other end of the spectrum. In 2004-2006, the non-UK born population made up 7 per cent in Havering, and 12 per cent in Bromley. These proportions have increased to 10 per cent and 14 per cent respectively in 2008-2009.93 Taken in conjunction with low population turnover rates in these latter boroughs as shown in Figure 11, it is possible that in such relatively stable populations the rise in the migrant population may be more visible as Deville et al point out.94 That is, increases in migration are noticed more in a borough or area that has relatively few migrants, rather than proportionate to the actual increase.

Further, if we consider areas in which more than half the population is non-UK born, particularly Newham and Brent, we can see that recent population turnover rates (Figure 11) are relatively less than in some other boroughs. This suggests the importance of a relatively settled migrant population in these areas, in comparison with areas such as Westminster and Kensington & Chelsea, which have high proportions of non-UK born people but also relatively high population churn, particularly among international migrants. In all London boroughs however, relatively high proportions of migrants have British nationality; these range from over 50 per cent in Harrow and nearly 50 per cent in Brent, to over a third in Newham and in inner London boroughs such as Westminster.

**Countries of birth of migrants in inner and outer London**

There are differences according to country of birth among migrants living in inner London and outer London. Overall there are higher proportions of non-UK born people living in inner London (40 per cent) than in outer London (30 per cent). If we look at the ten most often occurring individual countries of birth of migrants in inner and outer London respectively, we can see that Inner London is clearly the settlement area for migrants from wealthier countries, for instance working in the financial sector and other high level industrial sectors,95 although it is also home to established migrant communities such as Bangladeshis especially in Tower Hamlets, as well as relative newcomers such as Polish Indians predominate in Outer London, but other groups such as Polish, Africans (Kenyan, Nigerians, Ghanaians, South Africans), as well as other South Asians also have a presence.

**Table 2: Top ten countries of birth among migrants, Inner London & Outer London**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Inner London</th>
<th>Outer London</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Countries of birth</strong></td>
<td><strong>Estimated percentage among non-UK born</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(n=1206767)</td>
<td>(n=1389318)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Percentage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jamaica</td>
<td>3%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Annual Population Survey, 2008-2009*

National insurance number (NINo) registrations for foreign nationals at borough level in London flesh out these patterns a little more (Figure 13). While A8 nationals have a significant presence in many boroughs, this is by no means uniform. There are proportionately more A8 migrants in the outer than inner boroughs. In the majority of inner boroughs they are clearly secondary to other groups, such as EU migrants in boroughs like Westminster, Kensington & Chelsea, Islington and Camden, and migrants from Asia and the Middle East in Newham and Tower Hamlets. Migrants from Asia and the Middle East are also significant in many outer boroughs such as Redbridge, Hounslow and Harrow, alongside A8 nationals.
Overall, outer London has a higher proportion of longer established migrants: 37 per cent arrived in the UK before 1990 compared to 30 per cent in inner London (Figure 14). This pattern is also apparent for most country of birth and world geographical categories, apart from A8 and A2 migrants who are more likely to be recent migrants in both outer and inner boroughs. It is interesting that migrants from the pre-accession EU and EEA countries are more recent arrivals in the inner boroughs: only 34 per cent came before 1990 compared with 54 per cent in outer London. This may point to the more temporary/transient nature of residence of EU/EEA born people in inner London as they move back and forth in relation to their countries of origin.
Finally, we can get a snapshot of patterns of A8 worker settlement in the boroughs by looking at Worker Registration Scheme (WRS) data from the most recent quarter available when this report was written. There are considerable gender differences among workers at borough level. In some boroughs such as Lewisham and Hackney three quarters or more of workers are women, even though in these boroughs, especially Lewisham, the total number of people registering is relatively small. In Westminster, where there are the largest number
of workers, just over three fifths are women. Clearly, the proportion of A8 female workers in a local area need to be viewed in the context of local employment opportunities, for women, and for migrants – that is, the kinds of jobs open to these categories, which may influence decisions to migrate to these areas. The significant presence of female A8 workers in some boroughs has implications for demand for and delivery of services at a local level, for example maternity and child health services.

The largest number of workers in London are Polish nationals (2,205 in October – December 2009), followed by Lithuanian (960) and Hungarian (910) nationals. The clustering of people of different A8 nationalities within particular boroughs – for example, Latvians in Islington and Westminster, Polish nationals in Westminster, Ealing and Camden – has implications for language issues in the planning and delivery of services and in terms of community engagement.

**Summary**

The demographic review we have presented here shows enormous diversity in London’s migrant population, varying from inner to outer London, between boroughs and across ethnic groups. This emphasises the fact that London can be described as super-diverse, with migrants outnumbering the UK-born in some areas, many with long term residence in the UK and with British nationality, and with few areas dominated by any one single ethnic or national origin group. This super-diversity must be placed in the context of other forms of population churn, given that domestic churn exceeds international churn in the capital: London is a place of mobility, and a destination for people from across the UK as well as from abroad. This mobility has always been a central feature of London’s unique features. It contributes to the polarity of London’s migrant and non-migrant population: as a place where the richest people live, whether British or not, and as a place of intense deprivation. London’s super-diversity, its mobility and the polarities of wealth are all factors which affect the processes of migrant integration. In the next section, we turn to those processes.
5. What is integration?

Integration is a series of dynamic two-way processes of interaction and participation which begins the moment someone arrives in a place, whether they are staying for a year or for life. It occurs in different domains, including the economic, social, cultural and civic, and in relation to identity, each of which is related and which need to be considered together, not in isolation. Different legal frameworks for migrants’ rights and entitlements, as well as different national, regional and local integration policies, can impact positively or negatively on these processes. We therefore discuss integration strategy as facilitating the processes of interaction between migrants and the individuals and institutions of the receiving society to promote the economic, cultural, social and civic participation of all residents, including migrants, and an inclusive sense of belonging at the national and local level.102

The concept of integration is a complex and contested one. In this section, we will attempt to summarise some of the key issues here, and to provide a working definition for the purposes of a migrant integration strategy for London.

Integration is not a single process but a series of processes, each has a certain independence but which relate to each other in complex ways. These processes begin the moment a migrant arrives, regardless of integration policies, which can promote or hinder it. In general, the literature identifies a number of domains in which processes of integration occur.103

The European Union has a strong definition of integration: ‘integration should be understood as a two-way process based on mutual rights and corresponding obligations of legally resident third country nationals and the host society which provides for full participation of the immigrant’.104 The Common Agenda for Integration (2005) and the successive editions of the Integration Handbook (from 2005)105 highlight the dynamic two-way nature of integration – that is, the idea that not only migrants need to change to fit into European society, but also that they might contribute actively and enrich the receiving society, and that settled residents of receiving countries might be changed by the process too.

A strategy for migrant integration has been slow to develop in the UK. For minority ethnic people, the dominant paradigm has instead been cohesion. For many categories of migrants (most notably European citizen migrants, particularly numerous after the A8 accessions in 2004) there is still no strategy designed to include them in the economic, civic or cultural life of the country or to address their specific social or educational needs. For one group of migrants only, refugees, there has been a national integration strategy106. The most recent Moving on Together: Government’s Recommitment to Supporting Refugees (2009) focuses on the economic domain (employment) and on what might be expected of refugees, alongside a sense of the specific social needs of refugees.

There is a strong consensus from evidence from across Europe that it is at a local and regional level that the processes of integration actually occur, and where more
sophisticated and nuanced strategies can develop.\textsuperscript{107} Therefore, despite the uneven rolling out of a national framework, at a regional level work was being done to develop regional refugee integration strategies. \textit{London Enriched}, the Mayor’s strategy for refugee integration (December 2009) is one such, and this emphasises the dynamic, two-way dimensions of integration, and embraces all aspects of life, including civic and cultural as well as social and economic.

In moving from a focus on refugee integration to migrant integration, it is vital that this dimension is retained and enhanced (as will be discussed in the remainder of this section), while broadening the purchase from the specific issues facing refugees to the many and complex issues facing other groups of migrants, and migrants in general (an issue that will be discussed in the following section).

Integration occurs across a series of domains.

\textbf{Economic integration:} This broad domain includes labour market integration and integration in housing, healthcare and education. The literature on economic integration focuses on the role of institutions and on how opportunities and barriers are structured. It is worth emphasising that this domain should not be reduced to labour market integration, which has a dynamic and complex relationship with other forms of economic integration.\textsuperscript{108}

\textbf{Cultural integration:} This domain includes morals, values, behaviour and lifestyle. This domain is less of a policy focus than some of the other domains, but is often highlighted in popular, media and politicians’ discourses, as in discussions on learning English or the lifestyles of different religious groups.

\textbf{Social interaction:} This domain includes the ways in which migrants and existing members of the receiving society interact with each other socially.

\textbf{Civic integration:} This domain includes issues such as voting rights and civic habits, which are clearly structured by the cultural domain. Both the NGOs and the Home Office, as well as some politicians (including the Mayor of London) have in the last decade emphasised the importance of active citizenship and the civic and associational activity of migrants, whether they hold British nationality or not.

\textbf{Identity integration:} Although clearly related to both cultural and civic integration, and less developed in the literature, this domain concerns the extent to which people feel they belong and can identify with the place of residence, both the locality and the nation (not withstanding retention of other identities related to their background). Evidence on this domain is largely positive in the UK: 83 per cent of foreign-born people say they strongly feel they belong to Britain, not very different from the UK-born population.\textsuperscript{109} This final domain is particularly important in a city such as London, because there is considerable evidence from Europe that migrants often come to identify locally before they come to identify with the nation.\textsuperscript{110}

To conclude this section, four key points are clear. First, integration should not be seen as an end state (‘an integrated society’) but about processes. Second, emphasis on one domain to
the exclusion of others is not helpful, although some may be more important than others. Third, underpinning participation in each domain is a migrant’s legal rights – whether permitted to work, access public services and to vote in local and national elections – and also a migrant’s responsibilities. Fourth, integration is not solely about migrants, but a two-way process: it is about the opportunities and barriers created by the receiving society too.

In the next section, we will look at the processes of integration across the domains in more detail, showing the factors in successful integration but also the ways in which migrants are sometimes unable to realize their full potential, and then draw out the policy implications of these findings.
6. The Mayor’s integration themes

In setting out the Mayor’s vision for refugee integration in London, *London Enriched* identified seven core themes and objectives for each. This section follows those themes and identifies the state of knowledge on factors of successful integration and barriers to this, focusing on where the evidence is most relevant to city-regions in general and London in particular. The themes are: English language; housing, employment, skills and enterprise; health; community safety; children and young people; and community development and participation. As well as these core themes, there are two cross-cutting themes: equal life chances for all; and partnership working. In each section, we have focused on factors in successful integration rather than on impacts of migration, and on integration as a two-way process, with outcomes for migrants as well as the settled population.

6.1 English language

Language acquisition is a fundamental necessary determinant of integration, but not a standalone one.\(^{111}\) The literature is clear that ESOL is absolutely central to migrant integration. The evidence shows both significant resource allocation to this area and huge unmet demand. The evidence, however, is not clear on what works best and what provides value for money. Some elements, however, stand out: rooting of programmes in local communities,\(^ {112}\) for instance through mentorship programme, enhancing pedagogy by building in personal and community development, a focus on exit and progression routes rather than simply numbers accessing courses, good contacts with employers,\(^ {113}\) and gearing learning towards the needs of integration, including labour force integration and citizenship. Clearly, this is a priority area for London, but a more sustained analysis is required in setting out clear policy interventions at a London level.

English language plays a central role in the Mayor’s strategy for integration in London, which states that ‘Access to English language support for refugees will be crucial to integration,’\(^ {114}\) Similarly, the government’s Commission on Integration and Cohesion (CIC) in 2006 placed considerable emphasis on the importance of English language to integration. The academic evidence is summarised in a 2007 DCLG report which follows the Commission on Integration on Cohesion – see box.

### English as a factor in successful integration\(^{115}\)

- Fluency in English (as assessed by an interviewer) increases the average hourly occupational wage by approximately 20 per cent.\(^ {116}\)
- Language increases productivity and communication (and hence the market wage) and also increases employment probabilities.\(^ {117}\)
- A Canadian study concluded that immigrants who do not usually speak either English or French (the two official Canadian languages) at home have earnings 10-12 per cent lower than those who do. This study also found that those with better language skills receive more benefit from an additional year of education (in terms of the wages earned).\(^ {118}\)
The Commission concluded that speaking English is an important binding ingredient for diverse communities and a key ingredient of ‘being English’. It also found that speaking English was a key way or promoting equality, because it leads to greater success in the labour market. The Commission’s report set out the importance to cohesion of people being able to communicate with one another – with recommendations for both improved English language skills for new migrants, as well as targeted campaigns to help settled communities understand the nature of migration in their area, and to provide the opportunities to meet migrants and to work together.\footnote{119}

Some migrants come here with high levels of English proficiency; for some migrants (for instance the considerable numbers from Ireland, Australasia or parts of Africa) English is a first language. For others, in particular those whose route to settlement is family reunification, there are fairly low levels of English proficiency.

In the post-16 sector, the most widely used term for the provision of language education for migrants is English for speakers of other languages (ESOL), which is the term we will largely use in the remainder of this report.\footnote{120} In the UK the pattern of provision has been classes within mainstream provision, either within schools for the under-16s or mainly at FE colleges for over-16s. A core curriculum for ESOL was published in 2001, and a shorter employment-focused qualification, ESOL for Work, was introduced in 2007, as well as a language with a civic content pathway aimed primarily at those who intend to take the Life in the UK test as a prerequisite of acquiring British citizenship. The requirement to pass a language test (English, or Welsh or Scots Gaelic) has led to a significant increase in demand, as has the demographic change described above, with the shift from (post)colonial labour migration to family reunification, asylum and then A8 labour migration.

In the school sector, around £120 million is spent a year on provision, funding some 8000 teachers and bilingual assistants, disproportionately located in the capital. In capital-wide figures (from 2000 and therefore likely to have been exceeded), over half the students in inner London borough schools and around a quarter in outer London boroughs did not have English as their home language.\footnote{121} Despite this, there is evidence that the capital has insufficient staffing – a ratio of ESOL teachers to students in need of their tuition of 1:200.\footnote{122}

In the adult sector, government expenditure on ESOL has tripled from 2001 to 2009.\footnote{123} The Home Office has estimated that total central government spending on English language courses in 2008 was over £250 million, constituting the lion’s share of the £350 million central government monies spent directly on migrant integration.\footnote{124} Nearly a third of ESOL budget in the country is spent in London.\footnote{125} Despite this scale of investment, there is considerable evidence for unmet demand for ESOL provision, with long waiting lists for courses.\footnote{126}

Changes in legislation since 2007 have reduced entitlements to free ESOL provision, partly in response to the rising costs of meeting expanding demand, partly as part of an emphasis on balancing migrants’ rights against their responsibilities, and also to discourage language learning ‘tourism’. European Social Fund provision channelled through the Skills Funding Agency cannot be accessed by asylum seekers (except in exceptional circumstances) or by
newly arrived third country nationals; free ESOL is now only available to those receiving means-tested benefits. These restrictions create bureaucratic hurdles for ESOL providers, who have to police their clients’ entitlements more carefully. There is evidence, including from London, that certain needy sections of the population are disproportionately affected by these restrictions, including women, low paid workers, and part-time workers (who are disproportionately women). Restrictions on access are likely to have a negative impact on integration outcomes, especially for these groups. Evidence on this is restricted by the lack of non-anecdotal data, but long waiting lists in certain parts of the country, including the capital, are a strong indicator. The European Integration Fund has channelled additional support to newly arrived third country nationals who are otherwise not entitled, including innovative schemes aimed at newly arrived female marriage migrants who are identified as particularly excluded, but these funds are relatively small, and create new bureaucratic hurdles due to complex European funding rules which prevent refugees and third country nationals being taught from the same funding sources. The national New Approach to ESOL has developed a framework for local authorities to start shifting the balance of provision towards the most needy groups and towards the most effective forms of delivery, and providers are now reviewing provision and identifying priority target groups.

There is little data about which groups of migrants are accessing ESOL provision, but COMPAS research on A8 migrants in 2007 found that only one third had done so, with long working hours, cost of courses and accessibility of courses as the major barriers for the remaining two thirds. Strikingly, it was those who arrived with the least English who were least likely to have accessed ESOL. There is also evidence, for instance from the London Borough of Islington, that parents of refugee children have unmet language acquisition needs, which impacts on their ability to support their children’s learning. There is evidence, for instance from the London Borough of Southwark, that the timing of classes can be a major barrier for those in work, especially those in vulnerable low pay employment, and for those with young families.

In addition to these issues of quantity of supply and demand, there are issues about the different types of provision required and about quality of provision. There is great diversity of need. According to Green, ‘Support needs in terms of language training vary in accordance with existing English language ability and general educational levels... Some new arrivals require [ESOL] support at pre-entry level alongside basic skills support, others require very specific work-focused provision to enable them to function more effectively in a particular workplace environment or require support at a more advanced level to enable them to progress in the labour market where they have the other necessary job-specific skills to do so. For those with no or limited English language on arrival, experience suggests that work-related language courses, in combination with work placements as part of a specialist package work well, furnishing individuals with sufficient language ability to function in a specific workplace environment as quickly as possible. For those in employment, evidence suggests that English language courses specifically tailored to the workplace environment (e.g. to the health sector in London...) and encompassing the language needed in social situations, aid the labour market and social integration.’

There is evidence that different forms of pedagogy are appropriate for different categories of migrant, for migrants of different ages, and for migrants who have been in the UK for
differing lengths of time. For example, while some English language needs is best delivered in formal settings, some of the social learning dimensions key to integration are best delivered in relatively informal adult education contexts. There is also evidence for the benefit of learning English as soon as possible after arrival, both in terms of language acquisition and in terms of integration outputs. Pre-entry learning in particular is important for new migrants.

On the whole, though, there is insufficient evidence in the public domain about the quality of ESOL provision being accessed by migrants, little or no monitoring of progression routes of those completing ESOL courses, and considerable anecdotal evidence that some provision may not be appropriate to the needs of new migrants. These concerns raise the question of value for money in the sector, and how this can be improved, which could be a focus on a migrant integration strategy for the capital.

A related issue is the extent to which employers should be encouraged or obliged to contribute to these costs, as they accrue the benefits. As the DCLG has noted, 'Where employers fail to support English language training they are effectively externalizing the costs of employing migrant workers onto local services in their area. Businesses clearly benefit from a well integrated work-force that can speak English.' There has been some evidence that some employers with significant migrant work-forces have taken note, and a Business in the Community Code of Practice in 2008 has facilitated this. However, the prevailing evidence is that widespread employer buy-in has not been secured, and that this is the case especially of employers of the lowest paid, most vulnerable workers.

**Interpretation and translation**

Up to £50 million is spent on translation and interpretation by public services in London. The evidence on the extent to which access to translation and interpretation is a success factor or barrier is patchy. As summarised by the DCLG, 'Our position is that it depends on the individual: where migrants from the past are still relying on community languages, then translations from English are likely to extend their reliance on their mother tongue; where new migrants do not speak English then clearly they need initial information in appropriate languages.' In either case, investment in ESOL will clearly save in the long run on this expenditure, while also overcoming the barriers to integration posed by mother tongue reliance.

**Policy implications of the evidence on ESOL**

From the above review of the evidence it is clear that the issues raised around language and ESOL provision for refugees in London Enriched are also issues for other categories of migrant and that the actions set out in the strategy should be extended more widely. The lack of evidence around quality of ESOL provision (and hence of the value for money of the investment made in it) points to the need for a review of this. Some London local authorities have been or are now working on reviews of ESOL provision in their boroughs, and most have inter-agency working groups or partnerships to do this. There are some examples of cross-borough working, but there is scope for expansion of this. The evidence also points to some priorities, such as the greater integration of vocationally-oriented and
community- or civic-oriented provision, and a focus on provision that provides opportunities for building learners’ bridging capital. Times at which classes are offered – e.g. suited towards those working part-time – are a key priority. Finally, the evidence points to the need to more closely engage business and employers in the ESOL field, both in terms of investment and in terms of creating opportunities for learners. Some London local authorities have initiated work on this, with mixed results, and this again could benefit from cross-borough or London-wide development.
6.2 Housing

Migrants face multiple barriers in the housing market, but work to address these needs to be placed in the context of meeting the needs of other residents too. From the available evidence, it is clear that widespread perceptions of asylum seekers and other migrants jumping the housing queue are unfounded; migrants have very limited access to social housing. However, factors which concentrate migrants in particular parts of the housing market, primarily in lower rent private rented housing, have knock-on effects on the social housing market, and raise a number of integration issues, both in inner city old contact zones, where migrant clustering has both positive and negative integration outcomes, and in outer city new contact zones. The evidence suggests that there is a need to focus work on addressing the integration issues related to housing in new contact zones.

**Migrant housing patterns**

Migrants experience multiple barriers in the housing market, leading to particular patterns of settlement and to homelessness. Migrants are overwhelmingly housed in the private rented sector, especially in areas of lower rent prices.\(^{147}\) Newly arrived migrants are over six times more likely than the UK-born, and more than twice as likely as the foreign-born in general, to live in private rented accommodation, and are less likely to live in social housing and particularly less likely to have become owner-occupiers.\(^{148}\) Many are entering neighbourhoods, for instance in inner London, being vacated as earlier generations of migrants move through the integration process and suburbanise.\(^{149}\) Overall, migrants are competing with other low income groups for housing of a type which is under-supplied in the capital.\(^{150}\)

Different groups of migrants have slightly different housing patterns. The evidence base for *London Enriched* sets out some of the issues affecting refugees’ housing patterns, from the point of arrival when asylum seekers often stay with friends, to hostel or B&B housing provided by UKBA on applying for asylum, to dispersal out of London into Section 95 accommodation usually provided via private sub-contractors, to limited rights to social housing for those who have been granted settlement. Since 2004 refugees can only apply for social housing in boroughs where they have a local connection.\(^{151}\) In the most extreme case, asylum seekers whose claims have been refused have no entitlements to public support for their housing, but no access to income to pay for shelter; local authorities, although not funded to do so, have to spend money on providing non-cost effective emergency accommodation for such asylum seekers – although the numbers are small (in the hundreds across the capital), the expenditure on this is relatively great.\(^{152}\)

A significant number of Labour migrants live in accommodation provided by employers and tied to jobs; the Local Government Association found that this is often overcrowded, of poor quality, and at risk of fire.\(^{153}\)
**Migrant homelessness**

There is considerable evidence of refugees and especially refused asylum seekers at risk from homelessness and destitution.\(^{154}\) There is also evidence that labour migrants from the accession states are at risk from homelessness, due to precarious employment and limited entitlement to benefits.\(^{155}\) This is particularly the case in London, the place where migrants are most likely to end up as rough sleepers. In one DCLG study in April 2008, it was estimated that 15 per cent of the capital’s rough sleepers are migrants without recourse to public funds.\(^{156}\) Surveys in November 2007, June 2008 and November 2008 found that 18 per cent, 20 per cent and 25 per cent respectively of the capital’s rough sleepers were A2 and A8 nationals.\(^{157}\) In a similar period, research with homeless people at day centres, hostels and on London’s streets found 39 per cent were non-UK nationals, up from 18 per cent in 2004.\(^{158}\)

**Migration and neighbourhood change in London: old and new contact zones**

Evidence suggests that, although there are variations in the pattern, new immigrants often live in poor quality housing in deprived inner city neighbourhoods, but there are increasing numbers moving to the outer boroughs too.\(^{159}\) These patterns can be described using Robinson et al’s distinction between ‘old contact zones’, with a long-established pattern of migrant settlement, and ‘new contact zones’, previously less diverse and experiencing migration for the first time.\(^{160}\)

There are two types of old contact zones in London: those with a single large minority ethnic group long settled there, such as is common the former industrial regions of England, of which there are very few examples in London; and more diverse areas, which are experiencing high absolute numbers of migrants but small proportional changes. Both of these areas reflect historic patterns of migrant settlement initially created by employment opportunities and reinforced by chain migration and family reunification.\(^{161}\) The factors that continue to drive new migrants into these areas include social factors,\(^{162}\) but also the actions of recruitment agencies or gang masters,\(^{163}\) or issues of affordability.\(^{164}\) In general, the old contact zones are characterised by a relatively large private rented sector, ready access and high turnover, as well as poor quality and especially overcrowded houses of multiple occupation (HMOs).\(^{165}\)

Nationally, many rural and semi-rural areas fall within the category of new contact zones, but in London this term is relevant to two types of areas: in particular outer-city areas, in boroughs like Havering, which are experiencing low absolute numbers of migrants but large proportional changes in the make-up of the population, but also some inner-city social housing estates that, for historic reasons, remained pockets of predominantly white British residence, which have become more diverse in recent years.

**Housing and integration**

The multiple barriers faced by migrants in the housing market creating the patterns of settlement described above lead to issues of the processes of integration which emerge in the literature: the effects of migrant residential clustering on integration and cohesion; the
impact of migrant housing market patterns on community cohesion; and the impact of migrants’ insecure housing on the integration process.

**Residential clustering as a factor in migrant integration:** The evidence suggests that migrants often choose to live near people of the same background, and benefit in several ways from doing so; this can be a factor for successful integration in a number of domains, including the labour market.\(^{166}\) Because of this, there is considerable evidence that these areas attract migrants for reasons additional to purely housing market factors – for example, the preference among new migrants from outside the EU for locations where family or friends live.\(^{167}\) There is some evidence that similar factors are behind the settlement patterns of A8 migrants,\(^{168}\) but labour market factors more often drive A8 migrants into areas, including on the fringes of London, which have previously experienced few migrants.\(^{169}\) (On the other hand, the literature notes a ‘well-established pattern of gradual residential integration’, whereby migrant populations move within and across generations from these sorts of inner city areas to suburbs,\(^{170}\) and it is likely that current migrants will follow this pattern.)

However, if living in a neighbourhood with high numbers of migrants is a clear positive factor for migrant integration in the socio-economic and political domains, it is less clear that it is a positive factor in the cultural and identity domains, and may even be a negative factor. Government policy since 2001 has increasingly seen ethnic clustering as socially problematic and negatively impacting on cohesion.\(^{171}\) However, other evidence points to the contrary. Analysis of the Home Office Citizenship Survey has found that the religious and ethnic concentration of a neighbourhood is statistically insignificant to a sense of belonging and identity with Britain across all groups.\(^{172}\) Robinson and Reeve claim that ‘Evidence suggests that new immigrants are making a positive contribution to... the cultural and social fabric of towns and neighbourhoods and, in some situations, the regeneration and revitalisation of declining neighbourhoods.’\(^{173}\) In London, though, there are relatively few areas which are characterised by the predominant presence of a single ethnic minority population and most old contact zones fall into the category of highly diverse inner city areas. The consensus in the literature seems to be that such areas, while not necessarily cohesive, facilitate a strong sense of local belonging for migrants and strong opportunities for civic participation.\(^{174}\)

**The impact of migrant housing and community cohesion:** On the other hand, new contact zones in London present different sorts of integration challenges. It is in such areas where, the evidence shows, migrants are most likely to suffer discrimination, racism and harassment.\(^{175}\) In these zones, too, the much smaller private rented sector also experiences some pressure as a result of arrivals, indirectly impacting on demand for social housing,\(^{176}\) sometimes meaning that white British populations experience competition.\(^{177}\) It is these sorts of areas in London where far right extremism is having an electoral impact.\(^{178}\)

A recent study for the Thames Gateway London Partnership\(^{179}\) provides no evidence that new migrants have any advantage when it comes to accessing social housing. They do, however, identify a range of factors that may be contributing to this perception in London, and point to some of the actual pressures on the supply and demand for social housing.
affecting residents from a range of backgrounds, such as the affordability gap, and the undersupply of social housing to demand in most London boroughs.

**Housing insecurity as a factor in migrant integration:** Finally, migrant housing patterns impact on integration negatively in one further way. Migrants are disproportionately likely to be living in various forms of short-term insecure accommodation for longer periods than other Londoners, and this limits their ability to establish a connection to locality, to access local social networks, to participate in local civic life, and in other ways participate successfully in the two-way process of integration. Living in certain types of temporary housing particularly impacts negatively on children.

**Policy implications**

The above review of the evidence has a number of policy implications. Widespread ideas of migrants jumping the housing queue are mistaken, and there is a need to communicate better with migrants and the settled population on what the real entitlements are, especially in outer city new contact zones. Migrant homelessness is also an issue, faced by labour migrants, irregular migrants and refused asylum seekers.
6.3 Employment, skills and enterprise

The impact of migrants on the labour market is unclear, but the evidence suggests that at a national and regional level migrants contribute positively to the economy and to income levels, while at the local level in areas where there is a low skills base (as in the more deprived parts of the capital) they may have a slight negative impact. This is clearly, therefore, a policy priority area for an integration strategy. At the same time, migrants themselves face high levels of exploitation and vulnerability in the labour market, and this too has key policy implications.

As noted above, it is this aspect of integration that has received the most attention in UK national policy. On one hand, the government has emphasised labour market participation as the key route to integration, while on the other hand the managed migration policies developed in the economic upturn and the labour migration following the A8 accession have focused attention on migration’s ability to fill labour market gaps and skills shortages.\(^{184}\) For the purposes of a migrant integration strategy, however, it is the former point on which we will focus. As discussed above, the economy in general and employment in particular are central to the integration process. The European Union Common Basic Principle 3 states that ‘Employment is a key part of the integration process and is central to the participation of immigration, to the contributions immigrants make to the host society, and to making such contributions visible.’\(^{185}\)

Although the economic downturn since 2008 has led to rising unemployment, the period since the mid-1990s has seen the emergence of key skills gaps in a number of sectors in the UK and across Europe. ‘As a result of demographic changes Europe will be increasingly in need of foreign labour to sustain economic growth. Across Europe, employers are experiencing difficulties recruiting staff at both skilled and unskilled levels. Newly arriving and settled refugees and migrants can make a major contribution towards easing current and future labour market shortages.’\(^{186}\)

**Migrants in the labour market**

Different groups of migrants fare very differently in the labour market, and face very different issues. At one end, some groups have limited or no entitlement to work in the UK: including asylum seekers, asylum seekers whose applications have been rejected, pre-university students (who can only work 10 hours per week) and their dependents (who cannot work), and various categories of irregular migrants. At the other end, highly skilled labour migrants entering on particular sector-based schemes clearly have ready access to high wage jobs, as do EEA and EU15 citizens.

Despite the skills gaps which remain open, migrants in general and certain categories of migrant in particular suffer from relatively higher unemployment than the UK and London population as a whole.\(^{187}\) However, levels of employment and unemployment vary considerably across national groups, as set out in figure 1 below. For instance, those from Australia, Western Europe and Southeast Asia have very low unemployment rates, while those from Africa and the Middle East have somewhat higher rates than the UK average.
'Refugees and migrants are a very diverse group with different skills levels, language abilities, qualifications, work experiences and ambitions. However, what they do have in common is the fact they suffer higher levels of unemployment than the native population and are often found working in low-skilled, badly paid and temporary jobs. Due to the forced nature of their migration and their experiences, compared with other migrant groups, refugees often face additional difficulties in accessing the labour market. In the UK, around 36 per cent of refugees are unemployed.

Different groups of migrants access the labour market differently, experience different routes into employment as well as different barriers. The research shows, for instance, that social networks are especially important for migrants in accessing employment, and these networks vary in their effectiveness from group to group. However, migration networks that are based on personal ties – while being the most common forms – may lead the migrant (a) into a limiting ethnic niche occupation or domain, and/or (b) into a downward occupational trajectory as the migrant, through a specific network, gains a post-migration job incommensurate with his/her level of training. Migration networks based on organizational ties (schools, professional associations, agencies) serve better to match skill levels and jobs, although they are open for competition and therefore less certain in conditioning migration outcomes. Among the key such networks are those related to the experience of being an international student, which can facilitate the movement and labour market integration of the highly skilled, and not just for overseas students themselves but also for colleagues and friends from the home country as well; this is an especially important dynamic in London, with its high concentrations of overseas students and of economic sectors requiring highly skilled workers. Others include growing forms of brokerage and placement services, such as agencies based in India and other emerging economic areas involved in body shopping, as well as formal transnational and diasporic professional associations and web-based social networks which calibrate with flows of skilled migrants.

As well as access to employment, there is some evidence that employment retention is a vital issue. For refugees in particular there is some evidence that many refugees who access employment are unable to retain jobs. And as well as access to and retention of jobs, there is evidence that under-employment is an issue in the migrant population. Although some groups of migrants are employed in much higher grade jobs than the UK population as a whole (e.g. Australians), several groups of migrants are employed below their skills levels and/or in low-grade low-pay jobs. The labour migrants from the A8 countries have low unemployment levels, but have tended to work for low wages in low skill jobs, often below their own skills levels ('in other words they 'downgrade' and have a lower return on their education achievements than other migrant groups). This is the case, too, with many refugees, who are often relatively highly educated in their countries of origin. With refugees, non-recognition of overseas qualifications is a key factor in this sort of underemployment. In the case of both A8 citizens and refugees, where migrants are more skilled, these skills are often not directly transferable in the UK. This extends to the statistical recognition of existing skill levels: issues in comparing levels of UK educational attainment and those from other nations. Irrespective of these difficulties, however, there is clear evidence that the skills of many migrants are not being used in their current jobs. As recent research in the South East of England has shown, recent migrants have tended to be
Many migrants experience poor quality employment. Many [refugees and migrants] are unable to make use of their previous skills and experience and are often working in low skilled, temporary and badly paid jobs. They are also over-represented in the informal labour market due to lack of access to legal employment and the need to survive (in particular in countries with less developed social benefits systems). The evidence, including from London-specific research, suggests that government policy which emphasises migrants accessing work as quickly as possible, alongside migrants’ own survival needs, pushes migrants into low-pay work, making it harder for them to make long-term strategies based on employment progression, thus also not adding the most value to the capital’s labour market. The term 3D – dirty, dangerous and difficult – is used for the jobs that are hard to fill from within the settled labour force and therefore more commonly accessed by migrant workers. WRS figures presented below suggest that 50 per cent of A8 migrants are earning less than £6 per hour. These factors lead to issues of exploitation and vulnerability which we will discuss below, as well as exposure to risks of harassment at work or illegal deductions from pay by gangmasters.
Figure 1 shows that there is little difference in age-related economic activity patterns between migrants in London and the London population as a whole. Those migrants in the younger part of the working age range are a little less likely to be employees, and a little more likely to be students (particularly among 16-24 year olds – see section on ‘children and students’) or economically inactive compared to London’s population as a whole. Self-employment and unemployment rates are similar in both categories. The proportion of retired people among those aged 65+ is the same for both migrants and the London population as a whole.
Figure 2 shows that there are some differences in economic activity patterns of male and female migrants of working age. Men are more likely to be employed or self-employed than are women, and women are three times as likely to be economically inactive than men. This latter category includes women who are not economically active because of family responsibilities. On the other hand, rates of unemployment and of being students are similar for both men and women. Among men, the unemployment rate for migrants is similar to that for the total London male population of working age (7 per cent), while female migrants have a slightly higher unemployment rate than all females of working age in London (7 per cent compared to 6 per cent). Other evidence for London shows that unemployment among migrants varies according to countries of origin and length of stay. Other evidence for London shows that unemployment among migrants varies according to countries of origin and length of stay.

Figure 3 looks at the relationship between country of birth and economic activity for London’s population of working age. There are relatively large proportions of employed people among country of birth groups in the migrant population, which is not surprising given the extent of labour migration to the UK. Migrants from Australia and New Zealand particularly tend to be employees. Migrants from A2 countries are the most likely in London to be self-employed. Unemployment rates are a little higher among some country of birth groups compared to the UK born – for instance, those born in the Middle East, Africa, the Caribbean, Pakistan. Proportions of the economically inactive are high in some groups, notably, those born in Bangladesh, the Middle East, Pakistan. This category includes people with family responsibilities.
Figure 3

Working age population by country of birth, world geographical categories and economic activity, London 2008-2009

Migrants in London work in almost all industrial sectors, although there are some differences in patterns between them and the total population (Figure 4). Nearly one fifth of...
migrants living in inner London boroughs, and slightly less in outer boroughs, are employed in the business services sector. The largest proportion of the total population in both inner and outer London is employed in this sector as well. Higher proportions of migrants living in inner London than the total population in this area are employed in the financial sector. Other industrial sectors that migrants in inner London are more likely than the total population to be employed in include hotels & restaurants, domestic service, wholesale and retail, and transport and communications. The diversity of migrants in inner London is well captured here, as their industrial distribution clearly covers both migrants from more affluent Western countries in business, finance and communication, and those migrants from poorer countries and at the lower end of the socio-economic structure in London who are to be found in catering, domestic service and transport. Migrants living in outer London boroughs exhibit somewhat different industrial patterns from those in inner boroughs, which partly corresponds to differences between the total population in inner and outer boroughs, but also partly reflects the differences among migrants living inner and outer boroughs that have already been documented (see Section 4 above, demographic patterns). Overall, migrants in the outer boroughs, like the total population in these boroughs, are more likely to be in the health & social work and wholesale & retail sectors than are migrants in the inner boroughs. In both inner and outer boroughs, migrants are less likely than the total population to be represented in public administration, education and manufacturing sectors, although migrants in the outer boroughs, possibly as more settled residents, have a slightly greater presence in these sectors than do migrants in inner London. Slightly higher percentages of migrants than the total populations in both outer and inner London are in the construction sector, possibly accounted for by the recent increase of migrants from A8 and A2 countries.
Educational qualifications and skill levels are generally higher among migrants from many country of birth groups compared with all residents in London, and those born in the UK (Figure 5). This is particularly the case for migrants from wealthier countries such as Australia & New Zealand, North America, EU/EEA countries, and also among migrants from South East Asian countries. There is a more diverse pattern of qualifications among South Asian origin groups, with nearly two fifths of people born in India with qualifications equivalent to tertiary level, but with lower levels of qualifications among people born in Bangladesh. Bangladeshis also have the highest proportion of those with no qualifications (39 per cent). However, it is important to be cautious in interpreting these patterns as recognition of equivalent qualifications from different parts of the world needs to be taken into account.
Employment patterns of A8 nationals in London

The largest percentage of WRS registered workers in London in the October-December 2009 quarter were in the hospitality and catering sector (36 per cent) and in the administration, business and management sector (33 per cent).\textsuperscript{216} According to the Home Office’s Accession Monitoring report, the majority of workers in the former sector are employed by recruitment agencies and are in reality found in a variety of industries.\textsuperscript{217} Such jobs held by A8 migrants are unlikely to correspond to the patterns of higher levels of employment particularly among migrants from the pre-accession EU/EEA countries and other wealthier countries in the business and financial sectors shown earlier. An examination of the most common occupations of registered A8 workers in each local area in London confirms the pattern of employment at the lower end of the occupational structure. For instance, in Westminster, which has the largest number of WRS workers in the October-December quarter in 2009, the most common occupations are: waiter/waitress, kitchen and catering assistants, sales and retail assistants, hotel maid/room attendant, bar staff. A similar distribution of low skilled service employment among A8 workers is found in Camden; however, in Ealing there is more of a pattern of low skilled factory work. These occupational patterns need to be considered in relation to variations in local employment opportunities for all residents and for migrants, although most employment opportunities for A8 workers appear to be at the lower end of the economy, in London as elsewhere in the UK.\textsuperscript{218} It would also appear from the findings about educational qualifications of A8 migrants in London presented earlier that A8 workers in London are working in jobs that are below their qualifications and skills levels, and therefore their economic potential is far from being productively utilised.

The employment patterns of A8 workers in London appear also to be tied up with the temporary nature of their employment, as can be seen in the data on intended length of stay (Figure 6). More than half of registrants in London (52 per cent) give their intended length of stay in the UK as less than 3 months. However, as Figure 6 shows, the proportion of those with intention to stay less than 3 months is lowest in London compared with the rest of the UK. Further, 36 per cent of A8 workers in London were uncertain about how long they intended to stay in the UK. Proportions of those uncertain were lower in the rest of the UK.
Figure 6

Percentage of WRS registered workers with intended length of stay less than 3 months, by English region and UK country, Oct - Dec 2009

Source: Worker Registration Scheme 219

Figure 7

Percentage of WRS registered workers earning <£6 per hour*, by English region and UK country, Oct - Dec 2009

*Before deductions

Source: Worker Registration Scheme 220
The proportion of A8 workers earning less than £6 per hour was smaller in London than elsewhere in the UK (Figure 7). Despite the fact that A8 workers tend largely to be in low skilled, poorly paid jobs in all areas they have migrated to in the UK, wage rates are higher in London. However if we look at borough level data, there is wide variation in percentages of A8 workers getting less than £6 per hour, even in areas where there are relatively large numbers of A8 workers – for instance 48 per cent in Westminster, but over 70 per cent in Camden and in Ealing. These findings need to be seen in the context of general employment patterns and pay structures in local areas.221

**Barriers to migrant employment**

Most categories of migrants ‘face multiple barriers to work including insufficient language skills and a lack of knowledge of processes involved in looking, and applying for, work in England.’222 Many of the barriers are the same barriers faced by all members of the population, but often felt more intensely for new arrivals.223

The most important barrier, for those migrants for whom English is not a first language, is linguistic. It is commonly accepted that ‘Lack of linguistic proficiency is one of the primary causes of refugees’ and migrants’ disadvantaged position in the labour market.’224 ‘Language emerges repeatedly in research studies as a primary barrier to participation in training and employment, and to mobility within the labour market.’225 Anecdotal evidence collected from local authority employment services in the Thames Gateway at the end of 2009 suggested that these issues created greater vulnerabilities to the economic downturn for migrant workers, where more established workers are more able to overcome the challenges of an increasingly competitive jobs market.226

Other barriers include under-recognition of overseas qualifications (especially vocational qualifications, where recognition lags behind academic qualifications), migrants’ lack of specific competencies required for UK jobs, lack of UK referees and/or difficulty in accessing or using overseas referees, lack of UK job experience.227

**Migrant employment and integration and cohesion**

For those boroughs in London for whom recent migration trends are continuing a longer historical pattern (old contact zones), the migrants arriving in recent years continue to be, when compared to other London areas, disproportionately from those groups that have historically struggled economically. This may be in part because of the relatively low skill levels of some migrant groups. Research has shown, for example, that in 2004 only 7 per cent of Bangladeshi men and 3 per cent of women moving to the UK were graduates, while 41 per cent of men and 60 per cent of women had no qualifications.228

If it is true that there is a local effect of new migrants on local employment, particularly for the lowest skilled members and most vulnerable of the settled population, then there are implications of this for community cohesion: the reality and the perception of unfair competition for jobs is likely to drive resentment in the absence of a clear picture of the economic benefits of migration, particularly in the context of negative public discourses described above. Interviews with local authority employment service providers in the
Thames Gateway in late 2009 suggested that the visibility of services specifically tailored to specific ethnic groups might generate resentment and a sense of unfairness.229

Enterprise
In addition to the issues of employment discussed above, self-employment, enterprise and business are issues for migrants, as for other Londoners. Some migrant groups have higher rates of self-employment. Barriers to employment can sometimes encourage enterprise; access to ethnic or linguistic niche markets and access to capital through community infrastructures are also positive factors for migrant enterprise. However, there is evidence that migrant entrepreneurs find it hard to break out of niche markets, and sometimes remain within the informal sector, because of a lack of linguistic proficiency, because of difficulties navigating the bureaucratic complexities of formal business growth, and because of lack of access to credit through formal sources.230

Policy implications
All of these factors have policy implications in three areas. First, there is a need to plan, manage and deliver employment support which takes these factors into account. Second, action may be required to address the issues of vulnerability and exploitation that migrant employment raises. And third, a migration integration strategy must take into account the impact of migrant employment patterns on the local and regional labour markets.

Employment support: There have been a number of initiatives focusing on refugee employment, these included assistance in obtaining national insurance numbers and bank accounts, interpreters to enable them to use Job Centre Plus, facilitating access to New Deal, work-focused language tuition, targeting some of the Ethnic Minority Outreach service on unemployed refugees, and supporting professionals to adapt their qualifications to practice in the UK. In 2006, the government announced a Refugee Integration and Employment Service providing a 12 month advice, employment support and mentoring service to every individual granted refugee status or humanitarian protection in the UK.231

Despite all this, there is a lack of evidence about what works best. However, the literature suggests that key factors include quality of employment provision, focusing on holistic, developmental support and on sustainable employment. Due to issues of employment retention noted above, emphasis is needed not just on employment but in sustainable employment.

Some examples of good practice have, however, been identified. For example, the Migrants and Refugees Qualifications project in London was delivered in the mid-noughties by the Institute for Employment Research, University of Warwick. The project’s approach includes a review of migrants’ qualification comparability and of unrecognised skills, as well as support and active brokerage including the production of a personal development plan.232 A similar holistic approach was commended in an academic evaluation of another London project, the Refugee Education, Employment, Training and Advice project (REETA), which offers tailored and culturally sensitive support to refugees to help them not just to access but also to retain employment.233 Similarly, the Refugee Assessment and Guidance Unit at
London Metropolitan University has developed and evaluated pilot projects on work placements in London local authorities and in the NHS in London for refugees, and found them to be an effective means to address integration issues.\textsuperscript{234} In short, such a holistic approach has been described in the literature as expensive, but effective.\textsuperscript{235} It should also be noted that most of these examples were funded on an ad hoc project basis under short-term programmes.

**Exploitation and vulnerability:** Because of the issues discussed above, including concentration in more precarious sectors and discrimination in the labour market, migrant workers are likely to experience high levels of vulnerability and exploitation.\textsuperscript{236} Qualitative research shows that a combination of factors, including fear of detection and deportation and stricter regulations on employment, have made the working condition of undocumented migrants even more precarious and potentially exploitative.\textsuperscript{237} Construction, hospitality, retail, contract cleaning and residential care have been identified as the main sectors with migrant workers and that are suspect to exploitative labour conditions; of these, all but agriculture/horticulture are major sectors in London.\textsuperscript{238} There is also evidence of pay having declined in these sectors in London in recent years.\textsuperscript{239} Domestic work is of particular concern – especially for London, given the concentration of domestic workers in the capital and the large numbers of migrants employed in the sector, as noted in Section 3 above.\textsuperscript{240}

Given this, the evidence points to combating exploitation and vulnerability being a central issue for integration. The Business in the Community Migrant Worker Integration Group has made a number of recommendations to address this, including a voluntary code of practice for employing migrant staff, and an ethical audit accreditation process, as well as extending the authority of the Gangmasters Licensing Authority.\textsuperscript{241} COMPAS has made specific recommendations around migrant care workers, including the extension of government strategies on the social care workforce to migrants, the improved co-ordination between government and employers, and the use by UKBA of requirements such as signing up to the Care Quality Commission as a way of contracting with employers to prevent exploitation and support integration outcomes such as language acquisition.\textsuperscript{242} Kalayaan has made a number of specific recommendations around the exploitation of vulnerable domestic workers, including a route to settlement for domestic service workers, supporting employers to be aware of rights and responsibilities, model contracts for domestic workers, extending the Care and Counsel helpline to cover paid as well as unpaid carers, greater regulation of agencies, and supporting agencies to develop robust policies on racism and abuse.\textsuperscript{243}
6.4 Health and social care

Migrants face health inequalities because of the barriers they experience to health care, including restrictions on their entitlements, institutional barriers, language barriers and avoidance of contact with officialdom. Underpinning many of these is a lack of clarity around entitlements, on behalf of both migrants and health professionals.

Migrants feature in the literature on health both as providers of health care and as users of services. A large proportion of the UK’s health and care professionals are migrants or of migrant background. In terms of migrants as users, although the right to health is universal, regardless of immigration status (see Appendix 2), what this means in practice is uneven for different categories of migrants. There is a lack of robust data comparing migrants’ health to that of the rest of the UK or London population. According to Johnson, such evidence as exists ‘suggests that while some asylum seekers have suffered torture and trauma, the health of most new arrivals and immigrants is good, although most established minority ethnic groups in Britain tend to have poorer health than the national average.’ The Audit Commission report that the post-2004 A8 migrants have little impact on health service demand. There is, however, a clear link established between health outcomes and social inequalities, and, as many migrants experience various forms of disadvantage, many also experience health inequalities.

The weight of evidence suggests there is little or no health tourism in the UK. For example, the Terrance Higgins Trust, researching AIDS and HIV (an area where there is a widespread perception of treatment tourism from Africa) found that that migrants actually access HIV treatment a considerable time after their arrival in the UK. The London Project in 2007 found no evidence of health tourists who came to the United Kingdom seeking expensive treatment. Migrants and British citizens, their report showed, had similar health profiles, and migrants were no more likely to have expensive complicated medical needs than anyone else. Changes to health regulations which would prevent many migrants from getting access to the care of a family doctor would only result in greater costs because there would be less chance of preventing diseases, less chance of early and affordable treatment of diseases (including those which were contagious), and increased pressure on already overburdened accident and emergency departments.

However, some groups of migrants do face significant barriers to accessing health care. Among the barriers to good health recorded in the literature are language barriers, lack of knowledge of the system due to newness, cultural competence of health care systems and staff in certain parts of the capital (although this is less of an issue than elsewhere in the UK), and poverty and lack of disposable income (which impact on health, but also inhibit paying for care where it not freely available, as in some cases of non-emergency care).

Some groups face particularly severe barriers. Specifically, failed asylum seekers and most other categories of irregular migrant have no recourse to public funds; they are entitled to emergency care and primary care. However, access to primary care is limited by the GP’s considerable discretion as to whether to register them; widespread lack of clarity around entitlements mean that many surgeries require proof of immigration status, although this is
not formally required, along with proof of residence.\textsuperscript{252} Even where practices follow the legislation, a number of barriers intervene, such as migrants’ desire to remain beneath the radar and language barriers.\textsuperscript{253} There is some evidence that inappropriate use of (costly) emergency services is increased by the lack of access to primary care. Finally, non-emergency hospital care must be paid for by these categories of migrant, partly to discourage NHS tourism. Many papers have found problems in new migrants accessing both general medical care and dental treatment, usually because of their lack of national insurance cover.\textsuperscript{254} Undocumented migrants have the most severe barriers to accessing healthcare, as they experience all of the above described barriers particularly intensely.\textsuperscript{255}

\textbf{Mental health}

Research has show that refugees experience a number of health inequalities including in the area of mental health. Reports on asylum seekers/refugees ‘typically describe a number of mental health problems, including high levels of nervous illness, headache and depression,’\textsuperscript{256} For example, a report by MIND showed that people who came to the United Kingdom seeking refuge faced a 'stark lack of understanding' of their mental health needs, and were often denied access to crucial services and treatments. Restrictive policies on healthcare, education, accommodation, and employment were having devastating consequences, the report argued, further marginalizing refugees and asylum-seekers from society. A linked report argued that primary care trusts and local authorities need to do more to improve their engagement with refugee community organizations, and develop more culturally appropriate services.\textsuperscript{257}

\textbf{Maternity and maternal mortality}

As noted earlier in the report (section 4), some migrant groups have high numbers of live births, which impact on maternity services in the capital. There is also recent evidence of higher rates of maternal mortality among recent migrants to the UK compared to UK born White British mothers. The Confidential Enquiry into Maternal Deaths in the UK in 2003-2005 found that Black African mothers in England had nearly a six times greater relative risk of dying than White women.\textsuperscript{258} The majority of Black African mothers who died were recent migrants, including asylum seekers and refugees. Among the total number of mothers who died, the proportion who spoke no English was relatively high, and overall higher proportions among minority ethnic mothers compared to White mothers had inadequate healthcare use including late booking (after 22 weeks) or no antenatal care. The report also notes that there were several maternal deaths among women newly arrived from Accession countries and ‘this reflects the experiences of the maternity services in general who report rising numbers of women from the expanded EU, many of whom do not speak English’.\textsuperscript{259}

\textbf{Policy implications}

Policy initiatives around migrant health recommended in the literature include education and training for newly arrived migrants, educational initiatives for professionals, translation of key information into new migrant languages, group-specific health needs assessments, innovative forms of screening and hand-held records, better recording of monitoring data, improved assessment at or close to the point of arrival, stronger partnerships between
health providers and migrant community organisations, improvements in the integration of health professionals from migrant backgrounds.  

One of the most important interventions is greater clarity around entitlements, both for the benefit of migrant users and service providers. There are some examples of London case studies working on these issues, including Médecins du Monde UK’s Project London, which provides health advice to irregular migrants, NHS job placement programmes developed by London Metropolitan University’s Refugee Advice and Guidance Unit and Newham Primary Care Trust’s drop-in service for vulnerable migrants. In addition, the issues around fertility rates and maternal mortality noted here are also key to planning of health services in London to take account of the migrant population, specifically around maternity care.
6.5 Community safety and community cohesion

The research and evidence on community safety and community cohesion points towards the need for policy intervention around reframing the debate, and tackling negative public perceptions of new migrants, through a strategy that is sensitive to local issues, takes people’s concerns seriously, and values the role of the media, especially local media, in making a positive difference. The Mayor and GLA group, with a leadership role in the capital, have the potential to be central to this.

Crime and safety

Crime and community safety are key issues for Londoners, and migrants face many of the same concerns faced by other Londoners, and have the same entitlements to protection from crime. London’s police force has changed in recent decades to reflect London’s demographic diversity, and has worked to build the confidence of the communities it serves. Migrants too need to be factored into this picture.

Community safety, however, is not a high profile topic within the academic integration literature, as there is little or no evidence of a specific migration dimension to this issue. There is no evidence of higher crime rates due to increased migrant populations. Work commissioned by the Association of Chief Police Officers noted that the post-2004 A8 migration has not led to higher crime but does create some challenges for policing, such as local rumour and misunderstandings fuelling tensions, which police have had to be proactive in resolving, and leading to significant increases in spending on interpreters, which can also make investigations more complex. Better forecasting and data-sharing between local agencies to pick up changes in local populations quicker is necessary to help anticipate the issues.\textsuperscript{263} There are some very particular criminal activities whose perpetrators correlate to very specific migrant groups – for example, some evidence of high incidence of youth gangs in certain migrant groups.\textsuperscript{264} There are also crimes to which migrants might be particularly vulnerable as victims, such as some hate crimes or extreme forms of exploitation in the workforce.\textsuperscript{265} There is evidence that some experience high levels of fear of crime.\textsuperscript{266} And there are crimes which relate to the abuse of the immigration system in general, such as trafficking, which have been noted in the section on irregular migration above.\textsuperscript{267} There is also evidence of the exaggeration of many of these issues in the mainstream media.\textsuperscript{268}

In terms of migrants’ experience of policing and the criminal justice system, there is evidence of barriers faced by migrants. Migrants are disproportionately affected by recent changes to legal aid provision.\textsuperscript{269} Migrants are disproportionally represented in the prison population, and there is evidence that they are under-accessing services provided within prisons.\textsuperscript{270} There is evidence that migrants, in particular irregular migrants, do not have the confidence to report hate crimes and other crimes to the police.\textsuperscript{271}
**Community cohesion**

The debates and literature on cohesion, both within policy and academic contexts, have tended to focus on long-settled minority ethnic populations, especially of South Asian Muslim descent, rather than on newer migrants. There is, however, a sizable and growing literature on cohesion issues as they relate to the relations between new migrants and settled populations. A first key element in this literature is the importance of spaces in which people of different backgrounds can come together, highlighted by the Commission on Integration and Cohesion. There is evidence that particular groups are less likely to have access to this kind of contact, including A8 labour migrants, who are working long hours and have few opportunities for socialising with British-born people outside work. Looking at the spaces where people meet a recent study found that people tended to meet people from their own ethnic and religious background in more spaces on average than they did people from other ethnic or religious backgrounds. The study suggests that the home remains an intimate space where interaction was largely with relatives and friends from similar backgrounds while the workplace, educational institutions and public spaces such as cafes, supermarkets and parks are important spaces for meaningful contact with people outside their ethnic or religious groups. It suggests that greater consideration be given to how public spaces can be used more deliberately to foster interactions.

A second key element in the literature is on attitudes towards migrants. The impact of new immigration on local neighbourhoods, and the public perception of their arrival, depends on a number of key factors: the local socio-economic context, history of previous settlement and ethnic profile, actual and perceived ethnicity and identity of new immigrants, the legal status of new immigrants, local media portrayals of immigration and asylum and the success of local agencies in mediating between established and incoming populations. There is evidence on each of these factors, of which the following are the most relevant for migrant integration in London.

**The local socio-economic context:** Competition for scarce resources is a factor driving tension, especially given that areas of migrant settlement map closely on to areas of deprivation, but evidence shows that deprived areas show a range of responses to migrants, including great tolerance. The policy implication of this evidence is that any strategy to build better public perceptions should not make assumptions about negative attitudes in more deprived areas, but should nevertheless take seriously local concerns about competition for resources.

**History of previous settlement and ethnic profile:** Broadly, areas with a history of ethnic diversity and migrant arrival tend to be more positive for new immigrants (although anti-immigrant attitudes are prevalent among settled BME residents), while areas without such a history are more likely to see harassment, discrimination or tension. In London, this distinction maps on to the difference between the inner boroughs, with large absolute numbers of migrants, and the outer boroughs, with lower absolute numbers but a greater proportional change. The policy implication of this evidence is that any strategy to build better public perceptions needs to be locally relevant, based on a recognition of the different histories of different boroughs and neighbourhoods. While London as a whole, and inner London boroughs in particular, have strong and proud histories of providing sanctuary to new arrivals, outer London boroughs do not necessarily share in these narratives.
However, London’s relatively cosmopolitan and tolerant attitude – for example, the Citizenship Survey and other polls show Londoners are less supportive of immigration restriction and more supportive of cultural diversity and that cultural diversity makes Londoners proud of their city280 – is an advantage on which a migrant integration strategy in the capital can build.

**Media portrayals of immigration and asylum:** The evidence shows that the media has a particular role and responsibility in relation to public perceptions of new migrants. ‘The British media has generally represented refugees and asylum seekers in negative ways,’281 British news coverage of asylum issues has been criticised for failing to provide context for the stories by not adequately explaining the reasons for asylum seekers’ flights to the UK and the conditions of their journey and life on arrival, and for not giving a voice to the migrants themselves. However, recent research has found that the local press has produced some very balanced, accurate and, at times, imaginative reporting on asylum. More personalised and humanised stories are seen in the local press. 282

**The success of local agencies in mediating between established and incoming populations:** New immigrants appear to receive a better reception in areas where local residents have been prepared in advance for their arrival. 283

Research has identified a key role for regional and local authorities and other regional and local stakeholders in tackling misperceptions and resentments, both directly, via their own communication strategies and via communicating with civil society organisations in their areas.284 ‘Although public opinion is often highly misinformed, people’s concerns should, nevertheless, be taken seriously. Research suggests that systems for responding to the concerns of people affected by the arrival of asylum seekers should be developed and information provision should be made a key part of asylum seeker and refugee settlement strategies.’285 A Joseph Rowntree Foundation report gives some guidelines on how best to deliver this, including sustained activities over a period of time and learning through doing and experiencing not just talking.286

Two elements have been given prominence in debates around communication for community cohesion: welcome packs and myth-busting. On welcome packs, I&DeA developed a guide to producing such packs, with examples of what is currently being used, showing an enormous variation in the content, languages used, costs, formats, and target audiences; however, there has been little formal evaluation of these types of packs.287 On myth-busting, recent research for the JRF recommended carefully targeted myth-busting exercises, proactively identifying and responding to local concerns and responding proactively to symptoms of tension, as part of wider, proactive communication strategies. The stress should be on the realities rather than on the myths, as there is some evidence, for instance from IPPR, that clumsy myth-busting can serve to reinforce the myths, and myth-busting cannot stand alone but should form part of a communication strategy, alongside other forms of guidance and work with the media.288 ‘Addressing negative and unbalanced media coverage of asylum has been identified by many as a priority in creating more informed opinions. This can be done by challenging inaccurate media portrayals... However, a more sustainable approach may be to engage with the media to work towards more varied and positive coverage. Training and supporting refugee organisations to work
with the media is a critical aspect of this.’ It must be part of a wider attempt at a new form of local conversation; local authorities clearly have a key role in this, but London’s regional agencies have the potential to take a leadership role too.
6.6 Children and young people

One in ten children in London was born abroad. The research and evidence on migrant children and young people points towards a tension between the growing focus on protecting the rights of children and the ways in which children are negatively affected by the imperative to protect the UK’s borders. The Mayor’s focus on children and young people clearly resonates with the policy implications of this. However, there are few examples of in the literature of good practice working with children from non-refugee migrant children.

11 per cent of all children under 16 in London are born outside the UK. If we take the 16-19 age group, which is more likely than other age groups to contain full time students beyond compulsory school age, 27 per cent are economically inactive students born outside the UK.290

Migrant children in the UK are pulled between two different policy agendas: an immigration agenda which makes their lives more precarious and restricts their abilities to reach their full potential as young people, on one hand, and a growing emphasis on the rights and entitlements of children and youth, on the other. The emphasis in policy literature on child trafficking291 can serve to highlight this tension, as it turns on both the protection of children’s rights and the securing of Britain’s borders.

There are broadly three large categories of migrant children: those who arrive alone (often referred to as unaccompanied or separated), those who arrive with families, and those born to a migrant family after arrival in the UK. Unaccompanied child migrants include those who are trafficked or smuggled, but this can hide the complex reasons and motivations for migration among children, including the main groups identified by Bhabha: (a) children who travel in search of opportunities, whether educational or employment related; (b) children who travel to survive - to escape persecution or war, family abuse, dire poverty; (c) children who travel for family reunion - to join documented or undocumented family members who have already migrated; (d) children who travel in the context of exploitation (including trafficking). These groups are not mutually exclusive.292

All children in the UK, regardless of their status, have the legal right to free education. However, in practice, according to the research, the application of this law is uneven, highly dependent on local situations – for example, varying not just from borough to borough but also from school to school.293 Practicalities which intervene between the law and the practice include the requirements for children to provide documentation, migrants’ desire to keep beneath the radar, language barriers, and insecurity of accommodation.294

The experience of migrant children and young people differs considerably by age group, with reaching adult status marking a crucial shift. Children and young people who arrive by particular migration routes or fall into particular immigration categories face a range of specific issues. For many, their age will define their status, as migrant children have considerably more rights than migrant adults in certain respects. As many irregular entrants and asylum seekers do not have ready access to documentation proving their date of birth
(and in many global regions from whence migrants come, these documents may not have existed), many asylum and immigration cases have turned on a child’s age. There are also a number of ways in which the principle of the protection of the rights of the child as set out in the Children Act are contradicted by both legislation and administrative practice designed to protect the UK’s borders, such as the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants) Act 2004 and practices of detention, resulting in concerns raised by, for instance, the Royal College of Paediatrics and Child Health, the Children’s Commissioner and the Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association.

Unaccompanied asylum seeking children (UASCs) are a category of migrant children of priority in the Mayor’s strategy. In December 2009, Westminster Council’s National Register for Unaccompanied Children estimated that 4,876 UASCs (based on incomplete reports from boroughs in the absence of statistics from UKBA) were in the care of local authorities in London. This includes 3,220 UASCs over 18 years of age supported under the Leaving Care Act but no longer considered children by UKBA.

Figure 1

The ‘other’ category includes countries in the Caribbean, South America and where nationalities are unspecified.

Source: calculated from data provided by UKBA

Figure 1 shows nationalities of UASCs in London over the past 3 years. The largest number is from Asian countries, dominated by Afghanistan (1959 overall). A relatively large number of African countries are represented, including Eritrea and Somalia. The majority of children from Middle Eastern countries are from Iran and Iraq.

There are also considerable numbers of children in London living in families that include undocumented or irregular migrants. Sigona and Hughes, drawing on Gordon et al, estimate 111,000 children in undocumented households in London, of whom 61,000 are UK-born.
Specific national origin groups within the migrant population face specific issues too. Among migrants from different parts of the world, the highest proportion of children in London is in the North American-born population. Among A8 and A2 migrants in London there are nearly 10 per cent under age 16 – that is, dependants. There has been little or no evidence on these specific groups of children and young people. There is some research, however, on other specific groups. For example, there are high levels of truancy and exclusion among Turkish and Kurdish origin children and youth, including those from families of Kurdish refugees, of refugees and Commonwealth migrants from Cyprus, and of labour migrants from mainland Turkey, while among Somali youth, research has shown educational disadvantage and vulnerability to certain forms of violent crime.

Policy implications

The legal and policy frameworks – both in terms of the rights of the child, enshrined in international law, and in terms of UK policy, founded on the Every Child Matters framework – are in place to tackle the issues that migrant children and young people face (although, as noted, they sometimes conflict with the immigration system’s imperative to protect the UK’s borders). The need, then, is for these issues to be foregrounded in the institutional agendas of the key agencies, working together, especially in relation to the most vulnerable groups, such as unaccompanied children and children in undocumented families.

There is some support in London for migrant children. The Ethnic Minority Achievement Grant (EMAG) channels funding to schools where there are children of under-achieving ethnic minorities and children with English as an additional language. 85 per cent of the fund is allocated directly to schools, based on the numbers of pupils in these categories, with the remainder going to boroughs for borough-wide work. It can be used to pay for teachers, classroom assistants (including bilingual assistants) or nursery staff who work directly with the identified children; to cover the costs of relevant teaching resources; to meet the specifically identified needs of refugee children; and to provide training for both specialist and mainstream staff. This fund is due to be reviewed in 2011.

There are some examples in the literature of good practice working with migrant children, such as the Multi Agency Refugee Alliance (MARA) in London Borough of Merton, which facilitates cross-agency working to support the newly arrived, the Refugee Team at North Westminster Community School, which supports refugee children in the school setting, the Refugee Council’s Improving the Educational Experiences of Refugee Children, which provides learning materials to supplement school materials; it is notable that most of these focus specifically on refugee children and that there is a lack of comparable examples for other migrant children and young people.
6.7 Community development and participation

Migrant and refugee community organisations are central to the domains of integration at all levels, alongside other stakeholders including local authorities, the third sector, community development organisations across sectors, as well as trade unions and employers. They all have an essential role to play in migrant community development and participation.

The contribution of migrant communities to economic, civic, social and the cultural life at a local level is key to integration. This aspect of integration, especially the promotion of the civic activity of migrants, has been one of the distinctive emphases of the Mayor’s integration strategy to date. This section reviews the evidence on this topic, starting with the barriers and factors of success in this domain, leading to the policy areas suggested by the literature.

**Barriers and opportunities for migrants’ community participation**

There are a number of barriers to migrant participation in civic life. They include: *practical* barriers such as lack of information and understanding of relevant decision-making processes, *economic barriers* such as lack of resources to attend meetings and lack of affordable and appropriate childcare; *personal barriers* such as lack of confidence, feelings of discomfort in formal meetings or communication barriers - several jobs to support themselves and families; and *motivational barriers* such as scepticism as to whether involvement is likely to make any difference.\(^{302}\) JRF research, which included a London case study, into who wasn’t being heard by governance structures in diverse communities found that the most marginalised groups who experience these barriers the most sharply included refused asylum seekers and newly arrived migrants.\(^{303}\)

Factors of success, on the other hand, include building upon clear, coherent and consistent frameworks that are easier for migrants to navigate; outreach and partnership with the voluntary and community sector, working with the organisations most able to reach the hardest to engage; welcome packs and welcome events to facilitate the introduction of migrants into civic life; and events which enable different groups to come together.\(^{304}\) Local authorities have a key role in delivering these factors of success, but alongside other partners in the state sector and civil society, as part of a shared responsibility.

**The role of community development in integration**

Community development – by which we mean communities themselves engaging in action to improve their social and economic situation – is central to migrant integration. As a recent JRF report noted, which included some positive case studies from the London Borough of Newham, ‘community development strategies need to be resourced via community development professionals, to identify and work with informal networks as well as with more established organisations and groups within the voluntary and community sectors, taking account of issues of equalities, accountability, democratic representation and social justice. Second-tier anchor organisations and agencies have particular roles to play here, supporting smaller organisations and groups and enabling them to navigate their way around the structures of local governance effectively. Community development needs to be
promoted both directly via local structures of governance, and via the voluntary and community sectors, and this role needs to be fully recognised and supported.\textsuperscript{305}

The evidence suggests that a number of stakeholders have a key role in this. Migrant and refugee community organisations themselves (MRCOs) – of which there are over 500 in London alone\textsuperscript{306} – have an important role. The emphasis on cohesion since 2001 has placed a question mark around the core principle of multicultural policy of groups organising on the basis of their identity,\textsuperscript{307} but there is evidence for the enduring importance of MRCOs. There is a great diversity of these organisations, but all can function both as a platform for articulating the specific interests of migrants and as a stepping stone to wider civic participation. ‘Civic participation in refugee community and migrant organisations can help newly arrived migrants and refugees settle and develop a social network. In addition, these organisations give refugees and migrants a voice.’\textsuperscript{308} This has been formally recognised for some time in relation to refugee community organisations (RCOs),\textsuperscript{309} but is less widely recognised in relation to other sorts of migrant community organisations (MCOs). However, for example, I&DeA emphasises the importance of the migrant organisations in providing an insight into the issues for local authorities and other key players to plan for integration. In London, the Mayor’s Migrant and Refugee Advisory Panel (MRAP) has played a key role in doing this, providing advice to the Mayor and sending representatives to the LSMP, and its existence is an indicator of the importance placed on MRCOs by the and LSMP and GLA.

However, MRCOs are often ‘below the radar’, operating on very little funding, unable to access finance, and struggling with the governance procedures involved in moving to the next step – issues which are further complicated when they involve undocumented migrants or migrants of uncertain or irregular status.\textsuperscript{310} Clearly, therefore, there is a need for ongoing support for such organisations. Most London local authorities work with MRCOs in various ways already, and some have strong partnerships. However, although there has been some funding for RCOs through the government’s Refugee Community Development Fund and through some charitable trusts, there is little funding for other MRCOs. Most MRCOs are dependent on precarious short-term funding; very few are core funded.\textsuperscript{311}

It is widely recognised that local authorities have a key role in integration. I&DeA noted that ‘The body of local authority experience on migration is growing fast and, with it, the confidence of local councils to take an effective and positive lead.’\textsuperscript{312} Local authorities and LSPs have a key role in the community involvement dimension of integration. Although they have little financial resources specifically associated with integration, many of the Local Area Agreements (LAAs) which determine their funding relate to integration. In particular, in their place-shaping role, in their community development work, in developing local cohesion strategies, in involving social housing residents, in developing welcome packs and in staging citizenship ceremonies. I&DeA nationally and the LSMP and London Councils have had a role in the sharing of best practice in these areas, and this is something that can be built on in the development of \textit{London Enriched}.

There also has been a growing recognition in the literature that the responsibility for integration does not lie wholly with either migrants or with the state sector, but with a wider web of stakeholders. The Third Sector in particular has been emphasised. 'Close
collaboration with the voluntary and community services sector is playing an essential part in establishing trust and ensuring that migration work is rooted in local needs.313

Of particular importance are anchor organisations in local communities, of whatever sector, the organisations that have the local intelligence to understand micro-level change, the local trust to lead settled residents in taking a positive view of integration, and the capacity to provide a venue for events and activities which bring people together across their differences.314

While recognition of the role of the traditional Third Sector is now established, there are some signs that other stakeholders are being brought into the process, including trade unions and business and employers. The prominence of exploitation and vulnerability at work in migrant life in London points to the particular importance of trade unions in an integration strategy.315 Research conducted by COMPAS shortly after the 2004 Accession found that Polish and Lithuanian workers in the UK had low union membership rates but widespread desire to join.316 Trade unions are also a space in which migrants and the settled population can come together, thus building bridging capital and cohesion. The TUC has a Migrant Workers Project, for example, which, among other things, has published a booklet introducing migrants to life and work in the UK, including but not simply focusing on, migrants’ employment rights.317 London trade unions have also been active in campaigns such as Justice for Cleaners, Strangers into Citizens and the Living Wage campaign, in coalition with other civil society groups, including faith-based groups and MCROs, and built close relationships with the GLA through this.

Finally, as industry is a major beneficiary of the successful integration of migrants in the socio-economic domain, and success in the integration processes in other domains is a key determinant of success in the socio-economic domain, employers have a key stake in integration. However, the policy and research literature has so far neglected employers in this sphere. Business in the Community’s Migrant Worker Integration Group represents an important step in this direction, although it has focused more on rural rather than urban matters.318 I&DeA provides a useful checklist for local authorities on working with employers.319

**Policy implications**

It is possible to draw some conclusions from the evidence on community development and participation, in terms of the elements examined in the literature review. In terms of the participation of migrants in civic life, it is possible to conclude, as ECRE do, ‘The promotion of migrants’ and refugees’ involvement in mainstream civil organisations is the duty of the whole society.’320

In terms of the migrant community organisation themselves, again it is possible to conclude, as ECRE do, that: ‘It is important to continue to invest in refugee community and migrant organisations as they play an important role in empowering their communities. At the same time it is essential to incorporate these organisations in existing structures so that they become part of mainstream civic life. Increased funding and support should be made available in order to enable them to build capacity and undertake medium and long-term
projects. Other civic organisations should encourage migrants’ and refugees’ membership and participation in their activities. This type of emphasis avoids the danger of a migrant community organisational ghetto, by pointing to its relations with wider networks, which is key to integration. It is important therefore that community development elements of a migrant integration strategy do not focus solely on the separate organisation of migrants, but that it is balanced against a commitment to involving the wider community development sector in migrant integration, and honouring the work it already does. It also means widening the web of agents who feel they have a stake in integration, focusing for example on trade unions and employers.
6.8 Cross-cutting issues and threats to integration

In this final section, before moving to the conclusions, we look at two cross-cutting issues: equalities and partnership working.

**Equal Life Chances for All**

Recent research for the Equalities and Human Rights Commission found that migrants face significant inequalities across a number of areas of life, including housing, health, care and social services, education, income, benefits, and access to finance, as well as facing harassment and violence.\(^{322}\) In relation to public services and welfare benefits, the government has been uneven in the ways it has granted access to entitlements, reflecting a tension between competing priorities – social, ethical, legal, political, economic, fiscal and pragmatic.\(^{323}\) There are arguments for extending entitlements which reflect all of these priorities. For example, there is a fiscal case in terms of the disproportionate contributions migrants pay in National Insurance.\(^{324}\) Some work has been done to quantify the fiscal impact of providing services to migrants in general at the local level.\(^{325}\) There is some research on the fiscal impact of providing cost-ineffective emergency services to those denied recourse to public funds – research which has estimated that London boroughs each spend £1 million per year on such services.\(^{326}\) There is considerable evidence of the ways in which exploitation in work are generated by exclusions from entitlements among both regular and irregular migrants.\(^{327}\) And there is some research on the impacts of lack of entitlement on particular groups, creating inequalities and destitution. This includes the research by Homeless Link (the network of frontline homelessness agencies) noting the challenge posed (to homeless migrants and to advice agencies) by the lack of entitlement of East European migrants to social housing.\(^{328}\) Another example is the research on the destitution of refused asylum seekers in London.\(^{329}\) But there is a lack of comprehensive research on the costs and benefits of the current patchy system of entitlements; there is also a lack of evidence on the integration outcomes of current entitlements and restrictions.\(^{330}\)

On the other hand, granting universal entitlements on the basis of need contradicts the principle of entitlement based on residence or belonging, and the provision of services and benefits to migrants can be seen by settled residents (who may experience needs themselves) as unfairness or jumping the queue.\(^{331}\) The tension between universal rights and a sense of fairness is felt locally, as deprived local areas disproportionately bear the local costs of migrant settlement while not feeling the (nationally accrued) benefits.\(^{332}\)

In addition to these tensions, research has found that some migrants are not accessing rights to which they are legally entitled due to their own and service providers’ confusion as to what rights they hold.\(^{333}\) This fact, along with the issue of the settled population’s perceptions of unfairness, both point to the same policy implication: that there is a need to more widely communicate the entitlements that migrants do and do not have, and perhaps to place this within a wider public conversation around the ethical stakes.
**Partnership working**

The previous section on community development, which finished by focusing on involving different stakeholders in the integration process, shows that no one agency can be fully responsible for integration, but that agencies need to work together.
7. Framework of interventions

In this section, we bring together the policy implications of the evidence presented above, showing where the evidence points to particular areas for intervention at a London level.

ESOL
A focus on ESOL clearly emerges from the literature as a key area of intervention. This gives urgency to the requirement for a better understanding of the supply and demand of ESOL in London – and, following from this, negotiating for appropriate resources to meet the capital’s need, from employers as well as from central government. The emphasis in the literature on what works is on overcoming barriers ensuring access in places and at times that migrants, including those working anti social hours, can attend. Innovative practice identified includes a focus on exit and progression routes; it requires a holistic or community development approach that addresses the real integration needs of migrants, building bridging capital and fostering habits of solidarity.

Housing
The evidence shows migrants disproportionately concentrated in the fast growing private rented sector, with large numbers at risk of poor housing or of homelessness – but public perception seeing them as unfairly accessing social housing. Two key actions, therefore, emerge from the evidence: to facilitate the regulation of the private rented sector through HMO inspections, on the one hand (more urgent in inner boroughs), and to facilitate greater understanding around entitlements to the social sector. This latter is most urgently needed in outer boroughs, and should be linked to a wider communication strategy as discussed below.

Employment, skills and enterprise
On this topic, three areas of intervention clearly emerge from the literature. First, there is a need for employment support targeted at the needs of migrants: personalised, holistic and developmental, with an emphasis on sustainable employment rather than simply numbers into jobs. Second, there is a need for action on exploitation and vulnerability. The GLA could take a leadership role here, for example, by kitemarking in sectors on which it has a key influence, such as the tourism and hospitality industry through Think London. London’s advocacy of a Living Wage and its advocacy of regularisation are already exemplary demonstrations of the city’s leadership role in this field. Third, there is a need for planning employment support that takes account of the impact of migration on settled communities, as the evidence shows that it is on the low-skilled that any negative impacts of migration fall.

Health and social care
The evidence points to a need for London-wide planning in some key areas where migrant health needs are highlighted, particularly mental health and maternity services. There are also interventions required around facilitating migrant access to primary and other forms of
care. This includes the need for greater clarity around entitlements, which again relates to wider communication strategies as discussed below – the lack of clarity experienced by migrants themselves and the lack of clarity which the evidence shows among some service providers.

Community safety and cohesion
London has the potential to take a leadership role in developing a public awareness/communication strategy, including communication of the benefits of migration (as implied in the title of the strategy, London enriched), reassurance about the local costs (myth-busting), and addressing issue of entitlements and unfairness (the visible justice urged by the Commission on Integration and Cohesion in 2006). The GLA’s place-shaping role can draw on a rich resource of London as a historical point of arrival, but the challenge is to do this in a way which includes long-settled Londoners. Working closely with the media and with a range of stakeholders including local authorities, London can help reframe and detoxify the public debate on immigration.

Community development
The evidence suggests the importance of the role of migrant community organisations, which need support, as well as the key role of local authority community development – but also the need to harness the potential contribution of a wider range of stakeholders, including trade unions and employers. These stakeholders have the capacity to promote the voice of migrants, to reach the ‘hardest to reach’ migrants, to provide support and leadership in this field, and to create spaces where migrants and others can interact and build a shared future for all Londoners.

Equal life chances for all and partnership working
On this topic, the evidence points to three areas for intervention. Many of the above points suggest the need for a comprehensive communication strategy. Key to this would be advice and signposting on the entitlements of and services for the newly arrived, including temporary stayers – communication targeted at the migrants themselves but also at service providers and at members of the settled population who are vulnerable to myths about migrant entitlements.

Second, the evidence suggests the potential to mobilise partners, including an increased role for migrant civic society, but also other stakeholders, such as community anchor organisations, trade unions and employers, to work together on integration as a shared responsibility of benefit for all. The GLA can embrace migrants within the implementation of the statutory duty to promote racial equality and good race relations – and encourage its partners to do so.

Finally, gaps in the evidence show that there is the need for the development of better London-level evidence on migration and integration, including but not limited to its costs and benefits. Key interventions would include a thorough review of whether the restrictions
on entitlements for migrants might impede integration in London and add to rather than reduce the (economic and social) cost of migration for local authorities in the region.
Appendix 1. Migration statuses in the UK

In this appendix, we list the key categories of overseas nationals in the UK today. Details on housing, employment and other entitlements of different categories are given in the next appendix.

**European Economic Area (EEA) nationals:** Nationals of the EEA states, which include all the European Union States and all the states of the European Free Trade Agreement (EFTA).

**EU15 nationals:** Nationals of the 15 original member states of the European Union (EU), mainly in Western and Northern Europe, with many of the entitlements of UK nationals.

**Accession 10 (A10) nationals:** Nationals of the ten countries which joined the EU in 2004, including the A8 countries (see below) and Malta and Cyprus.

**Accession 8 (A8) nationals:** Nationals of the eight Eastern or Central European states which joined the EU in 2004, subject to key restrictions in work and social benefit entitlement, in particular the transitional Workers Registration Scheme (WRS).

**Accession 2 (A2) nationals:** Nationals of the two countries, Romania and Bulgaria, which joined the EU in 2007, also subject to transitional arrangements.

**British Overseas Territories nationals:** Subjects of the British Overseas Territories, who require clearance to enter the UK but can work without a work permit.

**Swiss nationals:** As British Overseas Territories nationals.

**Work permit holders:** Nationals of all other countries require a work permit, obtained via an employer or other specific scheme.

**Refugees and asylum-seekers:** People entering the UK who have sought asylum are asylum seekers. If their claim is successful, they are classed as refugees and are offered Indefinite Leave to Remain (ILR) or another status, as described above in section 3.

The Points-Based System (PBS):
The Points-Based System is under review as part of the consultation on a limit on non-EU labour migrants, as discussed in Section 1 above. However, at the time of writing, the following were the categories of migrants in the system:

- **Tier 1 (opened 29 February 2008):** highly skilled individuals to contribute to growth and productivity. Subject to the interim cap.
- **Tier 2 (opened 27 November 2008):** skilled workers with a job offer to fill gaps in UK labour force. Subject to the interim cap.
- **Tier 3:** for low skilled workers from outside the EEA to the UK and remains closed.
- **Tier 4 (opened March 2009):** students. Allowed to work part-time. Not yet included in any cap, but might be after consultation.
- **Tier 5 (27 November 2008):** allows people to work in the UK for a limited period of time (a maximum of 1 to 2 years) to satisfy primarily non-economic objectives e.g. entertainers, athletes or ministers of religion. Excluded from the interim cap.

The Migration Advisory Committee (MAC) provides independent advice on whether there are skilled labour shortages that can sensibly be filled by migration. Under Tier 2 of the PBS, employers must ensure that the resident labour market test has been met before they can fill a vacancy with a migrant worker, unless the Government considers that the sector has a shortage of suitably qualified resident workers or the employer is transferring staff within the same organisation to a different location.336
Appendix 2. Policy context

This appendix provides a concise mapping of the broad contours of the policy landscape in which the above described interventions might be delivered. It was substantially written in March-April 2010, when this evidence base was being developed. Since then, there has been a change of government, and it is likely that the policy landscape will be changing considerably. We have not, however, described these changes, which are still emerging.

1. ESOL

Key threats and opportunities:

In force from 7 April 2010: changes to immigration rules affecting migrants who are applying for permanent residence, to ensure that those relying on qualifications in English for Speakers of Other Languages (ESOL) will study at accredited colleges, and to clarify the progression that migrants are required to demonstrate before they can apply for permanent residence. Full details here: [http://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/sitecontent/documents/news/guidance‐for‐esol‐providers.pdf](http://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/sitecontent/documents/news/guidance‐for‐esol‐providers.pdf)

No new guidance on ESOL has yet been issued by the new government, but the emphasis so far on policy in the adult skills sector has been on increased flexibilities for providers and an orientation to the specific needs of the local economy and local community. The London Strategic Migration Partnership’s Employment and Skills Pathway has set up a working group to consult with some key providers of ESOL in London on how they might use these new flexibilities to ensure that provision is responding appropriately to locally identified need.

Key stakeholders:
Local authorities – responsibilities to identify priorities under the New Approach
NIACE - national agency supporting the development of literacy, language and numeracy for adults
ESOL providers – accredited colleges in public and private sector, dominated by FE colleges
Skills Funding Agency – channels funding of ESOL.
LSEB – London Skills and Employment Board, setting the strategic direction for skills and employment in London
LDA – setting out the regional priorities to central government
British Council – advocates for ESOL
Citizenship Foundation – advocates for citizenship education
UKBA Integration Policy team – responsible for European Integration Fund which funds some ESOL provision for third country nationals and Refugee Fund which funds some ESOL provision for refugees.
2. Housing

To potentially be allocated social housing, applicants must first be eligible to join the Housing Register, or waiting list. All Local Authorities have an Allocation or Lettings Policy which outlines who is and who is not eligible to join the Register.

In all of the policies, there are two common exemptions for acceptance on the Housing Register:

1. If applicants are subject to immigration control;
2. Where applicants, or members of their household are considered unsuitable due to unacceptable behaviour (most commonly – a previous eviction or action taken with regard to rent arrears or antisocial behaviour).

In the case of the first exemption, this excludes anyone who does not have paperwork proving their eligibility to be in the UK (e.g. many categories of irregular migrants), all asylum seekers and anyone whose immigration status is conditional on them having ‘no recourse to public funds’. Further exclusions on the basis of immigration status are discussed in the next section. All applicants are required to present at least two pieces of documentation that confirm their immigration status before they are eligible to join the register. There are a number of other exemptions that apply is some boroughs. In certain cases, those aged 16-17 are exempt or can apply but will not be offered permanent accommodation until they reach 18. Some boroughs exclude home owners or those found to have sufficient funds or assets, from joining the housing register.

Prioritising housing need

All local authorities operate a points or banding system, or a combination of the two. Applicants who can demonstrate housing need are then allocated points and/or placed within a particular priority band. Some Local Authorities retain a band for applicants who cannot demonstrate a need for housing but who have a connection to the borough and have applied for social housing. Other Authorities will not accept applications from anyone who cannot demonstrate a housing need, or who has a certain level of financial stability in the form of savings or assets.

Date order

A number of local authorities operate a date order scheme where length of time on the list is a deciding factor between applications with the same level of need. In some cases, such as Greenwich, bands (need) take priority over time spent on the waiting list. Tower Hamlets have been operating a needs-based scheme but in response to public consultation are moving towards a date-order scheme which recognises the length of time applicants have been registered. This was due to concerns amongst the public about the fairness of a needs-based allocation system. Recent reports suggest that this is a particularly contentious area of housing allocation and a number of local authorities have conducted reviews or are revising their policies in the light of recent findings.

Local Connection

All policies stated that, except in specific or exceptional circumstances, all applicants need to have a local connection to be eligible for social housing. The rules vary in terms of how much priority this is given and in what circumstances. In Barking and Dagenham, for example, consideration is given to a local connection on a short-list with applicants who have the same level of housing need. In Bexley, relatives of existing tenants are prioritised even if they are not successors. In Newham, ‘reduced priority’ is given to those who are not resident in Newham or have no local connection.

Quotas/schemes and local priorities

Under current law, local authorities retain some flexibility in deciding how properties are allocated to particular groups. This is often in the form of set quotas or schemes which are designed to meet a range of government targets or to address local need. Special schemes include the allocation of housing to vulnerable groups such as young people leaving care, those with learning difficulties and
fostering families. Some local authorities make a certain number or percentage of properties available to particular groups each year, or set specific targets for reducing the number of vulnerable groups on the housing register. For example, Newham make two properties available each year for families wishing to leave the permanent Traveller site in the borough.  

Other schemes are designed to allocate housing in some circumstances in order to meet local need. A number of authorities retain the right to limit who can apply or bid for certain types of housing, by age or gender for example, in order to ensure or promote more balanced or diverse communities. A number of boroughs have schemes for allowing key workers to join the housing register in lower priority bands or operate a quota scheme for key workers nominated by their employers. In some cases this also applied to council employees or those retiring from employment with tied accommodation such as caretakers.  

Other exceptions to the allocation of housing by highest priority need are in relation to hard-to-let properties. A number of local authorities made exceptions for households that were under-occupied; households willing to give up one or more bedrooms to take a property with fewer bedrooms than they require are given priority. Such exemptions allow boroughs to fill vacant properties and make best use of current stock.

**Migrant access to social housing**

Except in certain circumstances, foreign nationals from outside the European Economic Area (EEA) are not eligible for social housing unless they are granted permission to stay in the UK which is not conditional on them having ‘no recourse to public funds’.

**European nationals**

EEA nationals are not eligible if they are economically inactive and not resident here, seeking work, or here for a short-term visit. Broadly speaking, EEA nationals are eligible if they have ‘worker’ status. For A8 nationals there is an additional transitional period of 12 months during which they must register their employment and work continuously for 12 months in order to maintain their ‘worker’ status. There are further restrictions placed on A2 nationals.

**Asylum seekers**

Asylum seekers are not eligible to join the Housing Register. Since 2002, housing and subsistence support have been supplied through the Home Office and the UK Border Agency. Only once a person’s claim for asylum is successful and they are granted refugee status, humanitarian protection or discretionary leave to remain, do they have the right to access mainstream provisions – including social housing. Those who become eligible for social housing will then be assessed against the same needs criteria as UK nationals.

**Key stakeholders:**

GLA Housing Unit
London Councils and local authority housing offices

**Private rented sector:**

Local authority HMO Licensing officers, who can use their powers to regulate the private rented sector where migrants are concentrated.

**Homeless migrants:**

Thames Reach’s London Reconnection Service – a programme of support, training and information-sharing within the homelessness sector arising out of the Homeless Link Central and Eastern European Action Plan

No Recourse to Public Funds Network
Shelter
London Homelessness Partnership

Social housing:
National Housing Federation
Thames Gateway London Partnership
RSLs
Capital Ambition
Homes and Communities Agency
Tenant Service Authority
3. Employment, skills and enterprise

Employment rights
Migrants have different employment rights depending on their country of origin and immigration status.

Asylum seekers and refugees
Asylum seekers are not entitled to work in the UK, except in certain exceptional cases. Once granted refugee or other similar status, they have the same rights to work as UK citizens.

EU citizens
Citizens of the European Union (EU) enjoy freedom of movement and work within the UK, except for citizens of the most recent accession states, the A2 countries (see below). EU citizens are entitled to equality of treatment and non-discrimination under social security schemes.

EEA citizens
There are three states in Europe which are not members of the EU but are members of the European Economic Area, Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway. The EEA Agreement gives nationals of these countries the same rights to enter, live in and work in the UK as EU citizens. In addition, Switzerland, while not being a member of the EEA, has signed a reciprocal agreement which allows its citizens the same free movement rights as EEA nationals.

A10 citizens
The A10 countries are the ten European states which joined the EU in 2004. This category includes the A8 states, eight countries in Eastern and Central Europe, along with Cyprus and Malta. A10 citizens can enter the UK and work without restriction. Workers from the A8 countries are required to register with the Home Office under the Worker Registration Scheme (WRS). Nationals from Malta and Cyprus have full free movement rights and are not required to obtain a worker’s registration certificate. Registration under the WRS makes workers eligible for certain in-work benefits and social housing (if other criteria, such as need, are also demonstrated). Other benefits become available when they have the right to reside – after a 12-month registration period has been completed. The requirement to register under the scheme ends when a worker has been legally working in the UK for 12 months without an interruption of over 30 days.340

A2 citizens
A further two states joined the EU in 2007. They were already EEA members. As EEA nationals, Bulgarians and Romanians do not require leave to enter or remain to reside legally in the UK. They have a right of residence for their first three months in the country and can remain legally resident as long as they wish if exercising a treaty right as a student; a self-employed person; or if not economically active and self-sufficient. But, unlike people from the A10 countries, their right to work is restricted. They do not have a right to reside as a worker unless they have permission to do so under the Home Office’s Worker Authorisation Scheme or are specifically exempt from that scheme. After working for 12 months under the WRS, they are no longer required to register and can work legally.341

Exploitation and vulnerability
There is a significant body of international and UK legislation against exploitation.

Key UK legislation342
- Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act (2004): gives a legal definition of trafficking, which implicitly implies that it is for the purpose of forced labour.343
- **Gangmasters (Licensing) Act (2004):** creates a compulsory licensing system for gangmasters and employment agencies who supply, or use, workers involved in agricultural activities and has the purpose to curb its exploitative activities. A regulatory body, the Gangmasters Licensing Authority, was set up to regulate exploitation in certain sectors, including agriculture but excluding construction.

**Key services and stakeholders:**

**General:**
- Business in the Community Migrant Integration Group
- Jobcentre Plus
- London First
- London CBI
- London Chamber of Commerce and Industry
- Community Links/Links UK – lead third sector agency in London on informal economy

**Employment support:**
- Refugee Integration and Employment Service (RIES) – provides employment support for refugees
- Corporate Stakeholder Group (CSG) – as National Refugee Integration Forum (NRIF) responsible for DWP’s Refugee Employment Strategy but broadened to be responsible for migrant employment in general.
- Skills for Care’s ‘New Types of Worker’ Programme for training – programme for migrant and other new types of care worker
- Third sector employment support agencies, e.g. REETA, Elephant Links, Reed in Partnership – better penetration in ‘hard to reach’ populations than mainstream providers

**Exploitation and vulnerability:**
- Gangmaster Licensing Authority – regulates exploitation in certain key sectors
- Kalayaan – domestic workers campaign
- Trade unions, many of which have migrant worker groups, e.g. Unite, as well as the TUC at a regional (SERTUC) and national level, including TUC Vulnerable Worker Project.
- Government’s Fair Employment Enforcement Board – board that meets three times a year to join up the work of different enforcement bodies and independent advisory and advocacy organisations; CBI, Citizens Advice, and trade union bodies are members.
- Regulatory bodies – the National Minimum Wage Inspectorate, the Employment Agency Standards Inspectorate, Health and Safety Executive
- London Advice Forum
4. Health and social care

**Key UK and European legislation:**

- Department of Health Statutory instrument Charges to Overseas Visitors (2004): Groups that are not considered ‘lawfully’ resident in the UK are liable for NHS hospital and secondary care charges.
- the European Social Charter (ESC) (Art. 13)
- the European Convention on Human (Art. 13)

UK law restricts some categories of migrants from accessing non-emergency care. There is an unfolding body of case law which addresses this. The 2009 court of appeal case, YA v Secretary of State for Health, overturned the judgement in 2008 allowing failed asylum seekers to be considered ‘ordinarily resident’ in the UK and entitled to secondary health care treatment without charge (in many cases). Department of Health guidance on charging for overseas visitors is to be revised, but this new judgement means secondary care treatment, including maternity services are once again chargeable, whilst immediately necessary or urgent treatment should not be withheld if individuals cannot pay.

**Key stakeholders:**
Regional Public Health Group
NHS London
Joint Strategic Needs Assessment
Médecins du Monde London Project
Refugee Advice and Guidance Unit (London Metropolitan University)
Kings Fund
London Health Observatory
5. Children and young people

International instruments, such as the Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC), offer considerable protection to migrant children regardless of their status. However, the enforcement of such international instruments depends significantly on their incorporation into domestic law: in the UK, for example, the UNCRC was ratified in 1991, but has yet to be incorporated into national law, despite recent efforts to do so.

The UK policy context for children and young people is set out in the Children Act (2004) and the ‘Every Child Matters’ (ECM) framework. Central to this has been the prioritisation of the duty of regard for the welfare of children to almost all state agencies and cross-agency co-operation and partnership to ensure this. The Children Act introduced the duty of regard for the welfare of children to almost all state agencies. It has also set out a statutory framework for local co-operation to protect children. According to the ECM framework, all organisations with responsibility for services to children must make arrangements to ensure that in discharging their functions they safeguard and promote the welfare of children. Working Together to Safeguard Children - A guide to inter-agency working to safeguard and promote the welfare of children (1999, 2006, 2010) details ‘how organisations and individuals should work together to safeguard and promote the welfare of children’. Safeguarding and promoting the welfare of children is primarily the responsibility of the local authority, working in partnership with other public agencies, the voluntary sector, children and young people, parents and carers, and the wider community. Local Safeguarding Children Boards (LSCs) are responsible for agreeing how the relevant organisations in each local area will co-operate to safeguard and promote the welfare of children, and for ensuring the effectiveness of their action. The then Border and Immigration Agency (now UKBA) was exempted, however, from the statutory duty to regard, until Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009 which explicitly requires the Agency to safeguard and promote the welfare of children when carrying out its duties.

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<tr>
<th>International legal instruments:</th>
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<tr>
<td>• the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) (Art. 26 (1))</td>
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<tr>
<td>• the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) (Art. 28 (1), 29 (1))</td>
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<td>• the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) (Art. 13 (1)/(2) and 14)</td>
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<tr>
<td>• the International Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) (Art. 5 (e).(v))</td>
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<tr>
<td>• the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (ICRMW) (Art. 30)</td>
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<tr>
<td>• the European Social Charter (ESC) (Art. 17 (2))</td>
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<td>• the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) (Art. 14)</td>
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<th>UK legislation:</th>
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<td>• Education Act (1996): Section 14 obliges English LEAs to provide full-time education to all children resident within the LEA.</td>
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The Education Act (1996) states that all children are entitled to free education and obliges Local Education Authorities to provide it to all children resident in their area, which implicitly includes ‘undocumented’ children. Further, the UK Border Agency explicitly states that all children of compulsory education age (5-16) regardless of their immigration status are entitled to full-time education, and adds that it is the responsibility of the parents to ensure that their children receive this.
Key stakeholders:
London Children and Young People Partnership
London Councils
Mayor’s Youth Ambassadors
London Active Communities
Association of London Directors of Children’s Services
ECPAT – provides training on supporting trafficked children
Ethnic Minority Achievement Grant – responds to demographic data about school populations which can become outdated
London Safeguarding Children Board
Young Mayors and Youth Councils in the boroughs
6. Cross-cutting issues and threats to integration

According to international law all people are holders of rights, including migrants whether ‘legal’ or not. A number of civil, political, social and economic rights apply to individuals irrespective of their legal or administrative status, which are formally guaranteed under legal instruments such as the European Convention on Human Rights, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights or the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. These universal rights have been enshrined in UK law via the Human Rights Act. A core principle of the Act is that non-nationals should have the same entitlement to the basic rights as nationals, and consequently a body of case law has grown up extending certain entitlements to migrants. For example, although certain categories have no recourse to public funds, the provisions of the Human Rights Act require local authorities to prevent their destitution, which has had implications for resource allocations. Although both main political parties in the UK have spoken of replacing the Act with a British Bill of Rights and Responsibilities, which would presumably apply to nationals only, it is likely that the entitlements guaranteed by this case law would be protected by the European Court.

In addition to this body of law, the UK has a robust body of law on equalities, which sets the policy context for achieving equal life chances for all Londoners.
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Chinese
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Vietnamese
Nếu bạn muốn có bản bản tài liệu
này bằng ngôn ngữ của mình, hãy
liên hệ theo số điện thoại hoặc địa
chỉ dưới đây.

Greek
Αν θέλετε να αποκτήσετε αντίγραφο του παρόντος
eγγράφου στη δική σας γλώσσα, παρακαλείστε να
eπικοινωνήσετε τηλεφωνικά στον αριθμό αυτό ή ταχυ-
dρομικά στην παρακάτω διεύθυνση.

Hindi
यदि आप इस दस्तावेज़ की प्रति अपनी
भाषा में चाहते हैं, तो कृपया निम्नलिखित
लिंक पर क्लिक करें और आपके नाम,
आयुष्य और पता दिये गये
पते पर संपर्क करें

Bengali
আপনি যদি আপনার ভাষায় এই দলিলের প্রতিলিপি
(কপি) চান, তা হলে নিচের ফোন নম্বরে
বা ঠিকানার অনুযায়ী করে যোগাযোগ করুন।

Urdu
اگر آپ اس دستاویز کی نقل ابتینی زبان میں
چاہتے ہیں، تو براہ کرم نچی گیا گی نمبر
پر فون کریں یا دنبی گیا یہ پر رابطہ کریں

Arabic
إذا أردت نسخة من هذه الوثيقة باللغة العربية,
يرجى الاتصال برمز الهاتف أو مراسلة العنوان
 أدناه

Tamil
பாடல் விளக்கம் மற்றும் புதிய வலிமை
முறைச் சீப்பிட்டு இரும்பு பகுதிகள்
தற்கால ஓரையை என்று கூறுவதற்கு,
உடன் இல்லாது பெரும் நோய் செய்யப்பட்டால்
லையை குறிப்பிட்டு அதன் நீரின் முருகா
என்று கூறுவதற்கு.

Punjabi
ਅਠਾਂਕ ਵਿਚ ਇਸ ਦਸਤਾਵੇਜ਼ ਦੀ ਚਿਤਰ ਅਧਿਕਾਰੀ ਜਪਾ ਦੀশ ਚਿਤਰਦੀਤੀ ਹੈ, 
ਉਤੇ ਖੋਜੀ ਸ਼ੋਧੀਜ਼ ਦੇ ਇਤਹਾਲ ਦਾ ਸਾਂ ਖੋਜੀ 
ਸ਼ੋਧੀਜ਼ ਪਹਿਲੇ ਇੱਕ ਸਿਰੀਝ ਦੀ 
ਵਿਦਾਲੀ 

Gujarati
જે તમે આ દસ્તાવેજની નકલ તમારી ભાષામાં
જોડીતી ક્રમ તો, તેના ક્રમ આપેલ નંબર ૨૦૨
પ્રેરણા કરી અધિકારના નીચેના 
સેટિફિકાને સંપૂર્ણ સાધો.