Integration of Migrants in Europe

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1. Introduction

The review, produced for the Centre on Migration, Policy and Society for the Autumn Academy on Inclusive Cities, surveys relevant literature from largely European academic and policy literature on immigrant integration within Europe. It considers integration as an active process involving actors and institutions in the receiving society as well as migrants themselves, or more appropriately, a set of processes that occur at multiple scales over differing time periods. These are processes that take place from the moment that individuals arrive in the country (or indeed from before their arrival), and are shaped by many factors, including policy intervention at different levels of locality, city, region, nation and within the transnational sphere.

It is no exaggeration to say that the topic of immigrant integration is a complex and active field; there is a vast wealth of research and practice on the phenomenon from the US as well as from within continental Europe. This has developed especially since the 1990s onwards, in response to the increasing scale and pace of immigration over the last two decades. This review has a European focus, primarily using the European academic literature on the subject and referring to a wide range of examples, but also drawing on the authors’ knowledge of UK literature and practice. It provides a summary that, while no means exhaustive, aims however to guide and orientate readers through the complexity of some of the debates. This complexity reflects social scientists’ various attempts to grasp and explain the variety of processes going on in immigrant integration.

2. Integration: What is it?

Integration, at a very simplistic level refers to the ways in which migrants and a receiving society live together, and covers the interaction of migrants with individuals and institutions within the receiving society. As a term however it is vague and highly contested, with competing understandings of the concept especially within normative debates on desired policy outcomes that ‘encompass a range of positions from more assimilatory policies through to more openly multicultural ones’ (Favell 2001). Agar and Strang’s review (2008) begins by using Robinson’s description of it as ‘a chaotic concept: a word used by many but understood differently by most’ (1998:118) and an area in which there is ‘no single, generally accepted definition, theory or model [...]’ (Castles et al 2001: 12).

The definitional difficulties can partly be explained by the fact that the term is used in multiple ways, referring to different things. First, integration is a concept describing a set of actions and processes (considered here from pages 2 to 7). This perspective is an analytic one in which processes happen regardless of desired policy goals. The task becomes to name, describe and understand the interactions that occur within those processes. Second, in another usage, which can even be complementary, integration can also be seen as a policy objective, referring to interventions that have a particular goal to influence actions and outcomes (considered here from pages 7 to 13). This latter perspective is characterised by more normative elements, referring to, as Penninx (2009) observes, the ‘wished for outcome’ of integration processes. Normative elements are sometimes, but not always made explicit (this emerges from policy-makers, but it is also important to recognise that migrants themselves also have their own beliefs about integration, e.g. a sense of ambivalence,
see Vathi and King 2013). Here, policies and practices aim to influence actions and seek an end-goal of a ‘more integrated society’. The tension between these two understandings remains in current usage of the term, with debates oscillating between on the one hand, a descriptive analytical dimension and a normative dimension on the other hand (Johnson and Tatum 2010). We consider both understandings in turn.

3. Integration as a set of processes

In the first case, the concept of integration has been seen as processes of receiving newcomers into societies’ institutions and relationships. This perspective derives from sociological research initially from the Chicago school of the 1920s whereby researchers aimed to explore and articulate the ways in which newcomers were received in urban society. It emerged as a key concept in the academic functionalist tradition in sociology in the post-war years, whereby integration was described as one of four ‘functional pre-requisites’ - essential elements - needed for social systems to maintain social order. In this view, integration refers to the maintenance of stability among society as a whole through the creation of cooperative social relations. While to some degree, it is concerned with newcomers’ experiences, it is also to a large part about a state’s self-interest, since the stability of society is in jeopardy if large proportions of the population are marginalised and excluded (Heckmann and Lüken-Klaffen 2013). Here we see overlaps with the second usage of integration as policy, since it reflects moral and political obligations of states to strengthen relations between different constituents as well as include new members within it, in order to create a stable social system (Arango 1999).

The ways in which new members engage with the social system involves a series of processes and actions. According to Sarah Spencer, integration refers to:

‘processes of interaction between migrants and the individuals and institutions of the receiving society that facilitate economic, social, cultural and civic participation and an inclusive sense of belonging at the national and local level (Spencer 2011:203).

Scholarship has drawn attention both the multidimensional and non-linear nature of these processes, as well as the range of conditions shaping success or setbacks (e.g. Phillimore 2010). Equally there has been recognition of the mutuality of the process, influenced by state policies influencing immigrants’ treatment and the choices the immigrants make themselves in the processes of adaptation. In this way, integration as a set of interactive processes refers to a combination of both the actions and efforts of migrants themselves, as well as the legal, economic and social conditions they meet in the new society (Heckmannn and Luken-Klasen 2013: 1). Such a view of integration as a dynamic and not unidirectional process has been recognised within EU policy (highlighting the overlap between the two usages) which resonates with much of the academic literature. As Martin Baldwin-Edwards (2005:4) comments,

[by] this definition, the nature of the receiving society is a crucial determinant in a complex equation, involving a wide range of actors – immigrants themselves, the host government, institutions, and local communities. According to this analysis, the unequal distribution of
power between the host society and the immigrants means that it is the host society which has the greater say in the determination of outcomes.

The extent of integration can be measured by the degree of parity or equality of outcomes with other members of the receiving society. Ager and Strang (2004:5) who offer perhaps the most comprehensive, though tentative definition of integration in work commissioned by the UK Home Office, describe an individual or group as ‘integrated’ within a society when they:

- achieve public outcomes within employment, housing, education, health etc. which are equivalent to those achieved within the wider host communities;

- are socially connected with members of a (national, ethnic, cultural, religious or other) community with which they identify, with members of other communities and with relevant services and functions of the state; and

- have sufficient linguistic competence and cultural knowledge, and a sufficient sense of security and stability, to confidently engage in that society in a manner consistent with shared notions of nationhood and citizenship.

The domains of integration

Reflecting the multidimensionality of integration, scholars have identified a number of different domains in which integration occurs. These are helpful both to explore in research and offer means of measuring integration via particular indicators associated with each domain. For example, the recent OECD report (2015) compares outcomes in indicators for immigrants in European and OECD countries according to a range of indicators, including employment, education and skills, social inclusion, civic engagement and social cohesion. Ager and Strang (2008) summarise integration as a process occurring across ten different domains (italicized below) and grouped into four headings. For them, integration refers to:

1) Means and markers: achievement and access across a variety of sectors including employment, housing, education and health. Achievement within these sectors is both a ‘means’ to integration as well as a ‘marker’ (as captured in indicators of integration) which can show that positive integration outcomes have been achieved.

2) Facilitators that make integration easier including language and cultural knowledge and safety and stability in the local environment.

3) Social connection: within and between groups within the community; this refers to social bridges, social bonds and social links.

4) Foundations: assumptions and practice regarding rights and citizenship (e.g. permissions to work, access services and benefits and voting rights, as well as their sense of responsibility).

Others have described these levels in different ways, for example, referring to integration occurring structurally, at a social/interactional level, at a cultural level and within a domain of identification or belonging (Heckmann and Schnapper 2003) and see Entzinger (2000) who distinguished between legal-political (state), cultural (nation) and socio-economic (market) domains. Various authors refer to or group the domains differently, but broadly, as Spencer (2011:203) observes, we can define these as follows:
**Structural:** Participation in the labour market, housing, welfare, healthcare and education, all of which are both ‘means’ and ‘markers’ of integration (Agar and Strang 2008). This includes interaction with the market and welfare systems of a country (Freeman 2004) referring to access to membership, position and status in a country’s core national institutions of the economy, education and healthcare. This aspect is often considered the most important area of integration, particularly integration into the labour market (e.g. see the European Commission’s first Annual report on Migration and Integration (2004)).

**Social:** How migrants and existing members of the receiving society interact with each other socially, including friendships, private relationships, marriages, social intercourse and memberships of groups and voluntary associations (Heckmann and Lüken-Klaßen 2013). It draws on the ‘contact hypothesis’ which assumes that greater contact between individuals of different groups breaks down anxieties and fears and promotes greater understanding and tolerance. Ager and Strang (2004) building on the academic literatures on social capital, identify three domains of “social connections”: social bridges, social bonds and social links. This recognises the tendency for some relationships to be more inward- looking and exclusive than others.

**Cultural:** Cultural aspects of integration encompassing religion, morals, values, behaviour and lifestyle and any change in this. In particular, how migrants and members of the receiving society can create cognitive, cultural, behavioural and attitude change among themselves, as well as enact change in the receiving society.

**Civic and political:** Voting rights and civic habits, such as associational activity of migrants. These are structured by the cultural domain. There has been considerable interest across Europe focusing on the importance of active citizenship, the civic and associational activity of migrants and the enhancement of opportunities for participation.

**Identity:** The extent to which people feel a sense of belonging and identification with the place of residence, both the locality and the nation (not withstanding retention of other identities related to their background).

The domains have complex relationships; Ager and Strang (2008) explain how the different levels identified maintain some degree of independence, but agree that these levels are not mutually exclusive and will relate to each other in complex ways. For example the degree to which one is structurally integrated (e.g. in the labour market or schooling) will affect social, cultural and identificational integration (Heckmann and Lüken-Klaßen 2013). The rate of integration can also develop differently within different levels, so one may be well integrated in the labour market but experience little sense of belonging for example. Similarly, policies for integration (which we come to next) in one sphere can impact negatively in other spheres (Zetter, Griffiths et al 2006). However, as
yet there is little knowledge of the complex relationships between them; for example whether integration in one domain (e.g. socio-cultural) is a pre-requisite for, or alternatively a consequence of, integration in other domains such as in the labour market (see SCIP project - https://www.uni-goettingen.de/en/153339.html). Some have found that there can be trade-offs between different domains, e.g. Maxwell (2012) asserts that social integration can come at the price of economic and political integration. This is because socially segregated groups are more likely to come together with co-ethnics and mobilise politically as a group (leading to better economic prospects) whereas those who are more socially integrated are more likely to be alienated from political representation.

**Facilitators, barriers and foundations**

Alongside these key domains, the academic literature has also focused on facilitators or barriers to integration within institutions and individuals. These facilitators or barriers may be specific to a particular domain or cross-cut several; they may also be a characteristic of the individual or be more structural or systemic. For example, a facilitator or barrier could be the human capital possessed by an individual as evidenced in educational qualifications or linguistic knowledge. However, the degree to which educational qualifications are recognised or language learning is facilitated (see Oliver 2013) is a structural or systemic facilitator or constraint. These barriers may have long-term effects. According to the theory of segmented assimilation (Portes and Zhou 1993) structural barriers such as poor quality schooling in disadvantaged urban areas with high concentrations of immigrants can lead to sequential disadvantage over a number of generations, effectively trapping subsequent generations into an underclass. Such concentration can effectively cut off immigrants from further educational and employment opportunities. Other immigrant groups in different enclaves may be more advantaged by their own groups’ resources, allowing for entry into the middle classes, either through retaining aspects of their ethnic identity or by losing them as they are upwardly mobile. Such patterns of segmented assimilation show the longer-term impacts on children and grandchildren of immigrants.

It is also worth briefly emphasising the foundations of integration also, namely the legal rights that shape participation in each domain. This includes whether particular migrants are entitled to work, to access healthcare, education, welfare support and are entitled to vote. Entitlements are determined by a complex range of provisions that vary according to both national welfare histories and European law. The extent of their impact on integration processes, whether central or marginal across the domains, is as yet not well researched (see Pobjoy and Spencer 2012, Oliver 2013).

**Scale and temporal dimensions**

In addition to the multiple dimensions of integration, there is also an issue of geographical scale. Although in the original definition and still today integration is seen as a national concern, processes of integration take place at different scales in domains. Therefore, social interaction tends to take place on a very local level; labour markets tend to be regional; identity and a sense of belonging can be felt for both the neighbourhood and the nation; cultural integration tends to follow national borders; and civic participation might be at any number of geographical scales. Most recently, there has been more consideration of the place of particular localities and cities as contexts for integration, while national approaches have been theoretically criticized as supporting
‘methodological nationalism’, particularly given the adoption of more transnational perspectives in academic work (Glick-Schiller 1999).

As well as more consideration of the importance of locality in integration processes, conceptualisations have sought to recognise the supranational and transnational dynamics involved in integration processes. Garcés-Mascareñas and Penninx (2015) conceive of integration as a ‘three-way process’ involving actors in the sending country also. This recognises the importance of transnational dynamics for individual migrants who are situated within fields of influence that span national borders. One example is the flow of economic remittances back to the sending country, but the influence of the transnational realm is also evident in the influence of transnational political organisations, family care and residential strategies across borders. These dynamics have implications for ‘local’ experiences of integration; integration takes place in the receiving country, but yet new forms of communication, different dimensions of globalization and nation-building rely on the diaspora as a strategic resource and also transform interactions with the sending country.

The INTERACT project (http://interact-project.eu/) explores the role of sending countries’ governments in local integration. Gidley and Caputo (2013) demonstrate for example the impacts of sending countries’ practices in terms of residential integration, drawing attention to the potential role of intermediaries in migration strategies, in which housing options are mediated by a range of state and non-state actors, including local housing providers, banks, credit agencies, ethnic estate agents or other intermediaries managing the migration process. Other areas of interest include different migrant careers (including housing pathways) and examination of economic flows to the sending country, in which investment in property is one key dimension. On the other hand, the relevance of supranational influences for integration processes has occurred through the emergence of large scale political actors and the development of regional policies, as is seen in the European Union, which shapes the contexts of integration, both by defining a common European area and goals, but also through its framework programme, providing financial support to assist with a common view of integration (see Caponio and Borkert 2010). This will be discussed further in the policy section.

Finally, integration as a set of processes does not merely occur at different scales but also has a temporal dimension. For some, integration is a process without a fixed end-point. This perspective recognises the differential ways and experiences of both migrants who have arrived today and migrants who have long settled in a country. If we view integration as a series of processes in separate but related domains, it is clear that these processes begin at day one (or even before entry) and may never be complete, while barriers within the receiving society may never be overcome. Most of the academic literature however suggests that the newly arrived experience many of the barriers to integration most acutely, although some specific groups and individuals experience disadvantage long beyond the period of arrival. Moreover, as Haque (2010) reminds us, the nature of ongoing demographic change means that integration as a broader societal goal can never fully be realised.

Having considered various considerations of integration as a series of processes, we now turn to explore integration as policy.
4. Integration as policy

The second reading of integration is as a top-down philosophy or policy of states for responding to migrants in a receiving society. Whereas integration in the first sense can be seen as a process that occurs regardless of any interference at all, this second perspective (which can complement the first) sees integration as an intervention or factor that changes and alters processes. This is the sense that sociologist Adrian Favell means in his influential Philosophies of Integration (2011) whereby it develops in response to the recognition that:

heterogeneity is a permanent phenomenon in societies. This view assumes that different social groups influence each other reciprocally and that together they create the national space in which all participants are citizens with equal rights and civic unity is promoted - but not at the expense of ethnic diversity (Spoonley et al 2005:11).

Integration in this sense occurs both nationally and regionally, as can be seen in relation to specific countries and Europe. However, what it is actually understood to be will vary and depend upon the national/regional context, the normative views and framing of the immigrant situation, which may also differ at different scales of governance. This understanding of integration as a policy objective is not divorced from the conceptual understandings of integration, but rather uses the notions of those theories instrumentally to influence behaviours and achieve certain end goals, for example by seeking to remove obstacles to integration. Schibel et al, in their 2002 review of the literature, note that:

One commonly held view is that integration needs to be policy driven. This is implicit in the Refugee Council definition, where integration is described as a process which prevents or counteracts the social marginalisation of refugees, by removing legal, cultural and language obstacles and ensuring that refugees are empowered to make positive decisions on their future and benefit fully from available opportunities as per their abilities and aspirations.

In particular, policies aimed at structural integration have included specific measures to improve immigrants’ labour market participation, influence segregation in housing and settlement, offer support in educational systems (for example through specific funds and programmes, or initiatives that engage migrant parents in schools) develop bodies for the recognition of qualifications, assist in setting up businesses etc. Although policies aimed at the structural domain have been more prominent, other policies aimed at (or effecting as a by-product) the other domains have also been applied, such as funding for language learning, support for civil society organisations and immigrants’ cultural activities, as well as policies around cohesion and belonging etc.

Other policies becoming increasingly more common are those that focus less on the barriers and opportunities within society and rather emphasise more individual responsibilities for integration, such as initiatives which demand immigrants meet ‘pre-integration requirements’ for language etc. before admission to a country is granted, as shall be discussed further below. First, some relevant observations about the nature of integration policies shall we made, including the influence of normative assumptions of nationhood, the extent to which policies should be aimed at immigrants as a separate group or mainstreamed and the multi-level governance of integration.
Normative framing of integration: National models

In understanding the orientation of policy responses across Europe, many scholars have argued that there are particular national philosophies of integration. The notion of ‘national models of integration’ has played a key role in European migration research particularly during the 1990s. This describes how particular models emerge from country-specific historical and institutional contexts, which are resistant to change. Brubaker’s analysis of immigrant policies in France and Germany (1992) made a seminal contribution to this debate, since it showed how each country’s distinctive understandings of nationhood and membership was deeply rooted in the nation’s past, social structure and political style. He shows therefore how French policies reflect a more assimilatory, nationalist and expansionist approach while Germany’s citizenry is rather a community of descent, based on ethnocultural understandings of nationhood. In addition to the French ‘assimilationist model’, the German ‘differentialist model’ are the British “race relations” model and the ‘Dutch multicultural model’ all of which shape the frameworks through which migrants are received (Koopmans and Statham 2000). Koopmans (2007) stresses the Netherlands’ adoption of multiculturalist approaches as emerging from its civic tradition of pillarization, in which Dutch society was structured by religious or socio-cultural pillars (e.g. Protestant, Catholic, socialist etc.) National models of integration, while rooted in academic research have also become used in their own right in public and political debates (Duyvendak and Scholten 2012).

Other relevant models of integration have employed typologies of different modes of integration, which again influence the sort of policies that have been adopted (see Entzinger and Biezeveld 2003). Hollifield (1997) identifies three types: (a) The guestworker model, whereby migrants were seen as temporary workers, with few consequent implications imagined for legal status or impacts of cultural diversity (b) The assimilation model, whereby immigrants are allowed to stay permanently and accorded legal rights on condition that they assimilate to the dominant culture and (c) The ethnic minorities model, where immigrants are recognised in terms of their ethnic or national origin and constitute different, separate communities form the existing communities. Castles (1995) also identifies three models: of ‘differential exclusion’; an ‘assimilationist’ model; and (c) A ‘pluralist’ model, the latter used by more recently developing countries aimed at nation-building. The anthropologist of migration Ralph Grillo (2007) avoids notions of models but rather describes the differential trajectories of new migrants (alternatively labelled as ‘orientations, scenarios, narratives, projects, maybe options’). Of these trajectories, integration (“here, but different”) is one such pathway, contrasted to “assimilation” (a position where newcomers are “here, but the same”) and “enclavement” (“here, but separate”).

In and of themselves, however, models have been criticised on multiple grounds. National models have been attacked for failing to recognize the dynamic nature of immigrant integration and policies, which under closer inspection reveal limited continuity over decades (ibid.) Some scholars point out how they exaggerate differences, especially given some evidence that despite quite profound differences in outlook across countries, integration policies among the EU Member States are remarkably similar (Entzinger and Biezeveld 2003). Moreover, Christian Joppke maintains that distinct ‘national’ models are no longer relevant in the context of recent convergences in policy around civic integration and anti-discrimination (see policy section). In this view, similar approaches have been developed by states which in former studies were depicted as fundamentally different, governed by historically conflicting logics.
Since 2000 there has arguably been a subsequent turn away from pluralist and multicultural policy frameworks across Europe, and some would assert more convergence in approaches. Joppke (2004) refers to the ‘retreat of multiculturalism’ coupled with a rise in more civic integrationist approaches, evident for example in policies and rhetoric in countries like the UK and the Netherlands which had traditionally adopted stronger commitment to multiculturalism (Brubaker 2001, although this position is open to debate, see Meer and Modood 2014, Meer et al 2015). Civic integrationist approaches reject the multiculturalist approach in particular as ‘too passive and tolerant of cultural differences’ (Joppke 2012: 1) asserting instead policies that require much more strong acceptance of host-society norms and institutions. For example, in the Netherlands, multiculturalism has been replaced less by integration than a more assimilatory approach, with migrants expected to adapt to mainstream Dutch values and beliefs. Such moves have emphasised the priority of socio-cultural levels of integration (the values and belief systems) rather than structural integration, particularly in the Dutch case (Entzinger, Saharso and Scholten 2011).

Integration policies: Mainstreamed or targeted?

The different types of national normative frameworks influence another important question governing integration policies, that is, the degree to which activities should be directed at particular migrants’ needs through specific and targeted services or should be more broadly aimed at building an inclusive society for all. There is no consensus of what is the best approach; as a Cities for Local Integration Policy (Spencer 2008) report exploring 25 European city notes, ‘each approach has its advantages and disadvantages’ (p.93).

In recent years, there has been a shift in the governance of integration across Europe with moves towards ‘mainstreaming of integration’, whereby mainstream services are adapted to meet the needs of the entire population, responding to a whole range of diversity within society - not just immigrants. In other words, migration as accommodated as one of a number of vectors of difference, including age, gender, disability that all general services must adapt to, rather than seeing it as a specific group of people dealt with in specific services. This approach has the potential to build a more inclusive society generally as well as improve integration outcomes (Gidley and Jensen 2014, UPSTREAM project on mainstreaming integration). It is also a considerably less politically sensitive solution, since targeting of resources to particular communities can foster resentment in times of scarce resources and reinforce notions of some immigrant groups as ‘problem’ communities (Spencer 2008). As Entzinger and Biezeveld (2003: 20) note, ‘Mainstreaming is meant partly to avoid the stigmatising of migrants, and to prevent negative feelings that could arise among the host population when they get the idea that migrants are favoured over them’.

On the other hand, there are equally recognised weaknesses of mainstream approaches. There is a risk that specific vulnerable groups (e.g. women family migrants) may be overlooked (Oliver 2013). By contrast, targeted approaches might prove more cost-effective and successful than adapting existing services, for example by concentrating specialist facilitators in one specially designed service and adapting them to be more easily accessible at a known place and time by migrants. Communication and awareness of the service-provision may also be facilitated by more targeted interventions (Spencer 2008). In practice therefore, many cities maintain a combination of using general approaches aimed at responding to diversity and more specific targeted approaches for migrants (and other sub-groups) as and where that is needed (ibid.)
Multi-level governance of integration

A related issue is the awareness that integration occurs over a range of levels and therefore relies on policy to be coordinated at many different tiers of government, from the local to the supranational level. A significant literature (e.g. Caponio and Borkert 2010) has drawn attention to the multi-level governance of integration. Within this literature, the local level assumes a great deal of importance because of its delegated responsibility for services. Also, at this level, there may be different territorial interests between the local and national e.g. divergence between national agendas of immigration control and local priorities for social cohesion as noted by Spencer (2015, and see also Hepburn and Zapato-Barrero 2014). Rather than there being perhaps a clear ‘national model of integration’ from which local policies diverge, or alternatively a separate localist response, Scholten explains multi-level governance as a process which ‘distinguishes itself by the existence of some form of coordinated interaction between various government levels in the scope of a specific policy domain’ (2013: 220).

This literature draws attention to how local level policy practices may vary from nationally formulated policies. Sometimes this can be to the extent that there is ‘governance decoupling’ with no meaningful interaction between different levels (ibid.) which as Spencer (2015) observes is exactly what occurs in relation to irregular migrants). Other times there is more correlation between the different realms, although as Poppelaars and Scholten (2008) show in the case of the Netherlands, there are city-level differences from the national model. There, it has been alleged that more group-specific multiculturalist approaches are evident, although this perspective has shifted towards developing the citizenship of individual migrants. At the level of local policy implementation however, these scholars demonstrate how ‘tailor made’ approaches nevertheless have proven remarkably resilient against the national shift. Other examples of differentiation are shown by Scholten (2013) and Scholten and Penninx (2015) through analysis of the regional differences between Amsterdam and Rotterdam. In Amsterdam, municipalities initially adopted the minorities policies, which corresponded with the national multiculturalist approach to immigration, yet later policies took on their own local logics. However in Rotterdam, a more integrationist approach was used from the outset, which was then later taken up and used by national government.

In other cases, inevitably, local areas will adopt policies that correspond with national paradigms; cities may not be any more inclined to be inclusive than national governments. Ambrosini (2013) draws attention to the development in some local authorities in Northern Italy of attempts to exclude migrants from some benefits and rights and the imposition of cultural exclusion (for example limitations on the use of other languages in public events) emerging because of bureaucrat’s xenophobic views as well as because of the way these actions can be a means of seeking political consent.

Such literature draws attention to a local turn in integration policy-making. This recognises that although migration is seen as a national issue created by crossing state borders, migrant integration is a set of processes that occur locally (Caponio and Bokert 2010). More particularly, as Penninx (2003, no pages) points out, it is cities that confront rapid changes in their population; often steered by national policies, migrants must integrate into the ‘social embroidery of the city’, which is ‘not a natural process’ and, by way of marginalization, social exclusion and segregation, they can
‘threaten the social cohesion in these cities’. The literature also highlights differences as emerging due to the nature of immigrant integration as an ‘intractable’ policy problem, which defies a clear solution since actors at different levels involved not only have different ideas about how to approach the issue, but disagree in the first place about what the issue is (Scholten 2013). Scholten’s work demonstrates how the multi-level governance of policy issues is particularly affected by agenda dynamics at different tiers of government, reflecting divergent understandings of integration at various levels.

This literature moves towards recognising the specific contribution of local integration policies which diverge from national approaches (Caponio and Borkert, 2010; Scholten and Penninx, 2015). Penninx (2009) observes that while the dominant mode of analysis for integration policies was at the national level, increasingly attention has turned to integration policies and processes at the lower level of regions, cities and municipalities. Indeed there is considerable evidence from Europe where it is cities or regions rather than nation-states that are taking a lead on integration. This literature recognises that local areas are not always mere followers in implementing national solutions, but rather local policymakers can act rather as entrepreneurs responding to their own cities’ practical issues and political contexts (see also Guiraudon 2000 on ‘vertical venue shopping’). Thus recognition of the interplay between various tiers of government draws attention to considerable convergence or divergence between local and national models of integration, but also reveals the strong potential for local governments to innovate in ways that can eventually find traction in national level policies. It has been marked by a shift more broadly from the use of national models as the dominant frame (Penninx 2009) to more empirical comparison of local and city practices.

The CLIP network for example (https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/about-clip) brought together 25 European cities to compare and exchange experiences to develop more effective integration policies, exploring initiatives in the areas of housing, diversity policy, intercultural policy and ethnic business. Other initiatives include the Eurocities network of major European cities, now bringing together local governments of 130 major cities and 40 partner cities to share knowledge, exchange ideas and ultimately draw attention to and strengthen the role of local governments in multilevel governance structures across a range of policy challenges (see http://www.eurocities.eu/).

While the local level has become more firmly recognised in integration policymaking, the other equally important dimension is the role of supranational dimensions, giving a further tier of governance that frames the contexts of integration. A full consideration of the European response is beyond the scope of this paper, but it is worth noting that within Europe, immigration has been framed as both a problem requiring control (e.g. as a security or legal issue) as well as an opportunity to generate economic growth through plugging skills shortages and a means of solving the problems of an ageing society (Gilardoni, D’Odorico, Carrilo 2015). Yet another important dimension has been to influence integration. As Caponio and Bokert (2010) point out, the Framework Program of Solidarity and Management of Migration Flows was established with a number of aims: to integrate the management of external borders, manage asylum policy, fight against illegal integration, but also importantly assist with the social, civic and cultural integration of third-country nationals through the European Integration Fund (EIF). However, while the EU has a strong role in the border and visa regime, in terms of integration policy it has much more limited authority, only able to support Member States to coordinate their policies and facilitate exchange of information (ibid.) We discuss this now.
European policy initiatives on integration

The European Union, particularly since Tampere in 1999 has aimed to develop objectives for the development of a common EU policy on immigration, ensuring the fair treatment of TCN migrants and comparable rights and obligations to EU citizens (Entzinger 2003). However, it has had a limited mandate especially until recently, with integration only a delegated issue with limited traction aimed at exchanging and funding good practice. In its conceptualisation, the EU has embraced integration as a positive goal, defining it, in 2003, common with the academic literature as a ‘two-way process based on mutual rights and corresponding obligations of legally resident third country nationals and the host society which provides for full participation of the immigrant’ (Communication, European Commission 2003). This definition was articulated during the drafting of Common Basic Principles (CBPs) on Immigrant Integration (adopted by the European Council in 2004) and subsequently elaborated through the 2005 Communication, A Common Agenda for Integration (2005) and the successive editions of the Integration Handbook (from 2005).

These, in common with the academic research, highlight the dynamic and two-way nature of integration referred to in the previous section – that is, the idea that not only must migrants change to fit into European society, but also that they might contribute actively and enrich the receiving society. From a policy perspective, this puts an expectation on receiving societies to be willing to adapt public institutions to accommodate changes in the population profile and accept newcomers as part of the community. In practice, this has translated into more emphasis on labour market integration, which is highlighted in the Common Basic Principles, which notes the key role of employment in the integration process, central to immigrants participation, especially by making immigrants’ contributions visible (see CBP 3) (ibid.).

However, as Penninx (2009: 4) notes, in understanding integration as a process that involves two sets of actors, it is important to recognise how ‘these two ‘partners’ are fundamentally unequal in terms of power and resources’. And while the two-way nature of integration has been embraced in the European policy framework, it has been done so only to a certain extent. Kate and Niessen (2008:59), in common with Martin Baldwin-Edwards earlier (see page 2) note that although there has been an emphasis on mutual accommodation, in fact the role of the host society has been markedly peripheral in policy documents. They note:

[...] most accommodations outlined in the Common Basic Principles are undertaken by immigrants, whose text obliges them to respect basic values, acquire knowledge of the host society and participate in education, cultural life, the democratic process and the design of integration policies. Despite the intended two-way process of mutual accommodation between migrants and citizens, migrants continued to carry the main integration responsibility.

Thus on one hand European strategy has been influential in stressing the need for EU Member States to provide migrants’ rights and obligations comparable to EU Citizens, as developed in the Tampere European Council. However, there has been a more recent paradigm shift towards seeing integration as a condition to be demonstrated by migrants, marked by tests, programmes and contracts (Gilardoni et al 2015). Across Europe, we see that increasingly policies for integration place the onus on migrants to demonstrate willingness to integrate (e.g. through pre-departure language learning, citizenship tests etc.) Such initiatives have been viewed within the research field.
as both helpful (e.g. learning some language before arrival is beneficial for integration) but potentially a barrier too (as they imply a large financial burden, and it is often difficult to overcome logistical issues to attend testing centres). Meanwhile attention to the role of state-imposed barriers is much less, including the degree to which the foundations of integration, such as whether a state grants access to certain services or benefits or restricts them for a period post-entry, has effects on integration (see Oliver 2013).

**Problems of policy approaches**

Viewing integration as something achieved by policy is problematic on several grounds. First, it can **distract** from the **broader processes which are at the heart of integration, particularly those which are arguably outside the remit and influence of any state processes.** This is the argument of Christian Joppke (2009:470) who argues against too many expectations of the state, since:

> successful integration is eventually the result of multiple adjustments in the multiple spheres of a differentiated society, including markets, culture and everyday life, all of which follow their own rationalities which can only minimally and indirectly be influenced or mended by the liberal state.

Somewhat controversially, he argues that integration policies, particularly at the national level can do more harm than good. Joppke (2009) **questions that notion that it is states’ failure to integrate immigrants**, citing the US as an example of a country in which there has been an absence of any explicit state policy on integration with reliance instead of its flexible markets and assimilatory culture. Given the retreat of the state on many levels in a globalizing society, he argues that ‘the entire idea of state-led integration appears misguided from the start’ (2009: 455). On the other hand, **evidence for the differential effect of policies** (not necessarily their success) is demonstrated by Koopmans (2009) using the example of the ‘natural experiment’ of European countries who experienced similar types of immigration but developed different responses. He argues that countries combining multicultural policies with strong welfare states (e.g. Sweden, Belgium and the Netherlands) show only poor integration outcomes, while countries with more restrictive integration policies (Germany, Austria, Switzerland, France) or a less generous welfare state (the United Kingdom) have achieved better integration results.

Second, integration as policy can have a tendency of **over-emphasising the outcomes rather than the process** (despite the academic literature seeing integration as processes and explicitly not an end state e.g. see Ager and Strang’s 2004 ‘tentative’ definition for the UK Home Office which defines it as an end state). **Integration policies** also still provoke **concerns** about their **underlying reasoning**, given that there is a sense in which the term often implies a **something into which migrants are integrated**. As such, discussions of integration beg the question “integration into what?” In this sense, the challenge for theorising and accounting for integration is to do so without assuming ‘the’ receiving society to be a single, homogeneous, stable thing or culture ‘into’ which migrants integrate.

There are also **problems with policy approaches** in that they can **rarely** encapsulate and **address the holism and multi-dimensionality of integration**. In other words, policy measures are often aimed at one domain to the exclusion of others. In particular there has been a dominant focus on socio-economic integration, with integration particularly into the labour market an almost exclusive focus.
in some countries until fairly recently (e.g. the UK). Many Northern European countries have had schemes that facilitate labour market integration for guest workers, while keeping them excluded in key ways - particularly in the civic and cultural spheres.

**Summary: Understandings of integration**

To summarise, there are two distinct, but sometimes overlapping and complementary approaches to integration, with certain tensions between them. The first conceptual approach focuses on the broad and multidimensional processes that happen in integration, in a neutral and observational way. The other approach sees integration as policy aimed at achieving an end-state of an ‘integrated society’ or influencing outcomes to get nearer that goal, and often reflects normative views about what ‘should be’. These two understandings are not as far apart as one might expect; as Spencer and Charsley (2015:5) observe, policy discourse influences academic discourse, and is typically characterised by ‘the difficulty there can be in separating the normative ought from the empirical is’.

Having now considered integration as both process and policy, we now turn to an evidence section, exploring what is known on the different domains or sites of integration – beginning with structural/socio-economic integration (comprising labour market, education, health, housing) before moving to social and cultural integration, civic participation and finally identity and belonging. Following the evidence on each domain, the review will close with some notes on benchmarking and will highlight some resources that provide examples of policy and interventions across cities.

5. Evidence on structural integration

As Castles et al (2001) note, it is within the domain of structural integration (particularly in terms of employment) that we have the most extensive and often the most robust evidence about integration. It is worth emphasising however, that this domain cannot and should not be reduced to labour market integration only, as it has a dynamic and complex relationship with other forms of integration (Spencer, Ruhs, Anderson and Rogaly 2007).

a) Labour market integration

Integration into the labour market is the most widely researched area and important priority for policy, with the assumption that moving into employment underpins other efforts at integration, helps avoid poverty and generates social links (Craig 2015). Ager and Strang (2008: 170) note:

> Employment has consistently been identified as a factor influencing many relevant issues, including promoting economic independence, planning for the future, meeting members of the host society, providing opportunity to develop language skills, restoring self-esteem and encouraging self-reliance (Africa Educational Trust 1998; Bloch 1999; Tomlinson and Egan 2002).

As Craig (2015) observes, most governments place considerable importance on the economic contribution that migrants make to their societies in taxation (versus welfare provision). Migration increases labour supply, helps cope with short-term skills shortages and demand from employers for
labour, particularly as some sectors are highly dependent on migrant labour (Anderson and Ruhs 2010). Migrant labour is particularly important in addressing broader demographic and social changes in many European economies, such as the shifts to a dual-earner model that have led to dependence on female migration to meet the care deficit (Yeates 2009).

Evidence on migrants’ integration within this domain can be drawn from indicators including paid employment, income level, types of jobs, level of education (and congruence between this and skill level of the job indicating de-skilling) and use of social security, welfare and other social policy instruments (Entzinger and Biezeveld 2003). The majority of research emphasises the difficulties of migrants’ labour market integration, whereby even improvement and success in educational attainment among migrant groups is largely unreflected in better labour market participation. As Algan, Dustmann, Glitz and Manning (2010:27) state in relation to analysis of education and labour market experience of immigrants in France, Germany and the UK:

there is a clear indication that – in each country – labour market performance of most immigrant groups as well as their descendants is – on average – worse than that of the native population, after controlling for education, potential experience, and regional allocation.

There is widespread evidence in most European countries of ethno-stratification of some immigrant groups in less favourable jobs or high rates of unemployment. This varies according to nationality or migrants status; one of the main findings of the recent OECD (2015) report on immigrant integration shows that EU Nationals have better employment rates than TCNs in almost all European countries.

Difficulties are also evident in particular groups of TCNs, particularly for refugees (see Bloch 2009); As the NGO Network of Integration Focal Points in Europe (2006:5) suggests:

Refugees and migrants are a very diverse group with different skills levels, language abilities, qualifications, work experiences and ambitions. However, what they do have in common is the fact they suffer higher levels of unemployment than the native population and are often found working in low-skilled, badly paid and temporary jobs. Due to the forced nature of their migration and their experiences, compared with other migrant groups, refugees often face additional difficulties in accessing the labour market.

A brief survey of a number of countries across Europe reveals this to be commonly the case. In the UK for example, where perhaps the most emphasis on socio-economic integration in policy instruments has been placed, there is considerable evidence still of difficulties for migrants’ labour market integration. Phillimore and Goodson’s (2006) research on asylum-seekers, refugees and their family members in the West Midlands shows significantly higher rates of under- and unemployment than for other ethnic groups in the UK.

The evidence however points to significant variations within and between migrant populations. Dustmann and Theodoropoulos’ (2010) study of labour market outcomes of immigrant groups relative to the UK-born white population finds that employment rates are particularly low among black Africans, Bangladeshis and Pakistanis. In the UK, wage differentials for some ethnic groups e.g. for Black Africans are substantial, even among higher managers and professionals (Brynin and Longhi 2015). This picture of labour market integration is also gendered. In the UK, women from Pakistani
and Bangladeshi communities have the lowest participation rates among ethnic minorities (ibid.) and Bangladeshi women having the lowest level of participation for any group in the UK (CLG 2009). Indeed in one study, just 27 per cent of Bangladeshi and 30 per cent of Pakistani women were in formal employment despite evidence that they wish to work (Equal Opportunities Commission 2006).

In considering the variation in integration outcomes, length of residence proves often to be significant; In Jayaweera’s (2012) research on Muslim family migrants in the UK, of the family migrants who had been in the UK less than 10 years, only 37.7% were in employment, although this rose to 50% for those who had settled (see also Cheung and Phillimore 2014). This said, although unemployment is high among Pakistanis and Bangladeshis, it is notable that many participate in a thriving ‘informal economy’ and there are high rates of self-employment (CLG 2009) although this may equally be because of limited employment opportunities elsewhere or racial discrimination (Clark 2014).

In understanding labour market integration, consideration of the legal foundations and role of facilitators and barriers are particularly important. In the first place, access to the labour market is shaped by legal entitlements, in which, depending on differing national arrangements, some migrants, for example asylum-seekers and other newcomers may not be entitled to work until certain periods have passed or certain obligations met (e.g. in Germany, the Netherlands and Spain, a residence permit granted, see Ivanescu and Suvierol 2013). However, even when the legal foundation is in place, a wealth of research shows that access to employment is difficult, as is finding work that corresponds with migrants’ professional qualifications and abilities. Downward mobility as well as un- or underemployment is common, due to a range of barriers. Many migrants (including both undocumented workers and those legally resident) work in informal, low-waged and casualised sectors, unprotected by unions, leaving them vulnerable to exploitation or forced labour (Geddes et al. 2013, Craig 2015).

Language barriers remain probably the most significant barrier in accessing employment (Phillimore and Goodson 2006) with language proficiency lowest among groups most excluded from the labour market (Dustmann and Fabbri 2003). Other significant barriers are employers’ failure to recognise overseas qualifications, or over-caution among employers in employing legally resident workers, who fear sanctions that in some countries might make it a criminal offence to employ unlawfully present migrants. Yet, as Craig (2015) notes, the influence of discrimination is also significant; he cites Haque (2010) who points out that migrants in a particular area might have higher skills levels and qualifications than HCNs, but have the same levels of economic activity. Indeed, a recent OECD study (2015) found that better educated TCNs have greater trouble finding a job than their EU peers, although this may be explained by other factors, including language difficulties.

Joppke (2009) indeed cautions against too much reliance on discrimination as an explanatory factor for limited labour market integration; with reference to British Muslims, he suggests it is rather more down to other structural and demographic factors. These include the younger age-profile of Pakistani and Bangladeshi populations, lower skill levels and concentration in particular pockets of economic deprivation and depressed work sectors. It is also a result of some traditionalist outlooks of the first immigrant generation that extend to religious and gendered views on work.
Other issues are around **limited social networks**, since these have proven very important in accessing employment (Wahba 2013). In particular, the CLIP network report (Spencer 2008) argued for greater support for ethnic entrepreneurship as a means of encouraging labour market integration. There is also evidence of the **interplay** of this factor with other integration domains, particularly housing, whereby difficulties faced by some migrants in securing reasonable accommodation compounds the high rates of unemployment among some families (Robinson et al 2007). There is also considerable concern among national governments of the **potential implications** of the labour market participation of immigrants for **social and cultural integration**. Employment is, within media and popular representations as well as among some politicians themselves, a contested resource for which **migrants are depicted as in competition with native workers** (Hudson et al. 2007). Craig (2015) however cites research which largely refutes the picture of ‘job capture’ by migrants or negative impacts of immigration on wage levels, apart from in a few cases (Somerville and Sumption 2008; Lucchino et al. 2012).

**b) Education**

A second key socio-economic area of integration includes education, which again proves a major indicator of successful integration, as well as a key pathway to it. As Ager and Strang (2008: 172) observe:

> Education clearly provides skills and competences in support of subsequent employment enabling people to become more constructive and active members of society. More generally [...] schools are experienced as the most important place of contact with members of local host communities, playing an important role in establishing relationships supportive of integration.

Indicators of educational integration are levels of educational qualifications, skills training and language skills, which, as Entzinger and Biezeveld (2003) point out, are good predictors of future labour market outcomes for newer migrants as well as the second generation. However, although children have rights to education, existing research shows that children from ‘low-status’ immigrant groups **do not achieve as well** as children from majority populations (Alba and Holdaway 2013). Disadvantages faced by some immigrant young people have significant longer-term effects, for example **higher rates of early school leaving** (the drop-out rate among migrant groups is much higher than among majority-born students, European Commission thematic working group 2013, see also Nouwen, Clycq and Ulicna 2015). Some immigrant children are also likely to **have lower acquisition of qualifications**, which limit opportunities for post-compulsory education or employment. Overcoming these difficulties is particularly pressing for large European cities, where some immigrant-origin children form the majority of students (e.g. see Crul and Doomernik (2003) on Rotterdam and Amsterdam).

Such a picture again **varies significantly among immigrant groups**; research into the attainment of migrant children as well as the children of ethnic minority immigrants/second generation (see Dustmann and Theodoropoulos 2010) shows a mixed picture. Within the UK for example there is a substantial gap between the educational attainment of pupils of Pakistani heritage and the national average (CLG 2009b) yet some immigrant groups, such as Indian Muslims have much higher educational outcomes (CLG 2009c). Attainment also varies according to generation; Analyses of several countries across Europe show that there is a **significant improvement in educational**
attainment between first and second generation migrants (Algan et al 2010). However, other studies show more limited advancement, for example Crul and Doomernik (2003) on Turkish and Moroccan second-generation educational attainment, which they suggest is a result of poor language instruction of Dutch as a second language and early selection/tracking.

Although immigrant children have a right to education, other research shows that there are problems for some accessing educational services (Pinson, Arnot and Candappa 2010) including even accessing a school place. A report by the UK charity Barnados (2007:47) notes, despite the right to education in London, ‘getting a school place can be very difficult – it has been estimated that at least 2,100 refugees and asylum-seeking children are out of school in London alone’. Again there is evidence of the interplay with other integration domains too: Immigrant children are regularly housed in poor neighbourhoods, and as a consequences of educational policy shifts towards ‘parental choice’, migrant families are increasingly ‘warehoused’ in underprivileged and poorly resourced schools (de Block and Buckingham, 2007, Lucey and Reay 2002, Portes and Zhou 1993). Within many member states, Entzinger and Biezeveld (2003) note that educational systems are marked by segregation related not only to residential patterns but the phenomenon of ‘white flight’.

Educational attainment is strongly influenced by parental engagement. Education is an important factor in migration decisions; many migrant parents arrive with high expectations of the education system and it helps to ‘root’ families longer-term (Ryan and Sales, 2011; Trevena et al. 2013). However, they often feel unable to support their children in their learning and educational and career choices (D’Angelo and Ryan, 2011). Partly this can be explained by language: children often speak different language at home than the dominant language, but also some immigrant parents have lower levels of education than those of parents of ethnic-majority students which limit their ability to help with homework or engage with school (ibid.) Other academic research however complicates the picture of immigrants as ‘hard to reach’ suggesting that schools may hold an understanding of the parental body as homogeneous and deracialised, which fails to understand the barriers to participation for certain parents (Crozier and Davies 2007).

Also significant to integration is not only children’s education but adult and continuing education, in particular language tuition. Phillimore’s (2010) study reveals that the migrants’ inability to speak the dominant language (in this case English) rendered them isolated and vulnerable to depression. Lack of language skill among parents also has negative impacts by placing responsibility on dependent children to act as cultural brokers, translators and intermediaries between their parents and others (Adams and Kirova 2007). Yet depending on different national regimes, some immigrants may find themselves subject to certain restrictions on foundational access to further and higher education or even language tuition. There is considerable discrepancy in practice between different countries e.g. in the UK, those without longer term residency pay higher rates than the ‘home fee’ rate (Jayaweera and Oliver 2013).

This barrier compares with other countries’ policies where language tuition is seen as an important enabler; for example in Germany from 2005 newcomers get 900 hours of language instruction and 35 hours of civics in integration courses (Lüken-Klaßen 2013). These have been seen to lead to positive outcomes found in structural, social, cultural and emotional integration, with such initiatives recognising the important role that language plays in aiding resettlement and integration.
c) Health

Evidence on the role of health in migrant integration is more limited, since it is less well researched than other integration domains. However, good health is nevertheless important insofar as it enables or prevents engagement with the labour market and broader social networks. Ager and Strang (2008:172) note:

Although infrequently cited as a core factor in integration in the course of local fieldwork, good health was widely seen as an important resource for active engagement in a new society across the documentary sources reviewed. As well as supporting health outcomes, reliable access to health services marks effective engagement with a key state service.

Some research notes that migrants generally are of better health — at least at first - because, migrants as a self-selecting sample tend to be young, more educated, more entrepreneurial and healthier than those born in the homeland (the so-called ‘healthy migrant effect’). However, this literature tends to emerge from North America, with less evidence from Europe, largely because there is limited coordination of data about migrants within national health systems which tend to be focused on ethnic variations (Mladovsky 2009, Jayaweera and Quigley 2010). Government policy is often therefore addressed at reducing ethnic inequalities, with for example in the UK, neglect of the influence of language, length of residence and immigration status (Jayaweera 2010).

Despite the possibility of healthy migrant effect, there are equally a range of factors that suggest that migrants may be vulnerable to particular health risks. In particular, their labour tends to be concentrated in low-waged sectors with insecure, flexible and unregulated work, including shift work and long hours. This sometimes involves hard physical labour in dangerous conditions with higher risks of work-related injury (Anderson and Ruhs 2010, McKay et al 2006, Dainty 2007). Other types of vulnerable employment (such as care-work and cleaning) also affect the health of workers (ibid.). There has been little consideration of the longer-term impacts of both this work, or more broadly on the associated financial insecurity and impacts on health. Such factors may influence decisions around retirement and experiences of ageing, especially since many immigrants are less likely than their ethnic majority counterparts to build up adequate retirement benefits from either public or private sources as they are less well-informed on access to private or state pensions, even when highly educated (Morisette and Zhang 2004, referring to Canada).

Research on migrant health shows that in general, migrants may also face a number of structural barriers accessing health services especially where there are broader restrictions on migrants’ access to services (Thomas et al 2010, Jayaweera 2010, Oliver 2013). Particularly in the UK, research has drawn attention to the frequent, confusing changes in policy relating to entitlements for healthcare for foreign nationals (Thomas, Aggleton and Anderson 2010) which is most recently evident in the introduction of an Immigration Health Surcharge attached to entry. Research in the UK shows that migrants may face confusion around charging for healthcare services, as some migrants are entitled to certain services and others not. Qualitative research by Cohen found that migrants in the country legally visited their GPs to access care, but nevertheless she refers to a migrant unable to access a carer recommended by her occupational therapist as she did not ‘have recourse to public funds’, despite the fact that healthcare is not included as a public fund. Similarly, Thomas et al’s (2010) research on access to HIV treatment shows the policy changes were unclear.
for many categories of migrants, and there was ensuing confusion which left vulnerable and sometimes destitute people having substantial charges placed on them.

Other research on the topic focuses on the explanatory factors as to why the rights have such limited take-up. These include uncertain immigration status and lack of clarity on entitlement, lack of language support, lack of information and limited cultural competencies of personnel outside metropolitan areas (ibid.). In the UK, migrants may have little information about how the health service is run, with little knowledge on how to apply to a doctor. Other literature explores different concepts of illness or communication problems with medical personnel, with some examples of studies how the health system in Germany adapts to the needs of migrants (e.g. Blümel (2009) on Germany and Montesdeoca et al. (2006) on Spain). Migrants report experiencing racism, delays in treatment and administrative barriers such as the need to find documentary evidence and given that many experience generally poor health conditions, there are suggestions that this should be a priority for developing effective health care arrangements (see also PICUM 2007 on undocumented migrants).

Finally, Craig (2015) makes an important point that integration in terms of healthcare overlaps with labour market integration, because of the important position of migrants as providers of healthcare rather than recipients. Migrant workers are often employed to care for the elderly and disabled, as recognised in the scholarship on global care chains (Yeates 2009).

d) Residential/housing

As Gidley and Caputo (2012) note, residential integration relates to two key elements: first, around the type and quality of the housing that migrants live in (e.g. tenure, overcrowding and level of repair) and second, around the patterns of residence and particularly the extent to which migrants are segregated, scattered across areas or concentrated. Residential integration overlaps considerably with the other socio-economic, social and cultural integration domains, especially the latter because it provokes concerns about access to scarce resources (e.g. through migrants’ access to social housing) and can generate concern about residential segregation (or using a more neutral term, clustering) and belonging. The literature is vast on this topic, but some key points will be emphasized.

Gidley and Caputo’s review of international literature on different forms of housing tenure draws attention to gaps between migrant outcomes and those of non-migrants. Home ownership is often seen as a good indicator of residential integration, since it may be seen as a sign of investment or loyalty to the new country (Entzinger and Biezeveld 2003). Evidence shows that migrants are less likely to achieve home ownership than those born in the receiving society. Despite some difficulties around benchmarking and monitoring outcomes (which they discuss further) evidence from a MPG report shows that the members of the foreign-born population are three times less likely to own property compared to the general population (age-group 20-64) although those born in another EU Member State are more likely to own property than non-EU immigrants. As they also point out, there is ‘some correlation between home ownership, length of residence and civic participation, but also that there is some correlation between residential segregation (ethnic enclaves) and the achievement of home ownership’ (Gidley and Caputo 2012:1, citing eg. Borjas 2002, Painter and Yu 2008).
However, the relevance of this indicator is debatable when considering that recent or temporary migrants have little reason to buy property. As a result, housing quality and access may be more relevant, especially since available evidence shows perhaps more importantly that many categories of migrants often experience overcrowding or poor housing conditions. As Penninx, Kraal, Martiniello and Vertovec (2004) maintain, new immigrants over recent decades have tended to concentrate in particular areas of cities, with uneven distribution within certain wards or neighbourhoods, often with low quality housing. This is likely influenced by both the absence of any housing policy as well as the tendency for new migrants to move to the same location as compatriots, particularly assisted by the existence of intermediaries and migrant networks (ibid.).

Housing market factors are also fundamentally important in determining the nature of housing that migrants occupy, which in combination with the socioeconomic characteristics of the migrant household are both key determinants of tenure, conditions and residential location. What a migrant household can afford to pay is also influenced by access to credit, immigration status and related rights and entitlements (for example a household in comparable financial circumstances to a migrant family might be entitled to financial support or access to housing from the state based on residency and contributions). Some research points to discrimination being a key issue facing migrants and minorities in housing markets. This might occur through direct discrimination of landlord or lenders’ prejudices to institutional racism of public housing providers. Other indirect discrimination arises from lack of information about housing, including advice about entitlements to public housing or access to cheap finance. This may also arise from some migrants’ limited language skills, which provide an additional barrier to information.

Indeed, Robinson et al (2007:82) point out that there is great variation in housing pathways for different immigrants based on this latter factor. Based on a study in the UK, they suggest: ‘the planned or enforced nature of immigration and the rights and opportunities associated with different types of legal status are critical determinants of the choices and actions available to new immigrants’. Their research shows clear distinctions in the settlement experiences of different new immigrant populations (ibid.: 2). Some migrants (such as family migrants) are better placed than others, since they join their spouse or family in often rent-free and permanent arrangements. On the other hand, research also demonstrates that many migrants are often housed in the private rental sector, with restricted possibilities for integration because of living in poor quality, over-crowded housing with little knowledge of their rights, responsibilities or entitlements (Phillimore 2010). Yet as Gidley and Caputo (2012) observe, rates of overcrowding decline following long-term residence.

Ager and Strang (2008: 171) initially regarded housing as covered by a range of indicators that included ‘measures of the physical size, quality and facilities of housing, along with the financial security of tenancies and, where appropriate, ownership’. However in their fieldwork with refugees, they found that these aspects of housing were considered unimportant; what was considered important was the sense of being settled and at home in an area (Ibid.) This affective dimension of residential integration is also manifest in more negative public concern around migrants’ access to social housing. However there is little evidence that migrants gain favourable treatment over settled communities (e.g. in UK, see Rutter and Latorre 2009. For example, Robinson (2010) quotes the Migration Impacts forum which was launched in June 2007 as demonstrating that less than 5% of social housing went to foreign nationals and less than 1% to migrant workers. As Spencer and Pobjoy (2011) elaborate in reference to the UK, local authorities allocate housing based on need which
prioritises families rather than individuals and yet they also have scope in setting their own standards of ‘need’ which involves giving priority to longer-established local residents.

The second – and related - aspect concerns migrant settlement patterns and considers **how far migrants and ethnic groups are clustered together in particular areas.** There has been a powerful policy discourse around “parallel societies” (*Parallelgesellschaften*) in several different European countries, especially older migration contexts such as Germany, the Netherlands, France and the UK (especially related to incidences of urban unrest and uprisings, e.g. in the French *banlieue* in 2005 (Schönwälder 2007). However, the evidence shows that despite some sites of residential concentration of migrants **European cities have far lower levels of spatial concentration by ethnicity than their American counterparts** (see e.g. Musterd and Ostendorf 1998, 2007 on the Netherlands or Andersson 2007 on Sweden). Koopman however points out that despite more favourable labour market integration, the UK shows high levels of residential segregation leading particularly to some Muslim immigrants living ‘separate lives’, as debated within the Community Cohesion Report in the wake of ethnic riots in Northern cities (Cantle 2001). Other research more recently contests this picture of communities ‘sleepwalking into segregation’ with evidence that counters these interpretations as ‘myths’ (Finney and Simpson 2009). Also, while attention is often drawn to the concentration of migrants in cities, the experience of asylum-seekers who may be dispersed in smaller towns or rural areas should also not be overlooked, particularly since integration processes will be affected by the extent to which such places have experienced prior immigration.

In the Netherlands Zorlu and Mulder (2008) argue that **new migrants use networks of existing migrants to access housing,** often settling in neighbourhoods where co-ethnics are concentrated. These strategies may generate unintended **consequences in terms of social integration,** as these arrangements encourage a reliance on small groups of co-ethnics and relatives during early settlement, with less engagement in friendships beyond these communities (Jayaweera 2012). On the other hand, **evidence suggests that migrants benefit in several ways from living near people of the same background,** and that this can be a factor for successful integration in other domains, including the labour market (Robinson and Reeve 2006a). Areas with high numbers of people from migrant backgrounds already living there “can be rich in various resources vital to helping new immigrants meet the challenge of satisfying their material needs, coping with hostility and discrimination, engaging with key services and negotiating a place in British society” (Robinson and Reeve 2006b:2). As such, research demonstrates **the importance of and complexity of housing as a factor in integration, which is as much an issue about identity and belonging than socio-economic status alone.** As Craig (2015:45) observes:

> What is generally clear is that *pace* the arguments of many governments and commentators, the concentration of minorities and migrants in deprived communities and neighbourhoods on an allegedly self-segregating basis (which drove much UK government community cohesion policy for example) is not the result of choices made by minorities and migrants but a result of their lack of bargaining power within a market driven by income and wealth and not by need.
6. Evidence on social integration

The evidence on social and cultural integration is mainly concerned with the extent to which social interactions and relationships develop among migrants and those in the receiving society. Evidence on this domain, especially around social integration, is covered within the overlapping domain of residential integration. Building in the recognition of integration as a two-way process, Ager and Strang (2008:177-178) describe different scenarios of social and cultural integration. These include first, the absence of conflict and presence of “toleration”; second, a more meaningful level of integration, in which different groups actively mix together. Finally, they refer to a situation where different people feel a sense of common belonging, involving friendship and family links across lines of difference as well as positive respect and shared values.

The main thrust of the research on social integration has been driven by the social capital literature, which offers some useful and measurable tools for assessing relationships. This examines how ‘bonding’ social capital may be useful in the short-term for ‘getting by’ for some immigrants, for example as newcomers are assisted and offered support through strong ties within homogenous groups. The outcomes can be seen in previous evidence, especially using social network analysis, where social networks have been demonstrated as helpful for migrants in labour market and residential integration. However, ‘bridging’ relationships, which transcend differences of ethnicity or class, are often noted as better for individuals to ‘get ahead’ (Putnam 2000:22). Of relevance too are the social links which migrants build with institutions, including local and central government services.

Other indicators, such as difference in incidence of intermarriage is also a central indicator of social integration, especially since intermarriage has traditionally been seen as a process of reducing the social distance between immigrants and existing groups in the receiving society, although recent research suggests this is too simplistic a picture (Song 2009). Saggar et al suggest that using the lens of local neighbourhoods is a good site in which integration can be measured through concepts such as trust and neighbourliness. Indeed the nature and extent of social interactions are closely related to locality, and particularly where people are housed, schooled and employed. Within the UK, residential clustering in the UK Northern Mill towns was identified as creating problems of cohesion, with those societies described as “sleep-walking into segregation” (Cantle 2001). However, some critics have disagreed with the conclusions (e.g. Bagguley and Hussain 2006) especially since other evidence points to the contrary (Finney and Simpson 2009). Other recent research has challenged some of the conclusions drawn as a result of the social capital literature. For example Cheung and Phillimore (2014) found that having good co-ethnic contact did not preclude good contact with those from the receiving society. However, Papillon (2002:iii) writes that:

The spatial concentration of immigrants may not necessarily be a problem: it may contribute to the creation of social networks and facilitate access to employment; but it may also, when combined with poverty, become an explosive mix, leading directly to the social exclusion of future generations.
7. Evidence on cultural integration

Cultural integration includes religion, morals, values, behaviour and lifestyle and any associated changes in them in both the receiving society and among migrants. This can be measured to some degree through attitudinal surveys around values and beliefs about the rules and norms of the host country or in public attitudes to migrants. On the other hand, as Entzinger and Biezeveld (2003:22) note, attempts to measure migrants’ integration are troubled by the absence of a discernible cultural ‘core’ to which migrants integrate:

One of the key questions that emerge in the assessment of acculturation processes of migrants to the society that surrounds them is to identify what exactly constitutes the core of that society, its basic values and rules.

Despite the difficulties in conceptualising and measuring, cultural integration is often the domain most often highlighted in popular, media and politicians’ discourses, for example in discussions of the failure of immigrants to learn English, or where the migrant family is constructed as ‘culturally different’ and possessing different values, practices and beliefs. Kofman et al (2010:2) for example refers to the construction of migrant families as an ‘an obstacle to integration – as a site characterised by patriarchal relations and illiberal practices and traditions such as arranged and forced marriage’.

This discourse emphasises the incompatible lifestyles of different religious groups, particularly in the wake of the 9/11 and 7/7 terrorist attacks, or riots in English Northern towns (Wray 2009). The question of public attitudes to migrants and differences in values, attitudes and beliefs was an early focus in policy and research in the 1950s and 1960s prior to more attention being given to the structural dimensions of integration. As Craig (2015) summarises however, its importance in policy and academic research is increasing particularly in the recognition of faith and religion as factors promoting or impeding integration (Levitt 2008). The consequences of these socio-cultural differences are not only important in terms of social cohesion, but are also viewed by some governments (e.g. in the Netherlands) as undermining the type of solidarity which is needed for the welfare state to function (Entzinger 2006). On the whole however, the literature focuses on the attitudes of migrants with lesser attention to the public attitudes of receiving societies, including issues such as racism, myths and scare-mongering. There is also little consideration of the effects of securitisation of immigration policies following 9/11 or increased surveillance over migrant and settled Muslim populations (Ramalingam 2013, cited in Craig 2015).

Reflecting the heightened prominence of the socio-cultural domain in recent years, immigration policy has prioritised the capacity to integrate well socio-culturally, which now features more strongly in the selection of migrants (Wray 2012) and may now be measured through tests and surveys (as carried out in Denmark for example). Entzinger and Biezeveld (2003) point out how in many countries (e.g. Denmark), the importance of some form of cultural integration is explicitly expected by governments. In the Netherlands, mandatory courses for TCN migrants have been offered since 1998, with not only attention to language but also imparting basic knowledge about Dutch society, with the example followed by many others (including Finland, Denmark, Austria, Germany, Belgium (Flanders), France and the United Kingdom).
Such developments reflect a shift in tone in integration debates; as Wray notes, ‘recent government discourse implies that government and the host society have fulfilled their obligations, and migrants and those of migrant descent must now fulfil theirs’ (2009:596). On the other hand, these developments fail to recognise the way that migrants’ identities, cultures and affiliations may not align easily with state visions of integration (ibid. see also de Leeuw and van Wichelen 2012 on the Netherlands). Spoonley et al (2005:91) citing authors such as Vertovec and Jenson, also note the following areas of contention:

- assuming a consensus about social cohesion as a desirable end-state
- the extent to which there are patterns of cooperative social interaction and shared core values
- what the common values consist of and how they are cultivated and maintained
- the extent to which the interest in social cohesion is a product of recent changes in economic policy and the greater labour market insecurity/flexibility and political restructuring.

Joppke maintains that in particular it is poverty which fuels the politicization of cultural difference. He points out (2012:1), ‘The core cause of European integration problems may be socio-economic in nature rather than religious’.

8. Evidence on civic participation

This area relates to the EU key area of Nationality, civic citizenship and respect for diversity as noted in the Common Basic Principle 9: ‘The participation of immigrants in the democratic process and in the formulation of integration policies and measures, especially at the local level, supports their integration.’ On one hand this refers to the extent to which they are given the rights to contribute to democratic debate and on the other, it refers to the extent that when they can participate, they are actually doing so (or are enabled to do so). Indeed, for some marginalised and vulnerable workers, civic participation is itself the fundamental step towards better integration in other domains. Anthias, Kontos and Morokvasic-Müller (2013) point out with reference to substantial work on gender and migration that integration should be reframed to mean greater equalisation and democratisation for women.

As pointed out earlier, although the EU has been influential in seeking to extend comparable rights between TCNs and European citizens, the granting of citizenship and associated rights is a matter of national preference, as well as individual preference, e.g. in the sense of whether migrants choose to be naturalised or not. Naturalisation processes vary between Member States, reflecting the different citizenship regimes of jus sanguinis (descent-based citizenship) or jus soli (place-based citizenship) and the differences to which countries have adopted from both schemas. Thus, as Entzinger and Biezeveld (2003) note, while numbers of migrants naturalised are often seen as a measure for integration, the huge differences in naturalisation regimes (including from sending countries, such as whether dual citizenship is permitted or not) means that whether one is naturalised or not may tell us more about the difference in rules than any sense of loyalty or integration to a receiving country.
The extent to which rights are granted to non-citizen migrants also vary between member-states. While most rights should align after 5 years’ residence, the IMPACIM project on the different rights and restrictions on access to services and benefits for family migrants shows some **differences in the post-admission rights regime facing TCN family migrants** in the Netherlands, Germany, Spain and the UK, e.g. Oliver 2013). This shows for example, that despite its more ‘open’ (but leaner) welfare state, there are more restrictions in place in the UK – for example to access education courses or welfare benefits than in the social insurance tradition of Germany and the Netherlands. Likewise, some states are increasingly imposing rules and thresholds that determine the extent to which people are able to exercise the right of family reunification (see Oliver 2013).

Other measurable aspects of participation can be seen through **membership of various civil society organisations.** These include specific refugee community and migrant organisations which can help newly arrived migrants and refugees ‘settle, access a social network and give refugees and migrants a voice’. (NGO Network of Integration Focal Points 2006:8). On the other hand, more broad **community forums** can provide useful places for developing shared understandings about contested issues (e.g. housing etc.) The volume *Citizenship in Europe* (Vertovec) offers excellent insights and evidence into the ways that immigrants have organised themselves or created forms of ‘citizenship from below’ (1). The volume also offers useful evidence on the ways that local governments have adapted their own administrative structures to respond and foster immigrants’ participation in public decision-making.

Membership in other collective bodies such as Trade Unions gives voice to immigrant workers, while engagement in the wider civic sphere through volunteering can be seen as a means and marker of integration. Evidence that provides **levels of participation in these sorts of activities can indicate some degree of migrants settling and finding a place in the receiving society** (Entzinger and Biezeveld 2003). On the other hand, again there may be issues of measurement involved – for example with reference to volunteering, involvement may not reflect any more or less indication of belonging, but rather reflect as Voicu and Rusu (2012) demonstrate, the tendency for immigrants who spent more time in more participatory contexts at origin and who are in contact with these societies, to continue to be involved in civic associations in the receiving society.

At the national level, **participation can also be measured in terms of voting,** although most Member States prohibit voting in national elections to foreign residents (but this may be dependent on reciprocal rights or long-standing historical associations, such as in Spain, where nationalities of certain Latin and South American countries can vote after a shorter residence period - see Ivanescu and Suvierol 2013). The MPMC-project focused particularly on the political participation of immigrants (but also included a more general comparison) in 16 major European cities and Tel Aviv (see Penninx et al 2004). Among naturalised residents with voting rights, however there is a general trend among immigrants for low turnout in elections, although the degree of ethnic participation in governments varies significantly between countries (see Joppke 2009 on Muslims in senior political posts) and this will likely have an impact. Indeed a key policy concern is about how to engage migrants better with local democratic structures.

Finally, another facet of this domain is the development previously observed about the use of civic integration policies within processes of naturalisation. Within this, **mandatory integration**
requirements must be achieved before a new immigrant is rewarded with citizenship. As part of this process, migrants must demonstrate certain competences (e.g. in language and cultural knowledge) as a means of demonstrating they are integrated. In this sense, civic participation or local knowledge is seen as a means of achieving better social and labour market integration, rather than these factors per se being an outcome of integration (Ponzo et al. 2013).

9. Evidence on identity and belonging

The extent to which people feel a sense of belonging, closely overlapping with the cultural domain, increasingly a preoccupation of governments (reflected for example in the need to demonstrate a sense of ‘national values’ in pre-entry or post-entry integration tests). Spoonley et al (2005) explain that for new settlers, there are different ways in which they come to feel part of a community following arrival, through both an ‘expressional or subjective dimension’ and a ‘functional dimension’ of incorporation (e.g. referring to belonging in the labour market). These dimensions of belonging and acceptance reflect not only the immigrant’s perception, but are also part of the process by which host communities accept new migrants (van de Leun, 2003).

From the perspective of immigrants, research tends to show however that it is local identification within a neighbourhood that occurs before national identification. There is considerable evidence, especially from Europe, that migrants often come to identify locally before they come to identify with the nation (although the British Citizenship Survey shows identity with the local area to be less strong than identification with the nation among the migrant population in the UK) (CLG 2010). However, it is also important to note that some of the empirical evidence around identity and belonging can refute some popularly held assumptions. For example, analysis of the Home Office Citizenship Survey has found that the religious and ethnic concentration of a neighbourhood, commonly believed to be detrimental to a sense of national belonging is statistically insignificant to a sense of belonging and identity with Britain across all groups (Maxwell 2006). Robinson and Reeve (2006b: 1) claim that ‘Evidence suggests that new immigrants are making a positive contribution to... the cultural and social fabric of towns and neighbourhoods and, in some situations, the regeneration and revitalisation of declining neighbourhoods.’
On the other hand, it is also important to consider the receiving society’s framing of identity and belonging, since a country’s sense of identity as a nation incorporates certain values, which significantly influence how a concept such as integration is approached as well as influences how rights are extended to newcomers (Ager and Strang 2008). Indeed, Joppke (2009) draws attention in particular to the work of the British state, which despite having done much more than other European governments to promote the integration of Muslims, face a situation in which, as countless surveys attest, British Muslims feel more disenfranchised than any other Muslim group in Europe. He explains this by the limits of British integration policy, and especially the shift towards recognition of Islamophobia. This, he argues acts as a symbolic tool of the perceived limited respect facing Muslims, but deflects from the real causes of disadvantage. In particular, he argues that the consequences – of Muslims seeking ‘respect’ and ‘recognition’ - are empty goals in a liberal state premised on freedom.

It is also important to recognise the role of other stakeholders – and particularly the media, especially given the upsurge in anti-immigrant messages in some populist press and social media (or calls for more humane political responses to the so-called ‘refugee crisis’ in Europe). Identity and belonging is also influenced by the representative of ethnic minorities in state institutions (such as the police force or political structure) affecting the extent to which immigrants recognise themselves as having a stake in public institutions (Entzinger and Biezeveld 2003).
10. A note on measuring and benchmarking integration

The comparability of data is an issue in measuring and benchmarking aspects of immigration and integration. Datasets are not the same across countries and data may be missing, or use proxies in the absence of concrete measures on immigration. Even definitions of what an ‘immigrant’ vary substantially across countries (Entzinger and Biezeveld 2003) while sample size can disrupt the scope of analyses (Craig 2015). Moreover, while it is possible to measure the outcomes for different migrant groups and perhaps compare them with existing members of the receiving society, it is less easy to demonstrate their relationship to any (or lack of) specific integration policies (ibid.) There have been attempts to develop common indicators across EU Member States, most recently seen in the OECD report (2015). These might enable comparison, identification of trends and identification of ‘best practices’ - although caution should be taken since policies are difficult to transpose from context to context.

Of note is the MIPEX (the Migration Policy Integration Index - www.mipex.eu) which employs 148 policy indicators to identify trends in policy levers adopted and discern what is happening across national states. This does not measure outcomes but rather measures the extent to which countries have policy levers that are favourable to integration offering means of some tentative evaluation (Craig 2015). A recent piece of work by the OECD (2015) does measure outcomes, offering international comparison of immigrant outcomes across European and OECD countries, grouped around the topics of ‘employment, education and skills, social inclusion, civic engagement and social cohesion’, providing for the first time a full set of indicators for TCN and EU migrants on integration.

11. Local policies on integration

Much of the research explored previously emphasises the crucial role and responsibility of cities and municipalities in developing local strategies that are responsive to increasing population diversity (Penninx et al 2004). Indeed, the ‘local turn’ in integration policy-making has been met in research by consideration of how best to develop and implement immigrant integration policy at city level. As Caponio and Borkert (2010) maintain, local responses are very much shaped in terms of wider state structures and centre/periphery relations (e.g. the degree of (de)centralisation) but it is at the local level that the details of policies are actually worked out and implemented.

Awareness of what kinds of policies and in what domains integration policies are being developed across cities can be found in a number of useful sources. In particular, Citizenship in Europe: Immigrants, Local Politics and Integration Policies (Penninx, Kraal, Martiniello and Vertovec 2004) provides evidence from a large scale comparative research project entitled ‘Multicultural Policies and Modes of Citizenship in European Cities’ (MPMC). Within that book, Alexander (2004) develops a framework and typology that gives an overview of the kinds of policies cities are implementing. These include policies ranging across different domains, including:

**Socio-economic Domain:** This refers to policies developed to encourage participation in structural institutions such as education, the labour market etc. Policies aim to increase access to employment, which might include the provision of advice centres on finding work, or specific work orientation
programmes, which help with language and build relevant skills for finding work (e.g. interview preparation and CV writing). They may also include youth employment policies (see Aybek’s chapter in Caponio and Borkert 2010) or might also be developed to help ethnic entrepreneurship, through networking or provision of discounted rates on business premises. Other policies may be developed in the field of education, concerning for example the degree to which bilingual teaching is encouraged (with ramifications for employment of teachers of migrant origin). Initiatives might also address changes in the curriculum to make it more reflective of diverse populations, the provision of extra funding for new immigrants’ education, special provisions or programmes or the employment of intermediaries to liaise between home and school. Other considerations are the extent to which education is extended to migrant parents as well as children e.g. in many German cities, Mama lernt Deutsch (Mother learns German) encouraged parents to learn the language while children were at nursery, kindergarten or school (Jaczewska 2013). Policies in this domain might also aim at developing better access to welfare and healthcare services, e.g. through campaigns that encourage awareness of rights, or that provide translators in healthcare encounters.

Legal-political Domain: Policies in this domain relate to civic incorporation of migrants in the receiving society’s polity and strengthening the involvement and participation of immigrants within a nation’s and city’s political institutions. What policies are developed will depend on the country’s specific institutional framework; for example in some countries where guest-labour policies developed a historically more exclusionary approach, more recent initiatives have aimed to encourage longer term residents to apply for citizenship through naturalization campaigns and awareness-raising e.g. in Berlin or Hesse in Germany (Caponio and Borkert 2010). Others aim to develop leadership capabilities among migrants through leadership and training programmes, encouraging the development of grassroots NGOs, becoming members of Councils, or setting up crime prevention programmes, as seen in initiatives in Brent in London (Jaczewaka 2013).

Cultural Religious Domain: This refers to policies related to dealing with the cultural otherness of immigrants and the extent to which religious practices are accommodated, supported, discouraged or ignored. Topics considered might be the extent to which the presence of halal butchers or places of worship are supported, or whether policies around religious dress and prayer facilities in schools are developed. They might also relate to integration courses which try to develop inter-cultural competence. It also relates to the extent to which communications strategies are developed, e.g. through media or awareness-raising campaigns that promote particular messages (e.g. anti-discrimination, anti-racism, multiculturalism). Some examples are the ‘cities of sanctuary’ movement in the UK, which aims to develop welcoming attitudes to refugees within a range of British cities (https://cityofsanctuary.org/).

Spatial Domain: This relates particularly to the issue of housing, which as was developed earlier remains a crucial issue for migrants, affecting their wider integration experiences in cities. Sometimes these may address specific housing for migrants (for example in hostels for migrant workers e.g. in Paris or specific housing provision for asylum-seekers in the UK) or they may relate more generally to other policies on social housing, gentrification etc. Other areas of policy that indirectly affect migrants in this domain is urban planning, which might seek to disperse migrants through de-segregation policies, for example by quotas (e.g. in Berlin in the 1990s) or through urban renewal and transport policies. The Spatial domain also relates to (often contested) symbolic space
– referring for example to debates about the height of minarets on mosques or the presence of groups in public spaces.

Across the cities covered in the MPMC project, it was evident that **there are different degrees to which migrants are taken into account in policy-making**, ranging from more proactive and inclusive approaches to ‘non-policy’ or ad hoc approaches, whereby there is no explicit integration policy for immigrants or policy instruments are arbitrarily developed only at moments of crisis (ibid.). Alexander (2004) makes the useful point that **neglecting to develop integration policy (non-policy) is still also worthwhile considering as a policy.**

**Caponio and Borkert’s (2010) The Local Dimension of Migration Policymaking** also provides an excellent overview of the range of local migration policy arena developing in European countries in response to migration. In contrast to Alexander, they found it helpful to explore the **similarities and differences in local level responses** (e.g. dynamics of policymaking, actors involved and the logic of action) with reference to three central arenas: policies around 1) citizenship 2) welfare services and 3) religious diversity. Across these local integration policy domains, they also stress the **influences of a range of actors**, including not only politicians and civil servants, but NGOs, immigrant associations, experts, media as well as neighbours.

In relation to **citizenship**, Caponio and Borkert (2010) suggest that the influence of locality and policy-making is underresearched. However, they point out differences in the extent to which naturalization decisions are made at the municipal level by a political body (e.g. in Switzerland) or vary between centralized or decentralized regimes. They demonstrate that variations in administrative bodies and type of bureaucracy in making these decisions are influential (e.g. the extent to which this is in the hands of regional or municipal bodies or national bodies). Across all types, **they found that local officials played a key role in crucial stages of the naturalisation process and that political influence is important in the selection of future would-be citizens.** An example given is the selection of immigrants for naturalisation in Quebec, whose criteria are favourable towards francophone immigrants, which reflects the political goal of preserving the French-speaking community. Other examples are the promotion of measures locally that favour immigrants’ naturalisation, such as language classes and orientation courses, or assistance to help pass citizenship tests. These may vary according to pro or anti-immigration attitudes, with favourable measures generally only promoted when they are consistent with consensus with the electorate, although NGOs also have a role in influencing this.

In relation to **welfare services**, Caponio and Borkert (2010) refer more broadly to the local socio-economic inclusion of immigrants and show how here, the importance of local policymaking is dependent on the **degree of administrative decentralisation** of the welfare state and immigrant policy (e.g. top down or bottom up). They also show how policymaking is dependent on the establishment of bureaucratic structures, since ‘old’ administrations might find it hard to respond to immigration as a ‘new’ social policy arena to be considered in intersection with more established local welfare policies, such as employment, vocational training, housing, social assistance, etc. This also raises **challenges of coordination** where new services are bolted on (e.g. for immigrant settlement) but not sufficiently coordinated with existing bodies.
Within this sphere, Caponio and Borkert demonstrate the range of different actors involved including: a) local government actors, including politicians pursuing a consensus building strategy to meet electorate’s interest and civil servants schooled in particular administrative cultures. Responses to clients by civil servants range from pragmatic accommodation, to neutrality, instrumental attitudes or indifference. While the tone is set by politicians, also influential are NGOs and immigrant organisations which have more client-focused aims, to support immigrants’ integration. However, the nature of this will vary across countries, e.g. in countries such as Italy there are more traditional, long standing associations that might crowd out newer immigrant based NGOs. Generally there has been a trend of increased incorporation of NGOs in local policymaking, but ‘this does not necessarily imply greater inclusion of immigrants, who may well be at the margins of established welfare organisations and networks’ (Caponio and Borkert 2010:189). Finally, another realm is that of experts and the media, who can influence the inclusiveness of public discourse and public opinion as well as immigrant stakeholders and neighbours who also aim to increase recognition of migrant groups, can be individuals or groups (e.g. Islamic cultural associations).

Finally, in relation to religious diversity, the local dimension is again crucially important in accommodating religious demands of immigrants, where cities are tasked with managing religious diversity. Policymaking dynamics will be influenced by the socio-demographic status, the established presence of religious organisations, and content of demands (for example for local governments to allocate the use of public space in meeting the needs for appropriate places of worship). Here again, they demonstrate how there are multiple actors influencing outcomes. With regard to the issue of mosque-building, Caponio and Borkert identify how there may be promoters of the initiative, who will vary in socio-economic and legal status. For example, some will be well established groups or organisations comprised of well-educated individuals who are aware of appropriate strategies; others may be individuals or first generation migrants with less awareness who may find it more difficult to articulate their requests. Second, there are actors at the municipal level, including both elected politicians from political parties represented in the city council versus municipal bureaucrats who again may pursue difference logics. They draw particular attention to the attitude of town planners, for example in seeing a claim for space as legitimate or alternatively in dealing with promoters through impersonal bureaucratic mechanisms. The latter might reinforce a lack of comprehension between the different actors, although they also give an example in Italy where bureaucracy helped ensure planning was granted despite centre-right political opposition. Other influences come from opposition political parties, who may get more coverage in local media, as well as the obvious influence of neighbours and ‘NIMBY mobilisation’.

There is not space to present in any depth any specific policies or integration initiatives in this introductory report; these will be considered in more detail in the Autumn Academy. Finally, however, in orienting readers around the enormous variety of local policies, in addition to Penninx et al (2004) and Caponio and Borkert (2010) we draw your attention to some other helpful initiatives or publications that bring together some of the ‘promising practice’ going on in cities. These include:

- Examples from the CLIP network ([https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/about-clip](https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/about-clip))
• **Cities of Migration** which draws attention to city-level practices that support innovative and practical approaches aimed at integrating urban migrants ([http://citiesofmigration.ca/](http://citiesofmigration.ca/)), or see Cities of Migration (2014) book, *Good Ideas from Successful Cities.*

• The UK **Institute for Public Policy Research**’s *What works in Integration* (Ramalingham 2013)

• The UK **Runnymede Trust**’s *What Works with Integrating New Migrants? Lessons from International Best Practice* (Haque 2010) – see particularly chapter 3.

• **European Migrant Integration Academy** – EU-MIA ([http://www.eu-mia.eu/content_view](http://www.eu-mia.eu/content_view)) – an International Labour Organization funded initiative aimed at consolidating practice and creating city to city synergies.
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