Social Integration of Migrants in Europe:
A Review of the European Literature
2000 – 2006

28 September 2006

Sarah Spencer, Associate Director, Centre on Migration, Policy and Society,
University of Oxford and Betsy Cooper, St Johns College, Oxford

This paper was commissioned for the ‘Gaining from Migration’ project coordinated by the OECD Development Centre, in cooperation with the OECD Directorate for Employment, Labour and Social Affairs (DELSA), the European Commission, and the Athens Migration Policy Initiative (AMPI), with financial support from the European Union. The paper was presented at an Expert’s Workshop on 10 January 2006 and is copyright OECD. The views expressed herein can in no way be taken to reflect the official opinion of the European Union, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, or AMPI.
Contents

Executive Summary ........................................................................................................... 3

1. Terms of Reference ....................................................................................................... 9

2. Method and Contributors ............................................................................................ 9

3. State of the Literature ................................................................................................. 10
   3.1 Limitations of the Literature .................................................................................. 12

4. Integration: Concepts and Approaches ...................................................................... 13

5. Integration Processes, Outcomes, and Strategies .................................................... 16
   5.1 Integration Processes .............................................................................................. 16
   5.2 Barriers to Integration ........................................................................................... 18
   5.3 Integration Outcomes ............................................................................................. 22
   5.4 Integration Strategies .............................................................................................. 25

6. Education ..................................................................................................................... 30
   6.1 The Literature ........................................................................................................ 30
   6.2 Education Outcomes, Causal Factors and Policy Intervention.......................... 31

7. Housing ........................................................................................................................ 36
   7.1 The Literature ........................................................................................................ 36
   7.2 Housing Outcomes and Causal Factors .................................................................. 36
   7.3 Housing and Neighbourhood Policies .................................................................. 39

8. Health ............................................................................................................................ 41
   8.1 The Literature ........................................................................................................ 41
   8.2 Health Outcomes and Causal Factors .................................................................... 41
   8.3 Health Policies ........................................................................................................ 45

9. Citizenship ..................................................................................................................... 46
   9.1 The Literature ........................................................................................................ 46
   9.2 Citizenship Outcomes and Causal Factors ........................................................... 48
   9.3 Citizenship Policies ................................................................................................ 49

10. Civil and Political Participation ................................................................................. 50
    10.1 The Literature ...................................................................................................... 50
    10.2 Participation Outcomes and Causal Factors ....................................................... 51
    10.3 Participation Policies ............................................................................................ 56

11. Cultural Integration ................................................................................................... 57
    11.1 The Literature ...................................................................................................... 57
    11.2 Cultural Integration Processes, Outcomes and Causal Factors ......................... 58
    11.3 Cultural Integration Policies .................................................................................. 63

12. Gaps in the Evidence Base ....................................................................................... 64

13. Challenges for Policymakers ..................................................................................... 67
Executive summary

The theoretical and policy literature on social integration issues has some significant strengths for policy makers. There are also major gaps, in part due to limitations in official data. Use of over-lapping concepts such as social cohesion and social inclusion adds to the complexity for policy makers in drawing on the research evidence available.

Integration processes and outcomes

A broad range of factors – from reasons for migration through to conditions in the host society - have been found to impact on integration processes. Legal rights are a pre-requisite of integration but not a sufficient condition.

There are significant differences in the trajectories of and within migrant groups after arrival. Women have different experiences from men and age of migration is a further significant factor. Migrants can be well integrated in one sphere (eg intermarriage) but not in another (eg housing, education). They may retain strong transnational links while integrating into the host society.

Migrants face a range of barriers to integration including restrictions attached to their immigration status, hostile public attitudes and discrimination. Only a minority of the public have polarised views for or against migrants, but patterns differ across Europe. The range of causal factors leading to hostile attitudes are not clearly established. Migrants can themselves have negative attitudes towards other minorities.

Some migrants ‘perform’ above average for the host population but on average migrants are disproportionately disadvantaged in education, housing, health and civic participation. The second generation are usually more integrated but can feel excluded and identify with their parents’ home country or faith. Only a small minority of the first or second generation hold extreme views. Perceptions that migrants are disproportionately involved in crime cannot be substantiated or refuted because of lack of data.

Approach to policy intervention

The differing models of integration adopted across Europe show some convergence in practice, particularly at the local level where municipal authorities develop their own approaches in response to the challenges they face.

Integration policies tend to be developed in response to events rather than as a considered strategy coordinated across government with clear policy objectives. Current strategies often focus on a narrow migrant target group neglecting individuals who may equally need support. Some integration processes are more susceptible to policy intervention than others. Delivery through the institutions of the welfare state can lead to migrants being perceived and perceiving themselves as dependent. The approach taken within some states may encourage and politicise ethnic identities.
Education
Education is an important pathway to integration for children and adults. Migrant children are disproportionately represented in secondary schools that do not give access to higher education, in special schools, and among those with lower educational attainment.

Girls tend to perform better than boys. Additional factors contributing to education outcomes for children include language, age of immigration, socio economic background, parents’ education level, teaching techniques, discrimination, effective induction and the school’s ethos and experience. Attachment to ethnic culture is not found to have a detrimental impact on performance. School based segregation can be marked, leading to children growing up with little contact with members of other communities.

For adults there is value in combining language tuition with social orientation and in tailoring programmes to meet individual’s actual needs, while ensuring availability of classes in areas and at times when migrants can attend.

Housing and neighbourhood
Standard of housing has an impact on health and situates migrants in a neighbourhood which provides greater or lesser opportunities for economic, social and political integration. Household size and patterns differ between countries with long standing immigration and the newer immigration states. There is evidence of some very poor housing conditions.

Evidence challenges the assumption that segregation is the result only of migrants choosing to live in proximity to members of their own community. Lack of choice in the housing market and discrimination are among contributory factors. Debate on whether segregation is increasing or declining is inconclusive. Residential segregation can lead to migrants and the host society leading parallel lives. Community tensions can arise but are not inevitable. The majority population can be the most segregated: migrants frequently live in multicultural areas lacking only the host population. Migrants can thus be socially well integrated – but only into a section of society, not into the mainstream.

The impact of new arrivals on a neighbourhood depends on the local socioeconomic context, history of previous settlement and ethnic profile, actual and perceived ethnicity of new migrants, local media portrayals of immigration, the legal status of the new migrants, and the success of local agencies in mediating between established and incoming populations.

Steps to prepare residents for the arrival of migrants are among initiatives which have been successful in avoiding tensions. Initiatives to reduce segregation directly by increasing diversity in a neighbourhood are less successful than those which increase opportunities to work, to access education or to live elsewhere. The presence of new migrants in an area can be a catalyst for regeneration.

Migrants who settle in municipal areas lacking experience of migration can find administrations unprepared, responding inappropriately, with fewer relevant services and greater likelihood of hostility from the host population.
Area based funding schemes, fragmented responsibility for policy and delivery and failure to consult minorities are among the factors which have exacerbated tensions in ethnic neighbourhoods and impeded reform.

Health
Good health has an impact on migrant integration into employment and the community. Access to mainstream services, discrimination, and the propensity of migrants to particular health problems are recurrent themes in the relevant literature. Five groups of factors are identified which determine health status: natural biological variation, health behaviour, social conditions, access to health care services and health related social selection.

Migrants have on average less favourable outcomes in relation to perinatal and infant mortality, injuries from accidents and unemployment following long illness. There is some evidence that they are also disproportionately represented among those with mental health problems and among those suffering from communicable diseases such as TB which are associated with poor living conditions; and that health for some migrants may decline after arrival. Some lifestyle and dietary habits such as low alcohol consumption account for lower mortality from certain diseases. In this case, integration increases ill health as migrants adopt the lifestyle of the host population.

Access to health care services is limited by lack of entitlement, lack of information, discrimination and language barriers. Recognition of these barriers has led to initiatives in member states to address them. Consultation with migrants on their own care and on policy and services helps to ensure that the cultural context of health behaviour is taken into account.

Citizenship
Migration challenges the single allegiance of an individual to one state as individuals acquire multiple, cross-national cultural identities. Acquiring citizenship (nationality) and the formal rights and responsibilities it entails accelerates integration rather than being an end in itself. Citizens and other residents, however, often do not enjoy the rights in practice that they have been accorded in law, undermining the citizenship ideal.

Naturalisation, which has increased significantly in some states in recent years, is an emotional as well as a formal process for the individuals concerned because of the association between citizenship status and identity. Little is known about why people naturalise, or adopt dual nationality, nor the subsequent implications for the integration process.

Ius soli countries are not necessarily more inclusive of migrants than those in which acquisition of citizenship is based on ius sanguinis. Changes in citizenship laws reflect immigration pressures, party politics on immigration and security concerns rather than strategies for integration. The impact of the recent trend towards compulsory citizenship and language tests as preconditions of naturalisation is not yet known.
Civic participation
Civic participation of migrants is important for the individual and community, potentially heightening a sense of belonging and commitment to society. It can strengthens bonds with non migrants and provide a means to express needs to government or employers.

As in other spheres, integration is a two way process requiring motivation by migrants and opportunities provided by the host society. Migrants can in practice be hesitant to participate and the institutions of the host society reluctant to provide opportunities to engage. A lack of mainstream channels for the participation of non citizens (e.g. voting), or low participation (e.g. in trade unions) increases the importance of alternative means of engagement.

Minorities tend to be less likely to vote than the majority population and women less likely to vote than men. Local factors are paramount in the opportunities open to migrants in practice, the differing dynamics of politics at the local level resulting in different levels and modes of participation. Migrant group characteristics are also a factor.

Migrants can find that identifying themselves under an ethnic label is the only means for acceptance; the consequence is that they are expected to represent a disparate group. Migrant groups may mobilise around an ethnic identity or choose alternatives such as faith, gender or locality.

Participation in mainstream organisations such as unions is generally but not always below that of the host population. People with a faith identity are most likely to contribute in a voluntary capacity and among them Muslims are most likely to participate in civic activities.

Official consultative fora can provide an alternative means for governments to access the views of migrants and minorities but are criticised for marginalising them in separate structures, compartmentalising and excluding them from mainstream channels.

Migrant organisations
Migrant organisations provide individuals with status, identity, connections, information, service benefits and an opportunity to develop their skills. It is less clear whether there are circumstances in which they also play a negative role in strengthening bonds within a migrant community at the expense of relationships outside it.

Migrant organisations can provide influence in local and national politics, with strong migrant organisation usually increasing, rather than being a barrier to, strong links with the mainstream political system. Even where such organisations are not formally recognised they can play a significant and acknowledged role in the system.

Many migrant organisations are poorly organised and resourced, representing a complex and fragmented community or claiming to do so. They may be out-competed in competition for attention and resources by better organised non migrant led pro-immigrant organisations. The need for migrant organisations to attract profile and funds may increase the leadership role of more radical voices.
Migrants’ participation in migrant organisations depends on their immigration status, the opportunities open to them in their area, their position in own community, culture, homeland politics and gender. Members of some groups show significantly higher rates of participation than others.

Governments can encourage and support migrant organisations to increase their effectiveness and benefit from their participation in discussions on the formulation of policies and services. Governments need to be wary of endorsing particular organisations as the representative of a group or faith given the diversity in practice within each community.

Cultural integration

Cultures among migrants, as among host populations, are diverse - by ethnicity and faith but also region, class, gender, age and legal status. Cultural integration involves changes in the attitudes and behaviour of migrants and in those of the host society (in its impact on the arts and cuisine for instance). The literature focuses almost exclusively on changes among migrants.

Outcomes in the field of cultural diversity are difficult to measure and to promote. A key debate is whether cultural diversity, including modes of dress, is an aid or barrier to cohesive societies; and whether migrants can identify with other migrants as well as share a collective identity with the host population. Studies have found young migrants may be more likely to identify with the city in which they live than with the host country.

Migrants have a different cultural trajectory from that in their source country. They have to navigate competing expectations of their original and host community. Their culture and faith are both influenced by their experiences. There is great diversity between groups. Those which might physically appear most different may nevertheless share a history, language or faith with the host population that is not shared by those migrants who appear more similar.

Research challenges the supposition that the values and practices of migrants deviate significantly from those of host societies. It also demonstrates that migrant cultures are not static but evolve in response, in part, to the institutions and politics of the host society. Children from the same ethnic group can achieve different outcomes in education for instance. Members of two ethnic groups may be in conflict in one locality but co exist peacefully in another.

Religion may exert external control over the individual not only through its rules and requirements but by separating out those who share its beliefs in the perception of others. The status of the religion and faith group in the country is a factor in the retention or loss of identity within the group as are the existence of organisations based on it, but there is no agreement whether such organisations are a necessary precursor to integration processes or a barrier to them.
Muslims are not a single homogenous community. There is significant diversity in cultural background, language, and plurality of views; and identities are in flux. Some have looked to Islam to find a positive identity and many want both a European and Muslim identity. The religion is reproduced by the migrants in the context of conditions in the host country and takes markedly different forms, from a ritualised apolitical Islam of older generations, for instance, to a politicised anti-western form among a minority of young people. A majority have been found to reject the use of violence, to lack a theological basis for their beliefs and to express conflicting interpretations of Qur’an. Education is a key factor in ‘modernising’ attitudes as is contact with people of different backgrounds. The role of religions other than Islam in influencing the integration process has been understudied.

The role of the family in migration and integration is a neglected factor though likely influential. Intermarriage rates remain low in relation to most migrant groups but highly differentiated. The implications of mixed marriages for relationships, for children, and on attitudes of the host population are not well understood. There remains a tendency in some communities for mono-cultural marriage with a partner from the country of origin. Many young people still want their family to have some say in choice of marriage partner but there can be tension in conflicting expectations on women’s role in the home.

**Evidence base**

There are major gaps in the evidence base on which policy makers can draw. A significant limitation is the paucity of official data on migrants, inconsistency in the way in which the migrant target group is identified, lack of data which identifies migrants’ immigration status, length of stay or, for instance, use of services; and little data on children, the elderly, recent migrants and those whose status is irregular. Agreement across the EU on core indicators to measure integration would facilitate comparisons. Longitudinal studies are needed which follow the experience of cohorts of migrants over time. There is an urgent need for evaluation of existing policy intervention.
1. Terms of Reference

The authors were commissioned by the OECD to review European literature on the social integration of migrants in Europe and to summarise the main findings. The review, necessarily illustrative of the broad literature available, is supported by an extensive, separate bibliography. The objectives of the project were to draw out the implications of these findings for European policy making and to identify the limitations of the available knowledge as an evidence base. The review identifies gaps in the literature to inform a forward research agenda.

2. Method and contributors

The review focuses on recent literature (2000-2006) and primarily on selected Western European countries: France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Where possible, the focus is on first generation migrants. While some texts on refugees are included, those relating exclusively to asylum seekers are not. To ensure that the most relevant texts from each of the selected countries were taken into account, five country experts were invited to contribute 50 bibliographic entries and 15 annotations of key texts. The external contributors to the bibliography were:

- France: Rahsaan Maxwell, University of Berkeley, California
- Germany: Karen Schönwälder, with Jessica Erbe, and Halil Çan, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung or Social Science Research Center, Berlin
- Italy: Ferrucio Pastore with Petra Mezzetti, CESPI, Rome
- Netherlands: Jeroen Doomernik, IMES, Amsterdam
- Sweden: Philip Muus, with Hanna Boynton, and Mirjam Hagström, IMER, Malmo

Alessio Cangiano (Compas, University of Oxford) contributed an overview of key data sources for the literature review, incorporated in relevant sections throughout the text. Sarah Spencer and Betsy Cooper are solely responsible for the interpretation of the texts.

The bibliography was compiled using a variety of methods including online databases such as http://scholar.google.com; http://esrcsociety.ac.uk; http://bubl.ac.uk/link/s/socialscientifcerrsearch.htm; http://sociog.ac.uk; and Proquest. Most searches used key words (migrant/immigrant/refugee) followed by the word integration and/or a particular area of study (eg education; housing; health; access to services and benefits; cultural integration; Islam; community relations; social cohesion; participation; language; legal status and citizenship). Particular countries were also included as key words to focus the search. The review drew on previous literature reviews on related subjects to identify works relevant to our subject. However, such reviews frequently used differing terminology, focusing explicitly on, for example, ethnic minorities or social cohesion. Literature from migration related organizations (Migration Policy Institute, Migration Policy Centre, International Centre for Migration Policy Development,
EUROPA), as well as government reports and literature from non-governmental organisations, were also included in the review.

In this overview, we first consider the state of the literature and its strengths and limitations for policy makers (Section 3). We then clarify the terminology used and differing approaches to ‘integration’ across the EU (Section 4) before reviewing what the literature tells us about integration processes, barriers to integration and integration policy levers (Section 5). In subsequent sections we review key findings on each dimension of social integration before concluding with observations on gaps in the evidence base (Section 12) and on policy challenges identified in the literature (section 13).

3. State of the Literature

The literature on the social integration of migrants has some significant strengths for policy makers. The range of theoretical and empirical texts has grown in recent years, producing a body of work substantially different from that available five years ago. In part this reflects the increasing saliency of integration on the European political agenda. The involvement of migrants in urban unrest and acts of terrorism and the growing body of evidence on poor integration outcomes in employment, education and health have contributed to greater interest of policy makers in research, and to an apparent increase in research funding. There have been a growing number of texts, for instance, on Muslims in Europe, social capital, identity and belonging and on the impact of migrants retaining transnational connections. An increasing body of theoretical and empirical work is comparative, whether between countries, cities or migrant groups.

Theoretical work is valuable for policymakers. It clarifies the goals of policy development and elucidates the processes by which policy goals can be achieved. A substantial group of writers have developed theories of integration (Parekh 2000; Koopmans and Statham 2000; Heckmann and Schnapper 2003; Penninx 2004), considering a range of objectives and processes from complete assimilation to multiculturalism/ethnic pluralism. A complementary discourse on transnational identities and relationships challenges traditional notions of territorially-rooted identities (Faist 2000; Bader 2001; Favell 2003).

A second body of work focuses on the processes of integration in different spheres, exploring the integration trajectories of different migrant groups or the experiences of one group over time. An increasing interest in measuring ‘progress’ has led to attempts to identify integration indicators to quantify or benchmark change (Guild 2000; Entzinger and Biezeveld 2002; Ager and Strang 2004; Commission of the European Union Directorate General Justice Freedom and Security 2004; Home Office 2005a). Most focus on measurement in key fields of integration such as education, language, housing, health and political participation, though choice of indicators differ (in part reflecting the availability of data in the country in question). Indicators can only provide an estimate of the level of integration for a particular group, and are difficult to apply to individual cases.
Some studies focus on the integration process at the city level, focusing on one city, such as Frankfurt am main (Strässburger 2001) or comparing European cities (Ambrosini and Abbatecola 2004; Penninx et. al. 2004): Others compare the process and outcomes for different migrant groups in the same country (Vermeulen and Penninx 2000) or the same group in different countries (Bousseta 2001). Recent texts have explored the impact of Islam on culture and identity across Europe (Alsayyad and Castells 2002); and of international politics on Muslim communities, in particular the impact of 9/11 and the subsequent ‘war on terror’. Abbas (2005), for instance, explores the impact of those events on British South Asian Muslims, focusing on community life, education, media, politics and identity.

There is a separation in the literature between studies on refugee integration and the process for other migrants (Kofman 2000). There are a number of texts providing an overview of integration in one country (Doomernik 2003; Colombo and Scioritano 2004; Zincone 2001) and helpful overviews of research findings (Castles et al. 2002; Fyvie et al. 2001). The IMISCOE series of State of the Art reports provide good literature reviews on particular topics, including cultural, religious, and linguistic diversity (Vertovec and Wessendorf 2004), migration and citizenship (Bauböck n.d.) and Muslims in Europe (Buijs and Rath 2003).

Research on outcomes in the key fields of integration (e.g. education, health), may have a national or local focus. Quantitative and qualitative studies at a local or community level can provide depth of understanding but make it difficult to draw cross-locality or cross-country comparisons. Studies reliant on national census data or other national or international databases (Favell 2003; Özdemir et. al. 2004; Burgess, Wilson and Lupton 2004) provide breadth and comparability but may not distinguish between migrant groups or generations. Such studies often lack a qualitative or ethnographic dimension that may facilitate the interpretation of quantitative findings.

A third body of work of value to policy makers is evaluations of integration policies. Some have a broad focus of study; Kamali (2004), for example, investigates the impact of locating responsibility for migrant integration in Sweden within the welfare system. Others, such as an assessment of recent European migrant introductory programmes (Entzinger 2004), more narrowly focus on individual policies. Academic and official texts describe national or European policies (Commissione per le Politiche di Integrazione Degli Immigrati 2001; Cooper 2004; Home Office 2002 and 2005a; Commission of the European Union DG JFS 2004) and may identify ‘best practices.’ Even so, robust and independent evaluations of policy interventions remain the exception.

A number of works compare the integration traditions in European countries, including several recent anthologies (Koopmans and Statham 2000; Body-Gendrot and Martiniello 2000; Hansen and Weil 2002; Heckmann and Schnapper 2003; Joppke and Morawska 2003; Penninx et. al. 2004; Süssmuth and Weidenfeld 2005). Other texts explain and interpret practical differences between European countries (Bauböck 2003; Ireland 2004). Some European countries have neither developed formal integration policies nor a body of research on the integration process.
Academic texts are supplemented in many instances by official reports from governments, for instance giving an overview of the situation and policy in that country or reports on particular events. There is also a growing body of literature from other public agencies and non-governmental organizations, some of which are cited in this review.

3.1 Limitations of the literature

The literature is fragmented across different academic disciplines: economists, anthropologists, human geographers, lawyers, political scientists and sociologists taking different approaches, often without reference to research on the same issue undertaken within other disciplines. Research on one topic can be highly theoretical or empirically based; reliant exclusively on quantitative or qualitative data; written purely for an academic audience or with a policy focus. Research may focus on place (e.g. cities); or on migrants defined by country of origin (e.g. Somalis), by generation (migrant ‘youth’), by legal status (e.g. refugees), religion (e.g. Islam), or gender. The analysis may moreover, reflect differing conceptual frameworks, relying on different explanatory variables such as race, class, gender or globalization. Limited resources can mean a long delay between collection of data and publication so that, for the policy maker, the findings are dated: a study published in 2001 on the participation of migrants in politics, for instance, relied on data from 1994 and 1998 (Fennema and Tillie 2001).

Research on the integration of migrants is often written in isolation from closely related debates with which policy makers may be more familiar, for instance those on social exclusion or equality. The varying terminology used in different academic and policy fields with over-lapping meanings – such as integration, cohesion and inclusion – introduces a further dimension of complexity.

The lack of comparable, comprehensive, and differentiated statistics on migrant populations limits the development of integration literature in Europe. Because of the different criteria used to identify migrants, it is difficult to compare quantitative data on integration across EU member states. Most European countries use nationality (and thus foreign nationals) as the standard criterion in their migration statistics, including the majority of countries which have experienced significant immigration only since the late 1980s (Greece, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Finland). In Belgium, the Netherlands and Scandinavia, however, the country of birth of a person and that of their parents (or grandparents) is used to define ‘immigrants.’ In the UK most statistics identify ethnic minorities rather than foreign nationals or the foreign born.

There are a number of weaknesses in relying on data on foreign nationals. It excludes nationals born abroad who come (or return) in significant numbers, as in Ireland or Germany – and who, despite holding the citizenship of the country, may need support in the integration process. On the other hand, data on foreign nationals includes ‘migrants’ who have lived in the host country for many years (but not naturalised). Moreover, if monitoring of integration outcomes relies only on data on foreign nationals, and the ‘most integrated’ migrants are those who have naturalized, the picture may be unduly
pessimistic. Naturalized migrants disappear from the statistics, leaving more recent immigrants over-represented.\textsuperscript{1}

Caution also needs to be exercised, however, if immigration statistics focus on the foreign-born (individuals, regardless of nationality, who are born abroad). Where a significant proportion of those born abroad are from former colonies (as in France) or are the descendants of former emigrants (as in Italy), and thus may have a linguistic and cultural affinity to the host country, their integration outcomes may not reflect those of the rest of the foreign born population.

Data on ethnic minorities also has significant limitations. Because such data embraces newcomers as well as subsequent generations – including long-term resident populations such as British Asians – such statistics prevent any individualized analysis of the impact of the migration experience. It also excludes those migrants who do not fall within the ethnic categories on which data is collected.

A significant gap in the statistics is their failure to reference migrants’ immigration status, whether they are refugees, minor dependents, entered for marriage or on legal work permits, for instance. The differing entitlements and restrictions attached to each immigration status are significant for the integration process. Furthermore, it is unclear the extent to which migrants whose status is irregular are excluded from such statistics.

A final limitation of immigration data, particularly significant for social integration, is that information on the duration of residence of the foreign population is only rarely available, although length of residence may be one of the most important variables influencing the integration process. Overall, the lack of consistency in data – coupled with its poor quality and erratic availability – effectively prevents proper measurement of integration processes across the EU.

\section*{4. Integration: concepts and approaches}

Integration is one concept used to explain the changing relationship between relative newcomers to a country and the society in which they live. Definitions vary in differing national contexts. Integration is, however, generally conceptualized as a process (or processes), not an end state (Penninx 2004), and as taking place in differing spheres: economic, social, cultural and political. (‘Social’ integration, the focus of this review, is here taken as a broad category to include cultural and political integration).

Academic authors differ, however, in the ways in which they group the different dimensions or levels of integration. Thus, Heckmann, for instance, identifies four dimensions: structural (acquisition of rights and access to the labour market and core institutions); cultural (behavioural and attitudinal change); social (relationships,

\textsuperscript{1} Adding to the complexity is the fact that some immigrants of foreign citizenship have the same ethnic background as the host population, e.g. “Aussiedler” (ethnic Germans from the former USSR) in Germany or Pontian Greeks in Greece.
engagement in voluntary associations) and identificational (belonging and identity) (Heckmann et. al. 2001).

Integration is a normative term, definitions of which reflect differing perspectives on the desired end goal: the optimal relationship between migrants and the host society. Thus, while some authors emphasise migrants' one-way adaptation to the host society, others emphasise a two way process in which the host society also adapts (for instance by addressing barriers to integration such as discrimination). This distinction is significant in identifying responsibility for ‘failure’ in the integration process as well as priorities for policy intervention.

A variety of alternatives to the term integration are employed depending on how the desired outcome has been identified. For example, the term assimilation is sometimes used where the emphasis is on the migrant’s adaptation to the host society. Assimilation refers in particular to change in the cultural sphere, often with the implication that migrants are assimilating into a homogenous majority culture (Rudiger and Spencer 2003). Some states, notably France, emphasise political assimilation: the migrant is expected to achieve equality with native residents and become part of a single national identity through the acquisition of full citizenship rights.

Brubaker argues that, while the concept of assimilation is ‘analytically discredited and politically disreputable’ it remains an essential analytic tool for understanding domains and degrees of emerging similarities and persisting differences. Rather than focus on an end state of ‘complete absorption’, in which migrants are the objects of assimilation, assimilation can help us understand how migrants become similar in some respects in the cultural and socio-economic spheres. Thus the question is not ‘how much assimilation’ but assimilation in what respect, over what time period, and in reference to what population (Brubaker 2001). Significantly, however, the concept retains its focus on the migrant as opposed to the simultaneous process of change within the institutions of the host society.

Assimilation can be contrasted to multiculturalism, in which cultural difference between ethnic groups is acknowledged as a continuing feature, and to multicultural policies, in which that difference is valued and accommodated. Empirical studies find variations in multicultural approaches across Europe with greater or lesser acknowledgement of ethnic identities in the public and private spheres (Ireland 2004:222), whether or not under the official label of multiculturalism. Multicultural policies do not necessarily accord rights to ethnic groups but do recognize ethnic identities and accord rights (and sometimes attach funding) to membership of ethnic groups. While some authors argue that such policies reinforce cultural boundaries, others argue that this need not be the case:

[M]ulticultural integration policies support neither the crossing of boundaries from one culture to another, as do assimilation policies, nor the preservation of those boundaries, as does segregation, but aim to foster their permeability. By facilitating participation of all groups in all social, economic and political spheres, such policies foster the continual development and cross-fertilisation of cultures and identities and can therefore help overcome divisions and segregation. (Rudiger and Spencer 2003).
Some authors argue that, when certain ground rules are in place a multicultural society can be successful, stable and cohesive (Parekh 2000). The report of an independent commission on the future of multi-ethnic Britain which Parekh chaired concluded a diverse society could be united if it is recognised as a community of communities as well as of individuals, if it develops an inclusive, plural national identity, and action is taken to address racism and structural inequalities (Runnymede Trust 2000).

Writers exploring the place of Muslims within multicultural societies have recently questioned the primacy of racial identities in multiculturalism, the reliance on narrow definitions of racism that exclude Islamaphobia and perceived bias towards secularism. Modood argues that, in an inclusive vision of multiculturalism, Muslims would not be ‘them’ but part of the plural ‘us’. The increasing Muslim assertiveness in Europe is in part a reaction against Western interpretations of multiculturalism that do not embrace faith identities (Modood in Abbas 2005; Modood 2003).

**Social cohesion**

The concept of ‘social cohesion’ has risen in prominence because of concerns about social divisions, particularly at the local level. It is perhaps most usefully conceived as one outcome of integration processes. It is usually considered to have two dimensions: how people feel about place and people (whether local or national) and their relationships with one another. Thus a cohesive society is expected to have positive community relations of mutual support or tolerance and to encourage active participation in social networks, for instance, and to be one in which people trust their neighbours and have a common sense of identity and belonging.

Social cohesion emphasises unity and stability (Zetter and Flynn 2005), is generally defined as an end state rather than a process, and is spatially oriented. Ireland argues, however, that cohesion should not be confused with consensus. They key is to find a means of dealing with conflicts of interest which allow the airing of alternative views and the development of a resolution acceptable to all parties (Ireland 2004:234).

The concept of cohesion does not itself include an economic dimension but the extent of cohesion is affected by, for instance, levels of deprivation (Robinson and Reeve 2006; Cantle 2005). Whereas legal rights are usually given some prominence in analyses of integration, they are less evident in writings on cohesion.

Social cohesion outcomes are difficult to measure, and are tied in large part to other integration indicators, including residential segregation and housing. Indicators currently being employed include host country attitudes towards migrants, discrimination and incidents of racial bias, crime rates, and incidents of violence. The use of such indicators may be problematic, particularly because it is difficult to establish migration-related factors (as opposed to ethnicity, socio-economic status, etc.) as the source of poor cohesion. Furthermore, Beauvais and Jenson (2002) point out that only a limited body of literature seeks to define the reasons behind declines in social cohesion as opposed to efforts to operationalize it or measure the effects of achieving cohesion. Literature on social cohesion policy generally evaluates and provides recommendations for

Social cohesion has to an extent replaced the earlier concept, used in some states, of ‘race relations’ which referred to the management of relationships between members of different ethnic groups in a multicultural society and is associated with measures to prevent discrimination and achieve equality of opportunity. Related to social cohesion is ‘social capital’, a useful concept developed in the US for analyses of the relationships between individuals, whether within their own social, religious or faith group (‘bonding capital’) or with those outside of their own group (‘bridging capital’) (Putnam 2000). A primary driver for development of social capital within communities may be to obtain security in a hostile environment; the result of fragmentation and exclusion from wider society and not evidence of the development of broader social networks with other communities (Zetter and Flynn 2005). A key debate, to which we shall refer below, is indeed whether strengthening migrant community groups — and hence the bonding capital among members — provides a strong platform for building bridges with people outside of the group or, alternatively, acts as a barrier to the bridging capital necessary for a cohesive society (Ireland 2004).

5. Integration processes, policy and outcomes

5.1 Integration processes
Research provides some insight into the factors which impact on integration processes. An overview of 17 EU funded studies identified those factors under six headings: migrants’ conditions of exit from their own country (for instance, if the decision to leave was not voluntary); their means of entry (e.g. if trafficked or on a recognized labour migration scheme); their legal status and hence entitlements; the migrants’ personal characteristics (for instance, their labour market qualifications); the characteristics of the migrant’s community (whether there are community groups, for instance, or the community is fragmented and unable to provide support) and the conditions in the host society (such as the availability of jobs and public attitudes) (Castles et al. 2002). Depending on the focus of study, authors emphasise only some of these factors. For instance, one study on Italian integration investigates the importance of local economic and social conditions, the approach taken by local government and the history of ethnic associations in the area (Grillo and Pratt 2002).

Some significant findings are that:

- Impact of employment: Migrants’ position in the labour market has a significant impact on other dimensions of integration. It also has an impact on the perception of the host population towards them (Özdemir et al. 2004; Commissione per le Politiche di Integrazione Degli Immigrati 2001). A set of studies on the impact of cultural versus economic factors on the integration of migrants in the Netherlands concludes that labour market factors are dominant and have a greater impact than any policy intervention. Even so, factors such as education and perceived lower language
proficiency increase the social distance between Dutch people and different ethnic groups (Hagendoorn et al. 2003).

- **Integrated yet excluded:** The concept of segmented ‘assimilation’, borrowed from the US integration literature, is illustrated by research showing that migrants can also be well integrated – but only into an excluded underclass. They may also be well integrated in one dimension (e.g. inter-marriage) but excluded on another (e.g. employment). Similarly, progress may be seen in one dimension, such as improvement in housing conditions, while disadvantage continues in other spheres (Özdemir et al. 2004).

- **Similarities across cities:** Comparative studies of European cities reveal similarities in integration trajectories where migrants experience similar opportunities and face similar barriers. For example, personal relationships, social networks and community institutions play key roles in the integration process in Berlin, Paris, Barcelona and Milan, all of which have deregulated labour markets and expanded service sector employment (Ambrosini and Abbatecola 2004).

- **No single integration experience:** There are nevertheless significant differences in the trajectories of migrant groups after arrival. A study of five migrant communities in the Netherlands confirms that there is no single ‘immigrant population’ sharing the same integration experience (Vermeulen and Penninx 2000). Distinctions between migrant groups in Italy challenge the assumption that ‘immigrants’ share characteristics and are all different from the host population (Columbo and Sciortino 2004).

- **Gender:** Women have different integration experiences from men, facing differing social expectations from people within their own community and from those in the host society. The migration experience changes gender roles in the family: providing women with greater opportunities for autonomy and prestige but also, as demonstrated by a study of Somalis and Moroccans in Italy, for social isolation (Decimo 2005). Where legal immigration status depends on marriage, and thus a marital breakdown can lead to expulsion, women’s vulnerability may also be a barrier to economic and social participation (Özdemir et al. 2004). Kofman and Phizacklea (2000) find that women may nevertheless prove more capable than men of adapting to refugee status, and that they act as successful mediators with service providers and play a strong role in establishing migrant associations.

- **Cultural mix:** The development of stable environments for cultural interaction is dependent on a mélange of factors, but stability is not itself contingent on cultural uniformity. In parts of Paris, public space is demarcated by cultural/ethnic group markers, a complex network of cultural associations, community services and economic ‘niche’. Rather than being divisive, this network is found to be productive and stable (Simon 2000).

- **Transnational links:** There is debate on the impact of transnational links on the integration process. Transnational theory argues that the rapid improvements in transportation and communications make it possible for migrants to maintain links with
co-ethnics in the place of origin and elsewhere, while also building communities in the place of residence (Castles 2003). Individuals can form a collective identity in ‘transnational spaces’ which is potentially, but not necessarily, in conflict with identification with a single nation state (Faist 2000).

- **Networks**: Migrant social networks and organisations can play a key role in modes of economic and social integration. Some migrant communities lack the economic or social advantages that those using networks gain, including the security, support and access which other migrants can offer and the connections to individuals and institutions in the wider society (Ambrosini and Abbatecola 2004).

- **NGOs**: NGOs play a key role in integration processes in some Member States, with national, church based NGOs significant in Italy and Germany. In the UK local, secular and ethnic based organisations are more numerous (Zetter et. al. 2003; Commission for Racial Equality 2004).

- **Impact of lack of experience**: Migrants who settle outside cities in areas with few minorities and with local administrations which lack experience and infrastructure to meet their needs have a different integration experience from those who settle in areas which have such experience (Zincone 2000).

### 5.2 Barriers to Integration

Studies identify many factors which impede the integration process in different spheres. These include legal restrictions on access to the labour market; lack of knowledge about and use of services by migrants; language barriers to accessing and using services; lack of specialized services in health or housing; failure to address the very differing needs of different ethnic groups; and weaknesses in policy coordination (Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für Migration, Flüchtlinge und Integration 2005; Fyvie et. al. 2001). Migrants’ irregular status and the perception of illegality among the host population contribute to a further barrier: negative attitudes in the host population towards migrants (Zincone/Commissione per le Politiche di Integrazione Degli Immigrati 2001).

**Hostile attitudes**

One barrier to social integration is negative attitudes of the host population towards migrants. Research finds that attitudes are in evolution, with only a minority having polarized views, strongly pro- or anti- migrant (Colombo and Sciortino 2004). There is nevertheless a level of public concern about migrants across the EU 25.

Eurobarometer and the European Social Survey (ESS) in 2003 provide comparative data on opinions and social attitudes across EU Member States. The surveys assessed the attitudes of the majority population towards minorities according to the extent to which they agreed or disagreed with certain statements related to immigration and asylum...
policies, multicultural societies, the granting of civil rights for migrants, repatriation policies, and other related issues.²

In 2003, half the survey respondents in western and eastern European societies expressed resistance to immigrants (ESS 2003). Across the EU-15, an adverse attitude towards immigrants was widely shared by respondents, especially in Greece (87 percent) and to a lesser extent in Austria (64 percent) and Portugal (62 percent). Among the populations of the new EU-25 Member States, Hungarians had the most negative attitudes towards migrants (86 percent). Sweden stands out as the most tolerant country with only 15 percent of respondents resistant to immigration. Belgium and the UK were the two countries with the largest proportion of people opposed to the admission of asylum seekers (48 percent). In Nordic countries hosting large numbers of refugees only a small minority of respondents expressed resistance to them (11 percent in Sweden and 19 percent in Denmark).

Around one in four Europeans living in the 15 EU Member States in 2003 – as well as a similar minority (28 percent) of people living in the new Member States – indicated their resistance to a multicultural society (Eurobarometer 2003). Again, this overall result hides significant differences across countries. Within the EU-15, Greece has the largest proportion of respondents resistant to a multicultural society (59 percent). Among historical migrant host countries, Belgium and Germany are significantly more hostile than the European average (37 percent and 34 percent respectively) while Sweden seems more open to multiculturalism (only 13 percent are against it). In Southern Europe Italians (24 percent) are more averse to a multicultural society than are the Spanish (15 percent). Similarly, a minority of one in five respondents was in favour of ethnic distance – that is, they prefer to avoid social interaction with migrants and minorities (ESS 2003). Again, an exclusionary attitude was manifested especially by Greeks (39 percent) and, to a lesser extent, by respondents in other Mediterranean and Eastern European countries (Czech Republic, Italy, Slovenia).

A possible hindrance to immigrant integration is that a significant proportion of the majority populations (four out of ten survey respondents in both EU-15 and new Member States) were opposed to the granting of civil rights for legal migrants (Eurobarometer). This view has even greater support in western European countries (Belgium 55 percent, Germany 51 percent) and in the Baltic States, while it is less widespread in Mediterranean countries (25-26 of respondents in Italy, Spain and Portugal and 32 percent in Greece).

Support for repatriation of criminal migrants was widespread – 70 percent of respondents on average, with peaks recorded in Southern and Eastern Europe and values below 50 percent only in Sweden, Luxembourg and Denmark (ESS 2003). A much lower, though increasing, share of respondents from the 15 EU Member States (22 percent) were in favour of repatriation policies for legal migrants (Eurobarometer 2003). Respondents from

² However, results from the two surveys are not directly comparable because respondents were asked different questions in each survey. For example, the Eurobarometer presents respondents with statements that relate to repatriation of legally established immigrants, while the European Social Survey asks respondents about their opinion on the repatriation of criminal migrants (EUMC 2005).
Nordic and East European countries were particularly hesitant to support repatriation (7-9 percent in Scandinavian countries), whereas respondents from Mediterranean (Greece 31 percent) and Central European countries more strongly supported such policies. Germany (30 percent) and the UK (29 percent) also showed values above the average.

Attitudes towards minorities across the EU are differentiated according to the issue on which respondents were asked to give their opinion. However, some countries are definitely more resistant to immigration (Greece, Hungary) while others remain more tolerant (Sweden). Evidence on the evolution over time (between 1997 and 2003) of opinions shows increasingly negative public attitudes towards asylum and immigration in some but not all countries.

Factors causing hostile attitudes
While opposition to migration and migrant integration persists for a significant proportion of European migrants, the causal evidence to explain such opinions is not strong. Some evidence points to the impact of economic factors – attitudes are more positive in high GDP countries, and higher skill levels correlate with pro immigrant opinion; while those in occupations with a higher proportion of migrants are more reluctant to approve immigration (Mayda 2005). Furthermore, data from the ESS suggest that negative attitudes toward migrants are associated with low educational attainment and labour market positions (EUMC 2005). Other researchers, however, find the influence of economic factors inconclusive. The wording and interpretation of survey questions, for example, is problematic, as such questions often assume the public know more about migrants than they do. As a result, such studies may reflect migrants’ perceived rather than actual economic impact (Crawley 2005). Attitudes do correlate with age (there is some evidence older people feel more threatened), levels of education, rural or urban living, and the pace of change (EUMC 2005; Crawley 2005). Those who are better educated are more liberal, in part perhaps because they face less competition with migrants for jobs, housing or services. Contact usually makes attitudes more positive but negative encounters can produce powerful negative generalisations. Many of the factors influencing attitudes are interrelated and difficult to disentangle. The impact of the media is difficult to measure (Crawley 2005).

Public opinion is intrinsically tied to the information provided about migration and migration trends. The public is generally ill informed, over-estimating for instance the number of migrants. One reason for such misconceptions is that portrayals of migrants in the media are regularly found to be negative. Examination of the portrayal of migrants from the Middle East and Africa in the Swedish media in the 1970s and the 1990s for example found a shift from a positive, benevolent if condescending view of newcomers to a skeptical view of the illegal, threatening migrant. Perceptions of gender relations among migrants are contrasted with those among free, modern and rational Swedes (Brune 2000).

Hostile attitudes appear to correlate with migrants’ ethnicity or religion rather than with the actual number of arrivals. Islamaphobia, a growing dimension of hostility toward migrants, takes different forms across Europe. In France it is found to be uniquely anti-religious: religiosity becomes a test of Frenchness for Muslims in a way that it is not for
Christians. Practicing Muslims are labeled extremists when non practicing Muslims can be seen as good French people regardless of other differences in civic commitments. Unlike Jewish or Christian job applicants, Muslims must in some cases show they are not practicing or face discrimination (Geisser 2003).

Broader changes in public attitudes – in particular evolving national and cultural identities - are also part of the context for integration. The diversity of identities within nation states and the fragility of national identities in some states is the context in which multiculturalism can be disturbing to many Europeans:

‘Where one’s identity becomes blurred, it is more difficult to accept the other. And when one’s identity feels threatened, it becomes hardened in nonnegotiable ways. Thus, precisely at the time that Europe has had to adapt to the growing presence of Islam among its people, national identities are being deconstructed and reconstructed, both from below and from above’ (Alsayyad and Castells 2002: 4).

Migrants may themselves have prejudicial attitudes towards members of other minorities. Qualitative interviews with East European migrants in Britain found some strongly expressed hostility to British ethnic minorities and to Roma, as well as to some other migrants, although how widely these views were held was not measured (Spencer et al 2006). A review by EUMC of the evidence on anti-semitic acts against Jewish people and property across Europe found some evidence that a rise in attacks since 2000 was attributable to young Muslims, linked to the political crises in the Middle East. This was the case in France and Denmark, for instance, whereas in the Netherlands and Sweden the majority of attacks were, as in the past, perpetrated by white right-wing extremists. EUMC insist, however, that the data on which this conclusion is based is not always reliable. The motivation of perpetrators and relationship between their acts and any underlying anti-semitic attitudes is under researched and unclear (EUMC 2006).

**Discrimination**

Discrimination is one outcome of negative attitudes and frequently identified as a significant barrier to integration. It can also be the outcome of institutional structures and procedures which systematically disadvantage members of minority groups. A review of evidence across the EU 25 by the EU’s Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC) found high levels of discrimination experienced in particular by migrant workers from Africa, the Middle East, Asia and Latin America, with migrants from Russia and the Ukraine also experiencing discrimination in some states. Muslim migrants faced particularly challenging conditions. EUMC argued that combating racial inequality is the key to promoting the integration of minorities and made specific recommendations including that member states’ National Employment Strategies should include targets for the improvement of the situation of migrants and operational measures against discrimination (EUMC 2005b).

The International Labour Office has also documented discrimination in employment in some European countries – Belgium, Germany, The Netherlands and Spain. It provides a methodology for documenting discrimination and measures for addressing it (Zegers de Beijl 2000). A UK government study demonstrated that discrimination is one of a series of
factors explaining minority disadvantage (Cabinet Office 2003); while research has found that ethnic identities in France can be reinforced by the discrimination and disadvantage migrants experience (Chapman and Frader 2004).

A Swedish government investigation recently found ‘structural discrimination’ on grounds of ethnicity and religion widespread within key Swedish institutions and sectors – including the police, housing and education. Racist discourse was evident in the media, labour market, welfare and legal system – in which ‘Swedishness’ is regarded as normal and migrants as deviant. Institutional practices were maintaining differences between ethnic groups, for instance providing some with access to voting rights on the basis of country of origin but not others (Swedish Ministry of Justice 2005).

An overview of integration in Italy highlighted racism and discrimination in both its explicit forms (e.g. job advertisements) and in more subtle forms, such as obstacles migrants face in accessing the banking system, sports organizations, and the judicial system (Commissione per le Politiche di Integrazione Degli Immigrati 2001). A large study of Muslim and Dutch youth in Rotterdam found that Muslim youths saw the discrimination against them as structural rather than personal, whereas the Dutch assumed that it was individually targeted (Phalet et. al. 2000). A review of housing across the EU 15 for the EUMC found similar mechanisms of discrimination across member states including denial of access to accommodation on the basis of skin colour, restrictions on access to public housing and physical attacks, which together deterred migrants and minorities from living in some neighbourhoods. It found resistance from some authorities to addressing discrimination but that implementation of the EU anti-discrimination directive was having a positive effect (EUMC 2006b).

A comparative review of the anti-discrimination laws in the 25 EU Member States commissioned by the European Commission found that some states have gone beyond the requirements of the EU Race Equality and Employment Equality Directives of 2000 but that some have failed to implement them or done so inadequately, for instance excluding protection from discrimination in the public sector. Protection from discrimination is not usually conditional on nationality or residence status. Most countries have a specialist body mandated to promote equal treatment and advise individuals, and in some cases to enforce the law. The review concludes that the most pressing issue is implementation and enforcement of rights in practice (Cormack and Bell 2005).

5.3 Integration Outcomes
Some migrant and minority groups ‘perform’ above the average for the host population on key integration indexes (e.g. Indians and Chinese in education and in the labour market in the UK, see Cabinet Office 2003). On average, however, most such groups are disproportionately disadvantaged (Castles et. al. 2002).

A comprehensive overview of outcomes exists for some states. A recent German report gives data on aspects of integration from education, employment and living conditions through to domestic violence, crime, political and social participation (Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für Migration, Flüchtlinge und Integration 2005). An Italian study reports on outcomes in housing, health, education, criminality, participation and representation
and makes recommendations based on its findings (Commissione per le Politiche di
Integrazione Degli Immigrati 2001).

A recent edited volume on France finds consensus among its authors that the French
aspiration to equality has not protected ethnic minorities from discrimination, for instance
in working class jobs, university admissions or central government policy making. As a
consequence, it finds disadvantaged minorities are increasingly expressing their ethnic
identity, attributing this in part to the absence of a strong cross-cultural union for blue
collar workers (Chapman and Frader 2004).

Some studies of integration outcomes focus specifically on groups of concern to
European policymakers. Muslim migrants are the focus of many studies of marginalized
groups although often defined by country of origin rather than faith. In the UK Muslims
are found to be disproportionately young, concentrated in deprived urban areas, more
likely to live in public housing and to have fewer qualifications. They experience
discrimination and negative stereotypes on the basis of their faith. The negativity of the
Muslim experience has led to religion becoming a more important marker of identity for
young Muslims, who seek recognition in the public sphere based on their faith rather than
ethnicity (Open Society Institute 2005).

While the second generation are usually found to be more integrated on most indexes (in
education and in the labour market for instance), they nevertheless can feel excluded and
identify with their parents’ home country. Even so, the overview of 17 EU funded projects
found little evidence that the second generation is ‘fired with political and religious
radicalism’ (Castles et. al. 2001).

Social tensions and crime
Social divisions are evidence of a failure in social integration (and lack of social
cohesion). The literature highlights many facets of this phenomenon, including residential
segregation, violent behavior, and crime. Significantly, patterns of conflict and of crime
may have ethnic contours while causal factors lie not in ethnicity but, for instance, in
socio-economic conditions.

Residential segregation can result in migrants and ethnic minority communities leading
separate, parallel lives with little social contact with the host population. Children attend
separate schools and adults operate in different social networks, community
organisations, and places of worship. Separation can lead to ignorance and
misunderstandings which are open to exploitation by extremists. Where funding for
regeneration of deprived areas is allocated to some neighbourhoods but not others,
tensions can be exacerbated (Independent Review Team 2001).

There is an increasing interest in the causal factors behind violent behavior by a minority
of migrant youth. Body-Gendrot identifies violence as one of three ways in which
marginalised youth deal with their situation: strategies of victimisation and calls for
justice; community level self-help and finally violence. Violence may be a response to the
perceived unfairness of their situation or a strategy of intimidation to secure what they
want. The propensity toward violent outbursts may be decreasing, not only because it is
costly and inefficient as a tactic of mobilization, but because policies used to repress such outbursts, including longer prison sentences and the discrediting of rioters, have become more sophisticated over time (Body-Gendrot 2000). Huysmans argues in the same volume that while there are real security issues relating to migration, the term is a social construction. It is used as a technique by government to provide authority to act and to do so in a particular way, including regulation of the integration of migrants. ‘Security’ in that context is closer to the concept of stability than to the military concept of defence, but the connotation is of migrants as an internal threat (Huysmans 2000). In some cases, the discourse advocating improvements in social cohesion to prevent violence, including both increased cultural homogeneity and socio-economic integration, may deflect more radical policy responses such as expulsion to public disorder, crime and rioting (Schierup et. al. 2006).

There is also a perception that migrants are disproportionately involved in crime (Fondazione Nord Est 2005). Crime statistics are difficult to collect for a number of reasons including victim bias and unwillingness to identify individuals’ ethnicity or immigration status. There are a number of reasons why links between migration and crime may be overestimated. First, there is a discursive tendency to perceive all migrants and refugees as ‘illegal,’ enhancing the perception that migration has an inherent criminality (Tsoukala 2005). Statistics showing a disproportionate representation of ethnic groups in crime statistics may in fact reflect an economic correlation (i.e. the migrants are disproportionately involved in crime because they are poor, not because of their ethnicity or migrant status); and thirdly that in some European cities minority groups have lower crime rates. The impact of particular cultures (e.g. parenting patterns and values), of discrimination in the criminal justice system, of social contexts in which migrants are living, and of criminal justice policy (e.g. styles of policing) must also be taken into account. More inclusive social policies in Sweden for instance seem to have had some impact on crime rates (Holdaway 2000). A study in Milan shows perceptions of migrants’ criminality may influence decisions on detention and probation (Quassoli 2000).

Measuring outcomes
A number of attempts have been made to identify indexes which can be used to measure integration outcomes. These are used to compare outcomes in EU states (Castles et. al. 2002) or to measure progress in one state over time (Commissione per le Politiche di Integrazione Degli Immigrati 2001). Attempts to measure integration outcomes across the EU find the lack of comparable data a major constraint relative to the data available on other comparable social policy issues (Citron and Gowan 2005).

The choice of indicators to measure outcomes reflects the priority attached to different levels of integration. A desired focus on cultural integration may lead to measurement of public attitudes or adherence to religious practices for instance, whereas socio-economic indicators are used to measure integration in employment, education or housing (Rudiger and Spencer 2003). Thus, for example, a study of migrant integration in Frankfurt which defines integration as ‘cultural and social approximation’, measured success as proximity to the German norm, using data on ‘life planning’, internal mobility, patterns of naturalisation and reliance on welfare benefits (Straßburger 2001). It should not however be assumed that ‘success’ on any index means that a State’s policies have been the
cause of positive outcomes. They could be the result of favourable conditions separate from the impact of any policy interventions (Favell 2003).

Host country nationals and migrants may perceive a lack of integration very differently. While the former may have concerns about migrant unemployment and its consequent burden on the state, about crime and security or the return of 'pre-modern' values, immigrants may focus on the restrictions they experience in relation to family reunification, their lack of legal status, lack of access to social services, personal security, or loss of values (Zincone 2000).

5.4 Integration Strategies

**Historical development of contrasting approaches**

There is a considerable body of academic literature analysing differing approaches across Europe: from France's emphasis on assimilation (in which policies which do not specifically target minorities have been seen as the most effective way to promote integration) and the UK's focus on anti-discrimination and race relations, to the Swedish approach of inclusion through general welfare policies. Strengths and weaknesses are found in each approach, with none evidently more 'successful' than others (Heckmann et. al. 2001; Castles et. al. 2002). While France is found to be strong at encouraging migrants to identify themselves as French, for instance, it is weaker on integration into the labour market and housing segregation. Germany is stronger on access to the labour market and training but weaker on identificational dimensions (Heckmann et al 2001).

Historical differences in approach have developed in Europe as a result of many factors including differing types and volumes of migration flows, national history, societal definitions of the immigrant situation, and institutional structures. Bleich (2003) for instance argues that French policymakers, rejecting France's collaboration with Nazi anti-semitic policies during the Vichy period, refused to recognise race as a legal category for fear of legitimizing racist discourse. UK policy makers, in contrast influenced by North America, were open to racial categories, enabling them to be more targeted in addressing race discrimination and tailoring services to the particular needs of ethnic minorities. Favell (2001) argues that cultural pluralism did not fit the French model for integration because citizenship, secularism and equal treatment were the mantras of the French Republic. But it is also the case that a series of pressures, including regionalism and European integration, were challenging France's central unity and national sovereignty and that immigration has been the playing field in which those broader tensions have been played out. Furthermore, the experience of France and of the UK suggests that a major reason for the retention of such historically contingent policies is that those who benefit from the current policy framework generally insist it should be retained while outsiders argue for reform.

Historical policy trends may also be retained through self-perpetuating cycles of reaffirmation. A recent study by the Swedish government suggests that Sweden's strong self-image as a non-racist opponent of Nazism and apartheid acted as a barrier to the recognition of prejudice against migrants and minorities, delaying policy development to address such prejudice. Because discrimination is not consistent with Sweden's self
image, immigrants' problems are perceived to be their own fault. This perception of failure is in turn reinforced by research focusing on migrants rather than on the institutions with which they interact (Swedish Ministry of Justice 2005).

A common feature of recent policy development in Europe has been the emergence of new policies in reaction to events and negative developments, rather than, as in Canada and Australia, as part of a forward planning process (Penninx 2004). Evidence of poor integration outcomes, rising public concern, and the growth and diversity of the migrant population led to a shift in the Netherlands from a rights-based ‘integration with retention of identity’ policy in the 1980s to a greater focus on individuals and access to the labour market in the following decade (Doomernik 2003; Entzinger 2003; Vermeulen and Penninx 2000). Similarly, the failure of the UK’s anti discrimination policies in addressing the disadvantage and segregation experienced by some ethnic minority communities has since 2000 led to the introduction of a positive duty on public bodies to promote race equality and good race relations, legislation on religious discrimination, and measures to promote social cohesion (Commission for Racial Equality 2004). Meanwhile, political pressure for policy change in the Netherlands, the rise in populism, and the rejection of policies seen to have been influenced by research findings, has reduced reliance on research as an evidence base for policymaking (Penninx 2005).

While historical and political differences are often emphasized in analyses of national-level policymaking on integration, interventions are frequently found in practice to converge across states. A comparison of recent policy interventions in France and the UK suggests that, despite apparently contrasting national philosophies, there are similarities in practice at the local level. A comparative study of Manchester and Marseille, for instance, finds that local officials in both cities acknowledge ethnic identities and mediate directly with ethnic minority leaders who provide essential information on hard to reach communities. In contrast to the French Republican ideal, policies which are officially ethnically neutral are in practice deployed in neighbourhoods with a significant concentration of minorities (Moore 2002). Nevertheless, such findings may be time and politically sensitive. Brubaker (2001) argues that an increasing acceptance of the ‘droit à la différence’ in France in the 1980s (including the acceptance of education in languages of origin in some public schools for instance) disappeared ‘with astonishing rapidity’ when Le Pen turned the argument for diversity on its head, insisting that the French had the right to preserve their own identity from unwanted admixture.

There can indeed by notable difference between the national model and the practices of municipal authorities at the city and local level. Considerable variation in migrant concentrations, the challenges associated with them and the policies which municipal authorities adopt ‘robs national-level statistics and comparisons of much of their punch’. It is at the local level that integration models meet reality and municipal authorities, within substantial constraints, develop their own approaches more nuanced than the national model would suggest (Ireland 2004:21)

**Social cohesion policies**
States have undertaken proactive policies to help improve relationships between communities at the local level and, in today’s terminology, to promote social cohesion, in
part as a response to urban disturbances in which migrants and or ethnic minorities were involved. Some writers interpret the emphasis on social cohesion as assimilationist and point to a lack of clarity on what migrants should be cohering to or who should be ‘doing the cohering’ (Zetter and Flynn 2005). Others suggest that the degree of social integration necessary for societies to function is overemphasized – placing too much stress on the need for shared norms, harmony and stability (Bader 2001).

An official UK study recommended defining rights and responsibilities clearly; honest dialogue; local leadership; and that local authorities should have local cohesion strategies including promoting contact and understanding between groups. Furthermore, it suggested implementing staff training on diversity issues; that funding for local regeneration should be thematic, not by area or community; that it should not be assumed that ethnic minorities are more needy than other communities; and that the media should be encouraged to enter a voluntary code of guidance on reporting community tensions (Independent Review Team 2001).

Good practice on area-based regeneration initiatives include promoting active community involvement in local decision making; culturally appropriate consultation methods; effective communication strategies to ensure all sections of the public know the actual basis of funding and of other decisions; flexible geographic boundaries for regeneration schemes; initiatives to build bridges between ethnic groups; and the encouragement of local NGOs to participate. Strategies should be monitored and reviewed. Different forms of mediation are recommended as a means of conflict resolution at neighbourhood level (Bonafe-Schmitt 2000).

**Strategy at EU level**

The emergence of a framework for integration policy at EU level, and initiatives to promote ‘good practice’ are recent developments. The limitations of policy at the national level, it is argued, necessitate that development (Rudiger and Spencer 2003; Penninx 2004). Where there is direction on aspects of integration policy from the EU however, as in anti-discrimination law, research shows that implementation can be inconsistent (Luciak 2004; Cormack and Bell 2005).

Attempts have been made to measure the development of integration policies and governance arrangements across the EU, using ideas on good practice (such as secure residence status, access to family reunion and naturalisation) as indexes (Citron and Gowan 2005; Zetter et. al. 2003). Citron and Gowan, comparing Member States’ policies relating to integration, found weakest performances on access to naturalization and strongest on provisions of rights attached to long term residency. They also found that European states experienced in receiving migrants did not score more highly on indexes of policy progress than states for which in-migration is a recent phenomenon. This is not to say that history of migration is irrelevant to the development of good practices. It is argued, for example, that lack of experience and of an existing policy framework in Italy has led to the adoption of a pragmatic but essentially reactive, assimilationist model (Zetter et. al. 2003).
The European Commission has been mandated to promote the exchange of good practice and has done so in relation to introductory programmes, participation in civic and political life and the development of integration indicators, by drawing on experience in Member States (European Commission DG JFS 2004). The Commission for Racial Equality in the UK is another source of good practice guides, for instance on promoting good race relations, building equality considerations into public sector procurement, and ethnic monitoring (www.cre.gov.uk).

Policy Critique
The content and impact of integration strategies at the national and local level is addressed in the literature, despite the paucity of rigorous evaluation of policy interventions. There is also a developing critique of policy at the EU level, identifying weaknesses and potential reforms (Penninx 2004; Spencer 2006). Academic literature is here supplemented by contributions from policy institutes and ‘think tanks’, as in a recent commentary on the EU Common Basic Principles on Integration from the European Policy Centre (Ceri Jones and Pineda Polo 2005; also Rudiger and Spencer 2003).

There is also discussion of the governance of policy making. Comparative studies reveal that national strategies are frequently not coherent across government. Facing competing departmental objectives, such strategies can lack clear goals (Zetter et. al. 2003; Zincone 2000; Spencer 2003). Decentralisation of responsibility for policy, as in Spain, creates particular challenges for coordination, coherence and uniformity (Aparicio and Tornos 2003). Policies can be contradictory, promoting integration while simultaneously creating barriers of access between migrants and jobs or services, or fostering a negative public debate (Kofman 2000; Commission for Racial Equality 2004) There can be a gap between the intention of national policy and implementation on the ground, affected by the degree of political acceptance at the local level for such programs where migrants may not be the only section of society facing exclusion (Castles et. al. 2002).

A significant theme is the impact of institutions of the welfare state on integration processes. Reliance on social services to deliver integration in Sweden, for instance, has been found to result in a state of economic and social dependency. Migrants are perceived and perceive themselves from the point of arrival as weak, in need of help, and as a social problem, rather than as actors with capacity for self-sufficiency (Kamali 2004). A study of integration in three countries (Germany, The Netherlands and Belgium) and in eight cities within them concluded that, in differing ways, welfare institutions and social policies encouraged, politicized and reinforced ethnic identities. Whether targeting ethnic groups directly, indirectly through funding of voluntary organisations which themselves organized on ethno-religious lines, or providing opportunities for political participation on the basis of ethnicity or foreign born status, states and municipal authorities effectively encouraged ethnic leadership and ethnic based mobilisation. The restructuring of welfare states since the 1970s, including greater reliance on outsourcing to voluntary sector service providers, decentralisation to municipal authorities and privatization, enhanced this development. The author concludes that ‘European policy makers have in large part created the ethnic problem with which they feel they are now wrestling’ (Ireland 2004:3).
Scholars have questioned whether increased ethnic diversity and/or multicultural policies are undermining public support for redistributive welfare provision. A related argument is that the disproportionate unemployment among migrants creates an unsustainable burden on welfare states and has made it necessary to reduce the level of benefits for some recent arrivals. However, a review of the literature on welfare state restructuring and reform does not find migration cited as an important causal factor (compared, for instance, to the impact of demographic ageing) and a micro analysis of trends in ethnic diversity and public spending finds no clear relationship between immigration and welfare spending (Hvinden 2006). Banting and Kymlicka address the related criticism – philosophical and empirical - that multicultural policies which support the maintenance of distinct ethnic identities make it more difficult to sustain a robust welfare estate – so that there is a trade off between a commitment to multicultural policies and to the welfare state. Reviewing the evidence in OECD countries they find ‘no evidence that countries that have adopted strong multicultural policies have seen erosion in their welfare states relative to those that have resisted such programs’. Alternative explanations can be established for levels of social spending (Banting and Kymlicka 2004).

Some additional findings of differing approaches to integration are:

- **Susceptibility to policy intervention:** Some aspects of integration, (e.g. ensuring access to services), are more susceptible to influence by policy intervention than others (e.g. ensuring access to the housing market or influencing public attitudes towards migrants).

- **Narrow target group:** The targets of integration strategies are often narrowly drawn, focusing only on refugees for instance or on dependents, not addressing the needs of those who have arrived through other migration channels.

- **Legal rights:** It is important for states to build a strong foundation of legal rights which take into account migrants’ ability and motivation to participate fully in society. For instance, security of residence provides an incentive to integrate, and right to family reunion encourages a long term stake in society (Guild 2000). A recent study of East European migrants in the UK, including those who became EU citizens on enlargement of the EU in 2004, shows that even if legal rights are a necessary condition of integration, they are not sufficient to dismantle the barriers migrants face (Spencer et. al. 2006).

- **Mainstreaming:** It can be effective to mainstream integration objectives for migrants within general policies which are likely to have a greater impact and allocation of resources than targeted initiatives (Rudiger and Spencer 2003). Targeted policies, while an important part of promoting integration, can also lead to stigmatization and perpetuation of ‘them’ and ‘us’ dichotomies (Borevi 2002).

- **Equality:** Creating equal opportunities for participation does not necessarily mean treating each person the same. Diverse needs may require different treatment to achieve equal access to jobs, services and civic participation (Parekh 2000).
Impact of immigration policies: There is little evidence on the impact of immigrant selection policies on integration outcomes. An investigation of the impact of entry policies in the Netherlands, including entry for family reunion, found no relationship between those policies and labour market outcomes for Turkish immigrants (Muus 2003). A review of literature on the UK, however, found that post entry restrictions on migrants including dispersal policies and restricted access to employment and to welfare benefits can contribute to social exclusion and to tensions with the host population (Robinson and Reeve 2006).

Irregular migrants: There are mixed incentives to providing undocumented or irregular migrants with the opportunity to integrate. If it is not viable economically or politically to expel all undocumented migrants they should for security and other reasons be considered for integration. But good integration programmes providing full economic and social rights to irregular migrants could also attract more irregular migrants to that country (Zincone 2000).

6. Education

Education is a pathway to integration into the labour market, assisting children and adults to acquire language and occupational skills, and is also a means of integration into wider society. It is itself a site of integration into the school or college community. The social integration of children occurs first and foremost at school, through the acquisition of new skills and through interaction with other pupils. Adult migrants are more likely to encounter education-based integration informally at work or in social settings, although there are also formal introduction programmes where they can acquire language skills, social orientation, job training, and the opportunity to communicate with and participate in their new community.

6.1 The literature

There is a considerable body of literature on the education of migrant children and adults, and broader works on education of ethnic minorities which do not distinguish between the first and subsequent generations. Key themes are educational under-attainment and its contributory factors; the importance of language acquisition and impact of retention of first language; the causes and impact of school segregation; and evaluations of policy interventions. The situation of Muslim pupils in schools is receiving increasing attention. The literature focuses heavily on schooling and attainment, offering fewer insights into the impact of education on wider social integration for either children or adults.

There is also literature on educational policies relating to migrants in particular European countries (see, e.g., Beaud 2002; Bunar 2001; Rijkschroeff et. al. 2005). The literature may explore education policies broadly at the national level – for instance the impact of Dutch education policies over the past 30 years (Rijkschroeff et. al. 2005) or take more specific approaches. Because the education systems, social contexts and data categories differ, it is difficult to compare outcomes. Even so, there is some convergence of views on good practice (Luciak 2004).
6.2 Education outcomes, causal factors and policy intervention
The outcomes of migrant youth in schooling are dependent on a myriad of factors. We consider the themes which recur in the integration literature: participation, performance, language, socio-economic background, cultural orientation, school ethos and experience, and segregation. As the approach adopted by schools is central to outcomes, we do not cover education policies separately but address them here.

While the outcomes of education for adults have been less developed, we then provide a summary of what is known about their experiences.

Participation
Large differences exist across the EU in terms of the enrolment of immigrants, foreigners or ethnic minority pupils in the educational system. Among the countries which report data on primary school enrolment by citizenship in 2001 or 2002, Luxembourg has the highest (37.9 percent) and Finland the lowest percentage (2.4 percent) of foreign pupils, while in Germany their incidence is around 12 percent (Luciak 2004). In the UK and the Netherlands, pupils with an ethnic minority background account for 14-15 percent of the total primary school population, with significant internal geographic variation.

Secondary school data show that migrant and ethnic minority pupils are less likely to be in secondary schools that give them access to higher education (Luciak 2004). Selection for academic or vocational education, taking place before migrant children have acquired good language skills, is one factor leading to their concentration in vocational schools and colleges, and hence to non academic qualifications, across many member states (Crul and Doomernik 2003, Luciak 2004). Poor language skills may be misinterpreted as learning difficulties, with the consequent danger that migrant or minority pupils are placed in lower level teaching groups and face lower teacher expectations (Warren 2006).

In several states migrant and ethnic minority pupils are also overrepresented in special schools for children with physical or mental learning difficulties. In Austria and Germany the share of pupils with a foreign citizenship in the Sonderschule (20.6 percent and 15.4 percent respectively in 2001-02) is significantly higher than their enrolment in general schools (9-10 percent). In the Netherlands, special education programmes have a much higher share of pupils with foreign ethnic backgrounds (29 percent) compared to other types of secondary school (4-6 percent) (Luciak 2004).

In countries where statistics are available, there are indications that the second generation is more likely to attend institutions of higher education than recent immigrants, but is still less likely to advance in university studies than students with no foreign background, in part because of higher dropout rates.

Performance

[3 In addition to the usual problems affecting data on the immigrant population, the different length of schooling across EU-countries further complicates a direct comparison of data. Moreover, data on enrolment at the university or higher education level do not distinguish – except for Germany – between foreign nationals or minorities who live in the country and others who came to the country just for the purpose of studying.]
Some minority groups outperform their majority counterparts in the classroom (Department for Education and Employment 2000; Reyneri 2004). A notable example is the school performance of Indian and Chinese pupils in the UK and their disproportionate representation among university students (DfES 2005). Even so, migrant and minority children frequently have lower educational attainment at school.

The PISA ‘Programme for International Student Assessment’, a comparative study on students’ performance, investigates pupils’ knowledge and skills at age 15 in reading, mathematics and science. It allows for comparison of the performance of native pupils, non-native pupils, and pupils who were born in the host-country but whose parents were foreign-born. Results show that non-native born pupils have much lower attainment than native pupils with no foreign background, with Germany, Belgium, Lichtenstein and Luxembourg having particularly large achievement gaps. In each of these countries, significantly, selection on the basis of performance is done at an early age (Stanat 2003). The performance of pupils born in the country but whose parents were immigrants yields more mixed results. In some countries, these pupils did not perform significantly differently from native-born pupils, but in others a wide gap remained (OECD 2001; 2004). Smaller scale studies find education attainment increasing among some groups of migrant and second generation children, such as Turks and Moroccans in the Netherlands (Crul and Doomernik 2003).

Girls are often found to perform better than boys and to have the capacity for higher social mobility as a result. Such success stories can be overlooked when only aggregate data for each migrant group is considered. Higher performance among girls from some ethnic groups may reflect parental encouragement and a lack of cultural pressures for early marriage (Crul and Doomernik 2003).

**Language**

The acquisition of the host country’s native language is found to be a key factor in success in education and in the labour market. (Van Ours and Veenman 2001; Reynari 2004; O’Leary et. al. 2001; Esser 2006). The PISA study confirmed that poor knowledge of the language was one of the main factors associated with the disadvantage experienced by students with a foreign background, whether born in the host-country or abroad. It showed that in Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland students who do not speak the language of assessment at home are at least 2.5 times more likely to be in the bottom quarter of performance indicators.

Age of immigration, length of stay, parents’ background and higher education level all facilitate the acquisition of the host-country language (Esser 2006; Luciak 2004). Linguistic difference, the value of the migrant’s own language as a vehicle for world-wide communication, and the migrant’s social distance from mainstream society negatively impact language acquisition. Esser found that competency in the language of the migrant’s country of origin brings no advantage in terms of host country educational

---

4 However, higher enrolments can reflect lower employment opportunities for minorities, completion rates may be lower, students with a minority background are less likely to have places in prestigious universities and often choose vocationally orientated courses.
attainment, and that conditions that favour the retention of language of origin usually hinder the acquisition of high competency in the host country language. Other studies confirm the importance of starting education in the host country at a young age.

While retention of migrants' own language may offer no advantage in educational attainment, it may nevertheless do so in relation to the migrant's sense of belonging and access to ethnic networks. There are thus conflicting views on the value of own-language teaching at school, historically a feature of education policy in some Member States (Vertovec and Wessendorf 2004). Some of the literature emphasises the value parents attach to teaching minority languages in schools, particularly for those who speak such languages at home, but the broader impact of such programmes is less clear (Aarts, Extra, and Yağmur 2004).

**Socio-economic background**
Research suggests that language acquisition may nevertheless be overemphasized as the key explanatory factor for underachievement. The PISA results showed that in countries where the socio-economic status of immigrants is comparatively low, the performance gaps between students with and without migrant backgrounds tend to be larger. Warren, from a review of the UK literature (2006), points out that acquisition of English has not removed significant disparities in ethnic minority educational achievement, for instance of African Caribbean children, and warns against too exclusive an emphasis on language as the solution to educational disadvantage. However, it is equally important to not overemphasize the role of socio-economic status in predicting integration outcomes. Research suggests broader factors contributing to poorer education outcomes among migrant children include inadequate teaching techniques, discrimination in places of education (Luciak 2004); as well as low parental education and language ability, limiting parental involvement in the child’s education (Crul and Doomernik 2003).

**Cultural orientation**
There is a complex relationship between cultural identification and educational outcomes. One important finding is that migrants’ attachment to their ethnic culture does not inhibit educational attainment. Research on Turkish students in the Netherlands suggests that there is no correlation between migrants' 'normative orientation' (group identification and ethnic contact preferences for instance) and educational level (Verkuyten and Canatan 2003). A separate study on Turkish and Moroccan migrant and Dutch youth with similar education backgrounds in Rotterdam found that the most successful students were those most willing to adopt Dutch culture at school while simultaneously retaining attachment to their ethnic culture: these two attachments were neither exclusive nor damaging to their education prospects (Phalet and Andriessen 2003). This research found that more highly educated minority and Dutch youth had more liberal, less conformist views, and concluded that education is one way to bring the worlds of the Dutch and minorities together. More highly educated women in particular were vanguards in bridging the gap between their parents' values and those of their multicultural surroundings (Phalet and Andriessen 2003).
Other studies have confirmed that education can facilitate cultural understanding, where pupils explore each other’s history, background, language, culture, and needs (Hedetoft 2005; Bunar 2001). A series of case studies in the Netherlands show that it is the interaction between culture and structural factors – in other words, not only the structure of schooling but relationships with family and community – that impact on outcomes for immigrant pupils (Vermeulen and Perlmann 2000). Education experts stress the broader importance of the school experience beyond attaining qualifications. For refugees, for instance, studies point to the importance of a child’s school as a safe, supportive environment, providing security in otherwise unstable lives (Warren 2006).

**School ethos and experience**

The environment created in school has a direct impact both on educational attainment of migrant children and on the integration process as a whole. Warren’s review of UK research points to the value of a ‘whole school’ approach which raises pupils’ expectations of themselves, which demonstrates that their cultural heritage is valued and in which there is an inclusive ethos of mutual respect in which any prejudice is addressed (Department for Education and Employment 2000; Warren 2006). Parental involvement, identification of underachievement through ethnic monitoring, the integration of specialist language teachers into mainstream teaching, clear and systematic induction systems for all newly arrived pupils, and effective dialogue with pupils, families and communities were among the factors considered to have improved outcomes. Few ethnic minority youth have participated in developing the national education programmes targeted to help them (Heckmann et. al. 2001).

Official reports suggest that schools with extensive experience with migrant children, and those provided with background information on the children before arrival, have been found to handle their induction more effectively (DfES 2004a, 2004b).

**School segregation**

Housing segregation and the selective entry of pupils to faith schools contribute to the concentration of migrant and ethnic minority pupils in certain schools (Independent Review Team 2001). Such concentration may include migrants and ethnic minorities from diverse ethnic and faith backgrounds, or students from one particular background.

An analysis of school and 2001 census data in the UK found significant variation in levels of segregation between ethnic groups, and that school-based segregation can be more prevalent than in housing (Burgess, Wilson, and Lupton 2004). In Sweden, local schools similarly replicate the socio-economic make-up and geographic distribution of the local population and are found to be places of both segregation and integration. The relationships between schools and the local community can be influenced by a negative perception of the school as a ‘problem’. The extent to which migrant children are affected depends on the schools’ handling of relations with the external community (Bunar 2001).

To help prevent segregation, priority education zones, such as those established by Sciences-Po in Paris, have helped disadvantaged individuals – including minorities – gain admission to competitive higher education institutions without overtly focusing on minorities to the exclusion of others (de Wenden 2005). But research also points to the
limits of ‘colour-blind’ area policies. Sabbagh (2004), in a critique of the Science-Po initiative, argues that it covered only limited local areas and was a more effective public relations exercise than the necessary comprehensive approach. Policies to increase the number of working class and minority students obtaining qualifications can have the contradictory effect of reducing standards or channeling students into vocational exams so that the qualifications do not lead to the expected social advancement (Beaud 2002).

Mentorship programmes are among the initiatives taken to build bridges between migrant and host country youth (Department for Education and Employment 2000). Some programmes incorporate members of the same migrant group, with established migrants helping new arrivals, while others mix migrants with members of the majority of the population. Toward an Independent Future for Somali Youngsters, for instance, a project initiated in the Hague, combined employment skills training with personal coaching and leisure activities designed to build community cohesion (Sijlbing 2005).

**Adults**

While the majority of literature on education outcomes focuses on the role of education for children in schools, a growing body of literature considers the role of education in adult integration. The literature considers the effectiveness of proactive policies for engaging adults in the education process from the time of arrival. Finland is among those countries which create individual integration plans for unemployed migrants, and designates specific actions to help migrants improve their language or other skills (Urth 2005). However, introductory courses for migrants in a number of states have been found to be insufficiently tailored to meet the individual needs of migrants and have had high drop out rates. Entzinger has found value in combining language and orientation components and in the use of positive rather than negative sanctions to encourage attendance. Where sanctions are used, these should be enforced to retain credibility in the system (Entzinger 2004). In a number of States, mentoring of adult migrants by longer established migrants or members of the majority population has been found to be of value (Sijlbing 2005; de Wenden 2005).

For adults in particular, skills-focused education programs which enable migrants to participate fully in the labour market facilitate social integration as well. Those whose skills do not transfer or whose foreign diplomas do not translate cannot obtain jobs that meet their qualifications so that they do not have the opportunity to meet work colleagues with similar educational backgrounds. Programmes such as those in Sweden which help to accelerate the acquisition of accreditation for professions in which it has labour shortages, including the Stockholmprojektet for foreign doctors (Englund 2005: 195), are thus also contributing to social integration.

Most formal immigrant integration programmes in the European Union for adults primarily consist of education practices in three forms: language training, social orientation courses, and occupational integration measures or vocational training (Urth 2005). Integration courses, including language classes, are mandatory in some EU States (Spencer and di Mattia 2004). Research has found that adult integration programmes can take a one-size-fits-all approach, neglecting the differing needs of migrants (Urth 2005). Detailed guidance on the design and organisation of introduction programmes has
been provided by a European Commission good practice guide (Commission of the European Union DG JFS 2004).

Limited access to affordable language tuition, and the availability of classes appropriate for migrants' needs prevent some who want to study from doing so (Griffiths 2003). Immigration status can also restrict entitlement to higher and further education, particularly through a requirement to pay overseas fees (Warren 2006).

7. Housing

The household is the centre of family life and of key social interactions. The standard of housing impacts on migrants' health and quality of life. Housing also situates migrants in a neighbourhood, a physical and social environment which provides opportunities to work, access services, socialize and feel a greater or lesser degree of physical security from crime (Phillips 2006). For all of these reasons the standard of housing, level of geographical segregation, proportion of migrants living in deprived areas and levels of homelessness are often included within the basket of indicators when measuring migrant integration (Ager and Strang 2004; Entzinger and Biezeveld 2002; Castles et. al. 2002).

7.1 The Literature

As in other areas of integration, there is a broader literature on ethnic minority housing than exclusively on first generation migrants. Many texts on migrants concentrate on refugees and asylum seekers, in part because more data exists for these than other migrant groups. In this field, literature on migrants and minorities can be found under such categories as urban development, regeneration and city planning as well as on housing per se.

Housing is discussed within theoretical works comparing models of integration in different countries (Popoola 2002) and policy interventions (Sala Pala 2005). Differing theoretical approaches are also taken in analyses, for instance on the causal factors leading to segregation. While some interpret segregation as an outcome of choice (albeit within income constraints), others take a structural approach, viewing segregation as a feature of inequalities in power, resources and discrimination. A third approach, drawing on the ideas of Jürgen Habermas, takes individual preferences and structural constraints into account (Urban 2005).

Housing conditions and poverty also receive significant attention in the policy literature, sometimes in the context of a broader analysis of social justice in neighbourhood life. The negative and positive impacts of policy interventions has receive increased attention in the context of urban disturbances in which migrants or subsequent generations have been involved.

7.2 Housing outcomes and causal factors

There is no comparative data on the housing conditions of migrants in the EU. However, census data on foreign nationals across the EU provide some information on household size and type and on home ownership. This data also contributes to an understanding of
integration processes by identifying cultural changes such as in fertility behaviour and patterns of household formation among the foreign born.

Housing patterns of migrants across the EU differ between host-countries with a long-established immigrant population and those with recent in-migration. In Germany and the UK the proportion of non-EU foreign nationals living with their spouse and children (around 34 percent) is much higher than among natives (20-21 percent), while single-person households are less common. Consistent with this pattern, the average migrant household size is larger than that of natives. In the Netherlands the average size of Turkish and Moroccan households – 3.7 and 3.8 persons respectively – is almost twice that of Dutch households (1998). Different patterns are observed in countries that started to host immigrants only in the past two decades. In Spain and Portugal only 15-16 percent of non-EU foreigners lived with their spouse and children, in comparison with 31-32 percent of nationals. Migrants in Southern Europe and some longer standing labour recruiting countries cohabit more often than nationals in Switzerland: for example, 8 percent of Turks and 9 percent of ex-Yugoslavians live in collective households, compared with 2 percent of Swiss people (Haug et. al. 2002).

The 2001 census data shows that migrants are much less likely than natives to own their home (42 percent against 64 percent in the EU-15, 47 percent against 67 percent in the new Member States). However, the magnitude of this result differs across countries, being higher in Germany and especially in Greece, where only 16 percent of foreigners are owner occupiers in comparison with 71 percent of Greek nationals, and lower in France and the UK.

There is evidence of migrants living in very poor housing conditions in many Member States (Commissione per le Politiche di Integrazione Degli Immigrati 2001; Phillips 2006), including substandard public housing (Simon 2003). New migrants heavily rely on rented accommodation. Some accept poor conditions on first arrival, including sharing overcrowded premises with other migrants or rely on family or friends for accommodation, but move into better accommodation when employed and receiving regular income (Spencer et. al. 2006) or they acquire entitlement to public housing (Bolt and van Kempen 2002). Instability in housing in the early years can reflect insecurity in immigration status or harassment. Women who leave the family home because of domestic violence have particularly limited options if precluded from access to public funds (Phillips 2006).

Experiences can differ significantly between and within communities. In the UK, Indians have high levels of ownership but in relation to overcrowding, poor housing conditions, and desire to move they are also disproportionately represented. Some ethnic minorities are also more likely to be homeless (Harrison and Phillips 2003). Tenants may be happy with the standard of accommodation but not with the behavior of their landlords or experience of harassment in their neighbourhood (Phillips 2006).

---

5 However, in the past five years the immigrant population in these countries has experienced considerable structural changes. The increasing weight of family reunifications has in all probability fostered the settlement of migrant families, levelling the differences with native households.
Where migrants are concentrated in areas of deprivation, community tensions can result and be exploited by far right groups, but are not inevitable. The impact of new migration on local neighbourhoods in the UK has been found, from a review of the literature, to depend on the local socio-economic context, history of previous settlement and ethnic profile, actual and perceived ethnicity and identity of new migrants, local media portrayals of immigration and asylum, the legal status of new immigrants, and the success of local agencies in mediating between established and incoming populations. The presence of new migrants can be a catalyst for regeneration in the area, increasing the viability for instance of shops and facilities (Robinson and Reeve 2006).

**Segregation**

In relation to spatial segregation, the literature broadly addresses three questions: Is segregation occurring; what are the causal factors; and does it matter?

It has long been recognised that migrants may choose to live in areas where there are members of their family and others from their country of origin. Making this choice provides access to shops and services that meet their particular needs, to jobs (through migrant social networks), to places of worship, and if need be to greater physical security. Concern arises when the level of concentration of one or more minorities is such that they have little social contact with members of the majority community, potentially creating social tensions and/or reducing the opportunities for social mobility.

A growing body of literature finds evidence of segregation in many Member States, although there is no agreement whether segregation is increasing or in decline (Chahal 2000; Molina 2001; Simon 2003; Urban 2005; Verbundpartner 2005; Simpson 2004). Some counter argue that it is the majority population that is most segregated, many migrants living in highly diverse communities in which it is only the majority population that is largely missing (Buck and Gordon 2004).

The evidence shows that migrants’ preferences are not the only or primary cause of segregation. Lack of choice in the housing market because of low incomes, direct discrimination in housing allocation, lack of entitlement to public housing and government dispersal programmes are additional causal factors (Bolt and van Kempen 2002; Verbundpartner 2005). Two Swedish studies (Popoola 2002; Molina 2001) dispute the oft-made assumption that segregation is the result of cultural choices because it overlooks the fact that people choose from within the limited opportunities open to them. Migrants should not be blamed for segregation when discrimination and other factors actively prevent them from making free choices about where to live. Migrants make choices within a housing market that is already heavily segregated, and not only within areas of deprivation. This highlights a theme across the integration literature that it is necessary to ask: into what are migrants integrating?

There is no agreement in the literature on whether segregation is negative for migrants or ethnic minorities (Musterd 2003; Simon 2003; Bolt and van Kempen 2002; Urban 2005). Some argue that it is the continuing correlation between ethnic segregation and deprivation which is the problem (Harrison and Phillips 2003). Although extreme levels of segregation may hinder integration, evidence suggests this may not be the case with
moderate levels of segregation. Evidence from Amsterdam shows minorities in similar levels of segregation vary in their performance on other indexes of integration such as education, employment, social and cultural values and political integration (Musterd 2003). Furthermore, ethnic clustering, by facilitating the development of community infrastructures and social support networks, can enable migrants to feel a sense of belonging (Harrison and Phillips 2003).

7.3 Housing and neighbourhood policies
Some Member States have been slow to recognize the connection between housing and migrant integration (Jacobs 2000) with the exception of problems resulting from segregation (Independent Review Team 2001). Governments have taken action to reduce the concentration of migrants or minorities in particular cities, and to reduce segregation in deprived neighbourhoods. Some key findings in relation to segregation are that:

- Unlike many other areas of integration policy, governments are constrained by the voluntary nature of housing decisions. Individuals usually decide where and how to live at least within a particular locality, if not across the country as a whole. Income levels and existing community or family relationships are often key determinants of individual housing choices (Bolt and van Kempen 2002).
- Where intervention is attempted, governments have perhaps been less constrained than in other areas by traditional models of integration: the ‘ethnic-blind’ French Republican model has not prevented overt attempts through housing allocation policy to increase ethnic mixing in urban neighbourhoods (Sala Pala 2005).
- A study in eight European cities found that spatial concentrations have been exacerbated by greater reliance by European governments on market forces in housing and urban policies in recent years, a process in which ‘local level policies intended to avoid such clustering were out-gunned’. The study did not resolve whether such concentrations were on balance negative in isolating immigrants from society at large or positive in providing a safe harbour from which they could develop social networks of mutual assistance. The evidence did suggest that ethnic concentrations were not in themselves the cause of ethnic conflicts (Ireland 2004:211).
- Dispersal programmes in the UK and Germany have devolved responsibility for housing asylum seekers. However, secondary migration to more attractive areas is common once refugee status is determined (Phillips 2006; Verbundpartner 2005).
- Policy initiatives to address segregation in neighbourhoods and create mixed-income areas by expanding the number of expensive homes in communities in the Netherlands, and broader efforts to mix populations as in France, are not judged to have been effective in reducing segregation levels (Jacobs 2000; Bolt and van Kempen 2002).

Findings in country studies may also be applicable more broadly. For example:

---

6 The UK’s dispersal programme, for instance, regulates areas in which refugees can resettle, but leaves them choice within the locality to which they are assigned (Home Office 2005).
• Simon, in a study for the French government, found the refusal to allow family members to live near one another to be discriminatory. He notes less effort has been made to remove discrimination from housing policy than in education or employment (Simon 2003).

• Research in the UK suggests that policy should focus on increasing housing choices, whether by providing support for those who wish to move away from the ethnic cluster or widening housing options within the cluster for those who want to stay (Harrison and Phillips 2003).

• Dutch research suggests that the existence of educational programmes and means of access to the labour market may be crucial explanatory factors in the successful integration of those living in moderately segregated areas. Programmes directed at the social and ethnic de-segregation of neighbourhoods may, in contrast, contribute little (Musterd 2003).

The most frequent intervention which impacts on the housing and neighbourhood environment of migrants are broader strategies of urban renewal or regeneration, designed to redevelop a locality as a whole. The intended outcomes of urban renewal programmes include reducing segregation and engaging a variety of state and non-state actors in the process (Bericht der Beauftragten 2002; UK Department for Work and Pensions 2001). Among the research findings on the impact of urban renewal programmes are that:

• Area based funding strategies have led to tensions between communities successful in attracting government funds and those which are less successful, a factor in the urban disturbances in the UK in 2001 (Independent Review Team 2001)

• Fragmented responsibility for policy and delivery has had negative impacts at the local level in Sweden (Urban 2005) and in the UK (Robinson and Reeve 2006).

• The concentration of resources in the UK has been on areas of public housing but ethnic minorities are mostly to be found in areas of mixed tenure. There has been a failure to incorporate the opinions of ethnic minority groups and thus to target policy initiatives in a way that meets their particular needs. (Chahal 2000)

• Housing providers run by ethnic minorities and recruitment of ethnic minority staff have helped to ensure that minority needs are considered but attempts to engage migrants in consultation can require a high investment in time and money (Harrison and Phillips 2003; Verbundpartner 2005).

The mobility of migrants from metropolitan areas towards smaller cities and rural areas finds municipalities in Italy still addressing migrants’ needs as an emergency in ways inappropriate to the individuals concerned (Commissione per le Politiche di Integrazione Degli Immigrati 2001) and, in the UK, treating diverse migrants as one immigrant group (Fyvie 2001). Immigrants settling in neighbourhoods with a limited history of minority ethnic settlement and fewer relevant services are less readily accepted by residents and more prone to harassment, abuse and violence (Robinson and Reeve 2006).

Steps to prepare residents in an area for the arrival of migrants, and orientation of the migrants towards their new neighbourhood, are among the interventions municipalities have taken (eg in the UK, Germany, Sweden and the Netherlands), with some evidence
of success in fostering more positive attitudes towards newcomers and more positive news coverage (Robinson et. al. 2003; Buck and Gordon 2004; Rudiger 2006). Ongoing support to residents and new migrants can however be needed if positive relations are to continue. This area of policy intervention can engage significant support from the voluntary sector, including faith based organisations (Phillips 2006).

8. Health

Good health is not just a product of medical welfare but involves ‘a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being’ (World Health Organisation 2001). Life expectancy, morbidity and mortality rates, accident rates, and migrants’ access to medical services are among the measures used as integration indicators (Castles et. al. 2002). Good health is also essential for employment and for social and civic participation. While health is included within some of the work on integration indicators (Castles et. al. 2002; Ager and Strang 2002); several works group health as one of many other services – such as accommodation and education – which are important to the broader integration of new arrivals (Entzinger and Biezeveld 2002).

8.1 The Literature

There is a considerable literature on aspects of health, though it has significant gaps. The available literature focuses on three themes: access of migrants to mainstream services; discrimination and racism experienced by ethnic minorities and migrants in health care systems; and the propensity of migrants to be more vulnerable to particular health problems. Where studies focus on the health issues associated with a particular migrant community or a particular health problem (van den Bosch and Roberts 2000; Elkerri 2003; Robertsson 2003; Watters 2002; Allebeck and Silveira 2001), it may be difficult to apply the results more broadly. A mapping exercise on mental health services in Europe (Watters 2002) reported a notable lack of research in that area.

There is a developing literature on health policy relating to migrants in the EU – in part as a result of the emerging evidence on poor health outcomes and the difficulties migrants experience in accessing services. A number of mapping exercises (Carr-Hill 2000; Council of Europe 2000; Watters 2002; Wren and Boyle 2001; Ingleby et. al. n.d.; Ahlberg, Lundström, and Krantz 2004) have been undertaken, concluding with recommendations and identifying ‘best practices’. Some texts are ‘grey literature’ emanating from projects, annual reports of government agencies and conferences or published by voluntary and public bodies addressing refugees’ needs.

The discourse on migrant health can reflect a wider social discourse in which migrants are seen as different or deviant, a problem requiring resources outside of ‘normal health care’. In such cases, the health needs of migrants are discussed by comparison with the needs of the host population, in which the latter are taken as the norm (Öhlander 2004). Migrants also can be portrayed as victims rather than as actors with some control over their situation (Carr-Hill 2000).

8.2 Health Outcomes and Causal Factors
The literature provides evidence on three main indicators of ill health in migrant populations – mortality and death rates; morbidity and the causes of death; and diseases, injury, and other health problems. Migrant populations are found to have less favourable outcomes in relation to perinatal and infant mortality (Weilandt et. al. 2000), injuries from accidents, and unemployment following long illness (Carr-Hill 2000).

Caution in the interpretation of data is particularly important in this field because of potentially strong self-selective processes, especially if mortality trends are analysed: migrants tend to be in good health on arrival and may decide to go back to the home-country when they are old or in poor health. General indicators which in part overcome this problem are infant and child mortality rates, less subject to that selective effect. Existing empirical evidence clearly shows that non-EU immigrant groups suffer from significantly higher infant mortality levels in several European countries. In Belgium, mortality among Turks and Moroccans in the 0-4 age group between 1993 and 1998 was 81 percent and 68 percent respectively above the corresponding levels for the population as a whole (Haug et. al. 2002).

Data on morbidity and on the causes of death are scarce. Results are sometimes contradictory and provide an unclear picture. Historically, tuberculosis (TB) and other communicable diseases such as hepatitis have been health problems associated with migration as they are prevalent in communities characterized by poor nutrition, inadequate housing conditions, low education and limited access to health care services. In Western Europe improvements in all these domains have reduced the problem of TB, but similar health benefits have not been achieved in many parts of Eastern and Central Europe. In Switzerland, significant excess mortality among the Portuguese as a result of TB has been recorded until recently. Deaths due to congenital abnormalities, cancer of the liver and the intestine, and infectious diseases, often imported from the country of origin, are also factors raising the mortality of foreign nationals in Switzerland.

On the other hand, certain dietary habits and lower tobacco and alcohol consumption account for lower mortality from particular causes among foreign nationals. In the Netherlands, infectious diseases cause excess mortality among immigrant Turks but there is a lower prevalence of cancer in that group. Evidence on cancer prevalence among migrant communities however is limited. In the UK and in the Netherlands cancer risks appear lower among most non-European migrants. In some cases, the native and host populations may have similar health profiles. In Portugal, the causes of death among foreign nationals do not differ greatly from those of the Portuguese population (Haug et. al. 2002).

Occupational health and safety is a major issue among migrants who are over-represented in low-skill, relatively high risk jobs such as construction, heavy industry, and agriculture, often without the necessary training. Reported accidents vary from one industry to another, but in general occupational accident rates in Europe are approximately twice those of native workers. In France, over 30 percent of industrial accidents resulting in permanent disabilities involve non-French workers. Similar findings are reported in Belgium and Switzerland (Council of Europe 2000).
The literature suggests that migrants are more susceptible than host populations to particular health-care problems (Carr-Hill 2000; Watters 2002; Törnell 2003). The Council of Europe (2000) has confirmed that the health problems that occur more frequently in the migrant population include communicable diseases (particularly tuberculosis and hepatitis) and respiratory diseases (which are often associated with poor nutrition, cold, overcrowding, inadequate sanitation, contaminated water supply, and underprivileged housing). The evidence suggests limited access to health care as one causal factor.

The extent of AIDS is a concern among a small number of migrant populations, though evidence is limited. In Belgium and Italy, the prevalence of AIDS among migrants is lower than among nationals. In Germany, on the other hand, AIDS is prevalent among migrants from developing counties (Council of Europe 2000).

Migrant health is a dynamic process affected by the process of settlement. While recent migrants to the UK including asylum seekers demonstrate relatively good levels of health compared to populations in their country of origin and to existing minority populations in the UK, their health declines after arrival (Johnson 2006; Fyvie et. al. 2001). While the literature warns against any generalizations on migrant health as this is a very heterogeneous group of people, it is possible to identify particular categories at risk, including refugee children and the elderly (Törnell 2003). Poor housing and the exclusion of young asylum seekers from mainstream society are among factors identified with declining health in the UK (Woodhead 2000). Nevertheless, the links between health and wider integration are not well explored.

**Mental health**

Mental health is a growing area of concern, particularly for refugees and asylum seekers who may have experienced trauma (Woodhead 2000). There is, however, a serious lack of research and monitoring in all countries on mental health in migrant groups. One common finding across the literature is a higher tendency to psychosomatic diseases among some migrants (Weilandt et. al. 2000). Stress-related symptoms, alcohol and drugs abuse are also not uncommon. In the Netherlands, data from psychiatric hospitals shows that admission rates for mental health problems among migrants tend to be much higher than for non-migrants, but vary according to ethnic background. In the UK, hospital admission rates for schizophrenia are highest among ethnic minorities and especially for people of Caribbean background (Council of Europe 2000). People of Black African and Caribbean origin are three times more likely to be admitted to a mental hospital and 44 times more likely to be detained under the Mental Health Act (Mental Health Act Commission et al 2005).

The implications of mental health service provision on migrant health have also been understudied. Most of the available services, including specialist centres, counseling, and psychotherapy, are targeted at the majority population. Little research has been done on whether racism, xenophobia, or discrimination is occurring in mental health work (Watters 2002), even though research in the UK has found that racial discrimination and harassment of minority ethnic patients is still prevalent (National Health Service 2001). Where specialist services exist, they tend to be in limited urban areas. Professionals
across Europe report serious concern over the quality and quantity of training for mental health care workers, and few mechanisms for consulting service users (Watters 2002).

**Contributory factors**
Studies have investigated the reasons why migrants have poorer mental and physical health. Reviews of the literature point to the difficulties in making such determinations. Carr-Hill (2000) finds five groups of determinants of health status: natural biological variation; health behavior; social conditions; access to health care services; and health-related social selection. Similarly, a review of the European literature concluded that:

Health varies in relation to socio-economic status, with housing, education, income, and conditions of work all affecting material living conditions, emotional well-being and behavioural patterns. Secondly, cultural factors require attention, as perceptions of health and health care, interpretations of physical and mental well-being as well as communication patterns and acceptance of treatments vary between cultures. Finally, maltreatment within the care process, such as inappropriate or discriminatory services, can adversely affect migrants’ health (Rudiger and Spencer 2003: 54).

Official reports and academic research confirm the impact of poverty; migrants’ working and housing conditions; and the restricted entitlement of some categories of migrants to health care services (Council of Europe 2000; Törnell 2003).

However, determining causality in individual cases or through data analysis for migrant groups is problematic. Research in the German state of Nordrhein-Westfalen finds health status and use of medical services vary with nationality and length of stay (Weilandt et. al. 2000). There are also difficulties in separating the biological from the social factors contributing to poor health, since the definition of what is ‘biological’ has changed over time, and the available data is inadequate and difficult to correlate. Even so, Carr-Hill (2000) suggests that social class and tenure may have less explanatory value for migrants than other populations, relative to emphasis on cultural factors.

Interactions with host populations may increase migrant health problems. Epidemiological research suggests that adoption of the host population lifestyle may result in behavior, such as smoking, which is associated with raised incidence of certain ‘diseases of affluence’ such as coronary heart disease or cancers which were previously of lower incidence among populations of migrant origin (Johnson 2006). A UK survey indicates that the majority population tends to cite lifestyle factors (smoking, stress and weight) as major risks to their health, whereas ethnic minorities attribute such risk to social factors, including crime and poor housing (Carr-Hill 2000).

Access of immigrants to mainstream services can be limited and they can experience discrimination during the health care process but this is only one factor influencing take up of services. A study in the Netherlands using insurance registers determined that immigrant groups were underrepresented in their use of specialized health care services, even when the results were adjusted for socio-economic status. Socio-economic status, in contrast, largely accounted for a higher use of general practitioner services and
prescribed drugs (Stronks et. al. 2001). German research finds pregnant migrant women less likely to access precautionary examinations and lower use of dental services by children. They are more likely to have accidents at work and less likely to access rehabilitation services – but whether through choice or barriers in access is not known. Furthermore, in Germany migrants are one fourth as likely to register as disabled; however, this may not reflect actual health status so much as the stigma attached to disability (Weilandt et. al. 2000).

UK research identifies several explanatory factors for the low take up by migrants of preventative measures such as screening and immunization, including uncertain immigration status. Lack of language support and the cost of providing it in areas where the migrant population is very diverse is an obstacle to accessing needed services (Johnson 2006). Lack of information is a further barrier. A recent study on East European migrants in Britain found a high proportion had no information about the UK health system or how to access a general practitioner when they first arrived (Spencer et. al. 2006). Lack of clarity on entitlement may also be a factor. Medical practitioners can be unclear who is entitled to which service; while those outside metropolitan areas may lack the cultural competency to provide appropriate care (Johnson 2006). Migrants themselves tend not to prioritize health care on arrival, relative to housing, security, or food and warmth (Woodhead 2000).

8.3 Health Policies
Member States are becoming increasingly aware of the need to acknowledge the particular health care needs of migrant populations. When the Council of Europe reported in 2000, many European countries still had no policy on migrant health care (Council of Europe 2000). It recommended ensuring migrants have access to information on health care; support for migrant associations in promoting health education; research on the cultural and linguistic barriers to accessing health care; and training in cultural awareness for health care providers. Health policies have also begun to be mainstreamed into policy at EU level. The Council of Europe recommended the exchange of experience and information between European states “with a view to developing a comprehensive, harmonised approach” toward the health of migrants and refugees.

Many current initiatives at the national level do focus on provision of relevant information to migrants on prevention and on accessing care, on information for health professionals and for planning services. Information is increasingly provided in migrants’ languages, with some language support for communication with health professionals. For asylum seekers, the UK has begun provision of hand-held medical records so that doctors in dispersal areas have the necessary information. Research on asylum seekers suggests that initial health assessment on arrival and language support are key factors in positive outcomes (Johnson 2006). Given the significance of behavior to health outcomes, research also indicates the importance of consulting and involving migrants in decisions on their own health care (so that the cultural context of the behavior is understood) and for policy development (Carr-Hill 2000).

A major obstacle to the improved provision of health care to migrants is the inability of states to track outcomes. Member States often lack sufficient monitoring mechanisms to
identify which health problems affect migrants more frequently, and to determine whether they have sufficient care (Rudiger and Spencer 2003), particularly in specialized fields such as mental health (Watters 2003).

9. Citizenship

The concept of citizenship as it relates to immigrants stretches from the legal status of nationality, with the formal rights and responsibilities that entails, to an individual’s broader engagement in civic and civil society (addressed, at a practical level, in section 10), and to issues of identity and belonging (addressed in section 11). We focus here on the broad texts which address these issues as a whole, and on citizenship as nationality.

9.1 The Literature

The literature thus ranges from legal and political science texts on citizenship as nationality status (Aleinikoff and Klusmeyer 2001), including texts comparing the historical significance and the rights attached to nationality across Europe (Weil 2001) to broader issues of identity and belonging (Aleinikoff and Klusmeyer 2002; Hansen and Weil 2002; Westin 2003). Much literature on citizenship is theoretical, including exploration of identity and participation in liberal democratic societies (Dahlstedt 2005).

Texts consider the evolving linkage between migration, citizenship and identity. Because migrants acquire multiple and cross-national cultural identities and responsibilities as they spend parts of their lives in different countries (Bader 2001), migration is perceived to challenge the single allegiance, loyalty and set of responsibilities that a single nationality status confers. Migration is thus posited as one among many challenges to citizenship as the dominant relationship between individuals and the state (Crouch et. al. 2001).

The fact that migrants not only have fewer rights than citizens, but often do not experience equal rights in practice even when they are provided in law, further undermines the citizenship ideal and unity it should confer. Citizenship rights, it is argued, could be extended to migrants and guaranteed in practice in order to overcome this inequity (Castles 2000). Women in particular can have less robust formal citizenship rights than those enjoyed by men (for instance, if not able to pass citizenship status to their children) and in practice the rights they hold may be illusory. Women’s residence rights are also often less secure than those of male migrants (Kofman et. al. 2000).

Recent writing, drawing on Soysal (1994), has urged the decoupling of citizenship from its traditional relationship with the nation state to an internationalist and multi layered global governance where rights are guaranteed at different levels from local through national to international bodies (Kofman 2000; Westin 2003). Some (Faist 2000; Bader 2001) also suggest the development of ‘transnational citizenship,’ a multi-network form of citizenship that extends beyond legal status altogether; societal membership instead is delineated by cultural and social connections.

Empirical work explores the significance of nationality status for migrants and host societies, including dual nationality and access to social and political rights (Aleinikoff and
Klusmeyer 2002) and the legal and emotional challenges posed by naturalization and its role in the integration process. Acquisition of citizenship is found to be one key factor in determining whether the children of immigrants integrate into the host society or return to their parents’ country of origin (Richard 2004).

**Citizenship in the integration process**

Three key debates in the theoretical and empirical literature on citizenship are whether it is a finite end goal or an ongoing process, its effect on the development of collective identity and its relationship to the concepts and experience of separation and difference.

Acquiring nationality status is sometimes seen as the end goal of the integration process; in other words, the migrant has achieved equal rights with the native born. Bauböck (n.d.) distinguishes between ‘citizenship’ and ‘nationality’ as the internal and external aspects of the end goal of societal membership. “Nationality refers to the international and external aspects of the relation between an individual and a sovereign state, whereas citizenship pertains to the internal aspects of this relation that are regulated by domestic law.” Elsewhere, nationality status is seen as (and empirically found to be) one means towards accelerating the integration process rather than an end in itself (Münz 2004). There is, however, no simple causality. On the one hand, naturalization may help migrants gain access to certain segments of the labour market and reduce discrimination. On the other hand it is evident that successful economic integration of immigrants makes it more likely that they become citizens of the receiving country. In European polities it is citizenship and not residence that warrants full political and civic rights.

Citizenship is also significant as a collective social identity, defining the individual’s relationship with the state. Greater symbolic importance is now being attached to naturalisation as a means to strengthen the migrants’ identification with the country. No alternative identity, some argue, should interfere in that relationship. But the implications of changing nationality become apparent when an individual migrates to another State and faces the option of becoming naturalized there. That process is not a formality; it is psychologically and emotionally complex because of its association to the individual's identity (Westin 2003). Forcing migrants to choose between their original nationality and that of their host country rather than allowing dual nationality has proved an obstacle to integration (Özdemir et. al. 2004).

The literature also demonstrates how the debate on citizenship parallels the controversy over assimilation versus multiculturalism. Brubaker (2001) uses past debate over German citizenship policy to demonstrate the persistence of notions of separation and difference as exclusionary forces, and the rehabilitation of assimilation as a progressive concept. He suggests that, until recently, the left in Germany argued for the extension of political rights to migrants rather than liberalising access to citizenship, which in essence would have provided the substantive rights of citizenship to migrants without questioning their ‘otherness’. Against this institutionalised separateness, which is also seen in the separate provision of social services to migrants, the relaxation of naturalisation rules in the 1990s can be interpreted as an ‘assimilationist turn’ in the sense that it encourages migrants to become more similar, emphasising commonality, not difference. At the same time, the post-Cold War liberalisation of labour market migration, at least until the
September 11 terrorist attacks, “led to gradual changes of conceptions of nationhood and the acceptance or even endorsement of the multicultural nature of most western post-war societies” (Bauböck n.d.). Calls for the de-ethnicization of citizenship policies accompanied such liberal multiculturalism (Hansen and Weil 2001; Joppke 2004).

In addition to debate on the nature of citizenship, there has been substantial discussion on how citizenship should be acquired. Historical analysis shows the evolution of *jus soli* (citizenship according to place of birth) and *jus sanguinis* (according to bloodline) in different European countries to be less immutable national models than often assumed, with France for instance combining both traditions over the centuries in response to changing political, economic and demographic conditions (Weil 2002).

### 9.2 Citizenship outcomes and causal processes

A literature review on naturalisation highlights four sources of data: citizenship and naturalization data; census data; population registers; and population surveys (Bauböck n.d.). However, because states differ, as we have seen, in the criteria they use to monitor the migrant population (see earlier discussion on collecting data by foreign born versus foreign nationals), cross-national comparisons are often difficult to draw even when robust data exists. Nevertheless it is clear that naturalization in many EU 15 countries significantly increased during the 1990s and the beginning of the 21st century, leaving foreign nationals less representative of the migrant population. In 2002, over 600,000 foreigners were naturalised in the EU (OECD 2005). The sharpest increases were found in Spain and the United Kingdom.

Naturalisation rates relate the number of naturalisations to the stock of potential applicants - people of foreign nationality at the beginning of the period. These rates make it possible to compare the relevant rates of naturalisation in different countries and to monitor the trends in naturalisations over time. In 2002, they varied from less than 1 percent in Luxembourg, Italy and Portugal to 8 percent in Sweden (OECD 2005). Other northern and western EU-countries have naturalisation rates above 5 percent: the Netherlands 6.6 percent, a fall from 9.4 percent in 1999; Denmark 6.5 percent; Belgium 5.5 percent; while Germany has a much lower share of the foreign population acquiring citizenship (2.1 percent), with France at 4.5 percent and the UK at 4.6 percent. The number of naturalisations in CEE countries was relatively high in the first half of the 1990s with over 12,000 persons naturalised each year, most of whom were returning co-ethnics who have lived in other countries for long periods of time (OECD 2005). Since 2000 the number of naturalisations each year has declined.

While we thus have data on naturalization rates in member states, trends in according citizenship or residence rights and their effects on integration are far more complex. There is a developing discourse for example around the trend for individuals to retain

---

7 However, cross country comparison is hindered by different national legislations and particularly by the fact that a number of EU countries have policies of preferential access to citizenship for persons who are considered ethnic or linguistic relatives (e.g. Germany with Aussiedler, Greece with Pontian Greeks, Portugal with PALOP nationals, etc.). Comparison over time is particularly difficult because some countries amended their legislation to facilitate the acquisition of nationality (e.g. Germany and Luxembourg), whilst others imposed new requirements, in particular with regard to the command of the language and integration.
dual or multiple nationalities and its implications for integration (Hansen and Weil 2002). Ten of the fifteen EU countries studied by Marc Howard (2005) permit dual nationality, some based on ethnic grounds. However, while evidence exists for example that Argentines have used ethnic claims to Italian and Spanish citizenship to migrate legally to Europe, a major problem with data on citizenship and naturalization is that it is difficult to determine the number of dual nationals that exist and how they have claimed such nationality (Gilbertson 2006). Thus, it is difficult to predict what implications dual citizenship might have for the integration process.

Moreover, what the data does not reveal is the reasons why migrants choose, or choose not, to naturalize; the characteristics of those migrants who do, or the effect it has on their future. Once it is acknowledged that citizenship in a globalized world does not automatically translate into integration outcomes, the use of naturalisation as an integration indicator has more limited value, in isolation, than might once have been assumed.

9.3 Citizenship policies
A comparison of the nationality laws in twenty five (largely European) states finds acquisition of nationality is determined by differing combinations of birthplace (*jus soli*), bloodline (*jus sanguinis*, the nationality of a parent or more distant ancestor), marriage, and past, present or future residence within the country. Providing historical background to the development of contrasting traditions on access to citizenship and to residence rights for foreigners, the study contests the assumption that countries which currently have a *jus soli* approach are more inclusive. It finds that, in countries with stable borders, democracy and self perception as countries of immigration, restrictions on access to citizenship for the second generation of foreign residents that impeded integration have progressively been overturned. Contrary to earlier analyses, it finds no causal link between national identity and nationality laws (Weil 2001).

Most theories on the way in which citizenship policies are constructed rely on interpretations of the historical context of the state concerned (Favell 2001). Hansen and Weil (2001) argue that states restrict access to citizenship when immigration rises, and when immigration policy is politicized in the context of party competition. The liberalization of such policies only occurs when the immigrant population has stabilized and settled in the state over a long time and the issue is no longer high on the party political agenda.

One notable trend in modern citizenship policies is to institute mandatory citizenship tests (Carrera 2006), a practice already established in North America. Naturalisation eligibility rules now frequently require applicants to demonstrate a level of language ability and knowledge of the host society. Since 2003 the Netherlands has for instance required a four-hour test on Dutch language and knowledge of the country (de Groot 2006), and the United Kingdom instituted its own test in 2005. Tests have even been proposed to target particular populations: the state of Baden-Württemberg has designed a two-hour oral exam, taken on top of the generic citizenship test, to gauge the loyalty of Muslim migrants to Germany, with questions on bigamy, homosexuality, and domestic violence (Connolly 2005). The effects of these eligibility requirements have yet to be evaluated.
Citizenship policy has increasingly been influenced by security concerns in the wake of the September 11, 2001 and subsequent terrorist attacks (Brouwer, Catz and Guild 2003). Consequently, recent legislation in a number of states has made it easier for states to withdraw citizenship and expedite deportation proceedings. The initiation of citizenship ceremonies and emphasis on demonstrations of loyalty also demonstrate the securitization of citizenship policy. Such policies may alienate some of the migrants they target (Hampshire and Saggar 2006).

A major comparative study of citizenship policies in liberal democratic states conducted by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, to which some of the authors we have cited contributed, concluded with a set of detailed recommendations on access to citizenship, managing dual nationality, political rights for settled foreign residents and citizens and access of non citizens to social welfare and employment (Aleinkoff and Klusmeyer 2002).

10. Civil and political participation

Whether citizens or not, the active engagement of migrants in civil and political life has significance for both the individual and the community. It can provide the migrant with a sense of belonging and commitment to the society, and, by strengthening bonds with non-migrants, contribute to developing social capital and cohesion. Participation also provides a means for migrants to express their needs to government or employers and thus serves as a method of communication not available through the ballot box.

10.1 The Literature

A strong theme in the literature is the lack of mainstream channels for non-citizens to participate in liberal democracies and the potential for governmental and voluntary sector organizations, including consultative bodies and migrant-led organizations, to serve as viable alternatives. There is overlap in the literature on the rights and responsibilities of citizenship (section above) and on wider forms of civic engagement. Penninx et al (2004: 7), from a study of 17 cities in 10 European countries and Israel, use the concept of ‘local-level citizenship’ for migrants who, lacking national citizenship, are active at the local level. Local citizenship may be granted, top down, by municipal authorities through the creation of opportunities for participation, or acquired through collective action by migrants themselves. Empirically the study investigated the opportunity structures through which migrants mobilize, individually and collectively, to exert influence.

Studies analyse forms of democracy that accommodate, or do not accommodate, ethnic participation. They include analysis of vertical relationships between migrants and political elites and horizontal relationships between individuals and migrant organisations in networks. Texts question whether the notion of a politically homogenous democratic system is compatible with the needs and interests of an ethnically heterogeneous population (Dahlstedt 2005).
Studies on the mechanics of political participation describe how the participation process works (Vermeulen 2005; de Wenden and Leveau 2001), or explain its successes and limitations – including the ways in which migrants can be marginalized from the mainstream (Bousetta 2001; Fennema and Tillie 2001; Garbaye 2005). There are a number of texts on the granting of voting rights (Purdam et. al. 2002; Dahlstedt 2005; Michon and Tillie 2003), though many studies do not differentiate between migrants and ethnic minorities or between the first and subsequent migrant generations.

Empirical works compare levels and modes of participation of one group in different countries, such as Moroccans in France, Belgium and the Netherlands (Bousetta 2001). Research explores the reasons for political mobilization and the influence of differing structures and opportunities in host countries. Some focus on benefits to individuals, others on the impact of mobilization at a structural level. Studies on migrant organizations have engaged in the debate as to whether such organizations are positive or negative for the integration process (Bericht der Beauftragten 2002; Laurence 2005; Terrel 2005). Several of the studies have identified reasons why some migrant organizations have not had success in engaging in local decision-making processes (Caponio 2005; Diehl 2002).

Surveys have explored the relationship between levels of socio economic and ethnic diversity in an area and levels of participation (Home Office 2005b). Examples of good practice are provided in relation to consultative fora and to capacity building with individuals (Adams and Lutaaya 2005). However, there is little convergence on best practices and few useful overviews or cross-country studies exist to determine whether the findings in one Member State are reflected in others.

Many works identified as having interesting results are unpublished graduate theses. This may indicate that there is a growing academic trend for the study of this subject.

10.2 Participation outcomes and causal factors
Participation can occur through formal channels (voting rights; union membership) or more informal channels (volunteering; migrant community organizations) and may relate to local, national or international issues. This mode of integration, as others, is a two way process requiring not only motivation by migrants but also opportunities for engagement provided by the host society. Some but not all of the indexes used to measure integration include measures of the frequency of participation in the democratic process (particularly formal voting) and in civic society (Entzinger and Biezeveld 2002; Castles et. al. 2002). The European Civic Citizenship and Inclusion Index, however, which includes five sets of indicators (labour market participation, residency status, family reunification, naturalization, and antidiscrimination), does not address the political participation of migrants (Citron and Gowan 2005).

Migrant Rights and Voting
Despite the advantages of migrant participation, European Member States have structures which make it difficult for them to engage formally unless they become citizens. Most countries allow immigrants to become active in the political field through political parties and other societies and organizations. However, only six countries (Denmark, Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands, and Sweden and the UK) allow some non-
EU nationals to participate in local elections or stand for office after a certain period of residency (Sierra and Patel 2001).

Many ethnic minorities across the EU entitled to vote are nevertheless less likely to do so than the majority population, although some are more likely to participate than others (Fennema and Tillie 2001; Sierra and Patel 2001; Purdam and Fieldhouse 2002; Dahlstedt 2005). Polls in Germany reveal that migrant groups show a lower propensity to vote (63 percent to 83 percent, depending on the community) than native Germans (87 percent). In the UK, Asians are more likely to participate in elections than black people (Cyrus et. al. 2005). However, analysis of electoral data in France has found migrants entitled to vote are as likely to do so as white French citizens and more so in districts where the far right receives support (Richard 2004).

Reasons frequently cited for lack of voting are that migrants do not feel that they can be adequately represented by the political candidates or policies upon which they are expected to vote, that the news media or popular culture alienates them from politics, or that they consider themselves to be altogether distant from the host country’s politics (Dahlstedt 2005; Bericht der Beauftragten 2002). Women are less likely to vote than men as a result of patriarchal control, a lack of party support for women leaders, and the reluctance of women to face intense conflicts of loyalty (Kofman et. al. 2000).

Where members of ethnic minorities do vote, as in Belgium where voting is compulsory, they do not necessarily vote for ethnic candidates. In the UK, these voters tend to support Labour and geographic concentrations of ethnic minority voters can have an impact on election outcomes (Martiniello 2000).

**Participation in Mainstream Political Systems**

The extent to which migrants can gain access to mainstream channels of participation is a key factor determining forms of political mobilisation, demonstrating again that the outcome of the integration process depends not only on migrants but on the opportunities provided by the host society. Channels of communication with migrant associations, funding for them, consultation and local election franchise are options used by political establishments to increase levels of engagement (Bousetta 2000).

Migrants’ lack of access to participation in formal democratic structures may be one reason that they have often turned to migrant or ethnic-specific organizations to exercise their voice. However, this theory is contradicted in part by the fact that those with voting rights do not, as we have noted, always choose to participate (Dahlstedt 2005). Furthermore, frustration at lack of progress through ethnic mobilization can, over time, lead to greater engagement in mainstream political structures and to a focus on realizable political goals (De Wenden and Leveau 2001).

Outside electoral politics, the access which migrants have to participatory structures – including political parties and constituent services – is often shaped by localized factors. Garbaye finds that national level politics and ethnic group attributes are less significant for understanding local ethnic politics than the specific local contexts or the operation of national rules at the local level. Birmingham is more open to migrant participation than
French cities in part, for instance, because the single member constituencies allow MPs to claim a direct mandate from ethnic constituents. But the differing dynamic of politics at the local level also resulted in very differing levels and models of participation in two French cities studied (Garbaye 2005). Particular outcomes may also be tied to migrant group characteristics. A study of Moroccans in four European cities found levels and modes of participation can be similar for one migrant group in different countries despite differing institutional structures. By revealing common barriers to migrant participation in mainstream structures, the study challenged the assumption that states such as the Netherlands are more open to participation (Bousetta 2001).

Group identity may not only be a barrier to participation, but may also facilitate it in some cases. Migrants, as has been the case for North Africans in Lille, can find themselves unwelcome in mainstream political parties (Garbaye 2004). One possible way to gain acceptance in circumstances of exclusion is to identify oneself with (an often homogenized version of) a known and trusted group. Swedish research, for instance, found migrants met suspicion and discrimination; to win acceptance, they had to accept an ethnic identification. As a consequence, one immigrant could find him or herself assumed to represent a large and disparate immigration population (Dahlstedt 2005). Members of ethnic minorities engaging in mainstream politics may mobilise around an ethnic identity but equally be influenced by other forms of identity, including religion, gender, and locality. Minority politicians in Birmingham, UK, were found to use racial discourse as a weapon against rivals while nevertheless motivated by more complex political identities (Solomos and Back 2000).

Group identity also may have some implications for the ways in which migrants participate in society, though perhaps less than might be expected. A government survey in the UK with a booster sample of 4,571 people from ethnic minorities, mirroring the findings of the Cyrus study, found that people who follow a religion were significantly more likely to volunteer, while those who were Muslims were also significantly more likely to participate in civic activities (Home Office 2005). However, it found no statistically significant relationship between ethnic diversity in an area and levels of civic participation (such as signing a petition, contacting a local elected representative or MP, or attending a public meeting or rally); nor with formal volunteering (giving unpaid help through groups, clubs or organisations to benefit other people).

**Participation in Mainstream Civil Society**

Participation in mainstream society organisations is generally low compared to the majority of the population in all European countries. Among the national institutions in which immigrants are engaged, trade unions are the most common. In Germany, about 10 percent of the 7 million union members are immigrants. In younger age groups, foreign nationals are even overrepresented compared to the German peer group. However, membership rates are decreasing: among Turks: the proportion of workers who are members of a trade union decreased from 51.4 percent in 1985 to 26.8 percent in 2001 (Cyrus et. al. 2005). In other countries, union membership is often below that of nationals, in part because of the cost of membership but also lack of trust. Women are less likely to participate than men in part because they are more likely to work in the informal sector, and because unions tend to be dominated by men. However, some
domestic workers have organised themselves successfully (Kofman et. al. 2000). Low participation is also found in other mainstream organisations.

Official consultative fora
When migrants do not have access to mainstream mechanisms for participation, opportunities for migrant or minority consultation and participation may be provided by government, ranging from seats on advisory councils to entirely separate bodies. Most countries have advisory bodies to guide the participatory process, but none of these bodies have true decision-making competence (Urth 2005). Fora targeted solely at migrant issues are sometimes perceived as ineffective and may have the adverse effect of compartmentalizing migrant participation, preventing their participation in broader aspects of society (Veredas Muñoz 2001). Some writers argue that such bodies have not been established to represent migrants so much as to marginalize them. A study of Moroccans in France, Belgium, and the Netherlands concluded that ethnic minorities had been filtered into marginal spheres of political activity via ‘migrant’ ‘minority’ or ‘religious’ councils established to contain their interests outside normal politics (Bousetta 2001).

European Commission reports on national practices nevertheless concluded that carefully developed consultation arrangements, particularly those with flexible structures that encourage a variety of mechanisms for participation, can assist in engaging the migrant population (Urth 2005).

Migrant Organisations
Marginalisation from mainstream society may lead migrants to work together in independent organizations in which members identify themselves through their common ethnicity, religion, or migration status. On the other hand, Fennema and Tillie (2004) found that local opportunity structures – and particularly government attitudes toward ethnic group initiatives – had direct implications for the level of involvement of ethnic minority organizations in local issues in Zurich, Liege, and Amsterdam. In Zurich the lack of group-focused politics inhibited the formation and influence of minority organizations. An overview of integration in Italy highlights the growing relevance of migrants’ associations (Commissione per le Politiche di Integrazione Degli Immigrati 2001). They serve a number of functions including provision of services to members and giving them a collective and sometimes influential voice with political elites. For the individual they provide status, identity, connections, and information (Fennema and Tillie 2001; Vermeulen 2005). A study in Mannheim of Turkish migrants explains the persistence of ethnic organisations in terms of the gains for migrants in social capital, service benefits, social status and affirmation of identity (Diehl 2002). A study of Moroccan communities in three European cities finds Islam likely to prove an identity option for mobilisation in the long term whereas the attachment to secularist left wing movements in the 1970s and 1980s proved a short term attraction (Bousetta 2000).

A Europe wide study of patterns of participation and their explanatory factors found migrants in France, Belgium and the Netherlands those most likely to mobilise around international political issues, such as demonstrations against the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, or against the war in Iraq. Migrants in France also engage more frequently in
cultural associations. The study found that religion is, however, the most frequently cited field of civic activities in which migrants in the Netherlands and Black and Asian people in the UK are engaged. In most EU host-countries the most active in faith groups are Muslims (Cyrus et. al. 2005).

Migrant organisations can be influential players in a plural democratic process at the local and national level, and potentially lead to better integration outcomes. A comparative study of migrant community activism in Amsterdam found that Turks were the most well integrated minority community in terms of political participation on a range of indicators from voting frequency to trust in the political system. It was also the community with the greatest number of interlocking organisations providing support to community members. The study found that the migrant communities that are best equipped to provide for the collective good of their members through voluntary associations are also best prepared to engage and be influential with local government. Such groups need not necessarily share a language with the host population (Fennema and Tillie 2001). Furthermore, migrant led organizations may be effective mediators with government authorities even where they are not formally recognized by public authorities. Despite formal French policy ignoring cultural and ethnic difference, local government in France does indeed create mediation channels, engaging with ethnic minorities in policy configurations for urban and social regeneration (Moore 2004).

Fennema and Tillie’s findings show that migrants can participate in wider civic society through migrant organisations. Yet there remains a concern that some associations, rather than building bridges between migrants and wider society, may create barriers to broader participation. Similar to consultative fora, such organizations may ‘filter’ migrants out of mainstream politics into marginal spheres of political activity (Moore 2004). Host countries can also fear that such organisations may advance potentially disruptive political interests. Evidence does suggest that organizations may adopt more radical identities in an effort to gain greater recognition and influence (de Wenden and Leveau 2001). Successful leaders also need to have a high profile to attract funds, so that the most radical voices receive most attention and most funds (Vermeulen 2005).

Research suggests, however, that many migrant organizations are poorly organised and are either marginalized in local decision-making processes, as found in a study in three Italian cities (Caponio 2005) or not designed to participate in them at all (Diehl 2002). Migrant associations can represent a complex and fragmented universe with diverse nationalities, cultural traditions and migration trajectories which make it difficult for truly representative organisations to emerge (Caponio 2005). The male domination in some groups can be reinforced by strong migrant associations, in some cases bolstered by state funding, to the exclusion of women. Similarly, a faith-based organisation may claim to represent a broader section of the migrant community, or to represent it on political issues, than does in fact identify with the organisation’s point of view (Laurence 2005).

Migrant led organisations may work with non migrant-led pro-immigrant associations. The local situation, institutional context, and relationship between actors all affect the way such organizations communicate and engage in decision-making activities (Marques and Santos 2004). Where non-migrant led groups are better organised or resourced or have
greater legitimacy in the eyes of the state, they may out-compete the migrant led organisations for resources and attention, regardless of the political orientation of the party in power (Caponio 2005). Poor accountability for funds can, as in other funding relationships, allow opportunities for corruption and for competition between organizations. These factors may in turn lead to less availability of funds.

**Individual members**
Research across EU states finds that the extent of migrant participation in migrant organisations or in mainstream civil society depends on a number of factors, including: the structures and opportunities open to them at the local level (including resources allocated to them); the migrants’ residence status; their position in their own community; their culture; homeland politics (for instance if opposition organisations are banned); and gender (Vermeulen 2005; Garbaye 2005; Kofman et. al. 2000).

Migrant and ethnic minority led organisations can contribute directly to building capacity in individuals to engage with decision makers. An evaluation of a UK initiative for women identified the need to remove barriers to engagement (e.g. child care and literacy), to facilitate contact between the women and policy makers and politicians, to enable them to identify their own learning and development needs, to provide first hand experience of how civic society works so that participants can become self-advocates rather than having to rely on ‘filter’ organisations, and to incorporate a variety of learning methods (e.g. trips, speakers, practice sessions to build confidence) (Adams and Lutaaya 2005).

The level and field of active civic participation of migrants differs according to the ethnic group considered. Turks are the most active in civic participation in Germany and the Netherlands. In the UK, Black people are less active in voting than other groups but engage more in campaigns on justice and human rights issues. Black women are most likely to be active in formal civic participation, whilst Asian women are least represented in any activity. In France and Belgium people of Arab origin are more likely to be active in political parties. African groups are particularly active in France, but their civic activities are directed towards their country of origin (Cyrus et. al. 2005).

**10.3 Participation Policies**
Both migrants and host societies can have reservations about migrant participation: effectively leaving a ‘reserved political space’ for nationals. Solutions should therefore not only be sought in changing immigrants’ behavior but in the dismantling the barriers that they face (Dahlstedt 2005).

In particular, government encouragement for minority organizations to participate at a political level, including funding and opportunities, can impact on their effectiveness (Vermeulen 2005; Rudiger and Spencer 2003). Mahnig (2004) suggests immigration policies providing immigrant rights often develop in closed-door negotiations between civil servants and the judiciary with immigrants themselves rarely having the influence to get relevant issues onto the political agenda. Government support for dialogue with migrants can enable them to participate in the planning, delivery and evaluation of the services they receive, can foster understanding, and can motivate migrant organisations to build bridges between migrants and long term residents. Evaluation of a Scottish Executive
initiative suggested that providing funds for training could enable migrants to speak
directly to the media and address imbalance and misconceptions in public debate
(Daghlian 2005). France’s decision to allow funding of associations of foreigners in 1981
led to a significant increase in ethnic mobilisation (De Wenden and Leveau 2001).

However, decisions to lend support to such organizations must be taken cautiously and
with a mind to potential adverse implications. Studies on government support for a
representative body for French Muslims found that tensions may develop if an
organization is endorsed publicly as the political representative of an ethnic or faith
community but is not accepted by increasingly diverse members of that group (Laurence
2005; Terrel 2005).

Official government literature also suggests several ways to make the development of
migrant organizations beneficial to broader societal integration. Better communication
between migrant, religious, and ethnic organizations and their wider local communities
can prevent the community isolation or segregation for which such organizations have
often been criticized (Urth 2005). Furthermore, the development of intercultural
competence – including the recruitment and training of employees from various cultures
and cooperation between mainstream and specialist organizations – may help enhance
migrant access to services and willingness to participate (Commission of the European
Union DG JFS 2004).

11. Cultural Integration

11.1 The literature
The process of cultural integration involves changes in migrants’ attitudes, identity and
behavior but also in those of the host society: the impact of migrants on the arts, cuisine,
music and fashion being well known examples. The literature, however, focuses near
exclusively on the extent and ways in which migrants’ attitudes and behavior approximate
to the host society (or sections of it), and on that process of change over time.

Theoretical literature engages in large part in the debate on whether assimilation or
pluralist attitudes towards culture more effectively encourage integration (Parekh 2000;
Colombo and Sciortino 2004; Favell and Modood 2002; Rex 2000; Burda 2001). The
relationship between race relations, discrimination, and cultural integration is also
addressed (Bleich 2003; Chapman and Frader 2004; Anwar et. al. 2000).

Both the literature on outcomes and that on policy tend to focus on particular units of
culture – including ethnic, racial, religious, and gender groups – and their experiences.
Studies compare the experience of single or different cultural groups in one society (Uunk
2003; Ouis and Roald 2003). With the exception of growing attention to the Muslim
experience in Europe (Cesari 2000; Hunter 2002), cross-locality or cross-country studies
are rare. Part of the problem with drawing comparisons may result from the way such
issues are approached: the UK literature, for example, focuses heavily on race relations,
while that from France and the Netherlands is more interested in outcomes for religious
groups, particularly Muslims. Thus, while the same individuals may be under discussion, the way they are grouped in the literature precludes direct comparisons.

Literature on cultural integration outcomes and indicators is sparse, in part because such outcomes are notably difficult to measure. More frequently, the integration of particular cultural groups are measured and compared according to socio-economic or political indicators, such as educational attainment or participation rates (Giraud 2004; Vermeulen 2005; Lindo 2000). Cultural integration issues are often also fused with social indicators (Castles et. al. 2002), as segregation in housing and incidents of racial prejudice are more easily quantifiable than measures of cultural acquisition. The fact that cultures are malleable and not statically constructed further complicates efforts to quantify cultural integration. Nevertheless, some indicators do exist, including the “accommodation of religious needs of members of religious minorities” (Rudiger and Spencer 2003) and rates of intermarriage (Banton 2001).

Cultural integration is as difficult to promote as to measure; while many other integration policies, including health, education, housing, and employment, may affect levels of cultural integration, it is less common to find policies which encourage cultural integration more directly. The key debate in cultural integration policies involves the nature of cultural diversity, and whether it functions as an aid or as a barrier to cohesive societies. Migrants’ sense of identity is also politically relevant: whether they identify with other migrants in efforts to gain recognition and rights for instance, or share a collective social identity with the host population (Westin 2003).

11.2 Cultural Integration Processes, Outcomes and Causal factors

Migration and the reception migrants receive foster a cultural trajectory different from the culture of the migrants in their home country (Boos-Nunning and Karakaşoğlu 2005; Özdemir et. al. 2004). Migrants have to navigate the competing expectations of their community, their host country, and their own aspirations. This is particularly evident for women. North African women in France can struggle to forge their own identity in the face of ‘patriarchal Maghrebian men and patronising white men’ (Souilamas 2000).

There is great diversity between and within migrant groups. Migrants who appear the most different may in fact be more integrated than those whose appearance resembles those in the host country. Maghrebian features are easily identified as ‘outsiders’ in France and yet many individuals have grown up in France and are more familiar with French culture than they are with the culture in the Maghreb (Souilamas 2000).

Four key themes have emerged in the literature during the period under study: the role of migrant cultural practices; the integration of Muslim immigrants; trends in family relationships and intermarriage; and the importance of transnational cultures to all these factors. Factors which may impede cultural integration – public hostility towards migrants and discrimination– were discussed above in Section 5.

**Migrant Cultural Practices**
Among migrants and among host populations values, attitudes and cultural practices differ. Ethnicity and faith but also class, region, age and gender influence the rituals, customs, attitudes, and norms which are considered to be culturally appropriate for members of different groups. Vertovec and Wessendorf (2004) suggest that, while societies over generations have accommodated migrants’ differing cultural practices to varying degrees, public opinion continues to reflect the presumption that host societies are based on monocultural norms which differ from those of migrant communities. Cultural practices among migrants which have particularly concerned policy-makers include polygamy, talaq (a method of Islamic divorce), arranged marriage, modes of dress, female genital mutilization, and the ritual slaughter of animals. In France and elsewhere, however, the wearing of Muslim headscarfs has itself prompted considerable discussion and debate (Favell 2001; Freedman 2004). The issue is whether retaining religious modes of dress is an impediment to integration, particularly in a society committed to to secularism in public life (Stasi 2003).

Research has challenged the supposition that the values and practices of most migrants deviate significantly from those of the host population. Research findings in the Netherlands (Hagendoorn et. al. 2003) and a study of women and girls in five migrant communities in Germany (Boos-Nunning and Karakaşoğlu 2005) for instance suggest that neither parenting practices nor the oppression of women differ markedly from practices found within sections of the host society.

Ireland, in his study of integration processes in Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium also finds that the evidence contradicts widely held cultural explanations for integration outcomes. Just as cultural practices change, so ethnic identity should not be seen as a given, he argues, but as a ‘dynamic, elastic entity’. It is created and defined in part by the institutions and politics of the host society – opportunities for representation and funding for instance - which enhance the political relevance of cultural identity. Groups with similar ethnic characteristics achieve different outcomes in education, the labour market and politics; and while two ethnic groups can be in conflict in one city they can peacefully coexist in another (Ireland 2004).

**Religion and Integration: Outcomes for Muslims**

Increased attention to Muslim migrants in Europe highlights the relevance of religion as a factor in cultural integration. A study of Muslims in European cities notes the rise in the religio-cultural dimension in integration since the 1970s. While religious affiliations are ascribed to individuals, in practice they are subject to reconstruction by individuals, collectives and institutions so that what it means in practice to be a Muslim evolves. Religion impacts on the individual in two ways: by exerting external control through its rules and requirements (often embedded in ethnic or cultural norms rather than the religion itself); and by separating out all who share its beliefs in the perception of others. European Islam is an emerging diaspora, but can nevertheless be an instrument of integration. Initially membership of the diaspora may reinforce the continuing link with the country of origin but this tie weakens over time (Cesari 2000).

Islam plays a key role for European Muslims, both as a mechanism for ideological development and as an organizing mechanism around which diverse individuals can rally
It is argued that there can be a tension between the values held by some individuals and the concept of 'Western' or 'European' Islam advocated by others. Efforts by governments to promote the latter may only reinforce traditional views (Höfert and Salvatore 2000). While some believe that Islam is essentially undemocratic and is in conflict with the secularity of liberal democracies, this view is increasingly contested (Buijs and Rath 2003). There is also no agreement in the literature on whether the development of faith-based institutions is a necessary precursor to integration processes, or a barrier to them (Penninx and Schroever 2002; Tibi 2002).

The literature cautions against grouping Muslims together as a single homogenous unit. Studies on Muslim migrants find significant diversity, plural views and identities in flux, including research in Italy (Commissione per le Politiche di Integrazione Degli Immigrati 2001), in France (Wieviorka 2002) and in the Netherlands (Phalet et. al. 2000). A series of country based studies across the EU suggests that, since the 1970s, three trajectories have developed: some Muslims are fully integrated, some are reverting to Islam to find an identity and some want both a European and a Muslim identity (Hunter 2002).

Wieviorka, in a study on Islam in France, argues that Islam must be understood as a religion which comes with migrants but also is reproduced and produced by them. Thus the form of Islam with which young French Muslims identify, for instance, may not be the same as that of their parents or preceding generations. He identifies four different forms of Islam in France: the traditional Islam of older people, ritualized and apolitical; the institutionalized form represented by the Paris Mosque, apolitical but Republican in spirit; the Islam of the peripheral suburbs, the outcome of a lack of social integration among young people of immigrant origin; and a political form, based on anti-Westernism – rigid, anti-democratic and radical. He concludes that these various forms have more to do with issues in French society than with issues in countries of origin. Thus a proper analysis of Islam in Europe must take the host society and the way it deals with Islamic populations into account, as well as an understanding of the individuals who have chosen a particular form of Islam and the meaning such a choice conveys (Wieviorka 2002: 133).

In the wake of September 11 and subsequent terrorist attacks, it has been suggested that poorly integrated European Muslims may prove vulnerable to terrorist recruitment (Leiken 2005). Despite such concerns, the overall trend for Muslim youth across Europe is not towards radicalisation (Hunter 2002). Wieviorka finds that Islam in France is largely practiced by people who are anxious to integrate, and that the criminal behavior engaged in by some people of immigrant origin has more to do with their being socially marginal and living in destructured environments and families with no strong community attachments (2002:143). Ansari, in a study of young Muslims in Britain, found the ‘overwhelming view’ was that the events of 9/11 and other terrorist acts were wrong; but that attempts to explain the political roots of the violence had created a public impression of at least ambivalence towards it. The study found that those professing religious beliefs were not very theological and had conflicting understandings of the Qur’an. Muslim suffering in other parts of the world was deeply felt and, together with current individual and collective experiences (rather than prescriptions from the past), influences attitudes. 9/11 and subsequent events had increased distrust of Muslims and Muslims’ distrust of media interpretation of world events (Ansari 2005).
Young Muslims may identify strongly with Islam but nevertheless retain strongly individualistic views, for instance for or against women wearing headscarves. Forty percent of youths in a large study of Muslims and Dutch youth in Rotterdam identified some tension between Islam and Western values but fundamentalism and adherence to far right ideologies were low (5 percent) among all groups. While second generation Muslims identified less with their parents’ country of origin they did not identify with the Netherlands but instead with the city of Rotterdam (Phalet et. al. 2000). A study of migrants in Frankfurt similarly found low identification with Germany but a high degree of local identification with the city (Straßburger 2001).

There are some indications that improved education and socio-economic outcomes decrease the likelihood of alienation. Dutch research finds education to be the most influential factor in ‘modernising’ attitudes (Uunk 2003), a study which confirmed the findings of the earlier Rotterdam study that more highly educated Turkish and Moroccan women are at the vanguard in bridging the gap between their parents’ values and those of their multi-cultural social surroundings (Phalet et al 2000). Increased contact between cultures may also contribute to the ‘Westernization’ of Muslim values. A study in Sweden which drew heavily on the views of Muslim women found that the coming together of Muslims from different backgrounds and contact with the host society had led to a more modern and equal view of gender relations (Ouis and Roald 2003).

**Age, Family Relationships and Marriage**

In keeping with a major theme of this review so far – that migrants and the processes of integration they undergo are diverse – it is relevant to note that the integration experience differs according to gender, age, and generation (Kofman and Phizacklea 2000; King et. al. 2004; Heckmann et. al. 2001).

The age at which an individual migrates is significant. We referred above to the educational benefits of early arrival but it is likely that in other ways integration processes for the children of migrants are likely to be substantially different from those migrating in later life. The child’s position within the family and the mix of source-country and host-country experiences of siblings may also have an impact. Negative experiences of older siblings in families with early marriage or education in Turkey, for instance, appears to affect the attitudes of younger siblings toward education (Crul and Doomernik 2003). Andall (2002), in a study of the second generation in Milan, points out how age and generation interact. While the experience of the ‘second generation’ is often treated as a homogenous group, the birth date of members in that generation affects the social and political contexts in which they are raised. Furthermore, as Portes and Rumbaut (2001) argue in reference to the United States, generational gaps can result in ‘dissonant acculturation,’ where parents are unfamiliar with the language and culture of the new society, and lose control over the integration of their children.

Kofman (2004) suggests that the role of the family in migration has often been neglected, though family reunification is thought to be a factor favouring long-term settlement and migrant integration. Research reflects the changing nature of traditional family practices throughout the integration process, including the development of non-traditional nuclear
families and the discontinuity of traditional cultural practices such as family meals (King et al. 2004).

Inter-marriage remains a key cultural integration indicator employed by European states. The incidence of mixed marriages involving immigrants from non-European sending countries is increasing but remains low and highly differentiated (Haug et al. 2002). In Belgium the proportion of mixed marriages involving a Belgian and a foreign national increased from 4 to 12 percent between 1970 and 1997 for Moroccans, while for Turks the increase was only from 1 to 3 percent, suggesting a greater level of endogamy in the case of the latter (OECD 2005).\(^8\) In the UK Indians, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis, only 4-7 percent of whom are in mixed unions, are much less likely to marry outside their ethnic groups than people with a Caribbean and African background. Mixed marriages involving migrants from other European countries are much more common than those with third country nationals\(^9\). Finally, mixed marriages are much more likely to occur between male migrants and native women than the opposite. In Germany (1998) Turkish men were 3.3 times more likely to marry German women than German men were to marry Turkish women, the corresponding ratios being 2.3 for Moroccans, 3.7 for ex-Yugoslavians and 1.9 for Italians (Haug et. al. 2002). The implications of such mixed-marriages for family relationships, social stigma, and children born into such unions appear to be understudied (King et. al. 2004).

The tendency towards mono-cultural marriage remains high within many migrant groups. Dutch research finds continuing high levels of marriage of Turks and Moroccans with partners from the country of origin. This is attributed to continuing migratory pressures, maintenance of transnational ties and imbalance in expectations between the sexes within these ethnic groups. Furthermore, family loyalty is high and most young people still want their family to have some influence over the choice of marriage partner (Hooghiemstra 2003).

Issues of marriage and family overlap with debates over the role of gender in integration, to which we have referred elsewhere. King et al. (2004) argue that the key debate regarding the genderization of migration involves the ‘changing nature of patriarchal relations.’ Much of this literature focuses on the decisions of women whether or not to migrate. There is some evidence that women are escaping traditionally male-oriented social structures in the household and public spaces (Brettell 2000). However, opportunities for the sexes to mix socially after arrival can remain limited. Both male and female Turks and Moroccans in the Netherlands want a partner from an Islamic background, but while females want to have career opportunities males continue to want their partner to play a more traditional role in the home (Hooghiemstra 2003).

**Transnationalism and Cultural Integration**

Cultural integration retains a growing transnational dimension. Improvements in communication technology and transportation have facilitated the continuity of cultural

---

\(^8\) On the other hand, if all mixed marriages are considered (including those with other EU citizens) the share of 18.2 percent was reached in 2002 (OECD 2005).

\(^9\) In the case of Italian and Spanish nationals in Switzerland, many of whom belong to the second generation, only one out of every five-six marriage involve spouses of the same nationality.
practices (Al-Ali 2002), the proliferation of religious-based diasporas in Muslim communities (Mandaville 2001), and the maintenance of family connections from abroad (Ballard 2004). There is thus some evidence to confirm the ideas presented by Faist (2000), Bader (2001), and others, that transnational identity is of growing importance. Nevertheless, the study of transnationalism’s implications, for example, on the second generation in Europe, is in its infancy (King et. al. 2004). Pessar and Mahler (2003) also criticize orthodox conceptualizations of transnationalism for failing to take into account ‘gendered geographies of power.’ Thus, more nuanced understandings of transnational cultures and their interactions with social groups are still being developed.

11.3 Cultural Integration Policies
Many of the key issues of cultural integration, including marriage and many cultural and religious practices, rely on personal decisions made outside the public sphere. Thus, governments have limited capacity to implement policies to encourage cultural integration. Furthermore, how such policies should be formulated is still a matter under consideration. The central debate is whether interventions which acknowledge cultural and religious identities and celebrate diversity are reinforcing social barriers or providing a strong foundation for a cohesive plural society. This issue has in part been addressed in reference to texts in Section 4 (Integration concepts). State attitudes toward this debate are often framed by their particular experience with migration and integration. Historical factors including racial tensions and state political philosophies influence whether states encourage diversity, allow it only in private life, or encourage assimilation (Favell 2001).

Some policymakers have challenged the inclusion of Muslim political and religious activities in mainstream society; the ban on headscarfs in French schools and the debate in the Netherlands over whether mosques should be government funded are but two examples. Many policy debates emphasise Western concepts of rights, such as gender equality and freedom of speech (Buijs and Rath 2003). Parekh (2000), in a defence of multiculturalism, argues that decisions regarding particular cultural practices are contextual, based on the host country’s values, but should not be non-negotiable.

While tendencies toward Muslim radicalization are found to be overstated, the literature seeks to identify policies to address it. Collective identity with non-Muslim residents at work and in housing is found to reduce alienation, but pressures to assimilate can lead to resentment. Structural factors, unemployment and ghettoisation, are the main barriers rather than culture, although aspects of Islam may challenge tenets of modern European norms. One study concludes that neither assimilation nor rejection is an option: progress must be part of the overall transformation of European identities (Hunter 2002).

12. Gaps in the evidence base

The starting point in identifying gaps in the evidence base for policy making is the limitations in the available data. National studies would, in particular, benefit from a breakdown of existing data by immigration status (refugee, dependent or work permit
holder for instance); and by date of arrival so that it is possible to take into account the impact of the migrants’ length of stay.

Comparative studies would gain from a standard means of identifying the target group: whether by country of birth or citizenship and (where permitted) by ethnicity. Additional data collection is needed, for instance, on migrants’ use of public services, so that the impact of service use (or lack of it) could be considered in relation to outcomes (eg ill-health).

There is a significant lack of data and research on migrants in the ten recent EU accession countries, on any integration policies targeted at them or on ways in which migrants are being accommodated within mainstream programmes.

Agreement at EU level on core indicators for measuring levels of integration in education, health, housing, civic participation and other spheres of social integration, would facilitate the collection of comparable data and to map changing trends.

In contrast to Canada and Australia, there is little longitudinal research in Europe which tracks the experience of a cohort of migrants over time. Studies tracking individuals from point of entry could help to identify the factors which assist or impede integration processes: whether factors related to the migrant, to opportunities and barriers in the host society, or the impact of policy intervention. Alternatively, longitudinal studies could focus on just one integration process, for instance health. What factors impact on the improving or deteriorating health of migrants after arrival? Is access to appropriate health care central or marginal to that process, relative to other factors?

Many studies focus on particular migrant groups: refugees or women for instance. There is surprisingly little on the experience of children who have arrived from abroad, nor on the migration of elderly people; yet both of these groups are likely to have particular needs. There is also little information on the experience of recent migrants, their immediate needs on arrival, whether they have the information or support they require and whether their initial experiences have a positive or negative impact on their subsequent capacity to engage in social integration processes. The growing body of research on irregular migrants is addressing a major gap in knowledge but considerably more information and analysis is needed on residence patterns, networks and use of essential services for instance to provide a sufficient evidence base for reasoned policy making in relation to this section of the migrant community.

The evidence on the importance of learning the language of the host country is clear. Some states have consequently made participation in language classes compulsory. What is less well understood are the factors which influence whether migrants take language classes. If they fail to do so, is it lack of opportunity or of motivation? Data analysis suggests, meanwhile, that retention of first language by migrants and the second generation is of no benefit in either education or labour market performance, and may indeed be harmful. What is less clear is whether retention of first language is nevertheless important to migrants because of the access it provides to social networks for instance and the security, identity and self confidence that may provide.
The lack of distinction between first and second generation migrant pupils – a general problem with research on youth broadly – makes it difficult to assess the significance of the migration experience on education outcomes and the impact of the education system relative to other factors. There is a paucity of analysis to explain why one group of pupils ‘perform’ better than another, the differing attainment of girls and boys; or the process through which some migrant pupils are assigned to special education or in other ways formally disadvantaged by the school system. There is a particular lack of evidence on adult education and, where it is considered, it tends to be discussed in the context of access to the labour market rather than to wider social outcomes.

There is a general shortage of evidence on the barriers which migrants face and how significant or marginal they are in the integration process. There is sufficient evidence to be clear that discrimination is a factor, but not how significant or what form it takes for instance in access to housing or health care. Lack of recognition of qualifications is a factor, but its relative importance in different professions and skilled trades, less clear.

Europe wide surveys have provided considerable data on public attitudes towards migrants, and some indication of the factors which may influence opinions. Policy intervention requires a greater understanding of causal factors however, and how they relate to underlying values or socio-economic criteria. We also need research on the impact of strategies to address attitudes: to what extent would accurate factual information about migrants shift attitudes among those whose opinions appear in part to be based on misinformation, for instance; and can initiatives to bring local residents together with newcomers have a lasting impact on subsequent attitudes and relationships?

Access to family reunion is dependent on the migrant’s immigration status. There is little research either on the impact of allowing family reunion on the primary migrant (is he or she more likely to settle in one place, or become more involved in community life for instance?); nor analysis of the impact which the regulatory framework has on the newly arrived family: the access of the spouse to employment, the right to or exclusion from social housing for instance, or provision of free schooling for children.

Studies suggest that extreme radicalization among migrant youth is rare. Nevertheless there is clearly a need to understand the processes that lead individuals to develop extreme views and affiliations. Assumptions are made in public debate that radicalization is a failure of integration (though some of those involved do not appear to have come from disadvantaged or socially excluded families), or the outcome of a distorted form of Islam, but there is little research as yet to explore the complex range of causes that are likely to lie behind involvement in terrorism or the nature of any connection with the integration process.

Education research focuses heavily on attainment, less on the impact of schooling on wider social integration. Do faith schools which bring together children from one faith but many ethnic backgrounds help to build bridges across communities or do they foster isolation? Are there effective initiatives schools can take to overcome the cultural
boundaries of their pupils to build sustainable relationships with people with other cultural backgrounds?

Migrants can compete with residents for housing in situations of significant shortage of suitable accommodation. This can be exploited by landlords and by employers who deduct rent for accommodation provided. Are there regulatory frameworks in any EU states that have addressed this effectively? There is some evidence that accommodation is a trade-off which migrants are willing to make in the short term. How temporary is poor accommodation, however, and what are its long term impacts? The dynamics of change in migrant neighbourhoods – population displacement, stability and sustainability – are also not well understood; nor the relationship between different levels of segregation and social cohesion. Little information is available on the interconnections between different dimensions of integration – the impact of poor housing or poor health for instance on employment or community engagement.

In relation to health there is a lack of data on morbidity and the causes of ill health, on incidence of particular diseases such as AIDS and on the incidence and experience of mental illness. Understanding is limited on the reasons for take up of health services and whether non take up reflects barriers in access or lack of demand. Longitudinal studies tracking health outcomes and contributory factors would be valuable as would more systematic sharing of good practice.

Research on naturalisation and citizenship is uneven across member states. Little is known about why people choose (or choose not) to naturalise or adopt dual nationality, nor the subsequent implications for the integration process. Limitations in national statistics often prevent detailed analyses of naturalisation rates by different categories of people, and cross-country comparisons are impeded by the divergent data collection methods across countries. The impact of different national approaches to granting citizenship, including the criteria for eligibility and whether individuals are encouraged and welcomed as new citizens, would be a potential focus for future research, as would evaluation of the effects of recently implemented requirements for citizenship and naturalisation tests in Europe.

If policy makers want to encourage participation in civil society and civic life it is necessary to know how migrants experience the opportunities and barriers to engagement in mainstream organisations and the benefits and disadvantages of participation through migrant associations. The literature is helpful in providing some answers to those questions in different circumstances across Europe but cities and states may want to understand the particular situation that migrants experience, given the political and institutional arrangements in that country. Comparative research on municipalities’ relationship with migrant associations, and of engaging individual migrants in local activities, could be helpful to administrations wanting to learn from good practice elsewhere.

Cultural studies focus disproportionately on the changing cultural practices within migrant communities with little focus on the impact which migrants have on the host society, including widely welcomed cultural contributions. There is currently a strong focus on
understanding Muslim populations with less attention to migrants from other religious and ethnic groups. The role of the family and of family reunion as a mechanism for integration is understudied. Mixed marriages are sometimes used as an indicator of integration yet we know surprising little about the experiences of this growing population and of their children. Research could explore the reasons why some migrants identify more strongly with the city in which they live than with the state, and why the second-generation may identify more strongly with their faith or ‘home’ culture than do their parents. Research could investigate the assumption that cultural differences between migrants and the host population impede integration, establishing the extent of those differences from a host population which is itself highly differentiated, and whether cultural differences identified are in practice a significant or insignificant factor in the integration process. What are the circumstances in which involvement in faith-based institutions strengthens the individual’s capacity to network across cultural boundaries or limits that engagement?

Research on the governance of integration policy finds poor coordination impacts on policy and delivery. But we know little more: what are the challenges of policy making in this field, what kind of evidence would policy makers find helpful and do they have the relationship with those who have the evidence – academics and NGOs for instance - that they need? We know that local administrations lacking experience of migration may respond in different ways from those in cities with long experience of migrants, but little about that process or whether there are lessons to be learnt that would assist local administrations elsewhere.

Finally, there is too little authoritative evaluation of the impacts of policy intervention. Descriptions of policies are more frequently available than evidence on their impacts. There is a plethora of initiatives at the national and local level, by state and non state actors, but little rigorous evaluation from which it is possible to identify ‘good practice’.

13 Challenges for Policy Makers

While research suggests that policy intervention is not the key variable in integration outcomes it is evident that the policies of central government and municipal authorities can have an impact. The urgency of the need to promote more positive outcomes poses significant challenges for policy makers. The research reviewed here suggests that the following are among the steps which authorities may want to consider.

Data collection, research and evaluation
At a national and local level, authorities need to collect better data on migrants; to investigate the factors which contribute to integration outcomes; to monitor change; and to evaluate the impact of policies and services so that there is an authoritative evidence base for policy development. Where it is possible to measure outcomes, it is desirable to use indexes that make comparison possible with other cities and states for shared learning – not least with municipalities which have little previous experience of migration.

Research should draw on different research methods (both quantitative and qualitative) and take account of the very differing experiences among migrants from different
countries of origin, and differing ages, gender, faith and other factors, including the length of time they have been in the host country. It should recognise that there are different spheres of integration (economic, social, cultural and political) and that positive outcomes in one sphere, for instance in the labour market, may not be matched in others areas of their life where support may still be needed.

While policy makers’ concerns appear to have influenced the focus of some recent research, dialogue with academic researchers could help to ensure that the questions to which policy makers need answers are included within the focus of study while protecting the independence of academic research.

**Identify contributory factors**

Through research and consultation, authorities need to identify the range of factors that impact on integration outcomes in the country or region concerned – factors relating to migrants, to the host society and to policy intervention (the impact of which may be positive, negative or marginal). In particular, authorities will want to identify any barriers to integration which could be addressed by policy intervention.

Authorities, for instance, may want to investigate the basis of any public hostility to migrants and whether this can be addressed, whether by provision of information which challenges misconceptions, addressing genuine conflicts of interest at the local level or by initiatives to bring migrants and members of the host community together to foster communication and understanding. They will need to identify whether there are discriminatory practices in housing, education or health care, take steps to encourage good practice and if necessary to enforce anti-discrimination law. It may be advisable to review the conditions attached to migrants’ immigration status to be clear whether an optimal balance has been achieved between necessary restrictions (for instance on access to the labour market, public services and voting) and the promotion of integration.

Among the many contributory factors on which too little is known is the impact of faith, and discrimination on grounds of faith, in the integration process (recognising that EU legislation on religious discrimination is currently much weaker than that on grounds of race); the causes of anti social behaviour, alienation and radicalisation and whether these relate to any lack of integration or to other factors; and the circumstances in which strengthening bonding capital within migrant networks increases the capacity of migrants to form networks with non migrants or acts as insulating barrier. There is a significant need for evaluation of current policy interventions to identify positive and negative impacts on integration processes. Gaps in knowledge are addressed more fully in the previous section.

**Challenge past assumptions**

It may be helpful to check whether any assumptions on which current policy is based are supported by the available evidence in the region concerned. One striking gap between the evidence that emerges from this review and current practice is the strong focus on migrants in recent policy development relative to the emphasis on addressing the barriers they face.
Policy makers may need to challenge assumptions about the migrant population (and the host population) to recognise their heterogeneity, not least in legal status, cultural and faith background, human and social capital, gender, age and reason for migration. It may help to be reminded that there is no single integration trajectory and that outcomes depend not only on migrants but on the opportunities (or lack of) provided by the host society. Migrants may be in the country for only a few months or years but nevertheless need a level of integration in all spheres. Those who look most different – who appear ‘outsiders’ - may nevertheless have more in common with the host society through history, language or faith than those from other parts of Europe who have not shared common experiences. The cultural practices of the majority among migrant populations, evolving with those of the host society over time, may be far less dissimilar from norms in the host society than the behaviour of a small minority of migrants might suggest.

**Clarify policy goals**

It may also be helpful to clarify exactly what policy interventions are intended to achieve. There are minority communities that have led relatively separate lives for generations without attracting policy attention. What is the actual issue to be addressed through policy intervention and how much change is needed to achieve the desired objective? How great a reduction in residential segregation, for instance; how much social interaction between migrants and their neighbours; how significant an increase in civic participation? To what extent do residents need to share common values; to what extent can diversity be valued and accommodated for society and community to function well?

**National government, municipal and non-governmental actors**

National governments control some of the key policy levers that impact on integration processes: modifying restrictions attached to immigration status, for instance, and strengthening anti discrimination legislation. City and rural authorities also control many of the relevant leavers however, including housing, urban renewal, delivery of education and opportunities for civic participation. Research shows that some migrants can identify more strongly with the city in which they live than with the country, a relationship on which cities could build.

NGOs can also play a key role in integration and need to be empowered to do so. Research suggests a need for authorities to recognise the danger that non migrant led organisations may out-compete those which are migrant-led in any bid for resources and consequently the need for capacity building if migrant led groups are to be able to contribute fully to delivery of services and to policy debates.

The differing tiers of government and range of departments within government that contribute to integration processes, as well as the need to engage with non governmental organisations, highlights the importance of mechanisms to join up policy making and service delivery and to monitor delivery on the ground. Lack of coordination has been found to be impeding delivery.

Authorities need to develop their strategy for integration not as a reaction to events, as research suggests is not uncommon now, but with clarity of objectives, awareness of the linkages between different policy areas and monitoring of outcomes to inform further
policy development. They need to ensure that their staff have the necessary cultural competency to understand and communicate with people of differing cultural and faith backgrounds. Providing for equality of opportunity in recruitment to the authority, ensuring that cultural competency is recognised as an occupational skill in relevant posts, and training in which migrants participate, are among the means to achieve that objective.

**Policy intervention**

The challenges identified in this review are extensive but will vary across regions. They may include the need to investigate patterns of discrimination and to consider whether existing forms of intervention based on providing remedies for victims are leading to the necessary reforms within the organisations concerned. If not, it may be desirable to consider alternative approaches including a statutory responsibility on public bodies to promote equality in their employment and service provision.

In relation to education, authorities need to ensure that the equal right of migrant children to progress in education is not marred by prejudice or by mistaking language difficulties for learning difficulties; that there is an opportunity to learn the language of the host country but not assume that this will be sufficient to ensure progress at school; and to take account of the wide range of factors which research has identified as relevant to education outcomes for migrant pupils including a school ethos in which all pupils are valued. States may wish to encourage family reunification at an early stage in the integration process so that the children of migrants enter the education system at a young age. They need to tailor adult language courses to migrants’ actual needs and, where opportunities to learn are not taken up, to investigate if this is because migrants lack motivation or because the courses do not match their needs or are held at unsuitable times or locations.

In order to reduce segregation in schools, authorities need to address the housing segregation which is its primary cause. A level of residential segregation is of benefit to migrants but authorities will want to ensure that there are opportunities for jobs, education and accommodation elsewhere so that they are not trapped in areas cut off from the rest of society: that is, to focus on increased choice not compulsory dispersal. To facilitate access to suitable housing, which is crucial for health, employment and for each child’s education, authorities can assist through direct provision of accommodation, through providing information and advice, and by using the existing regulatory framework to protect tenants’ rights without giving the perception of any special treatment or priority access for migrants - and by countering any misinformation to that effect.

Authorities will want to be informed on the health status of migrants in their area and to investigate the factors which contribute to any disproportionate ill health identified: for instance whether the need is to reduce barriers to access mainstream services, to increase availability of information on health prevention, or to provide language support in innovative ways where the range of languages needed is large and costs high.

Public bodies have significant opportunities to promote civic and political participation. These may include specific channels of participation for migrants but they must then ensure that the result is not to marginalize migrants’ voices from mainstream debates.
Research suggests it is also important to increase the opportunities for engagement that are not solely for participation as migrants, recognizing their multiple identities (e.g., as parents) and that they may therefore want to contribute in other capacities. There is also a need to increase the opportunities to participate in mainstream organizations where there is the additional benefit of interaction with non-migrants. When funding migrant-led organizations (as in all funding relationships), care should be taken to ensure that the organizations operate on democratic and equal opportunity principles so that, for instance, they do not marginalize women or young people.

In relation to cultural integration, authorities may want to ensure that the public are aware of the significant contribution that migrants make to the arts, cuisine, music, and fashion, for instance, so that any concerns over cultural practices are set in that wider context. Where there are concerns, authorities should ensure that any intervention is proportional to the harm it is perceived the practice may cause, taking into account the actual number of people involved. Municipalities may choose to be a catalyst for initiatives that facilitate positive social interaction between migrants and their neighbours across community boundaries and where feasible to prepare neighbourhoods for new arrivals. There is particular value in fostering contact and opportunities to develop a shared identity between young people of differing cultural and faith backgrounds, shown to have an impact on developing attitudes, including attitudes towards gender relations. The current focus on Muslim migrants should not lead to neglect of migrants of other faiths (and none) who equally need to be welcomed and encouraged to engage.

Finally, authorities may wish to consider what steps are needed to ensure protection of the basic needs of irregular migrants while they are in country and whether, if it is not practical to remove them all, pathways back to legality need to be considered.
WORKS CITED


Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für Migration, Flüchtlinge und Integration (2005). *Bericht der Beauftragten der Bundesregierung für Migration, Flüchtlinge und Integration*
über die Lage der Ausländerinnen und Ausländer in Deutschland. Berlin.


Macmillan.


