The contribution of UK-based diasporas to development and poverty reduction

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COMPAS Report Team:

Nicholas Van Hear, Frank Pieke and Steven Vertovec
With the assistance of: Anna Lindley, Barbara Jettinger and Meera Balarajan

COMPAS (Centre on Migration, Policy and Society),
University of Oxford,
58 Banbury Road, Oxford, OX2 6QS
Tel.: +44 (0) 1865 274711, Fax.: +44 (0) 1865 274718
Http://www.compas.ox.ac.uk



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Figures:

Executive Summary

This report explores the actual and potential role of UK-based diasporas in development and poverty reduction in their homelands. Included under the rubric 'poverty reduction' are conflict prevention, conflict reduction and post-conflict reconstruction, as these are all central to poverty reduction in countries with diasporas which have a substantial presence in the UK. Private remittances by individuals constitute the most sizeable and tangible form of diaspora contribution to development and poverty reduction. However, this report focuses on *collective transfers* of various kinds by diasporic associations for development and/or welfare purposes, as well as upon broader forms of collective support among diaspora non-governmental organisations, churches and other bodies, such as social and political lobbying. The report also touches on commercial investments in the homeland by diaspora members.

Diaspora are defined as populations of migrant origin who are scattered among two or more destinations, between which there develop multifarious links involving flows and exchanges of people and resources: between the homeland and destination countries, and among destination countries. Currently much more than in the past, diasporas include complex mixes of people who have arrived at different times, through different channels, through different means, and with very different legal statuses. When divisions in the country of origin are also taken into account, such diasporas can thus be highly fissiparous, which can give rise to problems of coherence when mobilising for development and other purposes.

Six UK-based diaspora groups are examined: Somalis, Nigerians, Ghanaians, Indians, Sri Lankan Tamils, and Chinese. The cases represent African and Asian examples of interest to DfID and encompass a range of conditions, from countries in or emerging from conflict to more stable low income and lower middle income countries.
Despite originating from countries with diverse social, political, economic and cultural backgrounds, the six diaspora groups reviewed reveal rather similar migration patterns. Early arrivals of seamen and/or students formed a core from which the diaspora expanded and consolidated. Migration for education and/or professional advancement has played a large role, with students and professionals often making up a substantial part of the early diaspora: often these are also political dissidents. Others migrated for livelihood purposes, as labour migrants or business people. These forms of migration often later transmute into family reunion as households form and become established. From the later 1980s, asylum migration has formed a significant stream for all six cases. The cases vary in terms of distribution in the UK: some have tended to form enclaves, to differing degrees, while others tend not to be concentrated in particular locations, although Greater London is the main site of residence for all six groups. The size of the UK-based diaspora in each case relative to the home country population and the global diaspora varies considerably.

Many governments of migrant-sending countries have recognised the potential of their citizens abroad in recent years, and international development agencies are beginning to do likewise. Migrants' incentives to participate in home country development or reconstruction depend on the extent to which they feel they have a stake in their home nation-states as well as in the countries that host them. With such factors in mind, and in partnership with developing countries and diasporas, DfID and other development agencies could work towards:

- securing the rights of migrants
- cutting the cost of money transfers
- encouraging migrants to invest in community development initiatives in their home countries, and, in particular, to engage with pro-poor drivers of change at home.
- taking steps to give diasporas a more active voice in the development arena, such as involving them in international fora to coordinate resource flows from donors and from diasporas for development and reconstruction.

In addition to these general policies, the findings of the report strongly support the following proposals made earlier by the African Foundation for Development (AFFORD):

- Acknowledge that the diaspora, as investors in, welfare providers to, and knowledge communities about developing regions merit as serious an engagement as the private sector with DfID and other government departments with a development brief.
- Drawing UK-based diaspora groups into the formulation of Country Strategy or Assistance Plans, Poverty Reduction Strategy Planning, and other instruments of UK development policy.
- Making greater efforts to bridge the UK's two parallel development and relief efforts, one mainstream-led (DfID plus UK-based NGOs engaged in development and relief) and the other diaspora-led. DfID might consider creating incentives such as a partnership fund (akin to its Civil Society Challenge Fund) to encourage 'mainstream' development and diaspora groups to engage constructively with each other.
- The formation of a dedicated unit within DfID (along the lines of the Private Sector Unit) to engage with UK-based diaspora groups, and to assess the different strength, weaknesses and potential of different groups (and of sections within particular diaspora groups).

Other policy lessons, positive and negative, drawn from the findings of the report include:

- *Recognising diversity within diasporas*
- *Acknowledging migrant/diaspora source areas are not necessarily the most poverty-prone, and identifying pro-poor drivers of change within them*
- *Taking account of ambivalent policy lessons*
- *Recognising and building on linkages across diasporas*
- *Fostering markets within and beyond the diaspora for homeland products and services*
- *Connecting asylum-seekers/refugees with development initiatives*
- *Encouraging transfer of diaspora expertise*
- *Developing new partnership projects*
- *Working with different levels of homeland government*
- *Promoting coordination between diaspora and aid agency initiatives*
- *Participating actively in the UN Global Commission on International Migration*
- *Exploring constructive 'conversation' with the diaspora to realise their potential in development, poverty reduction and peace building.*

The latter is arguably the logical starting point, and DfID should actively explore mechanisms towards this end.

1. Introduction

Diasporas and development

In this report we examine UK-based diasporas and their actual and potential role in poverty reduction in their homelands. We include under the rubric 'poverty reduction' such issues as conflict prevention, conflict reduction and post-conflict reconstruction, as these are all central to poverty reduction in countries with diasporas which have a substantial presence in the UK. DfID has commissioned the Migration Policy Institute in Washington DC to prepare a parallel paper on broader issues relating to diasporas and development (MPI forthcoming 2004).

Private remittances by individuals constitute the most sizeable and tangible form of diaspora contribution to development and poverty reduction. These fall outside the terms of reference for this report and have been addressed in other DfID initiatives, notably the the Sustainable Livelihoods Support Office/Asian Regional Economics/Policy Department Migration Policy Programme seminar series held in 2002-2003, the International Conference on Migrant Remittances jointly organised with the World Bank in October 2003, and Blackwell and Seddon (2004). Instead of exploring private, individual, person-to-person remittances, we focus on matters surrounding *collective transfers* of various kinds by diasporic associations (through charitable donations, home town associations, ad hoc projects and government-supported initiatives), as well as upon broader forms of collective support among diaspora NGOs, churches and other organized bodies (such as social and political lobbying). We also touch upon commercial investments by diaspora members.

For the purposes of this report, we define diaspora as populations of migrant origin who are scattered among two or more destinations, between which there develop multifarious links involving flows and exchanges of people and resources: between the homeland and destination countries, and among destination countries (Van Hear 1998, Vertovec and Cohen 1999). Currently and much more than in the past, diasporas are formed from and include complex mixes of people who have arrived at different times, through different channels (e.g. labour migration, asylum, family union, for education, for professional advancement), through different means (legal entry, illegal entry, smuggling, overstaying etc), and with very different statuses (citizen, resident, student, visitor, work permit holder, refugee, asylum seeker, exceptional leave to remain, humanitarian protection, indefinite leave to remain etc.). When divisions in the country of origin are also taken into account, such diasporas can thus be highly fissiparous, which can give rise to problems of coherence when mobilising for development and other purposes. In much literature and policy debate, diasporas are approached as rather homogeneous social or ethnic groups. We contend that this line of thinking can be misleading and – as we suggest in section 4 – can lead to inappropriate policy choices when seeking to mesh diasporas and development.

To its credit, the UK government was early to see the potential of migration for development, and was one of the leaders in the current wave of such interest. Together with the Danish, French and Swedish governments in particular, this approach has been usefully promoted in various EU and global fora, as well as on the domestic front (the work of the House of Commons International Development Committee being a case in point). The connections between migration and development, and specifically the diaspora role in development, were articulated early in the first term of the current

Labour government. Noting that migration can have both positive and negative effects on development, the 1997 White Paper observed: *We will seek to build on the skills and talents of migrants and other members of ethnic minorities within the UK to promote the development of their countries of origin* (UK Government 1997: 67-71). While these were sound and laudable aims, and it was prescient and an advance to articulate explicitly the development potential of migrant diasporas, not a great deal was done in practical terms to help realise that potential. With the recent renewed interest in the development potential of the diaspora in recent years (Danida, the EU and the World Bank are among the bodies that have re-articulated such interest), the stage is set for greater intervention in this field. It is to policy recommendations in this arena that this report seeks to contribute.

First, we outline our approach to the linkages – potential and actual – between diaspora and development. We have found particularly useful a typology formulated by Mohan (2002) for considering the role of diasporas in home country development:

- *Development in the diaspora:* 'how people within diasporic communities use their localized diasporic connections to secure economic and social well-being and, as a by-product, contribute to the development of their locality' (Ibid.: 104). Mohan terms this 'development in place'. One focus here has been the role of ethnic businesses in countries hosting migrant communities.
- *Development through the diaspora:* 'how diasporic communities utilize their diffuse global connections beyond the locality to facilitate economic and social well-being.' (Ibid.: 104). Mohan terms this 'development through space'. Prominent examples include the trade diasporas (e.g., Chinese, Indians, Lebanese) that span countries, regions and continents.
- *Development by the diaspora:* 'How diasporic flows and continued connections 'back home' facilitate the development -- and sometimes the creation – of these homelands'. This includes 'flows of ideas, money and political support to the migrants' home country, be it an existing home(land) or one which nationalists would like to see come into being.' This is diasporic development 'across space' (Ibid.: 104, 123).

As indicated by the case studies in this report, each of these types is to be found among migrant groups and ethnic communities in Britain. The third domain is perhaps the arena that is of most immediate interest to DfID. However, these three forms of diaspora-development links are interdependent. Thus *development by the diaspora* is likely to be dependent (or interdependent) on *development in the diaspora* and *development through the diaspora*. It follows that development agencies like DfID need to take account of all three spheres for interventions; for example, secure legal and residential status and the right to work, which are within the remit of Home Affairs, are prerequisites for, or least an inducement to, *development in the diaspora* and *development through the diaspora*, which in turn may lay the basis for *development by the diaspora*, an objective of agencies like DfID. We have also found value in the typology developed by Ali-Ali, Koser and Black (2001) which addresses the kinds of economic, social, political and cultural influences (direct and indirect) that diaspora communities can have on the homeland, and their *capacity* and *motivation* to intervene in home country development (see tables 1 and 2). The following section applies these approaches to six diaspora groups which are prominently represented in the UK (and elsewhere): Somalis, Nigerians, Ghanaians, Indians, Sri Lankan Tamils, and Chinese. The cases have been selected to represent African and Asian examples of interest to DfID. The cases also encompass a range of scales and conditions, from countries in or emerging from conflict to more stable low income and lower middle income countries.

Table 1
Categorization of individual and community activities by type and geographical focus

	Economic	Political	Social	Cultural
Home country focus	• Financial remittances • Other remittances (for example, medicine, clothes) • Investments • Charitable donations • Taxes • Purchase of government bonds • Purchase of entry to government programmes	• Participation in elections • Membership of political parties	• Visits to friends and family • Social contacts • 'Social remittances' • Contributions to newspapers circulated in home country	• Cultural events including visiting performers from the home country
Host country focus	• Charitable donations • Donations to community organizations	• Political rallies • Political demonstrations • Mobilization of political contacts in host country	• Membership of social clubs • Attendance at social gatherings • Links with other organizations (for example, religious and other refugee organizations) • Contributions to newspapers • Participation in discussion groups (e.g. internet bulletin boards)	• Events to promote culture (e.g. concerts, theatre, exhibitions) • Education

Source: Al-Ali *et al*. (2001).

Table 2
Factors increasing individual capabilities to participate in reconstruction in the home country

	Economic	Political	Social
Capacity	• Employment • Savings • Access to welfare and pensions from home country • Access to welfare and pensions from host country • Access to information • Access to banking facilities	• Secure legal status in host country • Positive attitude of host government and population towards ethnic-national diasporas • Political integration of diaspora by home government	• Freedom of movement within host country • Gender equality • Successful social integration in host country • Place of origin in home country
Desire	• Financial stability in host country • Economic incentives (or lack of disincentives) for remittances and investments in home country • Economic stability in home country	• Secure legal status in host country • 'Non-alienating' circumstances of flight • Positive attitude of home government towards diaspora • Political stability in home country • Lack of ethnic/religious discrimination in home country	• Links with family and friends in home country • Links with friends and family in other host countries • Integration within the diaspora in the host country • Positive attitudes towards home country • Desire to maintain 'national consciousness'

Source: Al-Ali *et al.* (2001).

2. UK-based diasporas: case studies

2.1 The Somali diaspora

2.1.1 Background

Migration has been a long-standing feature in Somali society – from traditional nomadic movements in the Horn of Africa, to merchant navy sailors working in British ports from the 1800s, to Gulf migrant workers, to elite students studying in the UK and Italy. People from northwest Somalia (formerly the British Protectorate of Somaliland) of the Issac and Darood clans had settled in the United Kingdom, Yemen and Saudi Arabia prior to the outbreak of war in the 1980s (El-Solh 1991). Many lived in port cities – London's East End, Liverpool, Bristol and Cardiff. Other Somalis, some made redundant by the declining Merchant Navy and some newly arrived in the UK, found work in industrial cities, for example in Sheffield's steel industry. From the 1960s, families began to join this group, which was originally composed of male migrants (El-Solh 1991). With persecution in North West Somalia in the 1980s, and the outbreak civil war between the Somali National Movement (SNM), which sought secession of former Somaliland, and the government of Siyad Barre in 1988, Somalis began to arrive in the UK under family reunion provision or as asylum seekers. Not surprisingly, these people tended to settle in areas where a Somali community already existed. With the collapse of the Somali Republic in 1991 more refugees arrived in the UK from southern and central Somalia. Somalian nationals granted permanent settlement in the UK totalled 43,050 in the period 1992-2002. The Census 2001 found 43,373 people in England and Wales born in Somalia, but estimates of the 'Somali community' range up to 95,000 (Cole and Robinson 2003). Most of the Somali-*born* population lives in London, concentrated in Brent, Ealing and Newham, with the largest provincial populations in Sheffield and Manchester (UK Census, 2001).

2.1.2 Diaspora infrastructure, networks and activities

Clan networks have been important in mobilizing support for members in the diaspora and in Somalia (Pérouse de Montclos 2003). It should also be emphasised that the Somali diaspora in the UK today is far from homogenous, but includes people from many clans and parts of Somalia: given the devastating civil war in Somalia, the relations between individuals and groups can be problematic, so that in many ways it is not appropriate to speak of a 'Somali community.'

Accordingly, there is a range of Somali diasporic organizations in the UK that maintain important kinds of connection with homeland issues and localities. These include Somali community organizations in UK that collect donations for projects in Somalia**.** A prominent example is Oxford House in Bethnal Green, London, which works with many Somali clients; it was the focus of significant diaspora donations for the establishment of the showcase Edna Adan Maternity Hospital in Hargeisa, Somaliland. There are also community organizations that provide the impetus for and work to channel funds to projects in Somalia. An example is Horn Stars in Brent, originally a football project for Somali young people, where community workers set up Ruuki Development Initiatives (RUUDI) to improve livelihoods in their home region. Somali money transfer companies**,** known as *hawilad*, are the only international financial services that provide a way for

money to be transferred to Somalia from abroad. The *hawilad* are themselves involved in both charitable and commercial development activities. The Somali Financial Services Association (SFSA) was launched in London in December 2003: it is based in Dubai and aims to capacitate and build self-regulation in this sector (UNDP (Somalia) 2003). In the UK and elsewhere there has been evidence of Somali clan 'collectors' who extract donations from diaspora members to support clan militia and warlords in Somalia**.** This practice is thought to have declined greatly since the mid-1990s, but the current incidence of clan collections for factions and the impact of such transfers remain under-researched (Bradbury 2002). Finally, there are organisations that incorporate the broader Somali diaspora, spanning different host countries with an interest in the homeland**.** An example of this is 'Somscan UK', a grouping of Somalis based in Scandinavian countries and the UK formed in 1999-2000, which has collectively bought a block of land in Somaliland to build homes which members of the group can reside in. The project, which involves some 400-500 families, is backed by EU funds, with the Danish Refugee Council helping with implementation (see box 1). The lessons from this case are ambivalent, and it raises some awkward questions about policies which seek to link migration and development.

2.1.3 Diaspora engagement in development and poverty reduction

The major threat to human life and livelihoods in Somalia remains on-going insecurity. In this context political and economic conflict, remittance income, diaspora-funded development projects and people returning from the diaspora are inevitably caught up, directly or indirectly, in the political conflict. However, without the receipt of remittances, without diaspora-funded development projects, and without the return of people committed to peace and prosperity in their homeland, marginalised and vulnerable people in Somalia might be worse off. According to the Somaliland Academy for Peace and Development, since the end of the last civil conflict in secessionist Somaliland in 1996, the diaspora's influence has become increasingly positive: 'Somalilanders abroad have provided funding, leadership and publicity for activities in their homeland, often returning to take part in the work on the ground. The financial and material contributions from the diaspora have helped to sustain important local efforts… This spirit of solidarity has served as a powerful antidote to the helplessness and disillusionment that prevailed in the wake of civil war.' (Somaliland Centre for Peace and Development 2002 p.78). However, as always, civil society organisations, whether diaspora-funded or not, raise issues about accountability to the users and the relationship between these initiatives and the state, the latter being particularly problematic in Somalia: the case of Somscan is a case in point (see box 1).

In terms of human resources, many professionals have left the country since the conflict began -- this brain drain was unavoidable. Some Somalis have returned, particularly to Somaliland. However, not all returnees from the West remain, and people move between the UK (or other host countries) and Somalia, finding it difficult to make a living in Somalia, or finding it useful to retain connections and parts of their livelihoods outside Somalia. This would appear to be in large part due to the still constrained labour market and the risks and limitations for businesses (Hansen 2003). AFFORD have identified a further way in which the human resources of the diaspora may be mobilised to support initiatives in Somalia and elsewhere – known as 'retrieval' (AFFORD 2004), this involves the flexible exploitation of diaspora networks and know-how. In the case of Somalia, there are groups of diasporic professionals running organizations that take a close interest in, fund, and/or manage projects in Somalia. The www.somalilandforum.com site

highlights the involvement of well-educated Somalis in reconstruction and development in Somaliland.

Box 1 Somscan, reconstruction and development in post-conflict Somaliland

In 1999-2000 a group of Somali refugees living in Scandinavia and the UK formed the Somaliland Scandinavian Cooperative Association, which came to be known as Somscan UK, reflecting the Somali, Scandinavian and British identity of the membership. Many if not most of the grouping came from Somaliland's second city of Burao, and expressed interest in returning to the area. Like much of the rest of Somaliland, Burao was ravaged by conflict in 1988-1991 and the mid 1990s, but since then has undergone a modest recovery. However living conditions remain very difficult and there have been substantial constraints on return, including disputes over land, insufficient education and health facilities, and, perhaps most important, inadequate supply of drinking water. The Burao municipality rightly feared that a substantial return of people from the diaspora with western patterns of consumption would put great strain on the current inadequate infrastructure of the town.

The group acquired 5.4 square km of land to the north-east of Burao. By 2002 the group had sold more than 400 housing plots to interested expatriate Somalis. There were some 500 families in the grouping in all. The plots seem to have been sold in blocks to groups within the Somscan grouping. Membership of the subsidiary groups appears to have been based on the country of asylum – thus there were several groups with members living in Denmark, the UK, Norway and Sweden -- though some were more mixed and based on kin and clan ties. The grouping was well organised and retained an agent who acted on behalf of the Somscan executive committee in its dealings with local government and the aid agencies.

In 2002, helped by the Danish Refugee Council, Somscan put forward a proposal to the European Union for a project to rehabilitate Burao's infrastructure, so that return could take place without placing undue strain on the city's resources. The main elements were an upgrade of the city's water supply and increasing the capacity of primary, intermediate and secondary schooling. The water supply upgrade involved supplementing the existing ring main system and taking a branch line to the Somscan site. It was argued that this would increase the city's overall supply, as well as supplying water to the Somscan site, helping to allay the (justified) concerns of the municipal authority that demand for water by the Somscan site inhabitants would be many times the Burao per capita norm. The plan also involved an upgrade of primary and secondary schools, proving sheltered facilities for girls as well as for boys. This involved the relocation of a large number of squatters currently on the school sites; that many of these squatters were returnees from refugee camps in Ethiopia vividly underlined the divide between former refugees in neighbouring countries and those from the wider diaspora. Later, violence and killings accompanied the relocation of these people.

Costed at around 600,000 Euros, the project proposal was submitted to the European Commission. It fell under the aegis of the EU High Level Working Group on Migration and Asylum, and in 2003 funds were released for the project to go ahead.

Policy lessons

The case raises a number of thorny issues. The most obvious is the use of aid in the service of promoting repatriation under the aegis of the EU High Level Working Group (HLWG), whose purpose is to develop policies towards countries of origin that prevent or at least contain migration (Van Selm 2002): Somalia was one of six priority countries targeted by the HLWG. A second, related issue is the use of aid for the benefit of those already better off than the local populace. While not necessarily rich by international standards, the Somscan membership was certainly wealthier than the Burao norm.

There were indeed substantial potential benefits for Somscan members. Buying land collectively outside Burao was much cheaper than acquiring land individually. Somscan members had the prospect of a relatively well serviced township that should generate its own economy and community. While many did intend to live on the site, at least for part of the year, others bought land to sell on, or intended to build houses and rent them out. More positively, the diaspora returnees may bring back skills, ideas and investment with them for the benefit of the population at large.

If the overall aim of aid interventions is poverty reduction, this case does raise questions about the desirability of using development assistance to build a privileged enclave surrounded by a poorer general populace. On the other hand, it might be argued pragmatically that overall, while some resources would indeed be used to promote EU repatriation or migration containment imperatives, and for the benefit of better off migrants, greater resources at the same time would be made available for the wider community, in the form of better water supply and schools, through this funding mechanism. It might also be argued that the presence of relatively affluent incomers might also promote raise general welfare by stimulating the local economy. If such is the outcome, some of the concerns the scheme raised may be allayed, on the basis of the benefits for the wider community.

Sources: Van Hear 2004, Kleist 2003.

2.2. The Nigerian diaspora

2.2.1 Background

Like most African countries, Nigeria both accommodates refugees and immigrants and has generated its own refugee and migrant movements. Since independence in 1960, there have been a number of migration trajectories and displacements to other African countries, North America and Europe. With regard to the UK, Nigeria's former colonial power, the first large scale emigration and search for refuge derived from the civil war in the late 1960s. In 1971 almost 27,700 Nigerians lived in England and Wales (UK Census 1971). This number did not much increase until the mid 1980s after Nigeria's oil-based economy had taken a downturn. Political oppression, the introduction of structural adjustment policies under the aegis of the IMF, and related socio-economic disruption contributed to large scale out-migration. Whereas in 1981 only 30,045 Nigerians were recorded as living in UK, the number increased to 46,231 in 1991 (UK Census 1981 and 1991). In the 1990s Nigerians continued to leave ongoing economic and political mismanagement and poor living conditions. Currently, 86,958 Nigerians are recorded as living in England and Wales (although there is an unknown number of others living illegally). The majority of those recorded -- 68,907 -- live in Greater London. Of these, 45,508 live in Inner London, with the highest degrees of concentration in Southwark (10,673), Hackney (6633), Lambeth (6121), and Newham (5423). 23,399 Nigerians live in Outer London, concentrated in Greenwich (3918), Brent (3070), and Barnet (2753) (UK Census 2001). As with the other cases reviewed, there are significant divisions of ethnicity, religion and region in the diaspora, so that it is perhaps misleading to speak of the 'Nigerian diaspora' or the 'Nigerian community': the plural of these terms is needed.

2.2.2 Diaspora infrastructure, networks and activities

UK-based Nigerian diaspora organisations draw on a variety of constituents. Some are interest groups with a national catchment, such as business associations; others are associations of particular ethnic groups; others draw their members from and direct their activities towards some of Nigeria's 36 constituent states; some are regionally based; and still others are based on gender, religion, political and cultural activities. For instance, Igbo communities drawn mainly from the east of Nigeria have been heavily engaged in homeland politics since independence. Largely through radio, Igbo communities in the UK gathered the news of Nigeria and breakaway Biafra in the second half of the 1960s which was used to promote their point of view. There are also Young Igbo groups engaging in both community activities and political issues in Nigeria (www.youngigbos.com). The Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP), agitating on behalf of the Ogoni people of the oil-producing Niger delta, is an ethno-national association with a branch in London which campaigns against the activities of Shell in the delta (www.nigerdeltacongress.com/). The Edo Association in UK (various UK cities) supports and promotes especially the government of the Edo State, and promotes community activities (www.edo-nation.net7edounity3.htm). Beyond state and ethno-regional groups, there are also hometown associations, such as the Odoziobodo Club of Ogwashi-Uku, which is based in London and aims to support the development and progress of Ogwashiuku town. Beyond such particular interest groups, Nigerians (and Ghanaians) in the UK figure prominently in diaspora organisations with a pan-African reach: an example is the London-based NGO the African Foundation for Development (AFFORD), whose mission is 'to engage Africans and their organisations in the diaspora directly with organisations involved in the processes of development on the continent; and to develop the skills and abilities of African peoples, either temporarily or

permanently away from Africa, in ways that will contribute to Africa's development and enhance Africa's contribution to global development' (http://www.afford-uk.org/).

2.2.3 Diaspora engagement in development and poverty reduction

Nigeria has suffered from the loss of thousands of highly educated professionals, but the Nigeria diaspora provides a substantial contribution, especially by way of remittances, to the homeland. The country is one of the Top 20 developing countries receiving remittances, estimated at over $1.2 billion in 1999 (World Bank 2000). In addition to these transfers, there are several other ways in which members of the Nigerian diaspora(s) contribute to poverty reduction and development in their homelands:

According to the Nigeria Investment Promotion Commission (based in Nigeria), each year some 2,000 Nigerians trained outside the country (in the US, Canada, UK, Germany, France, Russia, Japan and China) return home to seek employment or business opportunities (www.nipc/nigeria.org). Such 'diaspora-tapping' also provides the rationale for the TOKTEN (Transfer of Knowledge Through Expatriate Networks) programme of the United Nations Development Programme. AFFORD has set up the 'Hello Africa Project: Shifting power, tackling poverty by connecting Africa and Africa's diaspora' (AFFORD 2003). The project aims to facilitate and sustain developmental linkages and partnerships between Ghanaian, Nigerian and Sierra Leonean communities in the UK and counterparts in Africa. Nigerians in the Diaspora Europe (NIDOE), headquartered in London, focuses on mobilising Nigerians for the development of Nigeria, as are other similar organizations, such as Dunamis Impact (www.dunamisimpact.org).

Other diaspora organizations are primarily concerned with social issues. For example, ABANTU for Development is a UK-based international non-governmental organisation, founded by women from Nigeria and Ghana in 1991 (www.abantu.org). ABANTU provides training in the fields of policy analysis, economics, health care, media and environment. The Nigerian Chaplaincy in London was set up with support of the (Anglican) Church Mission Society, Christian Council of Nigeria and the Overseas Fellowship of Nigerian Christians. In addition to offering services for the Nigerian community in the UK, the Chaplaincy has set up a reconciliation initiative to provide a forum where the different Nigerian groups can discuss the conflicts which have hamstrung and impoverished Nigeria. It is hoped that this initiative will also have an influence within their communities back home (www.cms-uk.org).

Finally, there are diasporic political groups that campaign for democratic reform as part of development in Nigeria. For instance, in the 1990s the UK-based Nigerian diaspora contributed to the foundation of the pro-democracy organisation, the United Democratic Front for Nigeria-Abroad (UDFN). At the same time the National Democratic Coalition (NADECO-Abroad) was set up as an external wing of NADECO Nigeria which seeks to coordinate the activities of pro-democracy movements in Nigeria. The two organisations have jointly organised two 'World Congresses of Free Nigerians' in Washington and London, with the aim of building up a new umbrella grouping: an outcome was the Joint Action Committee for Nigeria which has a strong diaspora component. It should be noted that the pan-Nigerian appearance of some such organizations may belie rather more sectional interests within them, but the pro-democracy aspirations of these organisations are on balance to be welcomed.

2.3 The Ghanaian diaspora

2.3.1 Background

Along with Nigerians, Ghanaians form one of the largest West African communities in the UK. At independence in 1957 the Ghanaian population resident in the UK was relatively small: according to the 1961 Census only around 10,000 people born in Ghana lived in the UK. However, as in other African countries, soon after its independence Ghana faced longstanding political turmoil and unrest. Economic dislocation and political oppression drove thousands of Ghanaians to seek refuge abroad, and the number of Ghanaians living in UK and elsewhere steadily increased. The number of Ghanaians seeking political asylum rose particularly during the regime of Flt Lt Jerry Rawlings (1981-2000), especially after structural adjustment measures overseen by the IMF bit in the society and economy from 1983 (Peil 1995, Van Hear 1998). By 1991 more than 32,000 Ghanaians were living in the UK. Numbers increased further in the 1990s, so that Ghanaians numbered 56,000 in the 2001 Census. The 2001 Census data folded Ghanaians into the category 'Other Central and Western Africans' (ie other than Nigerians, Congolese and Sierra Leoneans). But Ghanaians made up just under two thirds of this category, which numbered 85,240 in 2001. Most Ghanaians live in Greater London, concentrated in the boroughs of Southwark, Lambeth, Newham, Hackney, Haringey, Lewisham, Croydon and Brent, with much smaller populations in Birmingham and Manchester.

2.3.2 Diaspora infrastructure, networks and activities

Despite possible political differences with the homeland, Ghanaians living in the UK have maintained close political, social, cultural and economic links to their country of origin. Currently there are more than 100 cultural, social, professional, ethnic, welfare and political associations in the UK (www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/diaspora). There are also quite a number of Ghanaian home town associations in Britain. However many of these associations seem to be small and their reach is uncertain.

Ghanaian diaspora actors in the UK frequently engage with the politics of their homeland. Politicians and policy makers from Ghana are often invited to speak and encourage the community to participate in the political and economic life of Ghana. Political parties are active in Britain too: the UK branches of the main parties have engaged in the debate on the 2004 elections and the participation in them by Ghanaians living abroad. Engagement of this kind has been encouraged by Ghana government outreach, such as an annual forum organized by Ghana's High Commission for the Ghanaian community in the UK, used to promote interest in Ghanaian politics. The Ghanaian Dual Citizenship Regulation Act of July 2002 and discussion about votes for the diaspora in national elections have further invigorated possibilities for political participation.

Other Ghanaian diaspora groupings are more UK-oriented. The Ghana Union London is an umbrella organisation for 50 affiliated Ghanaian groups which provide information and advice for the Ghanaian and other African communities on benefits, employment, housing, immigration, education, health and care services in the UK. (www.ghanaunion.demon.co.uk). Founded in 1983, the Ghana Refugee Welfare Group is run by exiles who fled the Rawlings regime in the 1980s and provides advice and guidance on immigration matters and benefit rights, accommodation, education of the youth, and makes referrals for legal matters (www.refugeesonline.org.uk/gwa/).

2.3.3 Diaspora engagement in development and poverty reduction

There is much activity within the UK Ghanaian diaspora on development and poverty reduction in Ghana (especially well documented at www.ghanaweb.com). The following examples are merely indicative of the variety of groups and interests involved. The Ghanaian High Commission occasionally holds events in London to raise money for schools and clinics. In March 2003 the High Commission in London set up the 'Five Pounds No Balance' fund which raises money for the purchase of basic equipment for the Ghana Police Service. In total, Ghanaian individuals and communities in the UK and Ireland donated more than £27,000, the main community donors being the Ashanti New Town Club of the UK and Ireland, the Ghana Union of Manchester, the Association of Ghanaians in Middlesbrough, the Kwahuman Association (UK), and the Ghana Union in Chichester. This list in microcosm hints at the diversity and character of diaspora organizations in the UK, based on the home town, home district or ethnic group. Other examples of initiatives with social development objectives include the following: people originating in Kwamang in the Sekyere West District based in the UK have presented building materials towards the completion of a medical laboratory block for the Kwamang Health Centre; the Wives of Ghanaian Diplomats Association in London (WOGDA) has raised more than ₤7,000 for the purchase of mammographic x-ray equipment for the Korle-Bu Teaching Hospital in Accra (the country's premier hospital); a private donation was made by the Akim Swedru diaspora for various items for the visually-impaired in Birim South District; the Ghanaian Nurses Association, London donated to the 'Stadium Tragedy Fund' following many deaths at a football match in the national stadium in 2001. Moral influence is exerted by the clergy of Ghanaian pentecostal and charismatic churches who urge Ghanaians in the UK to extend their influence over their relatives back home, especially among the youth to help curb the spread of AIDS there. Another interesting initiative in the health sector is the METCare Sankofa health insurance plan (SHIP). Developed by Ghana-based financial institutions Metropolitan Insurance Company Ghana Limited and Tristar Financial Services, the scheme will be operated in the UK by Goldcare UK Limited. Subscribers in the UK can insure a dependant resident in Ghana for a monthly premium of £15, while the underwriters agree to meet claims up to a maximum of 10m cedis (£606 at current rates) for outpatient services and 25m cedis (£1516) for admission to any private or public health institution in Ghana (www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/diaspora/).

Most of these initiatives are focused on the south of Ghana, rather than the poorer northern part of the country. A small scale exception was the 'Ghana Day' which took place in St. Mary's RC Primary School in Clapham, London. The purpose was to raise funds and awareness for Afrikids, a UK charity working with abandoned and vulnerable children in Northern Ghana. St Mary's Ghanaians UK was an active member of the organization team (www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/diaspora/).

Business promotion is high on the diaspora agenda as well. 'Ghana Expo 2003' was an exhibition fair in London facilitating Ghanaians in the Diaspora to connect with businesses and services in Ghana (www.ghanaexpo2003.com). The Non-Resident Ghanaians Association, UK and Ireland aims to establish an interest-bearing Non-resident Ghanaian Fund for investment among Ghanaians abroad.

2.4 The Indian diaspora

2.4.1 Background

The origins of the Indian diaspora in the UK lie in the special relationship between the two countries dating back to the 18th century when highly skilled Indians, mainly members of the Parsi and Bengali communities, emigrated as qualified lawyers and doctors. The largest settlements occurred after independence in 1947 when the first influx of primarily male Punjabis came to work in UK's industrial sector. From the 1960s onwards however, the British government imposed increasing restrictions on immigration from the Commonwealth and on unskilled labour migration in particular: this resulted in an increase in family reunification strategies by migrants which fundamentally altered both the nature of Indian migration and settlement patterns as wives and children joined migrants in the UK. Another immigration wave occurred in the later 1960s and early 1970s when people of Indian descent fled East Africa, especially Uganda, for Britain. It is estimated that one in four of the Indians and Pakistanis in Britain have arrived via East Africa. This wave was dominated by Gujaratis, who have primarily entered the small and medium business sector as well as the medical professions. Since then, professions rather than geographical origin have determined flows to Britain; in particular, these include IT professionals (at least two-thirds of all software professionals entering Britain are from India), medical professionals, and workers in the hospitality industry who come from various states of India (Ballard 1994, Khadria 2001, Government of India 2002).

People of Indian origin are the largest ethnic minority in Britain, totalling around 1.2 million (2.11% of the total UK population). The greatest proportion of Indians (45%) hails from the Punjab, followed by those from the Gujarat. Most Indian states are represented in the British Indian population, and so are the followers of the main religions: Hindus, Muslims, Christians, Sikhs and Parsis. Of the 1.2 million, 40% live in Greater London, concentrated in the boroughs of Brent, Ealing, Hounslow, Newham, Redbridge and Wandsworth. Outside London they are concentrated in conurbations such as Leicester, Birmingham and Manchester. A recent Greater London Authority study showed that Indians own 4.4% of London's businesses and employ over 51,000 people (Dewani 2004). UK-resident Indians feature the highest levels of owner-occupation, the highest educational performance at schools, and occupy senior positions in the NHS.

2.4.2 Diaspora infrastructure, networks and activities

The Indian diaspora is highly diverse, reflecting the large size and rich diversity of India. There are over 1000 listed UK-based Indian organizations, although perhaps only a quarter are active. These represent various interests, from regions or states to languages, religions and professions. Religion, caste and linguistic identities find significant space in associations and networks, and cleavages occur along these lines. With reference to closer ties to the homeland, religious and caste conflicts in India have been echoed amongst the diaspora especially in the UK and the US. As far as the diaspora's contribution to development and poverty reduction is concerned, UK-based Indian associations can be broadly grouped as: *Religion-based organizations* (e.g. the Hindu Cultural Society, Indian Muslim Federation, Ahmadiya Muslim Association, Indian Christian Organisation); *organizations based* on *regional or ethnic alignments* (e.g. the Confederation of Gujarati Organisations, Punjab Unity Forum and the Bengali Association); *professional organizations* (e.g., the British International Doctors Association, which has had a long-standing interest in Postgraduate Medical Education in India); *commercial organizations* (e.g., the Indian Development Group [UK] Ltd, the

Indian Forum for Business and the India Group at the London Business School); *alumni organisations* (e.g. Indianreunited.com established in the UK by two NRIs while studying in England, and medical school- and state-oriented organizations such as the Manipal Alumni and Tamil Nadu Doctors' Association); *organizations with a political orientation* (e.g. branches of the main Indian political parties in the UK such as the Indian Overseas Congress and the Friends of the Bharatiya Janata Party or BJP). Perhaps a less partisan grouping is the Indo-British Forum, a cross party discussion group which raises NRI and Indian concerns with the government of the day.

2.4.3 Diaspora engagement in development and poverty reduction

Once perceived as brain drain from India, non-resident Indians (NRIs) have come to be recognized within India as a significant external resource. Indians abroad have traditionally supported their families through remittances and improved the status of their families in the sending communities by investing in the village and improving social or religious infrastructure. Given the diversity of the Indian diaspora, more holistic and equitable efforts around poverty reduction have subsequently been more difficult to sustain.

Recently the Government of India has moved in various ways formally to harness and acknowledge the expertise, wealth and contacts of the diaspora. A recent report by the Singhvi Commission on the Indian diaspora (Government of India 2002) observed that many wealthy Persons of Indian Origin (PIOs, that is people of Indian origin who now hold other nationalities) individually and collectively support projects addressing basic needs such as health, education and infrastructure in their home states and villages in India. For example, many ophthalmologists run mobile eye clinics in India. During times of acute crisis (such as the Gujarat earthquake), community and religious organisations have mobilised significant funds and expertise to help in relief efforts.

There are also negative aspects of diaspora engagement however. Funds have been raised amongst the diaspora, especially in the UK and the US, for associations which use violence to promote their aims. For example, Sewa International is reported to have raised millions of pounds from the British public for humanitarian causes in Gujarat, which was apparently diverted to activities that induced religious violence. Similarly, caste or religious divides among groups in India are being echoed by some community leaders in the UK. More positively, the BJP has recently been trying to gain the support of Sikhs in Britain, the US and Canada, even among known Khalistan sympathisers and those who are blacklisted by the Indian Government. Such political manoeuvring can be seen as an effort to gain a foothold in the strong Sikh lobby, as well to promote the unity and integrity of India. These moves are part of efforts to reduce the risk of conflict surrounding Khalistan, whose cause has been promoted by overseas Sikhs (*Times of India* 14.03.03).

There is pressure for greater political representation in India of NRIs. A recent independent survey conducted by www.IndiaReunited.com suggested that 85% of NRIs believe it would be beneficial to have at least one MP representing them in the Indian Parliament. This political representation could potentially improve confidence among the NRIs and their families in India and lead to further investment (ExpressIndia.com 19.03.04). The passing of the dual citizenship bill in the Rajya Sabha this year for certain countries, of which UK is one, as well as other fiscal measures designed to encourage inward investment by PIOs, could provide a new platform for the role of the UK-based Indian diaspora in India.

2.5 The Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora

2.5.1 Background

The migration of Sri Lankan Tamils to Britain took place in three main waves (Daniel and Thangaraj1995). Like those who came from the majority Sinhalese community, the Tamils who migrated to Britain around and after independence in 1948 were largely professionals and students who came for university or professional studies and were mainly from upper class and upper caste backgrounds in Ceylon (later renamed Sri Lanka). As the Sinhalese-dominated government introduced discriminatory measures against the Tamil minority, increasing numbers sought to go abroad. This stream of migration increased in the 1960s after legislation was passed that made Sinhala the sole official language and thus devalued Tamil as one of the country's national tongues, and relations between the two main ethnic groups, Sinhalese (74%) and Tamils (19%) degenerated into rival nationalisms. Against this background, a second wave of migration to Britain gathered momentum, partly also to anticipate impending immigration legislation (Pirouet 2001). The escalation of communal strife into civil war between government forces and the separatist Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in early 1980s brought another wave of migration which had three components: professionals who used their social capital and networks to gain entry into Britain; those who could afford to travel and could connect themselves through education, retraining (eg as nurses), family union, or limited sponsorship schemes; and poorer people who fled the hostilities at home as refugees, especially after 1983. This latter group of asylum seekers came to dominate Tamil migration to Britain, as elsewhere (Canada, Switzerland, Australia and Scandinavia are other prominent destinations). There is evidence of tension between the different migration streams and cohorts of arrival (Daniel and Thangaraj 1995). Tamils live mainly in London and are concentrated in places such as East Ham, Southall, Wembley, Tooting and Croydon, though the earlier migrants are more widely distributed throughout Britain. The Tamils of the first two waves secured positions in the public sector such as in the NHS, in other white-collar jobs and in the professions. Subsequent waves have ventured into many other avenues, especially into small businesses such as retail. Given this disparate and volatile background, the size of the Tamil diaspora of Sri Lankan origin (hereafter referred to as the Tamil diaspora) in the UK is the subject of much debate, not least because the UK Census has not distinguished Tamils from Sri Lankan nationals generally. A reasonable estimate of the UK resident Tamil population is between 70,000 and100,000.

2.5.2 Diaspora infrastructure, networks and activities

Like the other diasporas under review, and reflecting in part the waves in which they arrived, the Tamil diaspora varies in its forms and levels of activity. Most are well networked, not only among themselves but also with the sending communities. UK-based Tamils have a large number of organisations for the size of the population. These associations have allegiances to various parts of the north and east of the country, where most Tamils live, and to professions, religions and educational networks. Political and caste identities are represented in associations and networks, and cleavages occur along these lines. As in the Indian case, Tamil organizations in Britain broadly include: *religion-based organizations* (mainly Hindu, although there is also an active Christian population); *alumni organizations* (which form an important source of exchange of information, knowledge, and transfer of resources for the development of the schools and universities); *professional organizations* (engineers for example have formed an organisation called Tamil Eelam Economic Development Organisation (TEEDOR-UK) to

contribute knowledge and finance towards infrastructural development); *welfare organizations* (including organisations that address the aftermath of the conflict such as the Tamil Rehabilitation Organisation (TRO), the Tamil Relief Centre, and the Tamil Orphans Trust); *gender-related fora* (for instance, as well as general support for the resettlement of Tamil refugees in Britain, the Tamil Refugee Centre (TRC) provides specialised services for female refugees who have experienced trauma);and *organizations with a political orientation* (some of which empathise with factions involved in the political struggle in Sri Lanka). Indeed, like both Sinhalese and Tamil society in the homeland, many of the welfare and other organizations are highly politicized: the TRO for example is closely identified with the LTTE, which until recently (when it was banned as a terrorist organization) had its international headquarters in London.

2.5.3 Diaspora engagement in development and poverty reduction

The Tamil diaspora's contribution to development projects and poverty reduction schemes in their sending communities has been circumscribed by decades of conflict (Van Hear 2002 and 2003). Many factors constrain useful interventions: concern for physical safety in conditions of conflict, issues of access, government intransigence, and the stand of the Tamil organizations involved in the armed struggle. The escalation of the conflict in the later 1980s and 1990s left much of the humanitarian and developmental work in the hands of international agencies: there is a thriving Sri Lankan civil society, but local ngos tend to be subcontractors to the internationals. The contribution of the Tamil diaspora has thus been largely in the shape of remittances to families or connected parties, or in response to calls for donations from various groups and organizations. Significant numbers of the Tamil diaspora have given tacit or explicit support to the armed struggle through voluntary or involuntary contributions to the LTTE.

The Norwegian-brokered peace accord of February 2002 has however opened up the possibilities for reconstruction and development-oriented interventions. Indeed, it was arguably partly diaspora disenchantment with the violent strategy of the LTTE, together with western circumscription of the organization before and after Sept 11 2001, that drove the LTTE to the negotiating table in 2002. As already indicated, some diaspora initiatives in the Tamil areas are closely allied to the LTTE (by choice or compulsion). The TRO for example was formed in 1985 as a self-help organization for Tamil refugees from Sri Lanka in South India at that time. Today, the TRO's head office is located in the northern town of Kilinochchi (also the headquarters of the LTTE) and branch offices have been opened throughout the country. The TRO has affiliates in many countries throughout the world, including the main destinations for Tamils, such as Canada, Australia, Switzerland, the UK and Scandinavia. The aims of the organization include providing short-term relief and long-term rehabilitation to the displaced and war-affected Tamils; channeling expertise and funds to promote economic development; raising the living conditions of displaced Tamils; seeking international aid from governments and ngos for the TRO's operations in Sri Lanka; and canvassing public and political opinion internationally to highlight the plight of displaced Tamils in North-eastern Sri Lanka. Apart from the politicised interventions of the TRO and like organizations, there are less high profile diaspora initiatives, often small scale, in primary health centres, eye clinics, IT and other support for schools (particularly by alumni groups), and procurement of medical equipment. However, while the potential role of the Tamil diaspora in the reconstruction and development of sending communities is significant, it is far from being realised. Harnessing this potential requires a stable polity, which, given divisions within both the majority Sinhalese and the minority Tamil (and Muslim) populations, is still some way off.

2.6 The Chinese diaspora

2.6.1 Background

Chinese migration to Britain has a history of at least 150 years. Until the Second World War, Chinese communities lived around Britain's main ports, the oldest and largest in Liverpool and London. These communities consisted of a transnational and highly mobile population of Cantonese seamen and small numbers of more permanent residents who ran shops, restaurants and boarding houses that catered for them (Parker 1998). The number of Chinese seamen (who mainly worked as stokers) dwindled sharply during the Depression and the subsequent decline of coal-fired intercontinental shipping after the Second World War. In the 1950s they were replaced by a rapidly growing population of Chinese from the rural areas in Hong Kong's New Territories. Opening restaurants across Britain, they established firm migration chains and soon dominated the Chinese presence in Britain (Watson 1976; Watson 1977b). In the 1960s and 1970s, they were joined by increasing numbers of Chinese students and economic migrants from Malaysia and Singapore.

Chinese migration to Britain continued to be dominated by these groups until the 1980s, when rising living standards and urbanization in Hong Kong, Singapore and somewhat later Malaysia gradually reduced the volume of chain migration from the New Territories. At the same time the number of students from the People's Republic of China began to rise. Since the early 1990s the UK has also witnessed a rising inflow of economic migrants from areas in China without any previous migratory link to the UK, or even elsewhere in Europe. A relatively small number of Chinese enter Britain legally as skilled migrants. However, most migrants arrive here to work in unskilled jobs, originally exclusively in the Chinese ethnic sector (catering, Chinese stores and wholesale firms), but increasingly also in employment outside this sector (for instance in agriculture and construction). Migrants who enter Britain for unskilled employment are from both rural and urban backgrounds. Originally, Fujianese migrants were the dominant flow, but more recently increasing numbers of migrants from the Northeast of China have arrived in the UK as well. Migrants now tend to come from an increasing number of regions of origin. Almost all Chinese unskilled migrants enter the country illegally and work in the nether economy, as the Morecombe Bay tragedy of February 2004 showed. Many claim asylum in-country, avoiding deportation after exhausting their appeals. In the 2001 Census, the population enumerated as Chinese totalled 247,000.

2.6.2 Diaspora infrastructure, networks and activities

In recent decades, Chinese associations and Chinese community centres have established increasingly active links with local government in Britain. The construction or renewal of the Chinatowns in Manchester, Liverpool and London is a tangible outcome of such cooperation (Beck 2004; Christiansen 2003). Simultaneously, the Chinese local and national governments and the Chinese consulate in London have become much more involved in overseas Chinese associational life. The consulate liaises directly with many associations and umbrella organizations such as the London Chinatown Chinese Association, and embassy or consular officials are routinely present at major festive occasions or fund-raising initiatives. In Britain, as elsewhere where there are significant numbers of recent Chinese immigrants, many new associations have sprung up in addition to the associations of the established overseas Chinese. Some of these have become part of the established Chinatown associational life, particularly those that represent immigrants, such as the Fujianese, whose employment and entrepreneurship

are similar to or dependent on long-established overseas Chinese groups. Other associations represent students or former students from a particular place in China, or represent Chinese working in a particular profession in the UK. The latter are organised by the Federation of Chinese Professional Societies in the UK. Chinese students at most British universities have set up Chinese students associations, coordinated nationally by the Chinese Students and Scholars Association, UK. Many Chinese associations, both those of established overseas Chinese and of new immigrants, have extensive transnational contacts with Chinese governments and/or counterpart associations elsewhere in Europe, North America, Southeast Asia and China itself, often through European or worldwide umbrella associations.

2.6.3 Diaspora engagement in development and poverty reduction

An elaborate institutional structure is now in place that ties overseas Chinese into selected parts of the administration in the region of origin (or ancestry). Both local and national governments actively foster links with overseas Chinese communities by sending and receiving individuals and delegations and by participating in periodic conferences of overseas Chinese from their region (Liu 1998; Nyíri 2001; Pieke et al. 2004: chapter 5).

Chinese in Britain have established numerous business connections with China. However, such connections are not fundamentally different from those of non-Chinese businesses with China. In the 1990s, China rapidly became the manufacturing powerhouse of the world economy, particularly for light industrial products, and the Chinese in the UK have simply capitalised on their Chinese language and cultural skills to trade or invest in China, usually without facilitation by the Chinese government or overseas Chinese associations. Business contacts are usually not primarily with ancestral homelands, but with areas where investment or trade opportunities are best. Contacts between highly skilled Chinese in the UK, usually former students, and Chinese business partners likewise usually have little to do with home town connections. Such projects typically involve technology transfer to China where the UK partner provides the technology and the Chinese partner the capital and production facilities. The Chinese government is actively promoting such links through trade fairs and conferences. Considerable importance is attached to this policy area, involving the Science and Technology Department of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Bureau and the Ministry of Personnel. The latter is keen to recruit highly skilled Chinese emigrants for employment in China and their involvement in business links between migrants and Chinese investors is one way of doing so.

Chinese in the UK are actively involved in fundraising for charitable purposes in China, although the sums involved are relatively modest (usually ranging from a few thousand pounds to around £100,000), especially compared to the amounts raised in the larger and richer communities in Southeast Asia and North America. Funds have been raised for the SARS epidemic, floods and poverty alleviation in China, although as a rule not for the home areas of overseas Chinese. An example of the latter was a fundraiser for schools in China held in Portsmouth in March 2004, involving representatives of Chinese women's organizations across the UK and Europe, the wife of the Chinese ambassador to the UK, and eight non-Chinese female mayors of British cities. Fundraising in the UK usually is part of a global mobilisation of overseas Chinese, and the money is perhaps less important than raising patriotic awareness among overseas Chinese. Chinese satellite TV stations play an important part in such mobilization.

3. Synthesis of lessons from the case studies

3.1 Migration histories, backgrounds and distribution

Despite originating from countries with diverse social, political, economic and cultural backgrounds, ranging from countries in or emerging from conflict (Somalia, Sri Lanka) to more stable low income (Ghana, Nigeria, India) and lower middle income (China, Sri Lanka) countries, the six diaspora groups reviewed reveal rather similar migration patterns. Early arrivals (seaman in the case of Somalis and Chinese, students in other cases) tend to have formed a core from which the diaspora expands and consolidates. Migration for education and/or professional advancement has played a large role, with students and professionals often making up a substantial part of the early diaspora: often these are also political dissidents. Others may have migrated for livelihood purposes, as labour migrants or business people. These forms of migration often later transmute into family reunion as households form and become established. From the late 1980s, asylum migration has formed a significant stream for all six cases, even if the grounds for asylum among many of these migrants may have been slim. In terms of distribution in the UK, the cases vary: some (Somalis, Chinese, Indians) have tended to form enclaves, to differing degrees, while others (Nigerians, Ghanaians, Tamils) tend not to be concentrated in particular locations, although Greater London is the main site of residence for all six groups. The size of the UK-based diaspora in each case relative to the home country population and the global diaspora varies considerably and is presented in table 3.

Table 3 Country cases and their diasporas

Case	*World Bank Classification*	*Pop (2002) (millions)*	*Global diaspora (millions)*	*UK diaspora (c2001)*
Somalia	Low income/ Least developed country	9.4	1m?	c95,000
Nigeria	Low income	133	3+	c100,000?
Ghana	Low income	20	2.5?	c56,000
India	Low income	1,000	20	1.2m
Sri Lanka Tamils	Lower middle income	Sri Lanka:19 Tamils: c2.5	0.7?	<100,000
China	Lower middle income	1,300	40	247,000

Sources
Classification and Population: World Bank, World Development Indicators 2003, UNCTAD The least developed counties report 2002. Global diaspora figures are guesstimates, which vary widely and are unreliable. UK diaspora figures are also guesstimates, based on projections from available census data: however it is sometimes unclear whether the figures include second generation people of migrant background born in the UK and holding British citizenship, as well as those born abroad.

3.2 Diaspora infrastructure, networks and activities

In its submission in response to the UK government's White Paper on Globalisation and Development in 2000, AFFORD (2000) usefully identified a number of different diaspora actors and the different ways in which they could influence the homeland. Among the kinds of *actors* identified by AFFORD were individuals, hometown associations, ethnic associations, alumni associations, religious associations, professional associations, development ngos, investment/business groups, political groups, national development groups, welfare/refugee groups, supplementary schools, and virtual organisations. Among the *activities* AFFORD pointed to were

- Person-to-person transfers of money, consumer goods, mainly to the immediate and extended family
- Community-to-community transfers for constructive but also destructive purposes
- Identity building/awareness raising in current home about the ancestral home, either with members of the same groups or with the wider society
- Lobbying in current home on issues relating to ancestral home, target politicians of current home, or politicians of ancestral home
- Trade with and investment in ancestral home, including electronic commerce
- Transfer of knowledge, values and ideas
- Professional support for development
- Payment of taxes in ancestral home

All of these kinds of actors and activities (except perhaps payment of taxes) feature strongly in the six groups reviewed. In addition the study reveals the following:

- The different backgrounds, routes, means of migration and statuses outlined in the case studies translate into great diversity within diasporas along many different axes, such as class, caste, clan, gender, generation, religion and ethnicity. There is of course nothing peculiar to diaspora groups about this, since civil society generally is subject to many internal cleavages. Such internal divisions are reflected in the diversity of diaspora organizations, as the cases also show.
- All the cases manifest a great number of organizations, though not all are necessarily active.
- The cases show rather different balances of civil society and business engagement, the latter featuring rather more strongly among the Chinese and Indian diaspora than among the other groups reviewed.
- The balance of individual and collective transfers also varies case by case, with significant implications for development and poverty reduction.
- Another feature of note, which also has development implications, is the importance of diaspora links *across destination/host countries,* such as among Somalis in Scandinavia, the Netherlands and UK, among Ghanaians in Germany, the Netherlands and the UK, and among Tamils in Canada, Switzerland, Norway and the UK. There are also significant links *across diaspora groups*, such as associations which include Ghanaians, Nigerians and other African diaspora groups (AFFORD being a good example of the forging of such links). Modifying Mohan (2002, see introduction, above) we might term this potential for development within such networks *development across diaspora.*
- Home country outreach has become a growing feature of all the cases reviewed. There is scope for greater engagement with different levels of government – national, regional, district and local. The following table summarizes the policies that countries of origin have instituted, or are discussing, that reach out to 'their' diasporas as a development resource.

Table 4. Home government policies towards diasporas

Policies	*Somalia*	*Nigeria*	*Ghana*	*India*	*Sri Lanka*	*China*
Voting rights			D	D		
Dual citizenship			X	D		
Representation/Ministries for diasporas	D			D		X
Entry concessions for diaspora with host country nationality				X (PIOs)		
Foreign currency accounts		D	D	X		
Incentives for FDI		D	D	D X		X
Customs/import incentives		D	D	D X		X
Property ownership	X	X	X	X	X	
Special economic zones				X		

X policies directed towards diaspora instituted
D policies under discussion

3.3 Diaspora engagement in development and poverty reduction

Ali et al (2001) introduced the simple distinction between the *capacity* and the *desire* to engage in activities which influence development at home (see tables 1 and 2 above, pages 5 and 6). By *capacity* is meant, among other things, the resources and assets that diaspora groups may have at their disposal, and their ability to deploy them. The *desire* to engage is shaped by a variety of conditions, among them secure legal, residential and employment status in the host country. This simple scheme helps us to understand the factors which encourage or discourage engagement in development activities among the groups reviewed.

In addition, our study highlights the following features of the UK-based diasporas reviewed:

- The six cases reviewed reveal many positive outcomes from diaspora engagement, in relief from war and disaster (Somalis, Tamils, Ghanaians, Indians), post war reconstruction (Somalis, Tamils), and in development, especially in the spheres of education and health (all groups)
- But there are also outcomes that are negative or at best ambivalent, as when diaspora groups (Tamils, Somalis, Indians) support warring parties and warlords and help to foment conflict, or when their interventions contribute to socio-economic differentiation (all groups).
- Divisions within diasporas may mean very different levels and intensities of engagement in development-related activities.
- Diaspora members are often willing to support development in the homeland, but often they are primarily interested in the advancement of their own particular group or sectional interest. This raises issues of equity which may have serious implications for poverty reduction strategies.

- Apparently positive diaspora interventions can conceal less enlightened motives. For example, pro-democracy rhetoric may be a cover for the opposition of particular interest groups to current regimes at home, and such opposition may be more for the end of winning power than the advancement of democratic values at home.
- Diaspora engagement raises issues of representativeness and accountability, particularly in the political sphere. As the notions 'long distance nationalism' (Anderson 1992) or 'armchair nationalism' suggest, diaspora groups are often able, through their considerable resources, to exert substantial influence on the homeland without having to bear the consequences of their interventions, particularly in terms of social tension, conflict and violence. This raises questions about the extent to which the most vocal and active among the diaspora are representative of the diaspora as a whole, and, even more contentiously, to what extent and with what validity can the diaspora speak for those back in the homeland, particularly in countries embroiled in violent conflict.
- These negative or ambivalent dimensions notwithstanding, on balance diaspora engagement in development, poverty reduction, conflict reduction, peace building, and the extension of democratic values and practices is positive, and there is unused potential capacity yet to be explored in these areas. One under-explored dimension for UK-based diaspora (other than the Indians and Chinese) is the extent to which diasporas in affluent countries like Britain can help to develop markets for products and services generated in the homeland (Guarnizo and Smith 1998). As in the classic case of Indian and Chinese cuisine, such products and services have the potential to extend beyond the diaspora group to the wider host society population, and if encouraged by deft interventions could perhaps help to provide markets and income for poor households in the homeland.
- AFFORD's notion of the '3Rs' – remittances, return and retrieval – reminds us that the same diaspora members may engage in a range of interrelated activities. For example a group of doctors may remit money, support the training of doctors at home or help buy hospital equipment for use there, offer their expertise during periodic visits home (retrieval), all of which may pave the way for their permanent return to work in the homeland. Different groups deploy different forms of 'capital' – financial, human, intellectual, social, political and so on – at different times and in different ways. As diaspora groups feel more settled as a community, their collective attentions (as opposed to their individual motivations which differ) turn to their home regions, so the orientation will broaden from the UK to the UK plus the homeland.

4. Policy lessons for DfID

4.1 General policy lessons

Hitherto, migration and development have constituted separate policy fields (Van Hear and Sorensen 2003). These fields are marked by differing policy approaches that have sometimes hindered coordination and cooperation. For migration authorities, the control of flows to the UK (and to the EU more widely) is a high priority issue, as is the integration of migrants into the labour market and wider society. On the other hand, development agencies may fear that the objectives of development policy are jeopardized if migration is taken into consideration: can long term goals of global poverty reduction be achieved if short term migration policy interests are to be met? Can partnership with developing countries be real if preventing further migration is the principal migration policy goal? These tensions will be familiar to those working within DfID.

While there may be good reasons to keep some policies separate, conflicting policies are costly and counter-productive. More importantly, there is unused potential in mutually supportive policies - in constructive activities and interventions that are common to both fields and which may have positive effects on poverty reduction, development, and the prevention or containment of violent conflicts.

As the above sections have shown, a number of factors suggest the need for a reappraisal of the developmental role of migrants. First, the remittances sent by migrants and refugees (which are outside the main remit of this study) are likely to be double the size of aid and may be at least as well targeted at the poor in both conflict-ridden and stable developing countries. Second, as indicated above, diasporas are engaged in a variety of transnational practices (such as relief, investment, business, cultural exchange, lobbying and political advocacy) with direct and indirect effects on international development cooperation. Third, an increasing number of migrant-sending states, including those reviewed above, recognize that migrant diasporas can advance national development from abroad and have begun to endow 'their' migrants with special rights, protections and recognitions. These and other trends point to the potential of migrant diasporas as a development resource and to seeking links between aid and migrants' transnational practices. However, realising that potential is not straightforward, as the following indicates.

Migrants influence the development of their home countries by the resources and assets they transfer or bring back with them. These resources are not evenly distributed, however, and there is a tension between the remittances migrants and refugees send and the return or repatriation of migrants and refugees. Transfers, both monetary and non-monetary, are an important resource for many households in developing countries, and because they move directly from person to person, they may have a more direct impact than other resource flows. But the benefits of remittances are selective. Though not exclusively, they tend to go to the better-off households within the better-off communities in the better-off countries of the developing world, since these households, communities and countries tend to be the source of migrants.

In societies in conflict or emerging from conflict, transfers from abroad help families to survive and to sustain communities in crisis – both in countries of origin and in neighbouring countries of first asylum. After conflict, transfers are potentially a powerful

resource for rehabilitation and reconstruction. But again there is selectivity: these transfers reach relatively few households – although there may be some pro-poor redistribution through networks of kin and friendship. At the same time, remittances, other transfers, and international lobbying by diasporas may help to perpetuate the conflicts or crises that beset such households and communities, by providing support for armed conflict.

Return of migrants and refugees can also be a substantial force for development and reconstruction of the home country, not least in terms of the financial, human and social capital migrants and refugees may bring home with them. However there is the dilemma that return of migrants will reduce the flow of remittances and other transfers to the home country. Similarly, if the resolution of conflict or crisis is accompanied by large scale repatriation, the source of remittances will obviously diminish, raising potential perhaps for instability and further conflict. There is an argument against mass repatriation on these grounds.

4.1.1 Building on the development potential of migrants

Many governments of migrant-sending countries have recognised the potential of their citizens abroad in recent years, and international development agencies are beginning to do likewise. Migrants' incentives to participate in home country development or reconstruction depend on the extent to which they are or feel incorporated in their home nation-states as well as in the countries that host them (see table 2). In partnership with developing countries and diasporas, DfID and development agencies could work towards:

- securing the rights of migrants
- cutting the cost of money transfers
- encouraging migrants to invest in community development initiatives in their home countries, and, in particular, to engage with pro-poor drivers of change at home.

Beyond seeing migrants as a source of resources for development and reconstruction, steps could be taken to give diasporas a more active voice. These steps could include involving diasporas in international fora to coordinate resource flows from donors and from diasporas for development and reconstruction. DfID has already taken some useful steps in this direction, and this should continue (notwithstanding the very real problems of bringing together fissiparous diaspora groups). In addition, diasporas could be allowed greater influence in peace-building and reconciliation efforts. Since nongovernmental organisations have become increasingly involved both in advocacy and in the delivery of aid, and often have direct lines of communication with diaspora groups, they are well placed to act as interlocutors promoting diaspora participation. DfID should assist with this process in a 'hands-off' way.

It should also be recognised that integration into the host community and return to the country of origin are not mutually exclusive: a balance needs to be struck between helping migrants who wish to return to do so, and accommodating those who can contribute more to their home societies by remaining abroad. DfID could promote research into which cohorts and groups within particular diasporas can help with home country development and in which ways.

4.2 Specific policy suggestions

4.2.1 DfID's current engagement with diasporas and development

Putting into practice the objectives articulated in the 1997 White Paper, DfID is already engaged in a number of initiatives which engage with diaspora groups. These include investigation into mechanisms for transfer of skills, experience and other resources from migrant communities in Europe to their countries of origin, notably Ghana and Sierra Leone in West Africa; research into the drain of skilled health sector personnel from Ghana and the Caribbean; assistance with the UNDP Diaspora Trust Fund programme in Nigeria which aims to promote the return of skilled and educated Nigerians in the diaspora to the homeland; exploring the possibility of support for the UK-based Dalit Solidarity Network, and consultations with the Indian diaspora on the Country Assistance Plan; and support for Connections for Development, a network of black and ethnic minority community organisations which aims to mobilise civil society for action on development. It should be said that these are rather limited interventions, most of them are still at a very preliminary stage, and they hardly meet the expectations raised in the 1997 White Paper. We therefore support the criticisms made by AFFORD in their response to the 2000 White Paper on Globalisation and Development (AFFORD 2000, see below). In what follows we suggest some ways in which DfID could help to meet its own objectives with regard to promoting positive linkages between diaspora and development.

4.2.2 Adopt AFFORD proposals

In its submission in response to the UK government's White Paper on Globalisation and Development in 2000, the African Foundation for Development (AFFORD) made a number of innovative proposals for DfID engagement with UK-based diaspora groups. Several of AFFORD's policy suggestions are reaffirmed and supported by our research for this report. However, few of these proposals have been taken up by the British government. Among the AFFORD proposals which we strongly support are:

- The notion that 'The diaspora, as investors in, welfare providers to, and knowledge communities about developing regions merit as serious an engagement [as the private sector] with DfID and other government departments with a development brief' (2000: 12)
- Drawing UK-based diaspora groups into the formulation of Country Strategy or Assistance Plans, Poverty Reduction Strategy Planning, and other instruments of UK development policy.
- Making greater efforts to bridge the UK's two parallel development and relief efforts, one mainstream-led (i.e., DfID plus UK-based NGOs engaged in development and relief) and the other diaspora-led. While some diversity is healthy in the mechanisms for the pursuit of development and relief, this diffusion of effort in the development arena may well be wasteful. DfID might consider creating incentives such as a partnership fund (akin to its Civil Society Challenge Fund) to encourage 'mainstream' development and diaspora groups to engage constructively with each other.
- The formation of a dedicated unit within DfID (along the lines of the private sector unit) to engage with UK-based diaspora groups, and to assess the different strength, weaknesses and potential of different groups (and of sections within particular diaspora groups).

Other policy lessons from the study, both positive and negative, include the following:

4.2.3 Recognise diversity within diasporas

Like civil society generally, diasporas are far from homogeneous social groups. Often they are nominally derived from common national origins, but such labels often mask serious divisions along ethnic, religious, linguistic and regional lines. Political differences – in many cases coinciding with ethnic or other criteria – further add to the complex social makeup of diasporas. A key question for DfID and other agencies interested in working with specific diasporas thus arises: who speaks, with any kind of authority or democratic representation, on behalf of given diasporas? Which parts of the fissiparous Nigerian or Ghanaian diasporas should contribute to the development plans for those countries? Which parts of the fractious Afghan or Somali diasporas should participate in the Consolidated Appeals Process? And should the LTTE have a voice in reconstruction plans for Sri Lanka? In light of the ethnic/regional or other specific homeland-targeted focus among diasporic organizations, DfID and other agencies should recognise that many diaspora groups interested in development will primarily be concerned with development as it affects the subgroup or region of origin in the homeland -- perhaps even to the detriment of other subgroups and/or regions. DfID may thus need to choose between generalised development activities (promoting good governance, liberalised economy, democracy) and supporting particular interests, sections or areas of the homeland communities (bearing in mind that migrants do not tend to come from the poorest of the poor households, and therefore the poor are not necessarily the beneficiaries of migration, see below). Following from these observations, DfID should rigorously research the composition and character of the diaspora and the organizations with which it seeks to engage, with a view to contributing to broad forms of development and poverty reduction rather than to forms which privilege one group over another.

4.2.4 Acknowledge diaspora source areas are not always the most poverty-prone

If poverty reduction is the prime aim, working with migrant diasporas does not necessarily direct financial and other resources to the areas that most need them. Migrants may invest capital in or transfer technologies to areas of their home country that promise the best return on the investment; these may be more developed regions, and not necessarily the migrant's area of origin. Even if migrants transfer funds or know-how to their areas of origin, it should be borne in mind that emigration areas are usually not located in the poorest parts of the country that are most in need of assistance. On the other hand, charitable donations raised through diaspora networks are often targeted at poverty-alleviation or disaster relief and are intended to end up where they are most needed. However, the sums involved are modest compared with remittances or business investments, and their most important contribution is perhaps raising awareness among members of the diaspora, linking them in a tangible way with the people (beyond their own kin and communities) and government of the country of origin. DfID could explore ways in which UK-based diasporas might connect with pro-poor drivers of change in their homelands.

4.2.5 Take account of ambivalent policy lessons

Given the debate over the last ten years or so about humanitarian and development aid ('Do no harm' etc, Anderson 1999), DfID is already all too well aware of the need to avoid interventions that unintentionally do damage to development and poverty reduction prospects: for example, those that play into conflicts, undermine the livelihood capacity of the poor, or encourage greater differentiation. Some recent interventions in the migration-development arena add to these ambivalent lessons. One such is the case of Somscan, alluded to in the case study on Somalia, above: some of the lessons from this case, which may be applicable to others, are presented in box 1, page 9.

4.2.6 Recognise and build on linkages across diasporas

DfID should look into the possibilities of support for initiatives that involve diaspora links *across destination/host countries,* such as Somalis in Scandinavia, the Netherlands and UK, Ghanaians in Germany, the Netherlands and the UK, and Tamils in Canada, Switzerland, Norway and the UK. It should also support links *across diaspora groups*, seen in associations such as AFFORD, which include Ghanaians, Nigerians and other African diaspora groupings. Modifying Mohan (2002, see introduction, above) we might term this *development across diaspora.* DfID could explore support for meetings and fora that strengthen such transnational links across diaspora.

4.2.7 Foster markets in and beyond the diaspora for homeland products

Taking the cue from the spread of Indian and Chinese cuisine, now taken for granted as mainstream in British society, there is unused potential in fostering markets for products and services produced in diaspora homelands; and these markets can extend beyond consumption of such products and services within particular diasporas alone, as Indian and Chinese catering shows. This is already happening to some extent among other diasporas: for example the expanding market for African and Caribbean vegetables, other foodstuffs, and clothing). DfID could explore how such markets could embrace poorer producers, rather than industrial and large scale commercial producers in the homeland, through initiatives like Fairtrade.

4.2.8 Connect asylum-seekers/refugees with development initiatives

A special highly skilled workers programme for refugees could be encouraged, aimed at the international labour market as well as UK labour market needs. This would build upon the study by Praxis (2002), funded by UNHCR, which investigated the employment potential of refugees in the international development sector. Based on interviews with 238 refugees in London, the Praxis study found that 75% of respondents said they would consider working in developing countries. DfID might assess the skills of the refugees concerned and attempt to match their skills with development projects and programmes. They could be offered refresher courses in their professions to update them, to make their qualifications compatible with UK standards, and to attune their skills to the conditions in the locations where they might be sent. This might involve placement in a development NGO such as Oxfam. From a Home Office perspective, this would present an alternative to entry through the asylum system, and thus might modestly help to relieve pressure on that system. The introduction of such a programme would thus benefit from the collaboration of DfID, the Home Office/IND/Work Permits UK, the Department of Education, the Department of Work and Pensions, and other ministries and departments.

4.2.9 Encourage transfer of expertise

There are many experienced and skilled people in diaspora who would be willing to contribute for a defined period among the sending communities. Their expertise could have far-reaching positive effects, not only in the service sector such as health and education, but also in promoting viable business environments. The recognition of such contributions by the diaspora members would encourage skill transfer. DfID could work with and encourage the UNDP to further the TOKTEN programme, which is running successfully in 35 developing countries currently. This also relates to the Praxis proposals outlined above.

4.2.10 Develop new partnership projects

There is a great potential for partnership in development/poverty reduction projects by drawing on the technical know-how and experience of the diaspora coupled with their geographical, logistical and cultural knowledge of the locale under consideration by DfID (another suggestion made earlier by AFFORD). Such partnership projects could bring into play key individuals and associations within the diaspora with DfID support, so that the participants feel that they are able to contribute to accountable and transparent developmental projects. There is also scope for more collaboration with international agencies that are undertaking initiatives in this arena. For example, the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) is developing databases for various migrant origin countries (such as Zimbabwe) which include detailed information on those members of the diaspora willing to participate in their development efforts. Cooperation between DfID and IOM would obviously be helpful, not least to share knowledge and to avoid duplication of effort.

4.2.11 Work with different levels of homeland government

National and particularly local governments in the homeland are crucial partners in directing diaspora contributions toward developmental goals. However, national and local governments, and the state agencies within them, often have rather different and sometimes conflicting agendas. DfID needs to identify governmental partners which share one or more of its specific developmental goals.

4.2.12 Coordinating office

DfID could do more to promote greater coordination of diaspora and aid agencies' activities for development and poverty reduction purposes. This might help to maintain good governance in the domain, which is crucial in conditions of conflict and transition. Such interventions might also help to allay anxieties among donors about the use and outcome of their contributions in fulfilling stated goals.

4.2.13 Participate actively in the UN Global Commission on International Migration

DfID should lobby for full and active UK government participation (currently rather low key) in this forum – launched in January 2004 at the request of UN Secretary General Kofi Annan -- to make it a success. For the first time on this scale, this forum brings together migrant-sending and migrant-receiving countries, with possibilities for real dialogue (if influential countries like the UK play a positive role). DfID might also lobby for diaspora voices to be heard in this arena as in other international fora of this kind.

4.2.14 Explore conversation with the diaspora

Finally, DfID could explore the concept of a 'Conversation' with diaspora groups to access the views on development of a cross section of the diaspora in the UK, as well as to find out how diaspora members see their role in poverty reduction and development projects. Such a 'conversation' could build on existing diaspora fora, or where necessary build new ones in collaboration with diaspora groupings. As well as the established elders, younger and second generation diaspora members should be actively engaged. As suggested above, there are transnational networks, involving diaspora links across destination/host countries, which could be mobilised towards these ends. The establishment of a dedicated unit within DfID could be a vehicle to this end, as well as to the achievement of other measures suggested in this report.

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Annex II Contributors, Interviewees, Organizations

This is an indicative list of UK-based diaspora organizations of the groups reviewed, some of which have been consulted in the course of this study.

Somalis

See www.somalilandforum.com for web links

Oxford House – local community organisation in Bethnal Green, which fund-raises for, among others, the Edna Aden Maternity Hospital in Somaliland - www.ednahospital.netfirms.com - www.oxfordhouse.org.uk

Horn Stars – community youth organisation in Brent, which set up Ruunki Development Initiatives (Ruudi) with diaspora funding. www.ruunki.org.uk - www.hornstars.org.uk

Somali Professionals Trust - harnesses skills and energies of Somali professionals around the world to promote poverty reduction, literacy and education. www.spt.org.uk

Somaliland Forum - diaspora internet site that supports projects in Somaliland, e.g. University of Hargeysa, members includes people in the diaspora. www.somalilandforum

Himilo Relief and Development Association - NGO founded by Somali intellectuals in Netherlands, run by Somali diaspora communities, focuses on poverty reduction and basic education. www.hirda.org

Somali Environmental Protection and Anti-Desertification Programme (SEPADO) - organisation based in United Arab Emirates. http://members.tripod.com/~sepado/

Nigerians

See www.afford-uk.org for web links

African Foundation for Development (AFFORD), Ground Floor, 31/33 Bondway, London SW8 1SJ. Tel. 020 7587 3900, Fax 020 7587 3919

ABANTU for Development – regional office for Europe, 1 Winchester House, 11 Cranmer Road, London, SW9 6EJ, Tel. 44 207 8200066, Fax 44 207 820088
Regional office for West Africa, PO Box 1-A, 4 Independence Avenue, Accra-North, Accra, Ghana, Tel. 233 21 246495.

Britain-Nigeria Association, 2 Vincent Street, London, SW1P 4LD,
Tel. 020 7828 5588
Britain-Nigeria Association, c/o The British Council 11, Alfred Rewane Road, PO Box 3702, Ikoyi, LAGOS, Nigeria, Tel. +234 (0)1 2692188-92

Dunamis Impact, P.O. Box 231, Edgware, HA8 0BQ, Tel. 020 8959 6961

Igbo Cultural Support Network (ICSN), 70-74 City Road, London EC1Y 2BJ, Tel. 0870 742 9848

Nigerian High Commission London, 9 Northumberland Avenue London WC2 N 5BX, Tel. 020 7839 1244

Nigerians in the Diaspora Europe (NIDOE), Southbank House, Black Prince Road. London, SE1 7SJ, Tel. 020 7793 4024

Women of Nigeria International, 54 Camberwell Road, London SE5 0EN.

Young Igbos Social Club (YIBOSC), P.O. Box 23309, London, SE16 3DB, Tel. 07957 628 941.

Ghanaians

See www.ghanaweb.com and www.afford-uk.org for web links

ABANTU for Development – regional office for Europe, 1 Winchester House, 11 Cranmer Road, London, SW9 6EJ, Tel. 44 207 8200066, Fax 44 207 820088
Regional office for West Africa, PO Box 1-A,
4 Independence Avenue, Accra-North, Accra, Ghana, Tel. 233 21 246495,
Fax: 233 21 246496

Gadangme Heritage, 48 Court Road, South Norwood, London, SE25 4BN, Tel. 0208 7713 769

Ghana Union London, 431 Caledonian Road, London, N7 2LT, Tel. 020 7700 5634

Ghana Refugee Welfare Group, 5 Westminster Bridge Road, London, SE1 7XW, Tel. 020 7620 1430

Ghanaian Community Development Trust, St Olave's Church Woodberry Dn, Hackney, LONDON, N4 2TW, Tel. 0208 809 5846

Ghana High Commission in London, 13 Belgrave Square, London, SW1X 8PN, Tel. 020 7235 4142

Ghana Welfare Association, 547-551 High Road Leytonstone, London E11 4PB, Tel. 020 85589311

Ghanaian Catholic Chaplaincy UK, 212 Sangley Road, London, SE6 2JS, Tel. 020 8355 8360

Indians

The Confederation of Indian Organisations maintains a substantial list of Indian associations in the UK (see http://www.cio.org.uk). The following list provides examples of organizations with interests in development issues in India.

Dr. Ambedkar Memorial Trust, 46, Brenthurst Road, London, NW10 2DU, Tel. 0181 459 8450. Raises awareness of the rights of Dalits in India.

Association of Indian Organisations, 134, Berkley Street Glasgow, G3 7HY, Tel. 0141 248 7307

Asian Foundation for Help, The Heaven, Grove Park Road, London, SE9 4NU, Tel. 0181 857 8965. A community organization that raises funds for those who need help in India with those who can help in different areas of development.

British Organization for People of Indian Origin B.O.P.I.O, 17, Thorpewood Avenue, London, SE26 4BU, Tel. 0181 488 4513 Fax 0181 699 7508 An established organization in the UK which consults with the leaders of the British-Indian community about the opportunities and harnessing the talents of the PIOs in the UK to bring benefit to Britain and India.

Friends of India Society International, 786, London Road, Thornton Heath, Surrey, CR7 6JB, Tel. 0181 683 0121, Fax 0181 683 3077 Set up by Indian professionals in the US in 1976, the UK chapter is one of 86 global chapters. One of the aims of the organization is to preserve and promote democratic processes, economic interests, human rights and civil liberties of Indians living in and outside India and to foster close cultural and personal links between NRIs and PIOs living abroad with their adopted homeland and India. http://www.fisiusa.org/

India Development Group (UK) Ltd, House of Commons. Place Of Westminster London, SW1A 0AA, Tel. 0171 219 4605, Fax 0171 219 3922

India Welfare Society, 11, Middle Row, London, W10 5AT, Tel. 0181 960 2637 Fax No0181 960 2639. Established in 1966, primarily to support NRIs and PIOs settled in Britain, they do advocacy work in India to raise awareness about family planning and good governance through their membership.

India Association of UK, 336, Grove Green Road, London, E11 4EA, Tel. 0181 558 3238, Fax No0181 558 5235

India International Friendship Society, 15, Artherton Road, Clay Hall, Essex, Tel. 0181 252 2167, Fax No0181 252 2167

Indian Council, 85, Newland Road, London, N8 7SL, Tel. 0181 348 4418, Email Hindnews@Hotmail.Com

Indian Society Of South West Wales, 5, Swallowtree Close, Neath, SA10 7EZ Tel. 01639 638 037, Fax No01639 646 609

NRI Institute, 4, Station Road, Manor Park, London, E12 5BT, Tel. 0181 514 3713 Fax No0181 514 0515

Sewa International UK, 56, Rokesley Avenue, London, N8 8NR, Tel. 0181 347 9325 Is a religious organization that which has many social development projects in India.

South Asian Development Partnership (SADP), www.southasian.org.uk/index.html - Set up to harness the skills and expertise of the Indian business professionals to facilitate and catalyse entrepreneurial initiatives in the UK and South Asia.

Asian Forum for Human Rights, 7, Rose Glen, Kingsbury, London, NW9 0JR
Tel. 0181 200 0931

Sri Lankan Tamils

Batticaloa Underprivileged Development Society, 135 Welbeck Road, Harrow Middlesex HA2 0RY – A community organization that raises funds for underprivileged and war affected individuals especially in Batticaloa.

Croydon Tamil Welfare Association, 15 Thornton Road, Thornton Heath, Surrey CR7 6BD, 020 8665 0444 – A community organization providing Information, advice and counseling service for refugees.

London Tamil Centre, 253 East Lane Middlesex Wembley HA0 3NN, Tel.: 020 8908 2646 – Organisation that provides support for refugees and raises funds for diverse projects in North and North East Sri Lanka.

Mallakam Development Association, 10 Cromwell Ave, New Malden, Surrey, Tel.: 020 8575 6104 - Regional community organisation which raises funds for their village in Sri Lanka.

Navatkuli Nalanpuri Manram, 14 Winston Walk Chiswick London W4 5SW.
Tel.: 020 8994 7833 - Regional community organisation which raises funds for their village in Sri Lanka.

Shropshire/Staffordshire Tamil Association, 8 Blenheim Court Alsager Staffordshire Stoke on Trent ST7 2BY, Tel.: 01270 877 500 – County residents interested in supporting their communities in Sri Lanka.

The Sri Lanka Project, The Refugee Council, 240-250 Ferndale Road, London SW9 8BB. T 020 7346 6700. http://brcslproject.gn.apc.org/ www.refugeecouncil.org.uk

Tamil Eelam Development Organisation, 202 Long Lane, London SE1 4QB, Tel.: 020 7403 4554 – A development based community organization that has a vast range of development projects in Sri Lanka from agriculture, to food processing to handicraft initiatives in the North and North East of Sri Lanka.

Tamil Information Centre, 7 LongCourt, Tank Hill Road, Purfleet, Essex RM19 1EA. 02085146390. Tamilinfo@compuserve.com

Tamil Orphans Trust, 83 Sudbury Court Drive, Harrow Middlesex, Tel.: 020 8908 3540 – Organisation that raises funds for established orphanages in the North and East of Sri Lanka

Tamil Refugee Action Group, 2nd Floor, 449-451 High Road, Willesden, Neasden, NW10 2JJ, Tel.: 0208 459 9070/1

Tamil Refugee Centre, Community House, Fore Street, Edmonton, London N9 0PZ Tel. 020 8373 6249

Tamils Rehabilitation Organisation (TRO)-UK, Tamil Rehabilitation Organisation, 1079 Garratt Lane, London, SW17 0LN.; 79 Hoe St, Walthamstow E17 4SA, Tel.: 020 8682 3567 020 8520 5876 - TRO runs a huge number of welfare and poverty reduction projects to help war-affected Tamils.

Tamil Welfare Association (Newham) UK, 602 Romford Road London Manor Park E12 5AF, Tel.: 020 8478 0577

Thamizhar Munnetra Kazhagam, 274C High Street North, Manor Park, London E12 6SA, Tel.: 020 8471 7461- Organisation dedicated to the advancement of Tamil society

Thondaimanaru Welfare Association, 17 Cantley Gardens, Barkingside Essex IG2 6QB, Tel.: 020 8554 4028 - Regional community organisation which raises funds for their village in Sri Lanka.

Universal Tamil Association, 3 Hastings Road, West Ealing, London W13 8QY, Tel.: 020 8840 9661

Chinese

To compile an exhaustive list of Chinese organizations would be a huge task, but an indication can be found on the website http://www.chinatown-online.co.uk/pages/community/ which has links to some of the main Chinese newspapers and other publications, sports and leisure clubs, organizations of British-born Chinese, Chinese schools and churches, and local community centres and organisations. Important umbrella associations and other organisations include:

The Federation of Chinese Professional Societies in the UK, http://www.fcps-uk.org/index.htm).

Chinese Students and Scholars Association, U.K., http://www.cssauk.org.uk/english.htm).

London Chinatown Community Centre, http://www.londonchinese.com/

London Chinatown Chinese Association http://www.chinatownchinese.com/

Chinese Information and Advice Centre (London)
http://www.ciac.co.uk/english_index.html