

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Review of the Research Literature on Integration and Resettlement in Europe and the Impact of Policy Interventions

Caroline Oliver



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About the author

Dr Caroline Oliver is a Senior Lecturer in Sociology at the University of Roehampton (from September 2016) and worked as a Senior Researcher at the Centre on Migration, Policy and Society (COMPAS) at the University of Oxford from March 2012 to August 2016. She has a PhD in Sociology and Social Anthropology. At COMPAS, she led a cross-national investigation into family migrants' rights to access benefits and services and their impacts on integration and led work with European city education departments to develop initiatives on migrant parental engagement with their children's education. Prior to this, she worked as a lecturer at the University of Newcastle upon Tyne (2002-2005) and researcher at the University of Cambridge (2006-2012).

Introduction

This review highlights some of the current research evidence and analysis on migrant integration, using European and some North American academic and policy literature. The review begins by setting out an analytical understanding of integration as a set of processes, before briefly considering some evidence on integration of migrants across Europe. It considers in more depth how integration is influenced by a number of societal factors that shape those processes, before reviewing how interventions in some domains have been shown to be effective. The review provides a summary that, while no means exhaustive, aims to guide and orientate readers through the complexity of some of the debates. The text refers to migrants throughout, encompassing those with differing immigration statuses, except where the evidence refers specifically to those with a particular status (such as refugees).

The concept of integration

Definitions and the domains of integration

'Integration' refers to the interaction of migrants with individuals and institutions within the receiving society. The term 'integration' is contested within academia, and can also be seen in policy to 'encompass a range of positions from more assimilatory policies through to more openly multicultural ones' (Favell 2001). In short, integration is a term for which there is 'no single, generally accepted definition, theory or model […]' (Castles et al 2001: 12). Some clarity however can be offered by making an important distinction between integration as:

a) an **analytic concept** describing a set of *actions* and *processes* that happen regardless of desired policy goals, and
b) a **policy objective** responsive to interventions that have particular 'wished for' outcomes (Penninx 2009). This latter understanding is more normative, with policies and practices expected to influence actions to create a more 'integrated society'.

Integration as a concept, which is more fully considered in this paper, refers to the processes of receiving newcomers into societies' institutions and relationships. In early sociological research, these processes were seen as important elements in maintaining social order; the creation of cooperative social relations was understood as contributing to the maintenance of stability among society as a whole, since the stability of society is in jeopardy if large proportions of the population are marginalised and excluded (see Heckmann and Lüken-Klaßen 2013). Sarah Spencer offers a useful definition of integration as:

> 'processes of interaction between migrants and the individuals and institutions of the receiving society that facilitate economic, social, cultural and civic participation and an inclusive sense of belonging at the national and local level (Spencer 2011:203).

Integration processes are understood as being **interactive** and **mutually created** by both the actions and efforts of migrants themselves, as well as the legal, economic and social conditions they meet in the new society (Heckmannn and Luken-Klasen 2013: 1). In this way, the receiving society itself is seen as a crucial determinant, with integration involving a range of actors including governments, institutions, local communities of receiving societies as well as immigrants themselves (Baldwin-Edwards 2005:4).

The **extent** of integration for individuals or groups can be measured by the degree of parity or equality of outcomes with other members of the receiving society. Ager and Strang (2004:5) developed a conceptual framework and set of indicators for integration, describing integration occurring when refugees:

- **achieve public outcomes** within employment, housing, education, health etc. which are **equivalent** to those achieved within the wider host communities;
- are **socially connected** with members of a (national, ethnic, cultural, religious or other) community with which they identify, with members of other communities and with relevant services and functions of the state; and
- have sufficient **linguistic competence** and **cultural knowledge**, and a sufficient sense of security and stability to confidently engage in that society in a manner consistent with shared notions of nationhood and citizenship.

As suggested by Ager and Strang (2008) integration processes occur across multiple domains (italicised below)**.** For them integration can be conceptualised in terms of:

1) **Means and markers:** achievement and access across a variety of sectors including *employment*, *housing*, *education* and *health*. Achievement within these sectors is both a 'means' to integration as well as a 'marker' (as captured in indicators of integration) which can show that positive integration outcomes have been achieved.
2) **Facilitators** that make integration easier including *language and cultural knowledge* and *safety and stability* in the local environment.
3) **Social connection**: within and between groups within the community; this refers to *social bridges, social bonds and social links.*
4) **Foundations**: assumptions and practice regarding migrants' *rights and citizenship* (e.g. permissions to work, access services and benefits and voting rights, as well as their sense of responsibility).

Others have described these levels in different ways, for example, referring to integration occurring **structurally**, at a **social/interactional** level, at a **cultural** level and within a domain of **identification** or **belonging** (Heckmann and Schnapper 2003). Entzinger (2000) also distinguished these domains as legal-political (state), cultural (nation) and socio-economic (market). Spencer (2011:203) also observes we can define integration processes along similar lines as follows:

Structural: Participation in the labour market, housing, welfare, healthcare and education (Agar and Strang 2008).

Social: How migrants and existing members of the receiving society interact with each other socially, including friendships, private relationships, marriages, social intercourse and memberships of groups and voluntary associations (Heckmann and Lüken-Klaßen 2013).

Cultural: Religion, morals, values, behaviour and lifestyle; including how migrants and members of the receiving society can create c*ognitive, cultural, behavioural and attitude change among themselves, as well as enact change in the receiving society.*

Civic and political: Voting rights and civic habits, such as associational activity of migrants.

Identity: Whether people feel a sense of belonging and identification with the place of residence (locality and nation) not withstanding retention of other identities related to their background.

In whichever definition, it is widely recognised that these **domains** or levels are **not mutually exclusive**. They have complex relationships and may proceed at different rates. How far a migrant might be integrated in one area, such as structurally in the labour market or schooling, will affect other areas of social, cultural and identificational integration (Heckmann and Lüken-Klaßen 2013). There can also be trade-offs between different domains. Maxwell (2012) for example explores integration 'trade-offs', demonstrating how social integration can come at the price of economic and political integration, because those who are more socially integrated are less likely to come together with co-ethnics and mobilise politically as a group (leading to better economic prospects) whereas those who are less socially integrated are more likely to do so.

Integration as a process may be encouraged or discouraged by what Spencer and Charsley (2016) term '**effectors'** - the facilitators or barriers that help or hinder integration. Such effectors include individual characteristics (e.g. the possession of human capital and qualifications, and linguistic capabilities). They might also include family and social characteristics (e.g. for family migrants joining an already well integrated household). They may also be structural or systemic effectors, such as policy interventions around language provision in the receiving country or legal conditions that restrict legal rights and entitlements to welfare and other support (see Oliver 2013, Agar and Strang 2008 on 'foundations'). The focus on effectors helps recognise the interplay of the different domains and stops the focus being entirely on the individual at the exclusion of the structural barriers they may face (Spencer and Charsley 2016). However, methodologically it is quite difficult to assess these topics, since it is much easier to measure outcomes such as individual skills and education of new migrants than objectively assess the relative job opportunities they face in different parts of the country, at different times, relative to those skills (ibid.)

A focus on effectors also draws attention to where and when integration processes take place. Integration processes most often take place at the local level (Caponio & Borkert, 2010) but there is also a crucial national dimension. However, there also needs to be consideration of the influence of effectors beyond nation, in terms of **transnational influences** on integration processes (Spencer and Charsley 2016). These might include remittance obligations to relatives in home countries, involvement in transnational political organisations, family care and residential strategies across borders, which may transform interactions with the sending country. Indeed, Garcés-Mascareñas and Penninx (2016:3) go so far as to say there has been a shift from a 'two-way to a three-way process […] which basically means a shift in focus from two actors (immigrants and host community) to three actors (immigrants, host community, and countries of origin)'. But it is also about the large scale supranational politics of the European Union, which shapes the contexts of integration, especially through providing financial support to assist with a common view of integration (see Caponio and Borkert 2010).

The temporal aspects of integration are also important to consider, since integration processes occur over time, certainly evolving but not in a linear fashion from 'not integrated' to 'integrated' (Phillimore 2012). They occur for both those who have arrived today and migrants who have long settled in a country, or may occur over generations. Indeed, according to the theory of segmented assimilation (Portes and Zhou 1993) structural barriers such as poor quality schooling in disadvantaged urban areas with high concentrations of immigrants can lead to sequential disadvantage over a number of generations. The spatial concentration can effectively cut off

immigrants from further educational and employment opportunities and effectively trap subsequent generations into an underclass.

Processes of integration may thus also be disrupted, reversed or may never be complete. It is known that refugees in particular face difficulties: for example, a survey of new refugees in the UK found employment rates low (49%) 21 months after arrival, compared to 80% for the working age population (Cebulla et al., 2010). Part of this relates to differences between migrant and refugee integration (da Lomba 2010) with distinctions between migrants who move on a planned basis and those who make more unplanned moves. For the latter, the principal behind international protection is where the receiving society acts as a 'surrogate' or substitute for national protection. The expected return to the country of origin underpins [temporary] support (Goodwin-Gill and McAdam 2007) but for those who stay longer term, structural exclusion from the labour market can lead to longer-term exclusion because of this abnormal hiatus in regular working trajectories. Yet, as Spencer and Charsley (2016) point out, there may be other circumstances where labour market integration may reduce, such as following from disability, but that this might lead to increased engagement in other domains, such as with civil society. To understand integration, it is important to recognise the full complexity of domains in which integration might occur, the non-linear and sometimes uneven nature of integration across those domains, the multiple actors involved, the multiple trajectories possible and the temporal and spatial angles.

Evidence on integration outcomes

Having assessed integration as a concept, the review now presents some evidence on general and specific integration outcomes for migrants and refugees across the different domains. Across Europe there is a mixed picture, with outcomes differing depending on countries of origin and settlement, ethnicity, gender, levels of prior human capital and reasons for moving, of which refugees emerge as a particularly vulnerable group. This section draws on some of the general observations from academic research as well as more specific evidence from the Eurostat overview of integration outcomes (2016), which are based on the Zaragoza indexes:

- In terms of **employment**, the most recent evidence from Eurostat suggests that there are important gaps in labour market participation between non-EU citizen migrants and both national born populations and EU mobile citizens. These gaps in *activity rates* have also been growing since 2009: In 2009, the gap between non-EU migrants and national populations was 3 percentage points (pp) yet in 2015 it was 8 percentage points (Eurostat 2016). The latest Eurostat data also confirms that 'the *unemployment rate* of non-EU citizens remains 10 pp higher than that of the nationals' with long term unemployment also increasing for this group (Eurostat 2016 - employment). This picture of labour market participation however varies according to different migrant groups, since by contrast to the picture with non-EU citizens, the activity rate of mobile EU citizens is higher than nationals (in 2015, 4 percentage points higher). On the other hand, there is variation across Europe. In many Mediterranean countries, the activity rate in 2015 was higher for foreign citizens than nationals and this is also the same in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Luxembourg and Poland (Eurostat – employment 2016).

Research suggests that although there has been significant improvement and success in educational attainment for some migrant groups, this does not necessarily translate into better labour market participation. There is widespread evidence in most European countries of 'ethno-stratification' of some immigrant groups in less favourable jobs. Downward mobility as well as un- or underemployment is common, with many migrants (including both undocumented workers and those legally resident) working in informal, low-waged and casualised sectors, unprotected by unions, leaving them vulnerable to exploitation or forced labour (Geddes *et al.* 2013, Craig 2015). As Algan, Dustmann, Glitz and Manning (2010:27) state in relation to analysis of education and labour market experience of immigrants in France, Germany and the UK:

> there is a clear indication that – in each country – labour market performance of most immigrant groups as well as their descendants is – on average – worse than that of the native population, after controlling for education, potential experience, and regional allocation.

The general picture is notably worse for specific groups – particularly women, where one sees wide gaps in labour market participation between men and women migrants (Eurostat 2016). There is also concerning evidence on the limited labour market integration of younger people, with youth unemployment for the non-EU born population (aged 15-29) increasing by 10.3 percentage points from 2008-2015 (Eurostat 2016 - employment).

Research shows also that refugees (see Bloch 2009) consistently suffer higher levels of unemployment than the native population (29% vs 60%, see Bloch 2004). They are often found working in low-skilled, badly paid and temporary jobs (NGO Network of Integration Focal Points in Europe 2006:5). Reasons for refugees' poor performance (despite in many cases, reasonable educational performance) are down to language in particular, which remains probably the most significant barrier in accessing employment (Phillimore and Goodson 2006). Language proficiency is lowest among groups most excluded from the labour market (Dustmann and Fabbri 2003). Refugees are at risk furthermore because the conditions of their migration mean that they often do not possess papers to prove qualifications, they have little or no prior experience of the different labour markets they encounter and experience caution among employers due to their uncertain legal status (Konle-Seidl 2016).

- In **education**, there is a mixed picture, with performance varying significantly by nationality and length of residence, with performance generally (but not always) better for second generation populations than those who arrived in their childhood (OECD 2015). In general, migrants from less developed non-European countries have lower educational attainment than intra-EU migrants, including young people from Turkish ancestry in countries including Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, and of Moroccan ancestry in Belgium and the Netherlands; from Maghrebin ancestry in France, Pakistani ancestry in Denmark, Norway, and Britain; and of Caribbean ancestry in Britain (Heath, Rothon and Kilpi 2008). Other intra-European migrants often perform less well, but better than the former group. Some migrants equal or exceed the performance of those born in the country including second generation Indians in UK and Norway (ibid). Bilingualism is shown to have significant benefits, although parents' low competence in a school system's dominant language or their

own limited levels of education can inhibit partnerships, creating distance between parents and schools, as the OECD report (2015:18) drew attention to in its international comparisons:

> What does emerge is that, in all countries, immigrant children's academic performance is systematically lower in schools where there are high proportions of children with poorly educated parents. On average, they lag more than two years behind their peers in schools with few such students.

The latest figures from Eurostat confirm that young foreign-born people attain more minimal levels (completing at most lower secondary education and not being involved in further or higher education, see Eurostat 2016 – education). Young non-EU migrants have the highest rates of early leaving, although there has been some narrowing of the gap with native-born populations over the last seven years. There remains however a sobering statistic: that one in four young people not born in the EU aged 15-29 are not in education, employment or training (Eurostat 2016-education).

- In the sphere of **housing**, evidence shows that migrants are less likely to achieve home ownership than those born in the receiving society (Gidley and Caputo 2012). According to the Eurostat data, in 2014, only 32.7% of all foreign citizens lived in owner-occupied dwellings compared to 71.2% of nationals from 20-64 years old across the EU-28 (Eurostat 2016 – housing). On the other hand, recent or temporary migrants have little reason to buy property, and indicators on housing quality and access may be more relevant than ownership. However, again, available evidence shows that many categories of migrants often experience overcrowding or poor housing conditions; Eurostat (housing, 2016) shows that foreign born populations are more likely to live in overcrowded accommodation than nationals, but this varies across countries with Hungary, Greece, Italy, Croatia and Slovakia having much higher rates of overcrowding for foreign born migrants than in Cyprus, Malta, Ireland, Belgium and the Netherlands.

  Penninx, Kraal, Martiniello and Vertovec (2004) show that new immigrants over recent decades have tended to concentrate in particular areas of cities, with uneven distribution within certain wards or neighbourhoods, often with low quality housing. This is likely influenced by the tendency for new migrants to move to the same location as compatriots, particularly assisted by the existence of intermediaries and migrant networks (ibid.) Yet rather than this be unproblematic 'choice', Debbie Phillips shows in her work on British Asian Muslims that clustering in inner-city areas offers important benefits for inhabitants, generating a sense of security and safety that is difficult to find elsewhere (Phillips 2006). Moreover, while there has been a powerful policy discourse around "parallel societies" (*Parallelgesellschaften*) especially in 'older' migration contexts such as Germany, the Netherlands, France and the UK, the evidence shows that despite some sites of residential concentration of migrants, European cities have far lower levels of spatial concentration by ethnicity than their American counterparts (see e.g. Musterd and Ostendorf 1998, 2007 on the Netherlands or Andersson 2007 on Sweden). And, as Haque (2010) points out, ethnic diversity in and of itself is not necessarily causing problems, but rather it is the rate of increase among new migrants as well as the absence of adequate policies and structures in place to help manage integration (Audit Commission, 2007). Furthermore, spatial

concentration 'may also, when combined with poverty, become an explosive mix, leading directly to the social exclusion of future generations' (Papillon 2002:iii).

- In terms of **health**, immigrants on the whole tend to be healthier on average than populations in both sending and receiving countries, with evidence of a 'healthy migrant effect' seen upon arrival (Riosmena, Wong and Palloni 2013, Antecol and Bedard 2006). However, this effect disappears over time including into retirement, where in many countries labour migrants working in blue collar occupations are overrepresented among people with disability pensions and are less well integrated in pension schemes because of the nature of the low-skilled work in which they were engaged (see Albin, Bodin, and Wadensjö 2015 on Sweden and Schellingerhout 2004 on the Netherlands, Anderson and Ruhs 2010, McKay et al 2006, Dainty 2007). Refugees are also a higher risk group for health issues because of forced migration, where issues of trauma and psychological distress are prevalent (Konle-Seidl 2016).

What societal factors are known to affect integration processes?

While Spencer and Charsley's conceptual framework highlights the range of factors (or 'effectors') influencing integration, including the individual, family, societal, transnational and policy, in this section we consider in more detail some of the larger scale societal factors influencing integration processes. These include those that refer to the legal-political aspects of integration (welfare state regimes and immigrants' rights), the structural domain (e.g. socio-economic factors, including responses to migrants in times of austerity) and issues around culture, the nation and belonging (e.g. securitization). I then consider some of the smaller scale societal factors or local influences such as local civic traditions, local population compositions and histories of place, which influence the social domain of integration. In this section, we consider how these myriad factors are important in shaping the pathways and processes of integration, first starting with welfare state regimes.

Welfare state

Welfare states are important in integration because access to rights affects migrants' experiences, while the degree and level of welfare provision influences available pathways through the structural integration domain. Bommes and Geddes explain (2000:2): 'National welfare states can be viewed as political filters that mediate efforts by immigrants to realise their chance for social participation'. Although there are debates about the extent to which migrants move to seek better welfare state provision (the so-called 'welfare magnet' theory, see Borjas 1999) many migrants underutilise welfare systems since they are in the majority young, and typically healthier than those left behind. On the other hand, some migrants – particularly refugees – can pose additional challenges for welfare states, requiring 'specific and intense endeavours to secure social inclusion' (Bommes and Geddes 2000:7).

Over the last century the growth of international markets and the global human rights agenda have seen a gradual expansion of social rights for non-citizen immigrants or 'denizens' (see Hammar 1990 and Guiraudon 2000a on the evolution of foreigners' rights in France, Germany and the Netherlands). This is justified often on the grounds of practicality. It is also supported by an ideological stance towards post-national citizenship and a cosmopolitan outlook, where national citizenship is negatively seen as 'the modern equivalent of feudal privilege' (Carens 1987:252).

On the other hand, migration generates a tension coined by Hollifield (2004) as the 'liberal paradox' between freedom of movement, trade and investment on the one hand and national sovereignty. In particular, migrants' reliance on welfare affects public attitudes towards immigration**,** with arguments couched in terms of belonging and deservingness (Anderson 2010). The very idea of the welfare state was as an edifice originally designed for the protection of 'insider' citizens, where welfare states exchange protection for the internal loyalty of citizens and key institutions built by historic coalitions within the majority population (Bommes and Geddes 2000, Banting 2010). Migrants present a structural challenge to this notion. Greater ethnic and racial diversity can threaten the solidarity on which the welfare state is built, since migrants' loyalty cannot be assumed (Brady and Finnigan 2014). In contexts of ethnic and linguistic diversity, so the argument goes, a sense of commonality and political consensus is undermined, class-based solidarity is more difficult and immigration erodes public support for welfare spending (Freeman 1986, Alesina, Glaesar and Sacerdote 2001, Brady and Finnigan 2014).

Alesina, Glaesner and Sacerdote (2001) indeed argue that the greater diversity and fractionalization in the United States is the reason behind the historically lower public spending and weaker support for redistribution there than in Europe. As Soroka (2016:175) summarises:

> Regardless of whether migrants are actually choosing their destinations on the basis of welfare state generosity or are more welfare state-reliant than native-born populations, concern about migration amongst native-born populations decreases aggregate support for redistributive policies.

While this argument suggests that immigration is bad for welfare spending more generally and creates cutbacks for all, the argument is significant to debates about integration because welfare spending that redistributes resources to newcomers becomes ever more contentious, negatively affecting public attitudes towards immigrants. Countries such as The Netherlands and Sweden see increasingly populist anti-immigration parties use welfare chauvinism (e.g. arguments about 'protecting the welfare state') to gain votes (Banting 2010) a trend that can be seen across many other countries in Europe.

On the other hand scholars, including Banting and others, have shown that it is not so clear cut to suggest that an increase in diversity leads to lower social spending. Banting et al's 2006 study of 21 countries showed that over twenty years the size of the foreign born population does not affect social spending per se, but rather the rate of growth of this population does. This effect they show can also be mediated by particular policies – for example welfare benefits for all can even *rise* with increased immigration if the actions of the left or the unions are strong (Lipsemeyer and Zhu 2011, cited in Soroka 2016). Indeed there is a growing body of work which shows that the effects of migration on social spending are limited, or certainly that spending varies by different policy arenas. Soroka et al (2016: 188) state, 'our reading of the literature and our own work converge in suggesting that the negative impact of immigration on welfare spending can be moderated by political and policy institutions'.

Understanding the impacts of welfare states on migrant integration also needs to be contextualised relative to the general welfare state offer available to *all* citizens (which may be low or high). This is important, because where there is only a weak level of protection for existing citizens (e.g. Spain) there may be less public concern about extending social rights to newcomers.

Typologies of welfare states such as that offered by Esping Andersen (1990) have be shown to have weaknesses, but they nevertheless provide a useful shorthand or proxy to understand different types, characters or 'worlds' of welfare (Papadopoulos 2011:39) between the following regimes:

Anglophone/Liberal: Where 'need' is the basis of entitlement and the goal of welfare is poverty alleviation. Welfare entitlement is means-tested and payment by flat rate. This is evident in the US or UK approach to welfare.

Social democratic: Where citizenship/residence is the basis of entitlement, e.g. Scandinavian welfare systems.

Continental/Conservative-corporativist: Social insurance tradition where work is the basis of entitlement and benefits are related to earnings to ensure income maintenance, e.g. the Netherlands or Germany.

Southern: Similar to the continental regime with income-transfers, but with universal healthcare provision and yet strong reliance also on family rather than the state for welfare support, e.g. Spain, Italy.

These different regime types affect how migrants are included. Analysis by Koopmans (2008) suggests that those countries with stronger welfare states (e.g. from the social democratic or continental regimes such as Sweden, Belgium and the Netherlands) when combined with multicultural policies display poorer integration outcomes than other similar countries with more restrictive policies (Germany, Austria, Switzerland, France) or leaner, liberal welfare states (such as the UK) where migrants must display more self-reliance.

However, another important element recently identified in research is a consideration of the specific policies and regulations around entry, residence and citizenship, termed as 'incorporation regimes' by Diane Sainsbury (2012) which affect particular migrants in different ways. Sainsbury (2012: 9) argues: 'A fuller understanding of immigrants' social rights requires that we also analyse the impact of the forms of immigration or 'entry categories' and the type of incorporation regime.' In this regard, academics have pointed out a growing 'civic stratification' (Morris 2003) where migrants are limited in accessing the full welfare offer (see also Oliver 2013). This might, for example in the UK, be where family migrants are excluded for a 'probation period' of five years from mainstream welfare benefits (ibid.) It is particularly the case for asylum-seekers who have been increasingly subject to alternative provision entirely, being removed from mainstream provision and subject to countries' own specific systems of responding to their legal obligations towards humanitarian migrants. Geddes (2000) shows how in the UK the alternative welfare provision - by denying access to cash-paid benefits and dispersing asylum-seekers - 'abnormalises the lives of asylum-seekers' and reduces their chance for social inclusion even once refugee status is granted. Sainsbury observes:

> It is counterintuitive that settlement programs and integration measures can negatively affect immigrant's social rights or serve as a mechanism of exclusion. However, the social rights of newcomers in reception programmes have often been separated from mainstream social provision, and proof of integration has been increasingly tied to the granting of a permanent residence permit and naturalisation.

Finally, in considering the interplay between welfare states and migrant integration, it is important to consider how broader shifts and convergences in welfare principles have also affected migrant

integration. Important has been the shift from the post-war Keynesian welfare state which saw welfare as a universal social right to more neo-liberal welfare regimes which emphasise individual self-sufficiency and means-testing (Ryner in Bommes and Geddes 2000). These social policy shifts though not necessarily targeted only at migrants, change claimants' rights and responsibilities, particularly through making some benefits conditional on particular actions and behavioural requirements (activation) such as job seeking or language learning (see Dwyer and Scullion 2014).

Breidahl (2013) shows for example how recent 'immigrant targeted activation' in the Scandinavian welfare states of Norway, Sweden and Denmark is underlined by 'welfare chauvinism'. In times of austerity, migrants are deemed less entitled to welfare support than citizens and harsher activation policies are more eagerly pursued for them (see later however, when the impacts of the more extensive support and interventions of Scandinavian countries is considered more fully). Other studies also show that following these broader welfare changes, refugees are particularly at risk of unreasonable sanctioning decisions because of language difficulties, problems finding information, staff holding the impression that they do not wish to work and staff failure to explain issues (Dwyer and Scullion 2014). Shutes (2011) cites evidence on how much of the new workfare orientation to get claimants into work has simply produced practices of 'creaming' and 'parking' whereby only the best performers who are already more 'job-ready' are 'creamed' or chosen for work programmes, while providers make less effort to find work for more difficult claimants (including refugees with limited language skills). These programmes also focus only on short-term impacts (getting a claimant into work) without consideration of the longer term impact, particularly around whether the work is appropriate to the individual. This means that refugees in particular have found the processes unresponsive to their needs and those most skilled are vulnerable to deskilling rather than being supported in retraining towards work in their professions.

Economic factors and the politics of austerity

A related and important societal factor influencing opportunities for integration is the economic circumstance of receiving countries. This influences not only job opportunities but affective feelings for both immigrants and nationals, particularly in terms of public attitudes to welfare provision (discussed in the section above). Research shows that higher unemployment levels negatively affect support for welfare programmes at the regional level when the proportion of foreigners at that level increases (Schmidt-Catran and Spies 2016).

Economic crises, such as the 1973 oil crisis as well as the more recent global recession from 2007, significantly affect both possibilities for immigrant entry and the integration paths open to refugees once arrived (Finotelli 2014). This is evident in the recent example of Spain, where migrants were among the worst affected following the 2007 economic crisis. Since immigrants were largely employed in low-skilled sectors that drove the preceding period of prosperity and growth, they suffered most in the economic downturn (ibid.) Unemployment rates for immigrants reached 35 per cent in 2013, almost 10 points higher than for natives and considerably higher than the pre-2007 figure of 12.5 per cent (Finotelli 2014).

Within Europe, national responses to migrants have tended to be driven by the view that some groups of migrants, particularly refugees are a cost rather than an asset. In this case, in conditions of austerity it is difficult to reconcile public spending on new vulnerable migrants with a politics of austerity and a need to balance the books (Hansell 2016). During the economic crisis in Spain

following the global recession of 2008, not only was there a restrictive turn in entry policies for labour and family migrants, but resources that had been directed towards integration policies and interventions were also sharply limited. Previously, integration policies and practices had been prioritised sufficiently through budget allocations and supported by governments driven by a particular political sensibility committed to migrant integration (representing values of democracy, egalitarianism and universalism, especially post-dictatorship). Those policies and practices were 'sustained and comprehensive' (Arango 2013: 4) and were upheld after 2007 as far as possible. However, following the government change in 2011, the budget for the National Integration Fund was suspended and there was a broader 'hibernation' of integration issues (ibid. 6). Somerville and Sumption (2009) point out that following a period of mass redundancies, the government even paid immigrants to return to their country of origin. Restrictions were also put in place to limit irregular migrants' access to healthcare, apart from in exceptional circumstances (although interestingly, several regional governments have refused to comply). In these contexts, Arango suggests that it is likely that Spain's immigration and integration policies will likely fall in line with those in other areas of Europe. In the current picture, the unemployment rate is of concern, affecting longer-term structural integration, but the most major concern is the extent of immigrant poverty (ibid.) since immigrants, even when working, had much lower rates of pay and less possibility for family support.

As Collett (2011) shows, however, there is a lot of variation in terms of how countries respond to austerity and the impacts it has on funding for integration. She shows that in some countries such as the Netherlands, where the economic impacts of the 2008 crisis were less strong than in countries such as Spain or Portugal, there was nevertheless a subsequent 'dramatic' cut to integration programmes, following the coalition's more hard-line approach towards immigration (2011: 13). Cuts to the civic integration courses (language and cultural orientation) for example were cut to one tenth of what they were in 2010. Partially this followed reduced numbers, but it also reflects a shift of expectations for immigrants to pay themselves rather than the State (ibid.). In the UK too, a similarly hard-line was taken to integration programmes, with reduced spending on language tuition under the austerity programme. Gateley (2014 citing Kane and Allen 2011) shows how it was estimated that the voluntary and community sector would lose £911 million in public funding a year until 2016 in austerity cuts. These cuts affected core funding of support organisations for refugees as well as legal aid provision. In the UK, the Refugee Council's funding was cut by 62% and the Refugee Integration and Employment Service was closed. This argument is however variable across countries. Research in 2012 shows the logic of 'austerity' was less a factor in German responses to irregular migrants than in Spain (Price and Spencer 2014). More strikingly in Portugal, spending actually went up, with around half of the funding going to the voluntary sector (Collett 2011). In conclusion, it is clear that recession alone does not always affect integration, but rather more important is the political responses to immigration in the contexts of austerity.

Securitization

Finally, in considering large scale societal issues affecting migrant integration, an increasingly important influence is the issue of the securitisation of immigration. Securitisation refers to the condition whereby certain immigrant populations and subsequent generations become associated with security threats. Baele and Sterck (2015:1120) in their consideration of the extent of securitization across the EU define it as when immigration has 'successfully been framed as a threat and transformed by EU authorities into a security issue calling for policies of

exception'. Lazaridis and Wadia (2015:1-2) explain that the basis of securitization is the conception 'that liberal migration regimes advance cross-border risks – for example, terrorism, drugs, human trafficking – while more restrictive regimes minimise such threats and improve state/national and societal security'.

Concern over the securitization of immigration has increased as over recent years, since as Lazaridis and Wadia (2015) explain, in the wake of 9/11 and other attacks there has been growing public and political concern about migration as a non-military security threat. This has escalated over recent months in 2016, following events in Nice, France and successive attacks in Germany, which were carried out by migrants - a fact met in Bavaria by an increase in controls on migrants and increased police presence (Henley in *the Guardian* 2016). Securitisation of immigration therefore affects both public attitudes to migrants as well as shapes policy responses to migrant populations. In this way, securitization runs the risk of creating a downward spiral that increases the likelihood of alienation for some migrant populations.

Academics however hold different opinions about the extent to which immigration is genuinely becoming securitized across the EU. Boswell (2007) argues that while security issues have been relevant to immigration policy, other framings around business concerns or human rights are equally important. Analysis by Baele and Sterck (2015) examining the use of security language in EU immigration policy does suggest, however, that within Europe this language does have an abnormally high presence, although the intensity of this framing of immigration in this way is uneven across various different subfields of immigration. Of particular relevance are the effects of this transformation of a 'social issue to a security one' on public attitudes. Karyotis and Patrikios (2010) show how public attitudes are affected by the discourse of political actors in Greece, where potentially antagonistic discourses can materialise into public acceptance and support for securitization. Key in Karyotis and Patrikios' argument is that religion is an important but overlooked factor in these debates, since they show in Greece that the church's defence of faith becomes linked with a defence of national identity. In this way, the issue of securitization can draw on existing fears and concerns about the perceptions of incompatible lifestyles of different religious groups, which have developed particularly in the wake of the 9/11 and 7/7 terrorist attacks (Wray 2009). It chimes into the public's existing suspicion and concerns about immigrants in a context where many see immigration more as a problem than opportunity (Transatlantic Trends Immigration, 2013).

Research suggests however that securitization, through negatively shaping public opinion and policy, has an effect on all immigrant groups, increasing instability and heightening social tension (Lazardis and Wadia 2015). In particular, policy measures against extremism have seen increased surveillance over migrant and settled Muslim populations (Ramalingam 2013, cited in Craig 2015). O'Toole, Meer, Nilsson DeHanas, Jones and Modood (2015) explore the effects of the 'Prevent' scheme in the UK aimed at tackling violent extremism through gathering information through community engagement and identifying those vulnerable to radicalisation. The leaching of the agenda into other institutions, whereby front-line personnel in schools, health services,

universities and charities have been made responsible for monitoring everyday behaviours and policing the State, has increased feelings of surveillance and suspicion. Such activities are also counterproductive for integration, since they fail to tackle other extremist views within the community and are likely to be harmful to community cohesion, particularly through stigmatising of Muslims, constructing them as a 'suspect community'.

Local influences on integration

Having considered large scale social factors shaping integration processes, in this section, the review turns to consider the importance of the local context. Local factors have major importance, since integration is experienced by migrants themselves as a set of processes at a local level (e.g. within a city or neighbourhood) rather than necessarily at the national level. At the local level, there is a great deal of variance in terms of reception and integration, as influenced by the civic or political traditions of particular cities and by the opportunities and constraints in local labour and housing markets, for civic participation, and so forth. In considering local context, therefore I include here local civic cultures, as well as the relationship between local, regional and national governance on integration, particularly important following the 'local turn' in integration policy-making.

First, it is important to recognise that it is at the local level where the social domain of integration is experienced, as Gidley (2016) discusses through 'face-to-face interaction […] in workplaces, public space or at the school gate.' Here, integration can be seen in terms of the degree of and intensity of contacts between individuals as well as attitudes and representations of each other (ibid.) Most widely accepted here is Allport's (1954) 'contact hypothesis' where increased contact with immigrants is understood to undermine xenophobia, with inter-group contact helping to break down stereotypes and prejudice, generating tolerance and understanding. However this does not come without the meeting of important preconditions that lead to 'optimal contact' including 'contact in a situation of *equal group status*, cooperative activities pursuing *common goals*, and the support of *authorities or norms* (e.g. in anti-discrimination law)' (Gidley 2016).

Locality is important in setting the framework for social integration, with the existing features of a population (including existing diversity) and infrastructure all impacting on integration. One research study compared the experiences of Iraqi refugees arriving in the UK under the Gateway Protection Programme for refugees in different towns and cities across England (Platts-Fowler, Robinson and Phillips 2012). They showed that the existing diversity of the population and local conceptions of community and belonging informed integration experiences. Integration processes were much easier for refugees in cities with histories of multicultural settlement, since this was more likely to lead to an acceptance of diversity and difference (evidence of what Wessendorf (2014) terms as 'commonplace diversity'). However, it was also explained by difference in structural provision, with those in the multicultural cities more likely to benefit from the specialist knowledge built up over time in local advice centres and the existence of Migrant and Refugee Community Organisations (MRCOs). By contrast, Platts-Fowler et al (2012) found that refugees in 'new immigrant gateways' without a prior history of in-migration are disadvantaged. Service-providers have less preparation and less experience. Such research shows in particular the critical role at the local level played by the Migrant and Refugee Community Organisations to help migrants cope and survive, particularly following on from the introduction of dispersal polices (Piacentini 2015). They help migrants overcome limited access to resources and help buffer their status while waiting for decisions on their status through providing a place of belonging, as well as offering informational, cultural and social

support (ibid., Griffiths, Sigona and Zetter 2006). These findings are supported by Price and Spencer's (2015) study of Local Authority responses to destitute migrant families in the UK where different municipalities show considerable variation in knowledge among both local authorities and voluntary organisations about the legal entitlements of migrant families.

Also influential are local areas' civic and political traditions. An example here is the growth of the *Cities of Sanctuary* movement in the UK, which sought to lead to the development and adoption of more inclusive practices at local level to overcome obstacles to migrants' personal safety generated by national controls on immigration (Hintjens and Pouri 2014). The movement attempts to develop new constructions of 'urban citizenship', where cities become zones of safety and security as an antidote to the criminalization of immigration, supported by individuals, voluntary and faith groups as well as media, police and local government.

Such city-based networks and social movements may be bolstered by political differences between national and local attitudes to integration. A significant literature (e.g. Caponio and Borkert 2010) has drawn attention to the multi-level governance of integration which highlights how the local level assumes a great deal of importance because of its delegated responsibility for services. This recognises that although migration is seen as a national issue created by crossing state borders, migrant integration is a set of processes that occur locally (Caponio and Bokert 2010). More particularly, as Penninx (2003, no pages) points out, it is cities that confront rapid changes in their population; often steered by national policies, migrants must integrate into the 'social embroidery of the city', which is 'not a natural process' and, by way of marginalization, social exclusion and segregation, they can 'threaten the social cohesion in these cities'. The literature also highlights differences as emerging due to the nature of immigrant integration as an 'intractable' policy problem, which defies a clear solution since actors at different levels involved not only have different ideas about how to approach the issue, but disagree in the first place about what the issue is (Scholten 2013). Scholten's work demonstrates how the multi-level governance of policy issues is particularly affected by agenda dynamics at different tiers of government, reflecting divergent understandings of integration at various levels.

In some cases, local areas adopt policies that correspond with national paradigms and cities may not be any more inclined to be inclusive than national governments. Ambrosini (2013) draws attention to the development in some local authorities in Northern Italy of attempts to exclude migrants from some benefits and rights and the imposition of cultural exclusion (for example limitations on the use of other languages in public events) emerging because of bureaucrat's xenophobic views as well as because of the way these actions can be a means of seeking political consent. On the other hand, it could be argued that national agendas focus more on immigration control, whereas local priorities might be rather for social cohesion (Hepburn and Zapato-Barrero 2014). As Poppelaars and Scholten (2008) show in the case of the Netherlands, there are city-level differences from the national model. There, it has been alleged that more group-specific multiculturalist approaches have shifted towards developing the citizenship of individual migrants. At the level of local policy implementation these scholars demonstrate how 'tailor made' approaches nevertheless have proven remarkably resilient against the national shift. Other examples of differentiation are shown by Scholten (2013) and Scholten and Penninx (2015) through analysis of the regional differences between Amsterdam and Rotterdam. In Amsterdam, municipalities initially adopted the 'minorities' policies, which

corresponded with the national multiculturalist approach to immigration, yet later policies took on their own local logics. In Rotterdam a more integrationist approach was used from the outset, which was then later taken up and used by national government.

There is indeed considerable evidence from Europe of instances where it is at the local level, in cities or regions rather than at the national level, that civil and political actors are taking a lead on integration. This literature recognises that local areas are not always mere followers in implementing national solutions, but rather local policymakers can act rather as entrepreneurs responding to their own cities' practical issues and political contexts (see also Guiraudon 2000b on 'vertical venue shopping'). Thus, recognition of the interplay between various tiers of government draws attention to considerable convergence or divergence between local and national models of integration, but also reveals the strong potential for local governments to innovate in ways that can eventually find traction in national level policies. It has been marked by a shift more broadly from the use of national models as the dominant frame (Penninx 2009) to more empirical comparison of local and city practices (see the CLIP network of 25 European cities working on more effective integration policies).

Policy interventions

Having assessed integration as a concept and considered the multitude of influencing factors at societal level that shape integration processes, the review finally explores the effects of different approaches to integration. It focuses on key areas of intervention rather than the important but complex debates on differing national philosophies and models of integration; models whose forms are ever evolving and contested (not least in France. See Bertossi 2012).

The review first considers approaches in the areas of labour market/employment, education and welfare at national level and second, it considers local interventions taken to improve integration outcomes through focusing on cohesion and belonging.

Labour market interventions

Integration in the labour market is perhaps the most important step migrants can seek, since it leads to success in other domains and is important in overcoming negative perceptions of them as a burden and drain on the host society. Equally, however, it can open up other contentious debates about 'taking natives' jobs' and bringing down wages. Most successful labour market integration outcomes are seen in countries where there are strong selection policies for highly skilled migrants, since these migrants have an easier time adjusting. However, since we are dealing with interventions post entry I will consider some of the most important interventions used to strengthen migrants' human capital.

Many countries operate interventions to help low skilled workers access training and work, but these may not be adjusted to meet the needs of immigrants. Somerville and Sumption (2009) point however to a range of interventions specifically targeted at immigrants, including programmes that increase the relevance of migrants' existing educational or professional qualifications and work-focused language training. Canada has also recognized the issues associated with recognizing skills and qualifications, launching Credential Assessment Services to help immigrants translate their qualifications into their Canadian equivalent – this helps employers more readily understand the

skills of potential employees (ibid.) These complement more general approaches to addressing the barriers migrants can face, such as anti-discrimination legislation and those around improving labour conditions (minimum wage, working hours and other contractual arrangements) although these tend to apply more to public sector work and less in the private sector where migrants commonly work (Haque 2010).

Somerville and Sumption also suggest other labour market policies that might be deployed to help encourage lower-skilled migrants to settle in areas where there is more work. This type of policy is used in Australia where new migrants need fewer points to be eligible to work in certain lower populated territories (Haque 2010). Interventions include exploring the role of labour market intermediaries in deploying migrants across a country and providing information to migrants about areas of labour market shortage. In Canada, there is a website (hireimmigrants.ca) which functions as an intermediary/resource for employers to find immigrant talent. It is based on a partnership with Canadian bank RBC and aims to help Canadian employers recognize the value of diversity for innovation, with immigrants viewed as possessing language and cultural knowledge and able to meet skills shortages. Other reviews, e.g. of the Swedish labour market experience (Lemait 2007) also show that immigrants working initially through temporary employment agencies face better prospects because employers prefer domestic work experience, so that this experience helps overcome employer reticence. Lemait (2007: 26) explains how incentives and measures that aim to get immigrants into employment as soon as possible are most important, while interventions that get immigrants into 'real jobs, such as recruitment subsidies and trainee replacement programmes (as opposed to labour market training, work practice and relief work programmes) are the only ones that yield positive employment probability effects over a five-year horizon…'.

Some groups of migrants, most notably refugees require specific interventions for labour market integration since they are especially at risk and require specific support to access employment including language provision, guidance and support in re-entering professions (Shutes 2011). Notwithstanding high levels of education and previous work experience in some cases, refugees can face specific challenges for labour market integration arising from their experience of displacement. Cheung and Phillimore (2014) show that language competency, pre-migration qualifications and occupations as well as length of time in the UK are most important for refugees accessing employment, suggesting some very clear implications for policies that help improve language competency from the outset. However, these labour market programmes are vulnerable to cuts, for example in the UK there has been a reduction of tailored services for refugees following austerity, as their needs are dealt with through mainstreamed services (Robinson 2013). Gately (2014) documents the effects of the abolition of the UK Border Agency-funded Refugee Integration and Employment Service (RIES) in 2011, which limits refugee to receiving very basic information and signposting from voluntary organisations about job seeking. In this sense, interventions that are considered more successful are 'one-stop shops' which offer more integrated advice and support for refugee employment. An example is the Integrated Humanitarian Support Scheme in Australia, which includes orientation information on services, advice and support on accommodation, rights and community support, as well as an early health assessment within 12 months to ensure adequate referral to ongoing healthcare services if needed (Robinson 2013). Other strategies including the engagement of refugees in voluntary work while they are unable to work formally, which help refugees to gain transferable skills (Bloch 2004).

On the other hand, other interventions, rather than focusing on the deficits of migrants, take a different stance, viewing migrants as a potential asset. In the contexts of the recent refugee crisis there has been an increase in private sponsorships and assistance extended by companies such as Google, Federal Express, Facebook and JP Morgan Chase (Hansell 2016) with these sponsorships seen as a way of getting new talent and knowledge into their firms (ibid.) For example, Siemens, the engineering multinational, which initiated a training/internship program for asylum seekers in Erlangen who were highly-skilled, multilingual and experienced and is now being scaled up to other cities across Germany (http://www.hireimmigrants.ca/success-stories/siemens-taps-refugee-talent/). As part of the programme, staff from the cities' public services help to identify asylum-seekers with skills in engineering, healthcare, medicine, biology and chemistry, reducing the common problem of deskilling for refugees, where even if refugees do get into work it is often in jobs not commensurate with their experience and qualifications.

Education and human capital interventions

In the sphere of education, there is a range of interventions that might indirectly address integration, for example those providing early years and nursery support or fair admissions policies which try to overcome problems of segregation within schools (Craig 2015). However, strategies specifically focused on new migrants in the education domain tend to focus on language as one of the most essential building blocks for migrant integration, specifically because it leads to better labour market integration (see previous section). Especially given the changing nature of the labour market towards more service-oriented work, communication skills are essential, even for migrants in low skilled jobs (Haque 2010).

As Craig points out, however, the extent, quality and availability of language teaching of the host country language is variable. Indeed research on legal family migrants' entitlements showed wide variation ranging from Germany where language education courses of 800 hours were compulsory and provided at a very minimal price for migrants, whereas in England, new TCN family migrants are not entitled to any funding for accredited language courses unless in exceptional circumstances for their first three years. These different approaches have obvious impacts on integration – with research in the UK indicating that these legal exclusions from language education lead to a long-term pattern of exclusion, particularly for some migrant women (Oliver 2013). At the level of schools, there are similarly different approaches to the education of children arriving with limited understanding of the dominant language. For example in Italy, migrant children are kept behind a year if they do not have a good enough command of Italian even in the lower levels of secondary school, again with obvious implications for longer-term integration (Mussino and Strozza 2012 cited in Craig 2015). In England, Arnot et al. (2014) suggest that many primary and secondary schools rather use the 'immersion strategy or mainstreaming approach' by placing new migrant children into mainstream classes, while providing more specific focused groups for extra tuition. One of the recommendations from this study was for schools to develop 'whole-school language policies' that make clear the approach chosen and express the benefits of multiple languages in schools for all pupils.

In addition to a focus on language, other interventions aim to overcome the obstacles to integration in educational systems. Research shows that many migrants have high motivations and aspirations for their children and that their active engagement in their education is beneficial, but also shows

that there are a number of barriers that get in the way (see Oliver 2016). For migrant families, parents might be inhibited by limited or poor educational experiences in their home country, limited fluency in the dominant language, lower levels of literacy and numeracy and poorer understanding of the ways that schools work, requiring them to learn how to 'decode the system' (Stanton-Salazar, 1997, p. 13). Limited access to social networks and issues of lack of time or access to transport are important, particularly for working parents in low-waged sectors that involve long and anti-social working hours (Alba and Holdaway 2013). Other problems also arise from the potentially different agendas, attitudes and language used in the interactions between parents and teachers, which academics suggest make the school system – rather than parents - 'hard to reach' and can make encounters adversarial (Reay 1998, Hornby and Lafaele 2011). Migrant families may not possess the same cultural knowledge that is valued by schools and possessed by teachers (Reay 1998) or may adopt a position of deference to the teachers as qualified 'experts' with superior knowledge (Crozier 1999, Harriss and Goodall 2008).

Strategies that help overcome some of these barriers in schools include interventions to engage parents in their children's learning. They focus on improving communication to a mixed body of parents, fostering a supportive climate and philosophy (for example through parent cafes) overcoming problems of location and timing of meetings (e.g. through an 'open door policy') and engaging with broader actors from the community and family (e.g. through the use of parents, relatives etc. as school mentors, see Oliver 2016). An important consideration to bear in mind is that while research on the impacts of parental engagement is strong, the research evidence on the impact of *interventions* to encourage parental engagement is rather mixed and not yet so strong. As Jeynes (2005: 240) notes, 'even if parental involvement effectively raises achievement, this does not necessarily mean parental involvement programs work as well'.

Welfare and rights

Different welfare policies have an important impact on integration outcomes, but there remain questions as to whether migrants are better off under more generous welfare models or whether this rather hinders their integration. Particularly when it comes to refugees, as a review of labour market integration of refugees for the EU (Papadopoulou et al 2013: 9) points out, 'The full integration of refugees through provision of housing, education, training, access to the labour market and social and health services is a costly strategy'. However the opposite is nevertheless associated with much longer-term problems of 'risk of a long-term integration failure and the political costs of a massive political polarization' (ibid.: 9).

Research on the question as to whether countries should adopt more generous or meagre welfare schemes for immigrants generally analyses the US and Europe, which offer highly different approaches. European welfare systems are acknowledged as offering more generous support to (all) migrants than in the United States; a situation arguably created by the historically greater ethnic diversity of the US which scholars argue undermined the solidarity needed for high levels of social provision – see earlier section (Alesina and Glaeser 2004). Based on evidence on outcomes however, some scholars have been critical of European societies' ability to integrate immigrants economically in comparison to the US, a situation which leads to higher costs for welfare associated with unemployment. Hansen (2012:1) suggests 'the failure of European immigration policies has been their inability to ensure that immigrants acquire and retain work'. These scholars argue

that the more generous European welfare pathways negatively shape migrants' propensity to work; Hansen (2011: 887-888) sees migrants in Europe as having an incentive to opt for welfare rather than employment. He argues migrants are:

> […] rational actors who will respond to the incentives they face on arrival. In the US, arriving migrants receive little or no social support, and consequently rely on their own initiative and the support of their communities. In Europe, legal migrants are granted the full range of benefits, housing, health care, subsistence-level social support available to permanent residents and citizens.

According to this view, employment rather than culture needs to be the central priority of immigration policy, with a need to get immigrants into jobs as soon as possible (Hansen 2011). However, debate still rages about the extent to which more minimal arms-length provision (such as in the US) or more extensive support for immigrants will lead to the best outcome. Some scholars argue that lack of welfare assistance forces groups to become self-reliant, but this can push them to enter a niche labour market from where it is difficult to progress (Korac 2003: 59). Other researchers find that migrants are only marginally more likely to be welfare recipients than non-migrants in any case (Borjas and Hilton, 1996; Brücker et al., 2002, cited in Soroka et al. 2016).

Two important examples of the most generous state provision are seen in Valenta and Bunar's (2010) analysis of Norway and Sweden, two countries which have developed extensive state sponsored integration programmes. Both countries have adopted generous refugee, immigration and integration policies ensuring accommodation and residential integration and support to integrate into the labour market for all permanent refugees. In Sweden this was underlined by a multiculturalist programme and from the late 1990s a shift towards cultural pluralism and urban policy aimed at addressing social and ethnic segregation. In Norway, integration policy was addressed through the housing sector, with grants to build infrastructures for integration, followed by a focus in the 1990s on economic integration and anti-discrimination. From the 1990s, there have been more coercive aspects to both these programmes, demonstrating a revival of assimilation tendencies, as discussed previously. The expectation behind such policies was that these intensive interventions would help to equalize initial differences in employment levels (ibid.). The downside is that, as considered above, it arguably also generates a culture of passivity and dependence, which would lead to increased marginalization. Indeed, Valenta and Bunar's conclusion is that 'extensive integration assistance has only a limited effect on equalizing the initial differences between refugees and the rest of the population'.

Particularly following the refugee crisis, interesting questions are increasingly asked about the extent to which some of the state's welfare responsibilities can be taken over by individuals, particularly through schemes around private sponsorship**.** This is where individuals or groups offer financial and practical support, taking over the obligations normally assumed by the state (Kumin 2015). This was introduced in Canada in 1978, where any group of Canadian citizens or permanent residents, business, association or province could sponsor a Convention refugee, or 'other persons whose life, corporal integrity, liberty or other human rights are in danger' (Denton 2003: 593). It has a long history from the 1970s onwards and in its zenith involved 20,000 refugees a year entering the country under the scheme (ibid.). In practice the scheme has run into some difficulties, mainly arising through different orientations of private sponsors and the government. There have been long

delays in processing applications (of over three years) and high rates of refusal for privately sponsored refugees (Krivenko 2012). Numbers now have dropped significantly due to volunteer fatigue, declining church numbers etc., so now it is more likely to be around 3,000 a year. Connections are much more likely to be based on family acquaintances or friends in family-linked sponsorships (Denton 2003), meaning the scheme is more like an extension of family reunification rather than genuine extension of humanitarian aid to those who need it.

In many ways, however, the programme has been very successful and is used as a possible method of response to refugee obligations in Europe, where there is little history of the scheme (Kumin 2015). On one hand, it reduces the cost to the state to meet its international obligations, since costs are taken on by individuals or groups, reducing the likelihood of reliance on welfare assistance (although there are expectations that private sponsorship does not contribute to a country's quota, but adds to it – see Kumin 2015). It is most successful, moreover, because it creates a strong interpersonal bond between sponsor and refugee, facilitating social cohesion and bonding. As Krivenko (2012: 595) summarises:

> […] it should be emphasized that research on private sponsorship is rather rare and there are few systematic studies on the issue. However, the available evidence indicates that this program not only helps to respond to resettlement needs, but also facilitates the long-term successful adaptation of sponsored persons to life in Canada.

Kumin (2015) cites evidence showing that privately sponsored refugees outperform other refugees, becoming self-supporting more quickly and less reliant on state services. This, she explains is largely down to the high social capital that they receive through private sponsorship: e.g. simple acts like being invited to dinner help refugees to build on links, social ties and networks for job opportunities, as well as gain better understanding of local economic conditions and social expectations.

Social cohesion and belonging:

Other interventions for integration aim to address attitudes and beliefs about cultural difference at the local level. This is a central theme of local and national volunteer initiatives including the City of Sanctuary movement, a well-known phenomenon particularly in Canada and the US (see 'Welcoming America': https://www.welcomingamerica.org/). Cities of Sanctuary are constructed as places of welcome, with the ethos of Sanctuary cities to build a culture of hospitality and welcome to refugees in cities, towns and boroughs. Since 2005, in the UK over 40 Cities of Sanctuary have been established, with volunteers helping schools, universities, health and maternity services, theatres, art centres, faith centres, sports, communities, businesses and homes become 'places of sanctuary'. The geographer Jonathan Darling (2009) points out that they exploit the leverage at a local level to develop a different agenda to the national stance of deterrence and suspicion around asylum-seekers. He explains how positive messages, including welcome signs were displayed by organisations, while the city council commissioned postcards to show the city's multicultural heritage and produced coasters for use in pubs and council offices to question dominant myths around asylum in the city. 'These visual methods', as he argues, 'sought to challenge thought in the city…'

Similar strategies were also adopted in the Siemens example above, where as part of integrating refugees into the workforce, training events were held to demonstrate to other workers how highly

skilled the new interns were, both in terms of specific knowledge but also more generic skills of language and cultural knowledge that was advantageous for the company and its employees as a whole. Positive themes around immigration are underlined too in the development of Intercultural Cities where rather than immigration being seen as a burden, it is seen as an opportunity ('the diversity advantage'). Migrants are reframed from 'people with needs…to people with resources' (C4i Communication for Integration, http://www.coe.int/t/dg4/cultureheritage/culture/C4I/C4iOverview.pdf).

Other interventions at the local level include volunteer initiatives that harness the energies of active citizens in assisting with migrants' long-term integration, through practical activities, advice and support as well as broader campaigning to address negative attitudes around immigration. Groups might work with new migrants as mentors for settlement, offering orientation and advice about housing, public services, applying for jobs or providing opportunities for language learning etc. Some examples in the UK are Refugee Action, Student Action on refugees, Hope not Hate and Citizens UK, while a multitude of other similar initiatives exist in other countries, including anti-racism groups in Europe such as Reflexes in France, Demos in Denmark, Vepsen in Norway, Respect Diversity-Football Unites in Poland.

Finally, some other notable interventions aim to utilise the principles of contact theory, by promoting sustained contact between people as the means of leading to attitude change. An example is the use of sports or the arts as a means of social inclusion or multi-faith work, where people and groups are 'skilled up' to have conversations and interventions embrace new media to create and sustain contact (Ramalingam 2014). Other initiatives aim to counter negative messages around migrants at state and civic society level. Thus although the key aim of the Siemens programme (see previous) was to integrate refugees into the workforce, it also recognised the importance of countering misconceptions about them in ensuring the strategy's success. The Siemens scheme is part of a wider European-wide strategy called C4i (communication for integration) aiming to address public attitudes, whereby particularly at the local level, cities aim to produce different, more positive messages about immigrants – and ease their social integration.

Conclusions

Although there are many factors influencing integration and it is impossible to do full justice to all these issues here, the review touches on some of the most important concepts and areas for consideration in understanding how best to influence positive migrant integration. In particular, it has shown how:

- Migrant integration refers to a set of processes undertaken by both migrants and those in the receiving society. These processes occur across a number of interdependent domains (structural, social, cultural, civic and in relation to identity) and they are not linear or one way, but rather occur at different tempos and across different geographical scales, from the local level to the transnational.
- While many 'effectors' shape or hinder integration from the family to international policy, the review refers to the importance of three societal factors that have become particularly significant over recent years, particularly for influencing public opinion about immigrants. These are 1) the welfare state 2) austerity and 3) securitization of immigration. All three

factors shape the reception and experiences of migrants at the local level, where local histories, population compositions, civic tradition and governance also shape the experiences of integration.

- Interventions aimed at improving migrants' integration can be used within many of the different domains, from labour market and education programmes in schools that address some of the barriers faced, to local interventions aimed at creating safe and welcoming city spaces. While many opportunities exist there is, as yet, still a paucity of authoritative evidence in many of these domains on the effectiveness of the interventions that have been deployed.

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

Global Exchange

on Migration & Diversity

The Global Exchange on Migration and Diversity is an ambitious initiative at the Centre on Migration, Policy and Society (COMPAS) opening up opportunities for knowledge exchange and longer term collaboration between those working in the migration field.