Global Exchange
on Migration & Diversity

Autumn Academy 2019

Understanding narrative change on migration and integration at the municipal level

Denis Kierans



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Background paper for the 2019 Autumn Academy

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Introduction

Narratives are stories that influence how individuals and groups view the world and take action in it, including on the topic of migration and integration. This emerged as a key theme in the 2018 Autumn Academy and Inclusive Cities programme, reflecting a growing awareness that migration and integration policy objectives cannot easily be met through policies alone – there is a need to engage with the opinions and narratives that inform it. This paper explores the work that narratives do in cities in Europe and North America in relation to migration and integration and what is being done to better understand and incorporate these narratives into policy making at the local level.

The stakes for considering how narratives interact with migration and integration policy are especially high at the city level. Cities comprise an increasing share of the global economy and population – growth driven in main by migrants moving to cities inside and outside of their home countries to live, work and study alongside longer standing populations (World Bank 2019; IOM 2015). Although city leaders do not have a role in determining national immigration or integration policies, they are responsible for and closest to the communities where immigration is most strongly felt and where integration primarily occurs (Rutter and Carter 2018). In the context of polarised public opinion and, in many cases, cities' growing remits and budgetary cutbacks, there is appetite among city leaders to see how engaging with narratives could help them to more effectively formulate, communicate and deliver on policies.

Disagreements over how to make sense of these types of narratives, however, make it difficult to use the knowledge base that is out there. While policy-oriented research is beginning to generate guidance, significant gaps remain. This presents risks to policy-makers and practitioners wishing to make a foray into, or expand their programming in, this area. City-level interventions have led to some positive results, although information emanating from them is oftentimes ad hoc, anecdotal or elusive, notwithstanding a few recent initiatives that provide peer-to-peer learning between city networks. Knowledge exchange between research and practice is one way that the intersection between the two can form a mutually reinforcing, two-way process, whilst acknowledging both that neither researchers nor practitioners have a monopoly on knowledge and that research will only ever aim to be at most policy relevant, rather than policy led (Spencer 2017). Accordingly, this paper was drafted to spark dialogue amongst participants of the 2019 Autumn Academy by raising questions about the evidence base, concepts, research and practices around the role of narratives as both an obstacle to and engine for inclusion at the city level. It has since been revised, building in the feedback and discussions of the Autumn Academy participants.

The structure of this paper is as follows. The terms and definitions used in this paper are briefly outlined. The research on how different types of narratives impact public attitudes towards immigration, integration and inclusion are then presented alongside a few

illustrative examples from the European and North American contexts. The paper then turns to explore policy-oriented frameworks that offer guidance on the development of narratives, which aim to reduce tensions and encourage the inclusion of newcomers and other groups in city life. The next section presents a selection of city-level efforts to leverage these narratives in pursuit of more inclusive and cohesive communities. Concluding the paper is a brief discussion which, drawing on inputs from Autumn Academy participants, summarises the key takeaways of the Autumn Academy 2019. Policy makers and practitioners at the city level, as well as researchers, may find these insights useful for directing their future work around inclusive narratives.

Terms and definitions

Narratives are "frames that tell a story. …A narrative has a point to it, a moral. It's about how you should live your life –or how you shouldn't" (Lakoff 2008: 250). Narratives are persuasive; they constitute and reconstitute the identities and attitudes of individuals, communities and groups (Mishler 1992), provide structure and significance, and influence how people ought to act (Brown 1990; Kirkwood 1992; Mitroff & Kilmann 1976, from Meyer 1995: 211). Grounded in concepts of belonging, narratives bear on who is and is not welcomed to the public space (Hickman et al. 2012). Newcomers, minorities and immigrants have emerged as an important part of the narratives that define individual, group and institutional behaviours and identities across all strata of society (Ahad and Banulescu-Bogdan 2019). It is of little surprise that the idea of narrative change has emerged as one potential tool for policy makers and practitioners at the city level to foster more inclusive, integrated and cohesive communities, alongside policy formulation and service delivery based interventions.

Immigration is generally defined as the act of moving one's residence to a new country for a significant period of time – in many definitions, such as that used by the UN, this means one year or more – and is distinguished from migration, which also encompasses movements that are short-term, circular and occur within one country (Anderson and Blinder, 2019; IOM, 2019). Perhaps counterintuitively, most definitions of immigration include international students, who constitute a major share of immigration to many western countries; still, immigration tends to evoke images of asylum-seekers among the native-born population, even when they constitute a relatively small share of overall immigration to most countries (Blinder et al. 2011). The terms, definitions and understandings that surround immigration and mobility are regularly conflated and used interchangeably in the public debate and policy circles (Migration Observatory, 2019).

There are no universal, agreed upon definitions of inclusion, integration and social cohesion in research or policy. As with immigration, migration and related concepts, they are often conflated or used interchangeably. For various reasons, different research traditions have their preferred terms. This paper makes use of all of these terms – inclusion, integration and social cohesion, immigration and migration, and immigrant, migrant and newcomer – in order to examine the diversity of thinking on the subject at hand.

Generally, social cohesion refers to a "sense of togetherness, resilience and orientation towards the common good" (Eurofound 2018: 1), with trust and shared values, norms and institutions appearing as common aspects of many definitions (Phillips 2008). According to Delhey et al., the following elements are thought to constitute a cohesive society to varying degrees and with varying degrees of consensus among the research community (2018: 430).

Table 1: Elements of Social cohesion

Accepted	**Contested**
Social relations and networks	Inequalities
Social and political trust	Value consensus
Tolerance	Ethnic homogeneity
Civic-mindedness	Subjective well-being
Participation	
Absence of conflicts	

Source: Delhey et al. 2018: 430

Kearns and Forrest (2000: 997) think of a socially cohesive city as "one in which the members share common values which enable them to identify and support common aims and objectives, and share a common set of moral principles and codes of behaviour through which to conduct their relations with one another," setting out five constituent elements:

1. Common values and civic culture
2. Social order and social control
3. Social solidarity and reductions in disparities of wealth
4. Social networks and social capital
5. Territorial belonging and identity

Nonetheless, they are careful to point out that, "social cohesion is by no means unambiguously a good thing. It can be about discrimination and exclusion and about a majority imposing its will or value system on a minority" (1013). Cities can, for example, be composed of socially cohesive communities that are characterised by ongoing conflicts with one another.

An inclusive society is conceived of similarly, although at times with an added ideological emphasis on "equality, welfare and social justice" (which is not dissimilar to some definitions of a cohesive society) (Phillips 2008:4):

> 'Inclusion is ultimately about the dignity and worth of every person, which is the backbone of all human rights. […]

> There is a pressing need to develop societies that embrace diversity and pluralism in the face of the many deep structural inequities and exclusion that persist in countries and regions across the world. […]
>
> An inclusive society aims at empowering and promoting the social, economic, and political inclusion of all, irrespective of age, sex, disability, race, ethnicity, origin, religion, economic, or other status. It is a society that leaves no one behind' (Fredriksson 2019).

Both social cohesion and inclusion can be used to express concern for the more equitable treatment and social participation of disadvantaged sections of society, such as minorities and other groups (Pervaiz et al. 2013) and are at times used interchangeably (e.g., Arthurson 2012: 246) and to define one other (e.g., "cohesive societies are characterised by feelings of inclusion…", Eurofound 2018: 6).

Although both research and policy-making have a long tradition of defining integration as a two-way process of mutual accommodation, many still think of it as a one-way process (Schinkel 2018; Spencer and Charsley 2017). Some researchers therefore suggest that even the use of the term integration reinforces the concept of one-way assimilation. In certain public debates and policy spheres, the term integration retains a sense that it is concerned primarily with migrants, minorities and newcomers, which has led some policy makers to use the less contentious term 'inclusion' instead (Spencer 2011). Narratives that shape how immigration and integration are understood in society are particularly affected by the lack of consensus on the terminology. Unless otherwise stated, this paper employs an inclusive, 'two-way' conceptualisation of integration that is broadly in line with the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe's definition: "a dynamic, multi-actor process of mutual engagement that facilitates effective participation by all members of a diverse society in the economic, political, social and cultural life, and fosters a shared and inclusive sense of belonging at national and local levels" (2012).

Part I: Thinking on inclusion

Data and research presents a mixed picture on what constitutes inclusive, well-integrated or cohesive communities. Individual, group and institutional narratives, often articulated as public attitudes, are thought to reveal the extent to which a society can be said to be cohesive (Mishler 1992; Eurofound 2018:5). Different schools of thought provide competing explanations for how, why and under which circumstances these narratives are formed, find public expression and undergo change. City leaders already know that certain types of narratives pose a threat to inclusion agendas and social cohesion. What is less clear is how to understand and engage with these narratives to foster inclusion at the city level.

This section summarises the main strands of thought explaining how narratives affecting inclusion are formed and manifested. These are: issue salience; segmentation research;

contribution and competition in the economic role of migration; the role of community contact and socialisation; and the role of the media. Building on Dennison and Dražanová's (2018) research into public attitudes towards migration, this section considers inclusion and social cohesion quite broadly. It presents what is, admittedly, a somewhat complicated and even confusing picture. Disagreements over the fundamental causes, dynamics and effects of immigration, integration and inclusion, and their interaction with narratives, make it difficult to draw concrete lessons on how to respond (Boswell et al. 2011: 1). The aim is not to provide policy makers or practitioners with guidelines on how to 'do inclusion' or present different schools of thought as menu items to choose from according to taste. Rather, the hope is to create a space for the instincts and learned, on-the-ground experiences of policy-makers and practitioners to engage with a decently representative yet impartial sketch of the thinking in this area.

Salience

Salience is the importance ascribed to a particular issue, and is informed by a range of contexts and factors (Oppermann 2010). What is salient to one person may not be to another, and what is salient at one point in time may not be in another. Beliefs or attitudes that are salient "would occupy the person's attention and be more frequently verbalized" (Higgins 1996: 133). They often trigger an emotional response. Salient issues usually dominate in the public debate, and appear to influence the types of policies that are considered and implemented (Dennison 2019a). Salient issues inspire changes in behaviour, such as political action in individuals, which goes some way to explaining why restrictive immigration policies are often adopted when the public views immigration as an important issue (Ibid.; Givens and Luedtke 2005). Individuals tend to learn more, and learn more selectively, about issues that are salient to them (Boninger et al. 1995). The opinions held on issues that are salient are generally stronger than they would be otherwise (Fox and Schofield 1989). When they are seen to concern the personal life of an individual, they are quite stable over time, whereas salient issues that concern politics are subject to greater fluctuation (Miller et al. 2017). Political parties may seek to leverage these insights at the ballot box by increasing the salience of issues positively associated with them (and reducing the salience of issues negatively associated with them) rather than trying to bring the quite stable personal attitudes of the public into closer alignment (Dennison 2019a).

When it comes to attitudes towards immigration, the salience of immigration in the public debate has been shown to activate latent anti-immigration attitudes, compelling individuals to stray from their usual voting patterns and vote for parties that support their position on this issue (Ibid.). When immigration increases in salience over and above other issues, people are more likely to vote for far right parties, even if they identify as relatively 'pro-immigration', more so than when crime, unemployment, the economy or terrorism increase in salience over and above other issues (Dennison 2019b). In the UK, the likelihood of reporting an intended or actual vote for UKIP increased by 16% among those who saw immigration as the most important problem affecting the country (Ibid.: 18). This effect was less pronounced but still statistically significant for those who were 'pro-immigration'.

Similarly, the salience of 'Europe' is thought to increase the likelihood of anti-immigration individuals and, to a lesser extent, pro-immigration individuals voting for far-right parties across the EU. When the issue of immigration appears less important than economic or social issues, voters—both pro- and anti-immigration—are more likely to vote for parties that they view as more reliable (Dennison 2019a) and less likely to vote for far-right parties (Dennison 2019b).

Ford (2018) considers that, since the UK's 2016 referendum to leave the EU, immigration has been seen less frequently as 'a most important problem' (Figure 1) and is more commonly seen as having a positive economic and cultural impact (Figure 2). This trend holds among respondents with low and high levels of education.

Figure 1: Share of UK Population Naming Immigration as a Most Important Problem, June 2016-Dec 2017



Source: IPSOS-MORI and YouGov; from Ford 2018

Figure 2: Britons' Views on the Economic and Cultural Impact of Immigration, 2014-2017



Source: British Election Study/YouGov in Ford 2018

Ford poses three questions in response to these findings: Why has this change happened? Why isn't this shift more widely known and discussed? Why aren't those in politics, society and the media who favour a more open, liberal migration policy making greater use of this information to make a case for more liberal policy?

Put another way, Ford's line of questioning can be seen as a challenge to decision-makers to think beyond which issues are salient and consider why, for whom and in which contexts issues become salient. There is research to suggest that a less reactive approach, -- one in which policy makers increase the salience of shared identities, challenges or common goals – may help to foster support for inclusive agendas (Dovidio et al. 2010; Benton et al. 2018). Reducing the salience of controversial topics such as immigration may open up the policy space for broader policy options such as technocratic responses (as per Boswell's identification of first and second order policy problems). However, the reasons why (and when) issues become salient are complex and there is no firm evidence to support the idea that avoiding a topic reduces its salience. In fact, the opposite may be true – a prevalent sense that 'we can't talk about migration' may actually increase its salience.

Integration generally has lower levels of salience than migration but generates higher levels of positive public opinion, especially at the local level. Eurobarometer (2018) shows that over half of respondents (54%) from across the EU felt that the integration of immigrants is successful at local and national levels (though with wide variation between member states), while one-fifth of respondents (20%) saw immigration from outside of the EU as more of an opportunity. In response to a separate question, respondents were more likely to agree

that integration is successful in their city or local area (47%) than in the country as a whole (39%). Rather than focussing on (or avoiding) the topic of immigration, city leaders may find it worthwhile to explore how narratives around integration, and increased salience of integration, interact with the public debate around inclusion and immigration, as well as community dynamics more broadly.

Segmentation research

Segmentation research describes efforts to better understand public attitudes towards immigration by categorising individuals into different groups. It moves beyond the thinking that attitudes towards immigration and integration are either 'open' or 'closed', which is sometimes reflected in country-, regional- and global-level reporting. Segmentation theory reflects what practitioners at the city-level already know: attitudes towards immigration are varied and complex and that the majority of citizens are somewhere between the two extremes. These approaches, which have been developed predominantly from policy and practitioner approaches, aim to identify not only different 'segments' of the public, but also, among these segments, which attitudes are immovable (or at least strongly fixed) and which are subject to change and persuasion (perhaps due to being less strongly fixed). Segmentation research considers attitudes towards immigration and integration, and opinions that concern other issues, such as preference for a political party or 'tradition', to be interlinked. Put another way, seemingly unconnected attitudes can be predictors of opinions on immigration and integration. Perhaps surprisingly, socio-economic characteristics and other external factors are not considered to be the main predictor of attitudes towards immigration in segmentation theory, although they do play a role (Dempster and Hargrave 2017).

Segmentation research categorises individuals into groups and draws conclusions based on the supposed linkages between different types of attitudes and, to a lesser degree, socio-economic characteristics. It is therefore important to be mindful that these classifications are meaningful insofar as they aid reflection on attitudes (IMiX 2018). They should not be used to reduce, essentialise or cast judgement on individuals. Nor should segmentation be used to focus attention on one group at the expense of others; from a practitioner's and researcher's point of view, all segments of society should remain in view.

There are several recent efforts to organise segments of the public according to their opinions on immigration and related issues, such as diversity, multiculturalism and social change. 'HOPE not hate', a research and advocacy group based in the UK, has organised the English public into six distinct 'tribes', the largest being those occupying the middle ground (Ford and Lowles 2016):

1) 'Confident multiculturals' – very positive about immigration, generally young and educated, they consider diversity an essential characteristic of their society
2) 'Mainstream liberals' – very positive about immigration and multiculturalism, although to less of an extent than the confident multiculturals

3) ‘Active enmity’ – very negative about immigration, they are primarily unskilled and unemployed, see diversity as a negative and are more likely to advocate for violence
4) ‘Latent hostiles’ – very negative about immigration, they are mostly over 35 years old, uneducated and less overt in expression of these attitudes than ‘active enmity’
5) ‘Culturally concerned’ – a middle ground group, they are affluent, economically secure and have attitudes that are shaped primarily by cultural concerns about the integration of immigrants and changes in society
6) ‘Immigrant ambivalence’ – a middle ground group, they are primarily working class, ambivalent toward immigration and have attitudes that are driven by economic insecurity

IMiX has organised the English population according to their attitudes towards immigration, economic and cultural security or insecurity, as well as other socio-economic characteristics (Figure 3).

Figure 3: Segmentation of the English Population, 2018



Source: adapted from IMiX 2018

These ‘tribes’ are dynamic configurations and should be expected to change over time and in reaction to the issues of the day. Importantly, researchers and practitioners track changes in the size and composition of these segments as a share of the general public over time (Figure 4) and in different locations (e.g., Dixon et al. 2017), allowing for insights into the impacts of policy, events and other factors on the positions taken by the public on

immigration and integration. Between 2011 and 2016, the share of 'Active enmity' dropped from 13% to 8%, while 'Confident multiculturals' rose from 8% to 18% (Figure 4).

Figure 4: Segmentation of the English Population, 2011 and 2016 (%)



Source: Ford and Lowles, 2016

To better understand the changes to Britain since the 2016 referendum to leave the UK, HOPE not hate reviewed their previous efforts to classify British society into segments (Ford and Lowles 2019). The expansion of the previous six tribes (Figure 4) to seven (Figure 5) is thought to reflect increasing divisions and distrust stemming from the Brexit referendum – i.e., the erosion of public trust in the political system and growing animosity between the 'leavers' and the 'remainers' who feel most strongly about Brexit. These findings are generally in line with Ford's (2018) observations, discussed above, that the salience of and negative attitudes towards immigration decreased following the referendum. From fall/winter 2016 onwards, an increasing majority of the British public appear to have viewed immigration as a good thing for the country; a shrinking minority see it as a bad thing (Figure 5). That these attitudes emerge from a society apparently ever more divided shows that a more positive view of immigration does not necessarily reflect or lead to a more harmonious or cohesive society. It is important to note that over this period, immigration

inflows were generally on the rise. A more positive or less negative view of immigration often follows from the perception that immigration is less important, or salient, in relation to other issues.

Figure 5: Attitudes towards Immigration into Britain, Good or Bad for the Country, by UK Population Segment, 2019



Source: Carter and Lowles 2019

Figure 6: Attitudes towards Immigration into Britain, Good or Bad for the Country, February 2011-2019



Source: Carter and Lowles 2019

Carter and Lowles consider other possibilities for what might have driven these more permissive public attitudes towards immigration:

> ‘The reasons for this more positive view of immigration are complicated, but much can be attributed to a broader liberal shift in public attitudes, increased diversity, and an improvement in economic conditions.[1] For those with more hostile attitudes, a sense that Brexit might solve the ‘immigration problem’ had reduced concern, or their concerns were wrapped up in their focus on Britain’s departure from the EU. For those who already saw immigration positively, Brexit triggered a hardening of their support’ (50).

Although immigration is viewed much more negatively by leave voters than remain voters, by 2019, the majority of the English population appear to have relatively moderate attitudes towards it (Figure 7).

Figure 7: Attitudes towards Immigration into Britain, Good or Bad for the Country, by Leave and Remain voters, 2019

Source: Carter and Lowles 2019

The segmentation of the population should also be expected to change based on location. While there is undoubtedly a lot of common ground, More In Common’s research has identified tribes in France, Italy, Germany and Greece, all of which reflect their distinct national histories and present day contexts. Research conducted in Germany, for example, has led to the identification of five groups (as opposed to the UK’s post-referendum seven, for example) – an indication, perhaps, that the majority of German society was oriented towards the political centre, with fewer instances of the type of polarization found in the UK (Dixon et al. 2017; Carter and Lowles 2019). The attitudes of Germany’s ‘tribes’ are based on “a complex combination of feelings including obligation, scepticism, fear, empathy and guilt” and are organised around the extremes of support for or opposition to migration, as well as respondents’ assessment of the impacts of migration on the economy and culture (Dixon et al. 2017):

[1] See the following section on contribution and competition in the economic role of migrants for more information.

1) 'Liberal cosmopolitans' – The most open-minded, pro-refugee, and supportive of immigration of the five groups. They believe that immigration is good for both the economy and cultural life in Germany and that integration works.
2) 'Economic pragmatists' – Part of the 'conflicted middle', they mainly believe that immigration makes Germany more open to new ideas and cultures. They are concerned about the compatibility of the Islamic faith with German culture.
3) 'Humanitarian sceptics' – Part of the conflicted middle, they consider the acceptance of refugees an obligation and matter of principle, due in part to Germany's history, but are conflicted on the issue of integration.
4) 'Moderate opponents' – Part of the conflicted middle, they share many views with the radical opponents, but with less intensity.
5) 'Radical opponents' - The most opposed to refugees and migration and view letting refugees into Germany as a security risk which will encourage many more to come to Europe. They do not think integration works and German identity is seen as at risk.

Nationally distinctive elements emerge in the segmentation of the French, Greek and Italian populations as well. The seven tribes identified in Greece and Italy appears to be at least a partial reflection of national political polarisation and disenchantment (Dixon et al. 2019 and 2018). Nearly half of the Greek population had direct, recent contact with refugees, far more than in other parts of Europe (Dixon et al. 2019). As contact theory would anticipate, they were also more likely to express empathy towards refugees than to blame them for their circumstances.[2] Italians were also found to broadly support asylum – a possible result of the prominent role of Catholic national identity in shaping opinion – and were deeply frustrated by both national politics and what they perceived as the EU's failure to help Italy in managing the migration crisis (Dixon et al. 2018). The French public is segmented into five tribes (Beddiar et al. 2017). In France, the 'refugee crisis' is seen as proof of the failure of immigration policy and integration itself.

Despite national differences, research in all countries studied found that the majority of the population does not hold extreme views on immigration one-way or the other (Beddiar et al 2017; Carter and Lowles 2016 and 2019; Dempster and Hargrave 2017; Dixon et al. 2018 and 2019).

British Future's analysis of public attitudes in the UK reinforces this finding, identifying three groups in the population – two fringe minorities and one moderate majority (Ballinger et al. 2019; Figure 8):

- 'Migration liberals' – very positive about migration, they value diversity and are generally younger, university-educated and urban
- 'Migration rejectionists' – very negative about migration, they are generally older, white, male, rural and economically vulnerable,

[2] See the below section on the role of community contact and socialisation for more information about contact theory.

- ‘Anxious middle’ – least often heard in the public debate, they have concerns about migration while also understanding its benefits

Figure 8: The UK population by segment as three groups, 2018 (%)



Source: Ballinger et al., 2019

The National Conversation on Immigration in the UK also supports the theory of a majority or ‘anxious’ middle. It identified members of this group as ‘balancers’ of public opinion on migration who (Rutter and Carter 2018).

- Generally recognized that there are both benefits and drawbacks to migration
- Were more concerned with the potential strain of immigration on public services than the impact it may have on jobs and wages
- Changed how they talked and thought about migration based on whether or not they had meaningful contact with immigrants
- Had very low trust in government and its ability to manage migration
- Knew little about migration policies (Ibid., from Broadhead 2018)

There are, of course, other ways to conceive of the public vis-à-vis public attitudes towards immigration. Focussing on how the public views the role of migrants *economically* (see following section for more on this), Ford and Lymperopoulou (2017) found the British public’s views clustered around extremes, despite most research suggesting the effect of immigration on a country’s economy to be quite low. Results would likely vary according to geographical level. For example, the Athens Observatory on Migrant and Refugee Issues (AORI) research project (see the case studies section of this paper for more information) found meaningful discrepancies in public opinion towards immigration and integration at the neighbourhood level (Athens Coordination Center for Migrant and Refugee Issues 2017).

This supports the National Conversation’s findings that, positively or negatively, people view immigration through its impact on the place that they live, although a range of other factors can influence attitudes (Rutter and Carter 2018). That is, impacts on the local level – be it region, city or neighbourhood – may have an outsized role in how public opinion on immigration and integration is formed. This is significant as it links the creation of narrative to local government competencies of place shaping and integration, rather than placing these solely in relation to the national government and its policies. Whilst some of the concerns of public opinion towards migration undoubtedly relate to migration policy at the

national level, there remains evidence of policy space for local government to shape narratives of inclusion at the city level.

Contribution and competition in the economic role of immigrants and immigration

The role of the potential economic contribution of migrants and migration (such as through inclusive growth and investment initiatives as described elsewhere in this paper) is often contrasted in popular discourse with the idea of newcomers as economic competitors with longer-standing populations. As highlighted above, research has shown the impact on public services is often of more concern to communities. Nonetheless, narratives around contribution and competition resonate. Research suggests that competition between groups is thought to, 1. Strengthen bonds and cooperation within groups and 2. Weaken bonds and cooperation between groups (Puurtinen and Mappes 2009). City leaders will no doubt be familiar with these dynamics, which problematise the concept of a city as uniformly cohesive. Nonetheless, group competition is considered by some to be a major factor in driving negative attitudes towards immigrants, although to differing degrees depending on the type of competition (Malhotra et al. 2013), the age of the individual (Dustmann and Preston 2001) and other factors (Figure 9).

Figure 9: Differences (in percentage points) between Social Groups in their View that Immigration is Good for the Economy, 2002 and 2014



Source: Harding 2017

Immigrants do not need to be in actual economic competition with longer-standing populations to be seen as an economic threat and precipitate a negative shift in attitudes towards immigration (Espenshade and Calhoun 1993). The *perception* of economic competition is a stronger determinant of negative attitudes than *actual* economic competition. How likely someone is to perceive immigration as a threat varies considerably

depending on a number of variables such as their country of residence, which group (e.g., asylum-seekers, international students) they have in mind when they think of an immigrant or immigration (Meltzer et al. 2018, Blinder et al. 2011; Figure 10).

Figure 10: Perceptions of Overall Immigrant Impact on Europe, by Countries of Respondents and Regions of Origin of Immigrants, 2017/2018



Source: Meltzer et al. 2018. Notes: Survey carried out 6 December 2017—5 January 2018; n = 21,882; for visual clarity, the original index was recoded from -1 (indicating high perceived benefits from immigration) to +1 (indicating high perceived threats from immigration)

At an individual level, those who are less well off, unemployed or more disparaging about their own financial future are thought to be more likely to hold negative attitudes towards immigrants, whether or not there is supporting evidence (Rustenbach 2010; Burns and Gimpel 2000; Espenshade and Hempstead 1996). These individuals are also thought to be less likely to participate in or identify with their community (Kunze and Suppe 2017; see below section on the role of community contact and socialisation for more information on this phenomenon). There is evidence to suggest that actual and perceived economic inequalities between groups and individuals within groups can undermine broader social cohesion and manifest in negative attitudes towards immigration, doing further harm to the social fabric (Benton et al. 2018). This may help to explain some of the implications of Puurtinen and Mappes's (2009) research discussed above: actual or perceived economic

competition between groups may lead to high levels of cohesion within groups while simultaneously aggravating public attitudes towards immigration and undermining the cohesiveness of the broader community. As Dennison and Dražanová (2018) point out, however, it is difficult to demonstrate the relationship between public opinion and specific types or impacts of immigration, as opinions about a specific issue (e.g., immigration and the economy) may actually reflect views on immigration in general or another issue altogether (e.g., irregular migration). Several researchers have identified examples in which the 'economic argument' is used to justify pre-existing, less 'socially acceptable' positions (Hooghe and Dassonneville 2018; Mutz 2018).

In this spirit, these researchers are re-examining what led many voters to support Donald Trump in the 2016 US election. During the campaign, the main anxieties of his supporters, especially of so-called swing voters, were thought to do with the economy and (dissatisfaction with) the political status quo; this is what the opposition based much of its own campaigning and communications materials on. Research now suggests this may have been a misreading. Rather, the economy and political status quo were how voters gave voice to their actual concern: status threat linked to racial resentment and anti-immigrant sentiment. Policy makers are aware of the risks of such a misdiagnosis and the importance of understanding the difference between publicly expressed and privately held opinions.

Alongside economic competition, there is an economic argument made by some in support of immigration. It focusses on the economic *contribution* of immigration or immigrants and newcomers themselves and is often promoted by pro-migrant NGOs to boost support for immigrants and immigration in the public sphere. This line of thinking generally reflects the following points (e.g. Portes 2016; Rowthorn 2008; Auerbach and Oreopoulos 1999):

- Immigrants could bring different skills and aptitudes, and transmit those to non-immigrant colleagues (and vice versa)
- Immigration could be complementary to trade in goods and services (because of immigrant networks or for other reasons)
- Immigrants could increase competition in particular labour markets, increasing the incentive for natives to acquire certain skills
- Immigrant entrepreneurs could increase competition and bring new ideas into product markets (one very obvious example being the catering sector)
- Workplace diversity (across a number of dimensions) could increase (or decrease) productivity and innovation'

Cities sometimes highlight their diversity in external branding to compete with other cities in attracting outside investment, foreign talent and tourists (Kearns and Paddison 2000; Hadj-Abdou 2014). However, "city brands are not only used to create images for external audiences such as potential investors and tourists" (Belabas and Eshuis 2019: 209). They can also target internal audiences as part of a larger place shaping role that builds a "common sense of belonging that members of both majority and minority communities can relate to" (Ibid.: 210; Zapata-Barrero 2015). The development of an inclusive narrative of

place directed towards residents is especially relevant for cities that have experienced so-called 'super-diversity' (Belabas and Eshuis 2019). For many cities already contending with high-levels of diversity and demographic change, reframing this reality as an asset and shared experience rather than a challenge and abnormality can be useful foundation upon which to build an inclusive narrative of place. As Hadj-Abdou (2014) illustrates through the experiences of city branding in London and Rotterdam, diversity is most effective and persuasive as an inclusive narrative when the link is made not only to economic gains, but also to migration and the social, historical identity of the city itself. However, more work is needed to understand the link between city branding—inclusive branding in particular—and the segmentation research outlined above in order to better understand how cities may target their strategies towards different groups and ensure that the voices of various communities are represented in the strategy, whilst maintaining the overall coherence of the message and ensuring it is one which also meets the external aims to attract inward investment.[3]

The role of community contact and socialisation in facilitating the narrative

As with economic competition and contribution, *contact theory* and *group threat theory* are thought to influence public attitudes and behaviours vis-à-vis immigration and integration. These related theories centre on different types of social contact with individuals and communities and help to explain how groups are sometimes accepted and sometimes 'othered' along certain lines, such as social and economic class, ethnicity and location (Tolsma et al. 2009). These influential theories are particularly pertinent to the development of narratives at the local level, which are likely to focus not only on strategic or 'top-down' communications, but also on the community conversations happening within and between particular communities as well as how different communities use and share public spaces.

Contact theory contends that personal interactions with immigrants (and members of other groups) can offset negative conceptions individuals may have about immigrants and immigration (in general, as well as specific sub-groups and their members). Personal contact appears to reduce intergroup anxieties, foster empathy and increase knowledge [about the other group] (Dennison and Dražanová 2018). Allport (1954) sets out the hypothesis that face-to-face contact reduces intergroup hostility so long as there is equal status amongst participants, that they are working towards shared goals and that they have institutional support. A large meta-analysis (Pettigrew and Tropp 2006) was able to confirm this hypothesis, showing that social contact improved relations within and between groups and the preconditions identified by Allport increased the likelihood of these outcomes.

Hewstone and Swart (2011), in an appraisal of 50 years of contact theory, report previous findings that direct contact reduces inter-group anxiety and induces positive processes such as generating greater empathy and perspective-taking. They review the evidence that

[3] See the section on branding an inclusive city narrative in Part II of this paper for more information.

supports the role of indirect contact and come to the conclusion that there is far-reaching empirical evidence to say: a) people who simply hear about or witness intergroup relationships are more likely to exhibit less prejudice than those who do not; and b) even imagined contact "can reduce inter-group bias and improve both explicit and implicit out-group attitudes, enhance intentions to engage in future contact and even generalize to other out-groups, with reduced inter-group anxiety as the key mediator" (Turner & Crisp 2010; Turner et al. 2007; Crisp & Turner 2009; Husnu & Crisp, 2010; Crisp et al. 2011; Harwood et al. 2011; all from Hewstone and Swart 2011: 377). Still, Hewstone and Swart note that it is difficult to meet Allport's criteria for equal status, particularly when dealing with majority and minority communities, when translating this into practice – as can be observed in many city and policy making contexts. This may be taken as an endorsement of efforts to mainstream migrants into broader initiatives focussed on the reduction of inequality.

Hewstone and Swart also note that attempts to encourage contact and overcome biased attitudes between groups are oftentimes had as 'difficult conversations', which may hamper efforts. Research conducted by Tucker et al. (2018) points to a less contentious approach. Investigating retweet networks across multiple domains, they found that politically salient topics often resemble 'echo chambers' with high polarization, while other topics, such as the Olympics or Super Bowl, more closely resemble 'national conversations.' Less contentious or 'bridging' topics may be more effective at facilitating social contact – both actual and imagined – by highlighting commonalities between groups rather than differences. Where contact can be focussed on less fraught discussion topics, this might prove to be a way to enhance cohesion and more inclusive narratives – by approaching these issues from slightly more oblique angles rather than necessarily tackling them head on.

This speaks to the difficulty of translating contact theory to real life situations, particularly where inequality is present. Mayblin et al. (2015) explores the concept of 'meaningful social contact' noting that:

> 'Fleeting, unintended encounters, where diverse people rub along together as a consequence of accidental proximity, do not necessarily produce 'meaningful contact'. [Meaningful contact] is contact which breaks down prejudices and translates beyond the moment to produce a more general respect for others. Rather, there is a growing interest in the nature of contact, instead of the fact of encounter.'

The research considers contact through spatial lenses, exploring the role that 'contact zones' play – the everyday and micro spaces which facilitate contact. Most commonly, this has been applied to classrooms, but has also been applied to other public spaces and, in some instances, workplaces. As discussed in Part II of this paper, these research findings can speak to practical approaches for both the development of inclusive narratives (through community conversations and consultation) and its implementation (using contact as the mechanism by which an inclusive narrative is put into practice).

Group threat theory understands the effect of increased proximity to and engagement with immigrants and other outsider groups to worsen attitudes towards them by increasing the sense of threat that group poses (Dennison and Dražanová 2018).

More negative attitudes towards immigration are sometimes found in contexts where higher concentrations of immigrants are present or perceived to be present (Gang et al. 2002). Economically and ethnically heterogeneous communities have been shown to exhibit lower levels of social trust and participation than homogeneous communities (Uslaner and Brown 2005; Alesina and La Ferrara 2002). Yet diversity does not necessarily lead to conflict. McKenna et al. (2018) found that, while "ethnic diversity does not have a detrimental effect on any social cohesion variable," it is "positively related to generalized trust *through the mediators of intergroup contact and perceived threat*" (McKenna et al. 2018). Meanwhile, the European Social Survey found higher levels of support across Europe for the immigration of those who are a part of the racial or ethnic majority than for those who are not (Heath and Richards 2016). By reframing narratives of place, city leaders have the opportunity to shift the boundaries of belonging, which can mediate the processes of intergroup contact and perceived group threat. This in turn may help to diffuse biases and encourage practices that are more inclusive.

Perceived threats from out-groups can also arise from a salient in-group identity. 'Identity-identifying' questions such as 'What is your ethnicity?' are thought to increase the level of salience of in-group identities in individuals and therefore the sense of threat from out-groups (Benton et al. 2018). For city leaders implementing inclusive agendas through programmes such as communications campaigns and community dialogues, 'bridging conversations' which stress commonalities amongst groups may do more positive work than addressing issues of difference.

The key to resolving the seemingly contradictory findings of contact theory and group threat theory is in the types of contact the theories presuppose. Contact theory is based on meaningful, intimate interactions between members of different groups, leading to improved relations, whereas group threat theory trades in routine, non-intimate and even imagined interactions, which can enhance the sense of threat. Research conducted in Norway in 2016 during the construction of an asylum centre found that local residents who had anticipated negative encounters with asylum seekers held negative attitudes towards them. However, these negative attitudes could be ameliorated through actual interactions. The actual encounters resulted not in a radical shift in attitude, but a "subtle mood change of increased acceptance" or 'sigh of relief' as residents found that their new neighbours were not so different or threatening as they had imagined (Bygnes 2019). One wonders if the opposite may occur when anticipated positive interactions with immigrants of a shared background fail to pan out as imagined.[4]

[4] Cf, American Jews and their reception of, and subsequent relationship with, the 'third wave' of Soviet Jews in Flaherty et al. 1986.

Regardless of the aforementioned 'sigh of relief' and other positive potential outcomes of social contact and bridging conversations, Tolsma and van der Meer (2018) found that ethnically diverse neighbourhoods are less cohesive because, "(1) Members of ethnic minority groups are more likely to report having contact with and trust in their immediate neighbours than natives … (2) Minority group residents are less likely to be contacted and trusted by their neighbours … and (3) All ethnic groups prefer to mix with coethnics." However, neighbourhood diversity does not necessarily undermine intra-neighbourhood cohesion (2018) and these dynamics vary according to local context (Tolsma et al. 2009). Accounting for the place-specific relationship between social cohesion and diversity is a key element in forming inclusive strategies that resist a cookie cutter approach. This underlines the importance of placing those who have an intimate knowledge of the specific dynamics at play (i.e., members of the different groups and communities involved) at the heart of inclusive planning, including work around inclusive narratives.

Life experiences and values are key predictors of social attitudes in the eyes of some theorists, many of whom focus on how material and social conditions, ideologies and symbolic politics elicit attitudes and responses to particular and sometimes seemingly unrelated issues. These experiences can occur, and these values can be formed, in early and later life.

Early life experiences, such as religious upbringing, social class, education and the political environment (van Assche et al. 2016), dominant religion (Helbling and Traunmüller 2015), cultural practices (Meeusen and Kern 2016; Shin and Dovidio 2016) and history and identity (Bello, 2017; García-Faroldi 2017) of the area in which one was raised are thought to form values which may lay dormant but, when triggered, can inform attitudes towards a range of subjects, including immigrants, immigration and integration (Calavita 1996; Espenshade and Calhoun 1993; Sears 1997). These values may act as barriers to social cohesion and inclusion, although the ways that values they assert themselves, especially in relation to other (sometimes competing, sometimes amplifying) values are not straightforward (Kearns and Forrest 2000). The example of education illustrates how difficult it is to disentangle early life events and the values that emanate from them from one another. On one hand, education is thought to boost acceptance of immigration by encouraging "universalist rather than nationalist beliefs and the enforcement of similar social codes of conduct" (Jackman and Muha 1984 and Janus 2010, from Dennison and Dražanová 2018). On the other hand, it can be seen as indicating a 'suite' of values linked to events and characteristics such as place of birth, ethnicity, social class and access to public services (Espenshade and Calhoun 1993; Haubert and Fussell 2006). The early life experiences or contexts that are thought to predispose some to anti- or pro-immigration/immigrant attitudes and influence social cohesion more broadly are difficult to study in isolation and may be self-reinforcing.

Experiences that occur later in life can also influence anti-immigrant attitudes and behaviours, although not usually to the same extent as those which occur in early life.

Political messaging in later life can excite negative attitudes towards immigrants, especially among segments of society who are aware of the "party cues" and therefore are primed to respond in kind (Bohman 2011; Sides and Citrin 2007; Hellwig and Kweon 2016). However, those who are already solidly 'pro-immigration,' have been found to redouble their position when confronted with negative messaging (Careja 2016). Terrorist attacks, which have been found to activate negative public attitudes towards immigration (Legewie 2013), may only have a temporary influence (Castano Silva 2018; Brouard et al. 2018).

Meanwhile, research on the impact of having a family on attitudes towards immigration is mixed. On one hand, having a family has been found to lead to more negative attitudes towards immigration as upheaval, unpredictability (Jackson et al. 2001) and crime (Chandler and Tsai 2001) become greater concerns. While this may lead policy makers towards framing immigrants, immigration and integration in accordance with 'the family' or 'family values' – themselves complex and disputed notions – this risks falling into the trap of 'constructing the model immigrant', a practice that can divide immigrant groups into 'deserving' and 'undeserving' (Yukich 2013).

On the other hand, the family is a dynamic event, acting in different ways upon members depending on the particular make-up of the family unit as well as their unique perspectives and characteristics, such as their generation or stage in life. Bearing this in mind, having a family has also been shown to predict more positive attitudes towards immigration, perhaps due to the "increased likelihood that the children of natives will mix with the children of immigrants, increasing the contact and diffusing the tensions between the adults in the two groups" (Gang et al. 2002:27), a function of contact theory (discussed above). Having a family can also increase opportunities and reduce inequalities and vulnerabilities among its members by, for example, insulating them from violence (Gorman-Smith et al. 2004) and fostering success in business (Marger 2001), positioning families as an important vehicle to promote social participation and voluntarism at the local level in early and later life (Roberts and Devine 2004).

Psychology is sometimes used to explain values the beliefs that can inform attitudes towards immigrants, immigration and integration. Following Adorno (1950), some theorists locate the challenges to social inclusion in the ways different 'personality types' manifest and interact in society (Cohrs and Stelzl 2010). However, there is disagreement as to which factors really matter. The Schwartz theory of basic human values describes ten human values that comprise a social identity (Schwartz 2012). Dennison and Dražanová (2018) have found evidence to suggest that only four of these ten values – 'universalism', 'conformity', 'tradition' and 'security' – have strong effects on attitudes towards immigration. While not all aspects of an individual's psychological makeup inform their attitudes towards immigration or act as barriers to social cohesion, there appears to be a correlation between individual social and political values and levels of social trust (Semyonov et al. 2006; Hooge et al. 2006). Other psychological approaches locate negative attitudes towards immigrants and other barriers to social cohesion within the realm regular cognitive processing (Allport

1954) and as a response to perceived threats (Blumer 1958), which makes it difficult to distinguish the psychological approach from that of life experiences and values and contact theory. This demonstrates the overlap between these various strands of thought. Nonetheless, psychology's focus on behavioural change, and the processes and interactions between groups rather than outcomes and attitudes, positions it as a useful tool for providing practical insights into the dynamics of integration and social cohesion, including how to affect them (Cabaniss and Cameron 2018).

The role of the media in narratives of inclusion

Much has been made of the effects of media on public attitudes towards immigration. Scholars have been able to find evidence of smartphone use and engagement on social media "offering new opportunities for community engagement and influencing a sense of belonging within increasingly diverse societies" (Marlowe et al. 2017). Traditional media are also a powerful tool for influencing attitudes towards immigration. When media focus on the humanitarian aspect of immigration and immigrant interventions, more positive and welcoming attitudes are exhibited (Newman et al. 2015: 603), even "in the presence of countervailing threats" (Dennison and Dražanová 2018: 38). A rise in pro-immigration sentiment has been measured when commonalities and shared experiences (between immigrants and non-immigrants) are presented in the media, especially those from childhood or focusing on children (Motyl et al. 2011, from Ibid.). 'Cautious' findings from two European countries suggest that positive coverage of immigration is related to more positive attitudes towards immigration, while the reverse does not hold (Van Klingeren et al. 2015, from Ibid.). In addition, among traditional media, research suggests that the content and medium really do matter. Those who invest more time becoming informed on social and political matters by reading newspapers and listening to the radio tend to have more positive attitudes about the economic effects of immigration than those who invest in other matters in newspapers and radio and in all types of content on the TV (Héricourt and Spielvogel 2013: 225). At the same time, the media's ability to sway public opinion may over time incur diminishing returns; the longer an issue is relevant to the public debate, the less the media seem to be able to influence public attitudes on it (Van Klingeren et al. 2015).

Media can undermine social cohesion and drive negative attitudes towards immigrants. Structurally, Stocker, Cornforth and Green's (2003) simulation found that, except in the best connected of networks, television divided opinion and undermined agreement. In practical terms, at the individual level, negative headlines influence the attitudes of their readers to share in that viewpoint, although there is an element of confirmation bias at work as people often choose to listen, read or watch media that confirm rather than challenge their worldview (Allen et al. 2018). In Spain, negative newspaper headlines were found to increase negative attitudes towards immigrants, *especially in areas with the lowest levels of immigrants* (Schlueter and Davidov 2013: 179; own emphasis – for more information on contact theory, see above). Negative portrayals can 'spill over', fuelling other, related prejudices, such as racism (Czymara and Schmid-Catran 2017). Blinder (2015) speaks to this problem from the point of view of terminology. The term 'immigrant' is used loosely in

public debate, to the extent that it is not always clear what or who is being discussed. For the public, asylum-seekers spring to mind more readily than students when conceiving of immigration or immigrants, although as a rule international students vastly outnumber asylum-seekers in European countries' immigration statistics (Blinder 2015; Lahav and Courtemanche 2011).

Media are capable of engaging with and challenging public attitudes towards immigration and other issues, but its ability to do so is influenced by a range of factors, summarised here by Allen et al. (2018):

- Informative and myth dispelling facts and figures can sometimes temporarily shift opinion (Transatlantic Trends 2014; Blinder and Jeannet 2018), in some cases for as long as one month (Grigorieff et al. 2016).
- Appealing to the emotional faculties of the audience through story-based techniques is at least as effective as appealing to reason.
- Whether 'fact' or 'story' based, the impact of the information presented is highly contingent on the credibility of the actor presenting it, as evaluated in that moment by the reader (Druckman 2001; Mackiewicz 2010) – friends and family are the most trusted source of information, but social media and local media are other important sources (IMiX 2018).

Evidence from linguistics underscores the need to understand the "interdependence of logic and emotion and the blurring of the distinction between fact and belief" (Sandmann 1991: 18). This insight is borne out in Barcelona, Spain, which is discussed later in this paper: when framing inclusive narratives, leaders should use communication strategies that appeal to reason *and* emotion rather taking 'either/or' approaches (Casademont Falguera at al. 2018). Also in Barcelona, the use of familiar and credible 'narrators' were shown to help anti-immigrant narratives resonate more strongly (Ibid.).

Research findings are mixed on whether there are significant differences between the way local and national media cover immigration and related issues. In some instances, local media present a more positive image of immigration and immigrants than national media, while in other cases the opposite is true (Pogliano 2016). What is clear, however, is that media at the local level have an outsized impact on defining who does and does not belong, through the shaping of moral boundaries and local narratives (George and Selimos 2018). Research conducted in Canada suggests that the ways in which local media present immigrants has a significant effect on how 'welcoming' is taken up at the city level (Esses et al. 2010). There is also evidence that when a concerned policy or civic community acts influences media to reshape events and reflect a local, inclusive narrative, the sense of group threat and anti-immigrant attitudes are reduced (Pogliano 2016).

Media sit among the other above-mentioned theories and factors, contributing to positive and negative attitudes towards immigration and integration, as well as social cohesion more generally. At the local level especially, media can be a powerful lever for city leaders within

and outside of government to engage with public attitudes through the development of a clear, well thought out narrative.

Part II: Acting on inclusion

This section elaborates on the practical applications of the research base discussed above. First, materials and frameworks designed to assist policy makers and practitioners in shaping inclusive narratives and communicating about migration are considered. Second, a range of local level initiatives aimed at developing inclusive narratives is presented.

Developing inclusive narratives to promote community cohesion

Guidance to better engage with public attitudes and narratives of place around immigration, integration and diversity have been developed, primarily by advocacy organisations. Unlike much of the research discussed above, these materials are designed to be accessible to policy makers and practitioners. They do, however, draw on many of the insights outlined in the previous section. Generally, they acknowledge that public attitudes are diverse, with diverse drivers, and are held to varying degrees depending on individual or group (e.g., Ballinger et al. 2019). Still, they come down with quite straightforward recommendations – the result, it seems, of valuing or emphasising certain elements of the above mentioned research above others. It is unclear what their selection criteria are. Perhaps, building on Boswell et al. (2011), these guidance materials reflect the policy preferences of their designers as well as the preferences of those for whom the materials are designed. Or perhaps these materials are themselves "venues for introducing new issues on to the agenda and 'softening up' actors to accept controversial ideas" (Timmermans and Scholten 2006; Majone 1989; from Boswell et al. 2011: 8), which is understandable given how difficult the thinking on and politics surrounding this subject are to navigate.

Welcoming America (2011) tailors its 'Stand Together' toolkit to help actors to message and frame inclusive narratives for (primarily Muslim) immigrants and refugees in the United States. It aims to reach those whose opinion researchers often call the 'moveable middle,' or what Welcoming America sometimes refers to as the 'unsure' (Silver and Cooper 2016: 8). This approach underlines the importance of focussing on "the core values that animate your work—values that your audiences share" when communicating (Ibid: 7):

> 'Although the messages recommended in this toolkit are pragmatic in nature and focused on the economic benefits a community receives by welcoming immigrants, each of them is still rooted in the core values of the welcoming movement—the belief that we are all better off when everyone who lives in a community feels like a part of it' (Welcoming America 2013: 4)

IMiX has used the 'message house model' (Figure 11), which explains how to transform a narrative that reflects your core values into audience-specific frames. This allows practitioners to leverage insights gleaned from segmentation analysis to reframe narratives to engage with various population sub-groups, or audiences, while retaining (and not contradicting or confusing) the essence of their message.

Figure 11: IMiX's 'House Model' for Crafting Audience-Specific Messages



Source: IMiX 2018

Welcoming America's 'messaging wheel' is another tool to help practitioners plan their communication efforts. It emphasises the importance of reflecting the values of the audience in messaging and is a practical example of how to strategically approach potentially divisive topics like immigration and integration (Figure 12).

Figure 12: Welcoming America's Messaging Wheel



Source: Welcoming America 2013: 15

According to policy guidance by MPI, "it is important to remember that what resonates with one group might backfire on another" (Ahad and Banulescu-Bogdan 2019: 2). City leaders will certainly recognise some truth in this. The messaging wheel illustrates one approach that actors can take to think simultaneously about the content of the message and how it will resonate with the values of the target audiences in future messaging. At the same time, practitioners would do well to bear in mind that the overall message should remain consistent and none of the targeted messages should be anathema to the core message values (e.g., IMiX 2018).

Key principles for communicating inclusive narratives have been identified by several actors, with some audience- and context-specific differences. In its work communicating inclusive narratives about Muslim immigrants and refugees to the 'unsure' majority in the US, Welcoming America identified seven key principles of meaningful messages (Table 2).

Table 2: Welcoming America's Seven Key Principles of Meaningful Messages

Principle	**What does it mean**
Values over features	Emphasize the values common to your work and your audience
Perception over reality	Develop your messaging based on your audience's perceived reality
Emotion over logic	Hook your audience by engaging first with their emotions – facts and logic can come second
Brevity over precision	Attention is a limited resource – use it wisely by quickly getting to your main points
Vibrant language over jargon	Speak and write in easily understood, emotionally appealing language
Actions over magic words	Make sure you do more than 'talk the talk' – also 'walk the walk'.

Your audience over you	Your messaging needs to appeal to people who, unlike you and your colleagues, are likely more sceptical and not yet engaged

Source: Adapted from Silver and Cooper 2016: 7

Much of this wisdom is borne out in research conducted by IMiX and British Future, which looks at audience-specific approaches to structuring communications (Table 3).

Table 3: Inclusive Messaging Strategies by Population Segment

	Left	**Middle**		**Right**
British Future typology	**Migration liberals, active and potential supporters**	**Immigrant ambivalent**	**Culturally concerned**	**Migration rejectionists, 'tougher audiences'**
		'Anxious middle'		
IMiX	**Liberals**	**Grafters**	**Traditionalists**	**Sceptics**
Goal	Mobilise, enthuse, and help to persuade others	Persuade using simple frames and common sense arguments	Reassure, put at ease and (sometimes) rouse	Defuse, contain and neutralise
		Strengthen inclusive social norms		
Strategy	-Broadsheets, BBC, Channel 4, documentaries -Twitter, LinkedIn, social media (networked) -Shareable content – i.e. blogs, BuzzFeed etc. -Stories, explanations, explorations, stimulation – provide arguments -Campaigners, real life stories	-Less newspapers – red-tops and tabloids if so, music stations, SKY and ITV -Internet users -Simple social networks – Facebook, WhatsApp, texts, looking good (Instagram) -Celebrity endorsements Simple explanations, reasonable, pros and cons -Strong local figures – football	-Quality dailies and some broadsheets, broadcast mix, BBC Radio -Less socially connected – face-to-face, peer to peer -Human interest stories, relatable -Community/ church groups, institutions -Respected individuals, nonpartisan experts	-Less newspapers – red-tops and tabloids if so -E-savvy– 'keyboard warriors' -Ultra-local social networks -Face-to-face, familiarity, people they know, suspicious of others -Low trust, often angry -Listen to them – show respect but keep boundaries

	-Sometimes time poor – connect via work -Also active BME networks, faith groups charities	coaches, publicans, bosses -Busy lives, low news intake, financially pressed	-Sometimes time-rich – connect via families and children	-Provide roles, direct encounters with refugees can help, personal -Forces, organised sports

Source: IMiX 2018 and Ballanger et al. 2019

British Future (Ballinger et al. 2019 and Katwala et al. 2014) provides straightforward advice for policy-makers on how (not) to target communications on immigration (Figure 13). One of the unintended effects of using facts to talk about immigration is that it can shut down conversation before it even begins and cause some audiences to 'double-down' on their existing beliefs.

Figure 13: How (not) to Talk about Immigration



Source: Katwala et al. 2014.

Messages that are constructed around emotional appeals can sometimes avoid this trap, although this approach may not be appropriate for all actors. City leaders are advised to consider not only the content and communication style that are most likely to resonate with the target audience, but also consider the relationship of their target audience to the communication medium – the person or institution-delivering messenger. Familiarity with and trust in the messenger, and belief in the authenticity of the message, will help these narratives to land (Katwala et al. 2014; Ballinger et al. 2019; Allen et al. 2018).

Inclusive Cities[5]

Building on the models outlined above, Inclusive Cities has set out principles for the development of an inclusive city narrative (Table 4). These principles were developed at an Inclusive Cities workshop held in March 2018. They remain in development but aim to set out a way of working for the development of a shared narrative of inclusion.

Table 4: Inclusive Cities – Draft Principles for the Development of an Inclusive Narrative

Principle	Why is this important?
Take a positive, asset- based view both of the city and its people	The narrative should be rooted in a positive sense of place and start with the strengths of the city and its people
Link to the overarching strategic priorities for the city and any city branding strategies	Inclusion should be mainstreamed within the activity of the city and therefore an inclusive narrative must reflect the city values and vice versa and be embedded within it
Both shape and be informed by service delivery	Inclusion should be mainstreamed within the activity of the city and therefore an inclusive narrative must reflect and be reflected within service delivery
Be aimed both at newcomers to the city and longer-standing residents	Inclusive Cities builds on research which defines integration and inclusion as a shared responsibility and two-way process – therefore communications must be targeted at everyone and aim to foster this shared sense of place
Aim to tell the story of the place, its history and values, its present and future	Creating a sense of identity and belonging is vital to creating a place-based narrative, which is grounded and shared. Past and present stories are one way to do this
Be written in plain, accessible language	The narrative should be easy to understand and accessible to all

Source: Inclusive Cities 2018, in Inclusive Cities 2019: 21.

Building on the learning from first phase of the Inclusive Cities programme (2017-2019), the document, 'Inclusive Cities: A Framework to Support Local Authorities and Communities to Build Inclusive Cities', was developed and launched at the beginning of the programme's second phase (2019-2022). It outlines five core principles and areas of action for cities seeking to develop their inclusive policies and practice, among which is a call for cities to lead in the development of a shared local story of inclusion (Table 5). The point here is that

[5] For more information on the Inclusive Cities programme please see https://www.compas.ox.ac.uk/project/inclusive-cities/

narrative development is not an end itself – rather, city leaders should approach it as an integral element in a broader, citywide approach to inclusion.

Table 5: Inclusive Cities Framework – Core principles and areas of action

Core principles	*Core areas of action*
1. Provide local leadership to create change	**1. Leading in the development of a shared local story of inclusion**
2. Inclusion is a shared responsibility delivered in partnership	2. Supporting and driving inclusive economic growth
3. Work with newcomers and longer standing residents	3. Connecting communities
4. Use available data and evidence to understand the local context in order to identify core priorities, set goals, monitor impact and update strategies as needed	4. Mainstreaming and building inclusive public services
5. Take action at the local level, provide advocacy at the national level, learn from best practice internationally	5. Encouraging civic participation and representation

Source: Inclusive Cities 2019.

Case studies from cities and Municipalities

This section draws attention to different instances where cities have developed inclusive local narratives – at times making use of the above-mentioned guidance – to reflect on the underlying dynamics of narrative change. In some instances, practice may provide insights into the previously discussed research findings. The examples used in this section are drawn from Europe and North America and do not represent a comprehensive accounting of approaches. Their inclusion in this section is not an endorsement of their efficacy or replicability (i.e., in other times or locations).

Approaches for developing an economic narrative of inclusion: Waterloo Region, (Canada), Dayton (United States) and Bristol (UK)

There is broad agreement among researchers that employment is one of the key factors in reducing social exclusion of newcomers and encouraging integration processes such as social mixing among newcomers and longer-standing residents (Huddleston et al. 2013; Social Exclusion Unit 2001). Krahn et al. (2005) have shown that employment is the most important factor in immigrant retention in Canadian regional communities, followed closely by the presence of an established cultural community. Similarly, New Zealand's Welcoming Communities Initiative lists employment opportunities as the most important characteristic of a welcoming community, emphasizing that immigrants must be provided with the option to do work that is fulfilling, challenging and in keeping with their past experience and training (Esses et al. 2010). Making the 'business case' for migration is a popular strategy among a range of actors who wish to broaden the available policy options (e.g., McKinsey's

2016 report, 'People on the Move: Global Migration's Impact and Opportunity', and the work conducted by the New American Economy).[6]

Cities and municipalities may support policy aims by orientating the public debate on immigration and integration around employment and the economy. In 2006, the **Waterloo Region** Immigrant Employment Network (WRIEN) was established as a forum to address the employment gaps for immigrants in Waterloo Region. WRIEN had three objectives: "strong lives, strong economy, and strong and inclusive communities" (Fleras 2014: 318). It was framed for the public in three ways:

1) The Waterloo region's economic strength is historically the result of immigrant workers and entrepreneurs
2) The Waterloo region is not taking full advantage of the immigrant workforce and therefore not meeting its economic potential
3) A network of local actors who have historically welcomed immigrants and themselves have immigrant roots have decided to come together to better integrate newcomers into the labour market (Janzen et al. 2003).

Among other things, this programme raised awareness among employers about the advantages of hiring immigrants and facilitated networking events between immigrants, employers and the local community (Esses et al. 2010).

Although no longer active, much of WRIEN's legacy can be understood through the network that evolved from it, the Waterloo Region Immigration Partnership (WRIP), which remains active. The WRIP is able to pursue a bolder and more ambitious mandate due in part to the groundwork laid by WRIEN (Immigration Partnership 2018). Making the business case is sometimes seen as a safe first-step strategy in areas (or among audiences) that are socially conservative and where newcomers are isolated from the broader community. It should be noted that at the Waterloo region's economy was doing far better in 2006 than the national average, which likely offset potential concerns of economic competition (see Janzen et al. 2003). The evolution of Waterloo region's approach can also be seen in the improvement of materials promoting immigrant inclusion, which have become more accessible, clear, and humanising than they were under WRIEN (Immigration Partnership 2018). WRIP's latest newsletter tells the following story from the perspective of Jassy Narayan, a woman who immigrated to Canada from St Lucia in 1966. She attests and embodies the shift to a more inclusive environment, and lays partial credit at WRIEN and WRIP's doorstep:

> 'My path to being involved in the Immigration Partnership started with a local "Immigration Summit". While research about the wellbeing of immigrants and refugees that was presented at that conference was disheartening, it led to the formation of the Waterloo Region Immigrant Employment Network (WRIEN).

[6] See 'Part I: Contribution and competition in the economic role of immigrants and immigration' of this report for more detail around the 'economic argument'.

> WRIEN focused on the employment needs of immigrants and refugees and later evolved into the Immigration Partnership. With its three interconnected components of "settle, work and belong", it gives hope in the immigrant community that these goals will transform lives. For me, the word "belong" involves an invitation to join, acceptance by others, reciprocity - the dance of giving and receiving, cultural enrichment and so much more' (Ibid.: 9).

A city narrative based on inclusive, economic grounds can be seen in the materials for **'Welcome Dayton: Immigrant Friendly City'**, a programme launched in 2011 by the City of Dayton in partnership with the organisation New American Economy (Welcome Dayton 2015). This initiative aims to "promote immigrant integration into the greater Dayton region by encouraging business and economic development; providing access to education, government, health and social services; ensuring equity in the justice system; and promoting an appreciation of arts and culture" (Ibid.). A 2015 brochure, 'How Immigrants Are Helping to Grow Dayton's Economy and Reverse Population Decline' states the case plainly, focussing almost entirely on figures, charts and infographics (see Figure 14):

Figure 14: Welcome Dayton Promotional Brochure, 2015



Source: Welcome Dayton 2015

ACH, based in **Bristol, UK,** is a social enterprise focussed on resettling refugees through labour market and social integration that often works in cooperation with Bristol City Council and other partners in Bristol and across the UK. Its *#rethinkingrefugees* campaign, which has been running since 2015, aims to change public attitudes towards refugees by framing messages along economic lines as opposed to humanitarian lines. The message of #rethinkingrefugees is that refugees are assets to employers and local communities and the focus is not on "on how they came to be here … [but] on where they want to be" (ACH 2020). A selection of ACH programmes with related goals, some of which are supported by the #rethinkingrefugees campaign, are as follows:

Pre-Ignite addresses the factors inhibiting the transition of refugees to independent and sustainable living by taking on issues such as mental health, social networks and career management. It also provides ESOL-linked skill-based training to support progression towards financial independence.

Ignite aims to advance 25,000 refugees into median salary jobs by furnishing participants with the required skills and connecting them to high-quality employers, universities and other partners.

First Bus Training is a programme run in partnership with the bus operator First West of England that aims to provide refugees with opportunities to work with First West as a bus driver. A further beneficial effect is changing the narrative on local employment by evidencing refugees as helping to improve local bus services – a shared gain for newcomers and longer-standing residents.

Narratives and activities framed around economic inclusion can engage different audiences than those focusing primarily on cultural aspects of inclusion or point towards diversity as a goal unto itself. Their link to job market participation and economic independence/interdependence means they are strongly correlated to improved integration and increased social participation. Nonetheless, there are risks attached to this strategy, especially in times of economic downturn. The economic case for migrants may seem to some segments of the population as if immigrants are receiving special treatment – something beyond what is offered to longer-standing residents. In the county of Elgin, Canada, for example, municipal officials found it difficult to resume recruitment of migrant workers in the wake of the 2008 financial crash. They discovered that 'immigrant entrepreneurs' was a more publicly acceptable framing: "It is an easier 'sell' to the public: entrepreneurs are not perceived as 'taking the locals' jobs' in the way that employees of larger firms might be" (Wiginton 2013: 26).

It seems imperative to consider and counter the potential public perception that immigrants and other newcomers take the jobs of longer-standing residents, or that the longer-standing residents have been 'left behind'. For precisely this reason, some researchers advocate against the promotion of inclusive narratives that "shine a spotlight

on investments in immigrant and minority communities … [especially those that] appear to benefit newcomers at the expense of long-standing residents" (Ahad and Banulescu-Bogdan 2019: 4). Instead, they suggest investing in messages of inclusion and activities that resonate with the whole community—or at least the majority of it—and benefit other groups, especially those who are also economically or socially disadvantaged (Ibid.). This matches academic research findings that establish integration as a two way process and shared responsibility in which integration initiatives should engage both newcomer and longer standing residents (Spencer and Charsley 2016). Likewise, the Inclusive Cities Framework, discussed above, points out:

> 'Sometimes work that is intended to foster inclusion only works with one side of the coin – without engaging with longer standing communities and residents. This can recreate the very boundaries of 'us' and 'them' that the projects aim to overcome. This framework seeks to ground itself in shared values which makes inclusion the responsibility of everyone' (5).

Engaging the 'anxious middle' to support inclusive social norms: Villeurbanne (France) and Barcelona (Spain)

The National Conversation on Immigration showed that the majority of the UK public were sympathetic to refugees in their thinking that "the UK should help people in genuine need of protection" (Rutter and Carter 2018: 153). Similar findings emerge when looking to the populations of Germany, Italy and Greece, even in instances where the majority of the population also feel that the impact of immigration on their country is negative (e.g., Italy – 57%) (Dixon et al. 2017; Dixon et al. 2018; Dixon et al. 2019). Comparable majorities of citizens from these countries also reported they were concerned with the rise of racism and discrimination. Even when online discourses may appear to be becoming ever more polarised and extreme, majority public opinion may not be as polarised as it appears at first glance. Shared, mainstream values, such as equality and anti-discrimination, are useful for building public support amongst these middle segments sometimes referred to as the 'anxious' or 'persuadable' middle.

In 2009, **Villeurbanne, France** established a vigilance network to promote equality and non-discrimination (European Commission 2019a). Through this project, an Advisory Council against Ethnic Discrimination was founded to: combat discrimination and its supporters by identifying and dealing with situations of discrimination; promote their own visibility in the public space; and mobilise the law to its full effect when discrimination is encountered (City of Villeurbanne 2013). The council now represents over 40 local actors, including local business, CSOs and the city council, and has provided anti-discrimination training to more than 150 people. The project has also led to the founding of an observatory with a mission to:

- Centralize and compile studies and data on discrimination already collected in Villeurbanne territory

- Conduct quantitative and qualitative studies to measure discrimination and / or perception, analyse the causes or mechanisms of production and the consequences of discrimination
- Build indicators to measure the evolution of discrimination on the territory
- Share the knowledge produced

The annual reports it produces show that the greatest share of the identified cases of discrimination are based on country of origin, nationality and ethnicity; however, they dropped from 38% of the total share in 2011 to 24% in 2018 (L'observatoire Villeurbannais des Discriminations 2011-2018). Nonetheless, its promotional materials concern all types of discrimination. In 2013, the Representative Council of Black Associations (Cran) named Villeurbanne as the best city in France for fighting racism and discrimination (Le Figaro 2013); the city has since done much to establish its brand as one of pro-diversity and non-discrimination – both by publicly supporting the continued dispersal of asylum-seekers in 2015 and condemning the anti-immigrant rhetoric that followed a knife attack in 2019 that was allegedly perpetrated by an immigrant (Belfils 2015; Le Figaro and AFP 2019). Villeurbanne is an example of using the traditional French value of equality to grow an inclusive city identity among the mainstream public. Addressing issues of xenophobia and racism as both a human rights issue and matter of public security may have the knock-on effect of acclimatising or neutralising members of the public who are more likely to oppose immigration.

Faced with increasing incidents of racism and xenophobia, the **Barcelona City Council** launched its BCN Anti-rumours Strategy in 2010, as part of the Barcelona Intercultural Plan (Zapata-Barrero 2015; Gebhardt 2016; Cities of Migration 2011). Having identified that nearly 50% of residents polled cited "ignorance of the other, rumours, stereotypes and prejudices about this unknown other" as the main barrier to social cohesion, the anti-rumours strategy was crafted "to dispel rumours, misconceptions and the prejudices that many local people held about minorities and immigrants" (Sanahuja 2013: 187; Cities of Migration 2011). In pursuit of this goal, the city took a multi-step approach:

1) Provide information and promote public debate through 'myth-busting' materials the training of embedded 'anti-rumour agents'
2) Promote spaces for meeting and interaction between residents with different backgrounds
3) Engaging with local and broader media to shape "collective imaginaries and public opinion" (Casademont Falguera et al. 2018: 44; Cities of Migration 2011)

Casademont Falguera et al.'s 2018 analysis suggests that despite this multi-step approach, the project primarily resorted to the use of information, facts and figures to combat rumours, at least initially. However, "because the sources of prejudice are not strictly cognitive, arising from problems of communication or knowledge," this was not entirely effective (Casademont Falguera et al. 2018: 48). Over time, the project began to prioritise

emotional appeals and storytelling, as well as to focus on facilitating opportunities for meaningful contact between different groups (Ibid.; De Torres et al. 2015).

Thereafter, the programme shifted its approach to include the following:

- Interventions based on evidence (the survey)
- Combination of both 'rational' and 'emotional' appeals (facts and stories)
- 'Legitimate' and diverse narrators employed to communicate the message to different audiences (the 'anti-rumour agents', various media)
- Meaningful contact between different groups encouraged (spaces for meeting and interaction)
- Impacts of media considered
- Expertise of media integrated

The BCN Anti-rumours strategy highlights the potential gap that can emerge between policy and practice. Ensuring robust evaluation mechanisms and the inclusion of diverse actors at all stages of the programme can help to identify and bridge this gap. Nonetheless, even in a best-case scenario, campaigns may not have their intended, measurable effect. Despite BCN's efforts, discrimination and violence on the basis of race, ethnicity and nationality were shown to be on the rise in Barcelona, with individuals eclipsing law enforcement as the most common type of perpetrator of discrimination for the first time in 2018 (SOS Racisme Catalunya 2018; BCN 2019). It is important to bear in mind that there are a range of factors influencing public attitudes and behaviours and affecting the metrics used to evaluate them.

The use of research and evidence in developing narratives of inclusion: Athens (Greece) and Cardiff (UK)

Following an increase in the number of asylum-seekers to Greece in 2015, **the City of Athens** sought to improve how it collects and uses information about immigration, integration and public opinion on these issues to better address, in both the short- and long-term, the needs of vulnerable populations, as well as encourage integration processes and plan for future migration-related challenges (Athens Coordination Center for Migrant and Refugee Issues 2020). There was also a sense that public opinion on immigration represented increasingly dangerous waters for the city to wade into; an informed and light-touch approach was needed. With all this in mind, the Athens Coordination Center for Migrant and Refugee Issues (ACCMR) was established. It coordinates between municipal authorities and roughly 90 other city-level stakeholders, such as national and international NGOs, international organizations, and migrant and refugee community groups. It aims to be proactive while keeping its profile low in the public debate until an appropriate, effective, low-risk approach can be identified.

The Athens Observatory on Migrant and Refugee issues (AORI), a research project carried out by ACCMR and the polling company Public Issue, combines field surveys conducted in the reception centre of Elaionas and in temporary housing apartments in Athens with public

opinion telephone surveys. Analysis of these data aim to provide insights into the demographics, dynamics and integration processes of the newcomer population and how longer-standing populations view these issues at a neighbourhood level. The sense that the longer-standing population in Athens was no longer fully receptive to humanitarian-based narratives surrounding inclusion and were concerned about the potential of newcomers to integrate was largely confirmed by AORI's research.

Cardiff City Council has undertaken a project that involves the collection and analysis of public opinion data to help shape and understand the impact of a regional narrative campaign about South East Wales' migration history. The aims of the project are to, 1. understand the reach and effectiveness of the campaign on different audiences and 2. feed this learning back into the campaign strategy as needed. It uses the Building a Stronger Britain Together (BSBT) methodology, which leverages segmentation research findings, and has a robust evaluation component (Home Office 2019). Similar interventions in other UK cities, such as Leeds and Newcastle, found that this evidence-based approach provided solid insights into how to message most effectively to specific audiences. The use of trusted local facilitators and different thematic vehicles, such as sports and the arts, were also found to draw in otherwise disconnected individuals. The target audiences of campaigns conducted under BSBT found the use of specific examples and clear 'calls to action' particularly helpful in relation to campaigns that focussed on shared values. At the same time, conveying issues around shared values through public advertising campaigns was found to be more complex and difficult than campaigns focussed on acceptance and inclusivity, which resonated strongly and were broadly well received.

The role of heritage and the arts and in developing narratives of inclusion: Paris (France) and Hull (UK)

Between 1989 and 2001, public and political interest in a museum dedicated to the history and culture of immigration in France fluctuated; finally, in late 2007 and without a public ceremony, **the French National Immigration History Museum in Paris**, France opened (European Commission 2019b; Green 2007). While there are competing explanations – personal, political and social – for why the museum was created (Green 2007; Labadi 2013; French National Immigration History Museum 2019a), its official purpose is to improve integration processes and cause a shift in how the public views and talks about immigration and the role of immigrants in French society (European Commission 2019b; French National Immigration History Museum 2019a).

In pursuit of these goals, the museum frames immigration an integral part of France's cultural heritage, documenting the contributions of immigrants through the presentation of artefacts, information, narratives and events. It targets audiences of various ages and backgrounds through a combination of permanent and temporary exhibits, workshops, community events, educational resources and research (Ibid. French National Immigration History Museum 2019b). Cutting across its outputs is the intention to set into motion a new narrative by unpacking discriminatory narratives and upending stereotypes. The museum

sets out to convey an image of the immigrant population that is diverse and positive, but also realistic.

The museum also works with local museums and partners to transfer local histories and insights to the national level, explore issues of shared interest, and exchange knowledge and practice (French National Immigration History Museum 2019c).

Although regarded as a success by some, the project (in keeping with other recent attempts to 'decolonise' museum collections) has been criticised. Labadi (2013) finds, in opposition to the stated aims of the museum, that "no effort has been made to deconstruct properly the [anti-immigrant] narratives" presented in its collection. Rather, "meanings and categorisations created during colonial times cannot be questioned; they remain fixed, and with them so too the power relations established during this time between the French population and those living in former colonial countries, some of whom are nowadays immigrants" (Ibid.; Merriman, 2000: 302; Pieterse 1997). According to Labadi, the museum's focus on the diversity of France's national football team inadvertently reduces the contribution of migrants to a stereotype. At the core of Labadi's critique is the museum's failure to include migrants and migrant voices in its development and exhibitions.

Reframing exclusionary and reductive narratives through the arts and museums has the potential to strengthen social bonds, integration processes and a shared sense of identity. However, it also runs the risk of reproducing historical inequalities, power structures and stereotypes. Other migration museums (or museums which are developing their collections to reflect the increased diversity of the places they represent) may offer a better model than the French National Immigration History Museum. The Tenement Museum (New York), Malmo's planned Museum of Movement, emigration and immigration focussed museums in Italy, such as Genoa's maritime museum, Cardiff's Story Museum and the Migration Museum Project in the UK have all managed to raise a diversity of migrant voices.

The City of Culture programme in **Hull, UK** is an example of a whole-of-society approach to inclusive programming and narrative change. Through comprehensive arts programming and parallel monitoring and evaluation processes, it has "demonstrated the social impact the arts can have on a population and has examined how the city has utilised the culture title as a catalyst for creative place making and culture-led regeneration" (University of Hull 2018).

In 2013, when Hull won the UK city of culture title, it suffered from "low level cultural engagement, a poor cultural and visitor economy, and a poor external image of the city" (Ibid. 28). To follow through on its bid story of 'a city coming out of the shadows,' it identified several issues it wished to remedy:

- Low levels of engagement with the arts
- Low awareness of history and heritage

- Weak perceptions of the city
- Unrealised potential for visitor and economic growth
- Poor health and wellbeing

Key aims at that time included: raising aspirations and skills through increased participation and learning; growing the size and strength of the cultural and visitor economy; placing cultural regeneration at the heart of the city's future; transforming attitudes and perceptions of Hull locally, nationally and internationally.

Top line preliminary results showed significant progress and illustrated how inclusive programming in the arts can have knock-on effects on other sectors:

- 'Hull's UK City of Culture year attracted a total audience of 5.3 million attending over 2,800 events, cultural activities, installations and exhibitions.
- Over half of the audiences were from Hull with nearly all residents (over 95%) attending at least one cultural activity during the year. The evaluation evidenced a new confidence in local people, with significant increases (+9%) in residents' willingness to take part in a range of cultural and non-cultural activities, including volunteering and sport.
- The total number of annual visitors in 2017 is projected to be 1.3m greater than in 2013, when Hull bid for the UK City of Culture title and 4.7 million people visited the city. The projected value of tourism in 2017 is on track to contribute in excess of £300m to the economy.
- Roughly, three-quarters of residents are proud to live in Hull.
- The city achieved significant national profile, securing over 20,200 pieces of media exposure across print, online and broadcast media outlets.
- Nearly 800 new jobs have been created in the visitor economy and cultural sector since 2013, a direct result of investments totalling £219.5m in the cultural and visitor economy, which are fully or partly attributable to Hull being awarded UK City of Culture status in November 2013' (University of Hull 2018).

The UK City of Culture status was not the sole contributor increased civic pride, visitors and investment. Hull's ability to evolve the project beyond its initial ambitions (and in collaboration with a diverse set of partners) was key to its success and impact. The city developed its initial City of Culture bid for the into a broader project, encompassing 9 aims and 20 objectives across five areas of impact:

1) Arts and Culture
2) Place Making
3) Economy
4) Society and Wellbeing
5) Partnerships and Development

Ethnic minorities were the most likely group surveyed in 2017 to report that the programme reflected them and their lives, followed by those older than 65 years old (Ibid. 82). Furthermore, there was a significant rise in the engagement levels of these two groups compared to the previous year. Remarkably, in 2017, feelings of inclusion were relatively consistent across all of the sub-groups measured – between 30% and 40%, although of course this still represents a minority of residents – with the notable exception of those 'limited a lot by health conditions or disability', among whom roughly one-quarter felt represented in the cultural programme.

Hull Gada

Run by three Polish poets in collaboration with two Polish Saturday Schools, this engagement project delivered a series of workshops and other activities on Polish poetry to 170 children, young people and others. Participants learned more about Hull's Polish community and immigrant issues through meaningful group contact. Taken together, there were around 100 conversations and almost 40 poems written.

At the launch event, almost all of the audience reported that Hull Gada gave everyone the chance to share and celebrate together and that it was an enjoyable experience. More than half of audience members stated the project made them feel more confident in taking part in more arts and other activities in the future. Just under one-third of audience members reported that Hull Gada boosted their self-esteem/confidence. More than 80% of attendees reported that the event made them feel more connected with the stories of Hull and its people. (Ibid. 84).

Those who may not normally be included in city life should be put at the heart of the design and the implementation of inclusive programmes. Their insights will help to identify weak-spots, ensure that it has its intended effect and evolve it over time. Taken in the context of contact and group threat theories,[7] it is likely that involving a range of actors from different backgrounds will have the added effect of improving intra-group relations, thereby furthering the cause of inclusion in the city more broadly.

Community consultation, facilitating contact and increasing civic participation in Mannheim (Germany), Milan (Italy), Pittsburgh (United States), Utrecht (Netherlands) and London (UK)

As has been outlined above, intergroup contact and community consultation strengthen the development of inclusive narratives, both in terms of translating communications into real life activities and in ensuring that communications resonate with the people they are aimed towards. The local level is particularly well placed to convene and encourage such interactions; these examples explore a few ways in which municipalities have used consultation and contact to inform the development of inclusive narratives.

[7] For more information on contact and group threat theories see 'Part I: The role of community contact in facilitating the narrative' of this report.

The Mannheim Declaration on Living Together in Diversity frames the city's diversity as a continuation of its long-standing historical tradition to be "characterised by a coexistence in a spirit of openness and understanding" (Mannheim Alliance 2017). This vision, that diversity is in the city's DNA and narrative, is achieved through sustained engagement and responsibility sharing with the now more than hundreds of institutions and stakeholders from different types of communities across the city that have signed onto the Declaration (Kurz 2018; Mannheim Alliance 2017).

Alliance members (those who wish and are permitted to sign onto the Declaration) have the opportunity to participate in the following actions, which aim to 'give the Declaration life' (Preißler 2019a):

- Exchange experiences and expertise at networking events
- Find new partners to work with and link into existing projects or activities
- Co-host 'each other Action Days' events – typically lectures, workshops, conferences, exhibitions, concerts and theatre productions, sporting events and other activities – to learn from and exchange ideas with other Alliance members and members of the public (see the each other Action Days website for more information)
- Open up institutionally to diversity through 'encounter formats' and 'qualification offers'
- Make their work more visible through joint publicity initiatives
- Use the Alliance as a place for constructive conflict management (Mannheim Alliance 2018; Prießler 2019b).

Mannheim has created a space for over 300 different types of institutions to share ideas and coordinate actions in pursuit of the aims of the Declaration. This approach ensures that Declaration is more than policy on paper. It also creates spaces for different types of communities and community leaders to mix, institutionalising a mechanism that channels the concerns and identities of less visible communities into inclusive planning and activities.

The Municipality of Milan launched the 'Bella Milano' project in 2017. It aims to foster a culture of integration, improve the public's impression of asylum-seekers and provide opportunities for asylum-seekers to develop relationships with other communities outside of reception centres (Palazzo 2019; OECD 2020). Asylum-seekers living in reception centres are encouraged to engage in publicly visible volunteer work alongside longer-standing populations. Activities include tending to green spaces and street cleaning. Volunteers are rewarded for their work with vouchers, which can be redeemed for goods and services at local shops. By creating the space for meaningful and positive interactions between different groups (i.e., asylum-seekers, longer-standing populations, shopkeepers and city officials), community relations with asylum seekers saw a marked improvement. Asylum-seekers were viewed as contributing to the social and economic life of the city as friendships and networks were established and developed. Furthermore, the programme built capacity

within the municipality to better understand and respond to social inclusion challenges. This is an example of an initiative that brings together many of the dynamics described by the research on the contribution and competition of immigrants as well as the role of community contact and socialisation – both outlined in the first section of this paper.

All for All, a Pittsburgh-based project, "connects people, organizations, and communities to actions that build a welcoming and inclusive region for all" (All for All 2019). It works with municipal leaders, community-based organizations, institutions, and the business community to bring about more meaningful interactions and positive outcomes between immigrants and longer-standing communities, often in relation to meaningful participation in the labour market. The approach focusses on building capacity – upskilling unemployed and underemployed migrants and building the professional networks of foreign-born professionals through partnerships and community engagement. Its annual citywide summit explores the role of immigrants in the entrepreneurial and civic life of the city and the impact of immigrant inclusion on the city. Over 80 community consultation events were held to support the development of the countywide plan (and the Pittsburgh-specific Welcoming Pittsburgh plan).

A distinctive approach to using service delivery to 'walk the walk' of narrative comes from the **Utrecht Refugee Launchpad**, also known as Plan Einstein (Oliver et al. 2019 and 2018). This initiative aimed to facilitate the integration of asylum-seekers 'from day one'. It was developed by Utrecht City Council and partners and was based on the concept of local young people and asylum seekers living together and building social networks with neighbours and the community more broadly. Alongside the provision of housing, shared social spaces, and on-site events and trainings – all for both forced migrants and longer-standing residents – the project supported the development of a narrative centred on 'living well together.' One important aim of the project was to explore ways to engage with local perceptions of reception centres that have produced neighbourhood opposition in the past. Plan Einstein demonstrates how initiatives such as these can have an impact beyond the simple service delivery by influencing a broader narrative (though admitting that this could be positive or negative). Key findings include:

- Prior to the opening of the centre, the attitude of the local population towards the centre and asylum-seekers was negative. After roughly three months of operations until the centre closed in October 2018, the attitude of the neighbourhood to the centre was moderately positive.
- Despite this, Plan Einstein was not able to bring about regular engagement of the wider neighbourhood with the centre, the result perhaps of the project's relatively short lifespan. Many of those from the local community who did actively engage in events at the centre were themselves of refugee or migrant background or had a prior interest in refugees. Even among the tenants living in the centre, levels of engagement were variable.

- The project was able to help many residents transition into the labour market. However, this was most effective for those who already had high levels of education and English language skills.
- Participants reported higher levels of well-being during and following the programme.

Policy recommendations stemming from the programme can be found in Oliver et al. 2019: 14-16. Similar co-housing initiatives can be observed in the CURANT scheme in Antwerp, Belgium and the Cosmopolis hotel in Augsburg, Germany.

There are a number of city approaches that focus on civic representation and participation as a route to facilitating a more inclusive society and narrative around it. For example, under the Mayor's 2017 new citizenship initiative, the **Greater London Authority** (GLA) has begun to reinvigorate the citizenship ceremony by moving it from a purely administrative procedure for new Britons to a community celebration event (GLA 2018 and 2020). Under a pilot scheme, invitations to citizenship ceremonies were sent to local residents and a forthcoming evaluation will seek to set out the impact of this broader engagement, which posits citizenship and the welcoming of new Britons as a shared responsibility and experience for all residents. Guidance published by the GLA sets out how the ceremonies can engage a wider audience as part of the commitment to using the ceremonies as a mode of promoting social integration and local democracy. Other civic methods of increasing participation and representation – including citizen's assemblies, participatory budgeting programmes and initiatives to improve the representativeness of local bodies may also be methods to build a local narrative of inclusion.

Branding an Inclusive City Narrative: Rotterdam, Netherlands

Inclusive branding campaigns can help cities to compete on the global stage, attracting outside investment, sought-after foreign talent and tourists (Kearns and Paddison 2000; Hadj-Abdou 2014). They can also boost the participation of local residents in the economic and social life of the city (Belabas and Eshuis 2019; Zapata-Barrero 2015). Rotterdam's branding campaigns, as highlighted by Belabas and Eshuis (2019), display the difficulties and potential rewards of getting branding campaigns right.

Rotterdam, Netherlands is a highly diverse city. It has a history of large-scale immigration, was one of the first Dutch 'superdiverse' cities and continues to welcome "more and new immigrant groups, making the multi ethnic composition of the city one of its core characteristics" (Ibid: 214). In 2003, it embarked on a project to rebrand itself in the eyes of its residents, visitors, companies and potential students. Despite significant investment over many decades in social programming and cultural infrastructure, the city was still seen by most residents as "a cold and unsociable work city" (212). The 'Rotterdam Dares!' campaign was an early attempt to recast the city's image more positively and in line with its history as both a working class port city and a multicultural capital. Its "'no-nonsense' and 'sleeves-rolled up' mentality was emphasized" to further the underlying goal of attracting local support and attention for culturally-oriented programmes that nonetheless

reflected these traditional, shared values (210). According to Van der Berg (2012), the Rotterdam Dares! logo (Figure 15) reflects these conceptual aims:

> "[It] refers back to the harbour, blue-collar work and Rotterdam's roughness in the aesthetic imperfections of cracks and shades in the dark blue colour of deep waters, while using an old-fashioned font that is to remind people of the most productive days of the city. The exclamation mark at the end can also be analysed to symbolise the daring and doing attitude that is said to be part of the essence of Rotterdam-ness. Rotterdam is stressing its uniqueness in the aesthetics of its campaigns, while also creating diversions for the people of Rotterdam and a mythology to unite Rotterdammers" (8).

Figure 15: 'Rotterdam Dares!' Logo

Source: www.lacity.nl from Van der Berg 2012

By 2006, Rotterdam decided to "strengthen Rotterdam's international competitiveness" by reorienting its campaign towards companies, investors and tourists from outside of the city (Municipality of Rotterdam 2008, in Belebas and Eshuis 2019: 213). Although Rotterdam Dares! was accepted by residents, it did not resonate with global audiences – not least because it was in Dutch and appeared to be premised on local idiosyncrasies. The new Rotterdam brand, 'Rotterdam World Port, World City', portrayed the city familiarly, as a global hub that was well positioned to connect people to one another in the context of globalisation. Like Rotterdam Dares!, it also had a multi-ethnic and pro-diversity association. However, diversity was presented as an economic asset, rather than having contributed to the city's specific cultural and social make-up. The brand values of the campaign—ambition, change and engagement—were positive, outward looking and non-specific (Belebas and Eshuis 2019: 213). In pursuit of a broadly appealing, outwardly facing economic proposal, the city diluted the most persuasive and locally grounded elements of the previous campaign. In doing so, it lacked credibility and lost the support of residents.

In 2014, the city launched a cross-sectoral partnership, 'Rotterdam Make It Happen!', to drive forward a new and more inclusive branding strategy (Rotterdam Partners 2019). The city's brand values 'ambition, change and engagement' were reframed as 'international, worldly, ground-breaking, entrepreneurial, no-nonsense and raw' to resonate more closely with those of the residents (as per Rotterdam Dares!) as well as appeal to a broader, international audience (Municipality of Rotterdam 2014, in Belabas and Eshuis 2019: 213).

Rotterdam's branding strategy acknowledged and indeed leveraged the city's diversity but intentionally softened this element in branding activities. Diversity was only made explicit exceptionally and at the urging of citizens. Belabas and Eshuis hypothesize that this may have been due in part to the political context. Since the populist party, 'Liveable Rotterdam,' rose to power in 2002,

> 'The assimilationist tone regarding immigrant integration has not only changed the diversity discourse – in terms of the harsher rhetoric regarding old and new immigrants in Rotterdam – but also many policies that are connected to diversity, such as social cohesion, housing, spatial planning, and urban safety' (Ibid.).

Although the branding campaign was not mediated by city council, branding choices appear to have been nonetheless influenced by the council's composition. This goes some way in explaining why diversity, although a component of the branding strategies of Rotterdam for more than a decade, have primarily been framed along economic lines and rarely made explicit.

Other factors should also be considered. As discussed above, longer-standing populations, when faced with a diverse city narrative, branding campaign or economic model, may feel left behind by the local government and leaders and threatened by these newcomers (e.g., Espenshade and Calhoun 1993). This can breed resentment, competition and negative attitudes towards immigration, as well as undermine social cohesion. For more detail on these dynamics, see 'Contribution and competition in the economic role of immigrants and immigration', located in the first section of this paper.

It remains to be seen how cities should balance the economic aims of city branding, the shaping of an authentic inclusive city narrative and the potential risks. Belebas (2019) points to cooperation between marketing and planning officers, city administrators, private communications companies and politicians working in different government departments as one way of improving the odds of getting this balance right.

Recent developments in Rotterdam appear to address some of these concerns by actively involving local residents, leaders and different government departments in the branding process (Ibid. 2019; Rotterdam Make It Happen Brand Alliance 2019). This programme follows a leftward shift in the coalition council's political composition, bolstering Belebas' point about the influence of political discourses on the location of diversity in city branding. With the aim of showing 'the real Rotterdam', photos featuring visitors, residents and local scenery have been taken, branded and made available for free download. The website invites users to submit their own 'stories or examples' (Rotterdam Make It Happen Brand Alliance 2020). Future evaluations may wish to consider the amount of content available on the website produced by and featuring BAME, older and migrant populations.

Networks, partnerships and exchange to facilitate narrative change

The role of cities has risen in prominence in both academic research, policy on integration and inclusion, alongside a development of interest in facilitating narrative change or communications and messaging on migration and integration at the local level. Alongside the specific city initiatives enumerated here, there are a number of partnerships and exchanges have evolved which seek to address this issue at the city level including:

- Intercultural Cities
- EUROCITIES VALUES project
- Inclusive Cities
- URBACT Anti Rumours Network (in Catalan and Spanish) – building on the work of Barcelona as outlined elsewhere in this paper
- Welcoming International – bringing together initiatives in the UK, US, Germany and the UK with a strong focus on strategic communications and contact to facilitate the development of inclusive communities

Conclusion and key questions for consideration

Evidence-based arguments and approaches to policy-making are never free of subjective decisions and normative judgements about, for example, what exactly constitutes 'evidence' (and who decides on that issue), how to separate 'reliable' from 'unreliable' data and analysis, what to do about processes and effects that are hard or impossible to measure and so on (Ruhs, Tamas and Palme 2018:3). It is also fair to say that the arena of 'narrative change' remains a nascent area, particularly in the context of integration and inclusion at the local level. The interdisciplinary research recapped in this paper gives a sense of the breadth of research traditions, which may illuminate these complex social phenomena, such as political science, migration studies, social psychology and sociology. Drawing on these traditions and case study examples may help policy makers and practitioners to find a path through the complex web of understanding public opinion and not 'over value' certain findings while ignoring others. It may also help to clarify their potential role in developing a place-specific narrative of inclusion that speaks to both the assets and opportunities provided by both newcomer and longer-standing residents, as well as the challenges.

Similarly, the paper highlights the links between efforts to frame the narrative and service delivery. Whether this is related to economic development, promoting community contact and civic participation, or the role of arts and heritage, the question of narrative cannot be divorced from wider questions of policy development and even day-to-day programming related to integration and inclusion at the local level. In particular, participants of the Autumn Academy 2019 highlighted the that work on narrative change, if done effectively, can strengthen the hands of inclusion champions and build the will needed for policy changes, which might have been unthinkable prior to the narrative work.

Yet these gains are too often lost – lessons emanating from innovative approaches may not be shared more broadly. Changes to councils' resourcing and political composition sometime mean that effective programmes and policies are interrupted, revised or abandoned before the gains can be institutionalised. Efforts to broaden the stakeholders involved in shaping inclusive narratives to include not only local governments, but also business, arts and faith leaders, academics and migrant and longer-standing populations may help to ensure these efforts are sensible and sustainable. Cooperation through city networks and other forums can encourage the sharing of good practices and be leveraged to improve publicity and advocacy at local, national and international levels. For more insights into the outcomes of discussions held at the Autumn Academy 2019, please see the Learning Note.

Annex 1: Autumn Academy 2019 Discussion Questions

- How can public opinion and segmentation research support the development of narratives of inclusion at the local level?
- What is the role of local/ municipal government in developing place based narratives of inclusion?
- What are the research and evidence gaps in this field and how could these be mitigated?
- What are the areas of good practice and innovation missing from this discussion paper?
- What are the resourcing and capacity gaps and opportunities for municipalities and others in this field?
- Are there areas of advocacy at national government level that could support municipalities in their ability to develop this area of work?

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The Global Exchange on Migration and Diversity is an ambitious initiative at the Centre on Migration, Policy and Society (COMPAS) opening up opportunities for knowledge exchange and longer term collaboration between those working in the migration field.