

labour market. Nevertheless, on each pathway to inclusion, economic and social, migrants face barriers. And by whichever indexes we choose to measure it – language acquisition, education outcomes, labor market performance, social segregation, health, living conditions, civic participation – there is cause for concern across the EU states.

Moreover, the presence of migrants, the most visible evidence of globalization and the rapid social change it engenders, has also become the focus of tension in some local communities and of mobilization by the far right, spreading the politics of exclusion where communities need trust, cooperation, and mutual respect. Tensions are compounded by the involvement of a small minority of migrants in political violence and European leaders fear a growing radicalization of migrant youth. Concern focuses most acutely, though not exclusively, on Muslims. The alleged perpetrators of some high-profile acts of terrorism, including the September 11 attacks in 2001 and the killing of film director Theo Van Gogh in the Netherlands in November 2004, were Muslims. There is a perception that certain beliefs associated with Islam are not compatible with “Western values.”

The fear of radicalization dominates public and political debate on this issue. The possible accession to the EU of a predominantly Muslim country, Turkey, has raised the political stakes. While fear of radicalization sets a narrow and negative context for the debate, overshadowing the parallel agenda on economic inclusion, it has extended the political space for policy development across a broader integration canvas.

The European Union recognized the imperative to change gear on this agenda at the conclusion of the Greek EU presidency in Thessaloniki in June 2003. The foundations of a new approach had been set out in a European Commission Communication on Immigration, Integration and Employment earlier that month. Primary responsibility for action on integration would remain at the national and local level. Yet the Dutch Presidency, in the winter of 2004, was able to secure agreement on Common Basic Principles on integration across the 25 Member States, and Justice, Freedom and Security Commissioner Franco Frattini is taking the next step with a coherent European framework on integration in 2005. The question is what form the EU’s

developing strategy should take, and how assertive the Commission can afford to be in setting the direction for Member States to follow.

Many Member States, particularly the original EU 15, have already shifted their domestic attention to the integration agenda. The focus and approach each has taken differs, reflecting contrasting views on the meaning and objectives of integration and the strategies that should be adopted to achieve it. In some states in Northern Europe (e.g., Denmark, the Netherlands) there has been an increasing emphasis on programs of language instruction and social orientation for new migrants, often with an element of compulsion, in targeted programs. Others (e.g., Spain, Ireland) have looked to mainstream services and/or civil society to provide support, or focused less on migrants' needs than on the barriers they face, including discrimination (e.g., the UK).

There is, however, some convergence in approach. In particular, there is recognition that integration is a two-way process, requiring adaptation by the migrant but also by the institutions and public of the host country, and that to be successful it must take place in four spheres of life: economic, social, cultural, and political.

Differing views on the goals of integration and appropriate strategies to achieve it, coupled with Member States' insistence that decisions should, wherever possible, be taken at the national level, not in Brussels, have in the past inhibited the EU using the unique levers at its disposal to make an effective contribution. The fact that integration is necessarily a cross-cutting policy agenda, in particular engaging the Commission directorates on Justice, Freedom and Security and on Employment and Social Affairs (with commensurate committees in the European Parliament) has not been conducive to progress. The imperative to address integration issues more effectively could now provide the political momentum to challenge those barriers.

The aim of this chapter is, first, to revisit principles: what do we mean by "integration," and what should an integration strategy be trying to achieve? It then considers who should be the target of the strategy, whose responsibility it is to make it happen, and what policy levers can be used. It looks first, however, at the nature of the challenge.

The Challenge

Net migration into Europe is increasing, and is now the largest component of population change. Internal mobility within the EU was also enhanced by enlargement in May 2004, including mobility to work in those states (UK, Ireland and Sweden) which did not impose a transition period. Some European states have long experience with immigration but others, like Ireland and Spain, have become countries of immigration only within the last 10 years. Eastern European states in particular have little experience with the social and economic impact of immigration and the need for strategies to manage it effectively.

Migrants now come to EU Member States from a far wider range of countries, and bring a greater diversity of languages and cultures than in the past. School children in London speak more than 200 different first languages; in a Swedish city, Malmö, Mohammed is now the most popular name for a newborn son.

Migrants also bear differing immigration statuses. They may enter as business or labor migrants, on short or long-term permits. Alternatively, they may come as asylum seekers and subsequently secure, or fail to secure, refugee status. They may enter as family members, as students, or within a vast array of categories from minister of religion to au pair. The significance of each of these legal categories differs across Member States: in one state family reunification may be the largest category, in another entry for work. Migrants' status may, alternatively, be irregular. They may arrive legally but work without permission or overstay their visa, or their entry itself may be illegal. Migrants' immigration status, crucially, will determine their right of access to work, public services, and welfare benefits.

Migrants' legal status also determines, in part, whether they remain in the EU permanently or reside for only a few months or years. If free to travel, they may retain strong transnational links with their country of origin and remit some of their earnings to dependants who remain there. Nevertheless, they may not return but move on to another part of Europe or elsewhere. Whereas Member States once made the mistake of assuming that all migrants would eventually leave, it would now be equally

mistaken to assume that all will stay. Yet those who reside temporarily need a level of integration, both economically and socially. An integration strategy needs to accommodate these different migration trajectories.

Fourteen million third-country nationals lived in the EU 15 in 2001: less than four percent of the population. But their concentration in particular regions and cities; their vulnerability to exclusion even after they and the second generation have become nationals; and the fact that EU nationals themselves can face barriers to integration, make the issue more significant than that statistic would suggest.

While many are successful in the labor market and enjoy positive relations with other residents, there is substantial evidence of disadvantage and exclusion. In education, there is disproportionate under-achievement at school, in which poor language skills are one factor, as they are in the disproportionate unemployment and underemployment in the labor market. The employment rate for non-EU nationals in the EU 15, at 52.7 percent, is much lower than that of 64.4 per cent for EU nationals (2001). The gap is particularly significant for women. In housing, migrants experience homelessness, excessive segregation in poor neighbourhoods, and unacceptable housing conditions. Evidence suggests that migrants' health declines after arrival; and in local communities there can be tensions with local residents, victimization, and mobilization by far right.

Patterns of disadvantage and exclusion are complex: There are substantial differences in levels of economic, social, and cultural integration between and within migrant communities. Integration, as Portes and Zhou among others have shown, can be 'segmented'. Migrants, and the second generation, can become integrated not into the middle class but into an underclass, sharing its economic prospects and modes of behavior. Class and geographic location can thus be more significant as determinants of life chances than ethnicity or length of residence. Moreover, migrants and the second generation can be well integrated on one index (e.g., high rates of inter-marriage) but not on others (e.g., low rates of employment). Others can achieve success in the labor market while remaining culturally distinct, maintaining the values of and solidarity within their ethnic group, demonstrating that cultural assimilation is

not necessary for economic integration. Alternatively, migrants can become “acculturated” while no other forms of integration take place.

This situation translates into economic and political pressures for more effective integration strategies. Europe needs an educated, trained workforce to fill skill shortages in a tight labor market. Member States cannot afford to neglect the talents of migrants already in the workforce and, if states are to compete for the “brightest and the best,” potential migrants must be confident that they will not face discrimination and exclusion. Despite high levels of unemployment in parts of Europe, there are also shortages of workers for some low-wage jobs for which it is evident that migrants will come with or without permission. Political leaders cannot allow their presence to lead to resentment among long-term residents unable to find work. Most salient is the need to avoid the eruption of community tensions into violence, increased support for far right parties, and the EU-wide concern to re-engage migrants whose alienation may lead to their support for religious and political extremism.

Integration: the Goal

All Member States would now acknowledge that integration is a two-way process: that there is a need to address the barriers that migrants face as well as adaptation by migrants themselves. This approach reflects academic analysis that has established that the outcome of the integration process depends on the interaction between factors in the host society and the characteristics of migrants. Yet states have differed markedly in the emphasis they have placed on the two poles of this process. Germany, for instance, traditionally focused on increasing the employability of migrant workers by ensuring that they have the skills needed to get a job and prosper. In the UK, in contrast, while settled migrants have had access to mainstream employability programs, the emphasis has been on addressing the race discrimination barrier faced by ethnic minority immigrants and the second generation in employment, housing, and services. Despite continuing differences in approach across the EU, there is nevertheless some evidence of convergence on which an EU strategy can build.

It is also significant that integration is seen as a process, not an end state. Although states are increasingly identifying indexes to measure progress on integration – e.g., migrant employment rates – with the implication that integration is achieved when there is parity with long-term residents, this is a reversible process. In an economic downturn, former migrants are more likely to be unemployed. And there is evidence that the second generation, despite having necessary language skills and nationality status, may be less integrated socially than their parents' generation.

States have also differed in the emphasis they have placed on integration into the labor market, or on social integration and cultural assimilation. To avoid segmented integration, however, the strategy needs to be multi-tiered to achieve:

- Integration into the labor market – and at a level matching the migrants' qualifications and experience
- Social inclusion within the mainstream institutions and activities that meet individual and societal needs – education, health and social care, housing
- Inclusion in civic life – active participation in the institutions and obligations of civic society, particularly for those remaining in the long term
- “Bridging capital,” trust and good relations with neighbors and the wider community

Is the concept of “inclusion” actually more helpful than that of integration?

“Integration” is resisted by many because of associations not with a two-way process of mutual adaptation, but with assimilation. Inclusion, in contrast, emphasizes the responsibility of society to open up to the excluded, and is the goal identified for long-term residents. The EU has national action plans on social inclusion for the population as a whole - why not use the same term for migrants?

Barriers to Integration

Barriers in law

A distinction in terminology may need to be maintained for migrants (though not the second generation) for a significant reason: because the level of economic and social inclusion permitted by law to non-nationals is less than that for nationals. Depending

on their immigration status, non-nationals can be subject to restrictions on access to jobs (or be restricted to certain kinds of employment); on whether family reunion is permitted; on access to public services and welfare benefits; and on the length of residence itself.

These legal restrictions on integration, whether in the conditions attached to immigration status or in the rules governing access to public services and benefits, are rarely the focus of policy debate, and their impact is under-researched. Their purpose is to protect the public purse, and to protect jobs for the resident labor force. It is arguable that the migrant who arrives in Copenhagen or Dublin, who steps onto the tarmac at Heathrow or Charles de Gaulle, should not immediately be able to access the full range of social benefits and public services to which long-term residents have contributed. But states need to recognize that these restrictions can be a barrier to integration, and the balance may need to be reweighed between exclusion of migrants from public services (to limit public expenditure, deter welfare tourists and perhaps appease public opinion) and allowing access to services that promote inclusion. For an effective integration strategy, it is thus necessary to consider which services and benefits migrants should, over time, have access to, because it is in the interests of society – promoting self-sufficiency and social inclusion – as well as in the interests of the migrant.

Discrimination

Second, there is the barrier of discrimination – discrimination on grounds of race and, increasingly it appears, of religion. Discrimination can be overt, but more often unintended and systemic in the way staff are recruited and services are organized to meet the needs of the majority. When not tuned to the differing needs of new communities, lacking interpreters or materials in minority languages, services intended for migrants can fail to meet their needs or exclude them entirely.

Discrimination is a barrier to inclusion not just because it excludes migrants from the jobs they are eager to do and the services they need, but because of the resentment it fosters. Why go on trying if you keep getting knocked back? As Trevor Phillips, Chairman of the Commission for Racial Equality in the UK said in 2004:

“feelings of resentment based on discrimination, or the sense of rejection, can drive migrants into the arms of the minority who would like to retreat to the village instead of joining the world – into the arms of the people who support forced marriages, the folk who will not allow their wives to work or speak English, and the people who will back any kind of conduct on the ground that it is justified by cultural difference..”

Action to address discrimination can be seen, therefore, not simply as a matter of individual rights, as a separate project in a separate department from work on integration – but as one central, essential component of the integration agenda.

Public attitudes

The third and related barrier is public attitudes. In some local communities, migrants are warmly received, reflecting Europe’s best tradition of hospitality; but in others they are met with suspicion and hostility. Such attitudes can breed discrimination. But they can also lead to a breakdown in trust, tension, and even disorder. For the migrant, no lessons in citizenship, no encouragement to identify with the collective “we,” will override a negative message from the neighbors that “you do not belong.” An integration strategy that focuses only on migrants and not on their neighbors will not address this powerful force for exclusion.

Integration: the Target

It is often assumed that an integration strategy need target only sections of Europe’s migrant communities: only those who are from outside the European Union; only those who intend to stay in the long term; or only refugees. EU documents consistently refer, narrowly, to “legally resident third-country nationals” as the target, assuming that it is this legal status, rather than the experience of transnational mobility, that is the basis of their need for support.

States themselves require migrants to enter through a particular channel and acquire a label – seasonal worker, refugee, highly skilled permit holder, dependant. They can then assume that their needs differ, or that it is only worth investing in those who will

remain in the long term, or that European citizens, as holders of equal rights, are by definition integrated from day one.

Yet we know that, even within the EU 15, EU citizens exercising their free movement rights can face language barriers, non-recognition of qualifications, or resentment from the public. We call their arrival “mobility,” not “immigration,” but they are newcomers, facing barriers to integration, nevertheless. Their need for access to language courses, social orientation, advice, and even protection from exploitation by employers is often no less because they enjoy the status of EU citizen. Will the EU’s integration strategy recognize their needs, or will they be expected to fend for themselves?

Among third-country nationals, those whose residence is temporary may be those least likely to have families to whom they can turn for support. They may have the fewest incentives to learn the language or to build good relationships with their neighbors, while having greater susceptibility to exploitation. They may thus need assistance to ensure that they have a level of inclusion matching their own, and society’s, best interests. The question arises whether the EU integration strategy identify these temporary residents as a priority, or whether their temporary status, or simple budget constraints, will leave them out in the cold?

Moreover, within each category of migrants, women may have different needs from men, and the young from those who have greater experience in life. This suggests that, in practice, the strategy needs to be based on:

- An understanding of the barriers experienced by different groups of migrants
- Clarity of objectives for each group
- A portfolio of interventions, recognizing that one-size-fits-all will not deliver for this disparate group of people any more than it would for the population as a whole

Irregular migrants

Last on the list is the most difficult group to mention in the context of integration – irregular migrants, such as those who came legally but overstayed their visas. It is certain that a significant number of people are in this position, and undoubtedly many

are doing jobs that legal residents are unwilling to do. Privately, some officials acknowledge that it is unrealistic for the authorities to detect and remove them all, and that it would have damaging economic and social consequences if they did. Moreover, while these migrants remain it is in society's interests that they have access to essential services such as medical care and education for children.

There will be concern in some Member States about general amnesties for irregular migrants. Could the European Commission nevertheless initiate a dialogue among Member States on devising a pathway for some irregular migrants to legal status? It could perhaps be the kind of "earned legalization" scheme that Papademetriou advocates as part of a broader package of measures, which could bring this group of migrants out of exclusion without attracting future migrants to stay when their visas have expired.

Integration: Whose Responsibility?

Whose responsibility is it to promote the integration of migrants, other than migrants themselves? Increasingly, particularly in Northern Europe, national governments are taking responsibility for devising programs, often delivered by municipalities. Many large municipalities, like Frankfurt and Birmingham, already have their own programs, developed in response to evident need at the local level. Others support initiatives developed outside of the public sector.

There is a plethora of initiatives at the local level in operation or development, among employers, unions, community groups, and the public, to provide language support, mentoring, advice, access to jobs, and means of participation in civic society. This fits with the analysis of Brian Ray of the University of Ottawa, who argues that the key actors in the integration process are those people with whom the migrant interacts on a daily basis. And it suggests that we should see integration not as a state responsibility, but as a shared responsibility among a series of actors, including but not exclusively the migrant and the state.

There is scope for debate on the responsibilities of each player, as reflected in the diagram below.

Insert diagram

Migrants

The most contentious issue is perhaps the extent to which the migrant has a responsibility to adapt, and consequently the extent of adaptation it is legitimate for the host society to expect. Few would question migrants' obligation to obey the law and to pay taxes along with other residents. Nor is it unreasonable to expect migrants, like other residents, to make every effort to be self-sufficient and avoid reliance on the state (and hence reliance on other taxpayers).

Beyond those requirements, it is known that language acquisition considerably enhances the migrant's probability of getting a job. The question has thus arisen whether it is legitimate to require migrants to take language courses. In Member States where there is no evidence that migrants are unwilling to take such courses, this would seem premature. In some regions there are long waiting lists for courses or they are offered at a cost or on schedules that are not feasible for migrants. It would seem appropriate for states to ensure, first, that migrants have the *opportunity* to study. Should there be reluctance, incentives could be considered before applying sanctions for non-attendance.

Core values

Should migrants be required to adopt the values and norms of the host society, to assimilate rather than integrate? Should Member States, at one extreme, allow migrants to maintain any religious or cultural practice, or at the other ban any practice that arouses disapproval in any section of the public? Where should states draw the line?

Before addressing this question, it is important to remember that the vast majority of migrants do not engage in extreme practice nor hold values inconsistent with those of European citizens. It has also been shown that the security provided by inclusion within an ethnic culture is a form of social capital that can be of both psychological

and economic importance in enabling individuals to overcome the isolation of the migration experience.

It is also necessary to acknowledge that the nationals of each Member State are themselves diverse, not only with regard to ethnicity and mother tongue, but also in terms of class, gender, age, religion, and other characteristics. Values and social norms not only differ between groups, but have evolved significantly in recent decades and will continue to do so, influenced in some respects by those of migrants themselves.

Moreover, while the majority of Europeans would identify themselves with human rights and democratic values, commitment in practice (e.g., levels of voting) and standards of social responsibility (e.g., levels of criminality and other forms of anti-social behavior) suggest that we can not hold up Europeans per se as models to which third-country nationals should aspire. Rather, the common principles on integration adopted under the Dutch Presidency framed the aspiration more appropriately in affirming that *every* person resident in the EU must adhere to the basic values of the European Union. It cites the European Treaties and the Charter of Fundamental Rights as the source of those values and respect for human rights and the rule of law in particular.

In the UK, Ministers have highlighted the importance of human rights as core values that can unite a diverse society. Speaking to civil servants in 1999 on the Act of Parliament that would bring the European Convention on Human Rights into UK law, the then Home Secretary Jack Straw MP said:

“Consider the nature of modern British society. It’s a society enriched by different cultures and different faiths. It needs a formal shared understanding of what is fundamentally right and fundamentally wrong if it is to work together in unity and confidence.....The Human Rights Act provides that formal shared understanding.”

Human rights are, in most cases, not absolute standards. With exceptions such as freedom from torture, an individual’s human rights may be limited to protect the rights of others and of the community as a whole, for instance from crime.

International human rights standards set down the terms in which these restrictions are allowed and provide us with the most valuable tool for determining whether, in particular circumstances, restrictions are acceptable: the test of proportionality. When considering whether it is legitimate for the law to ban a particular cultural or religious practice, it requires us to consider: is this ban to achieve a legitimate aim, and is it proportional to the harm it is designed to prevent? Human rights standards do not necessarily provide direct answers to the questions raised by cultural practices – they do not always tell us whether the practice is right or wrong - but they do provide a framework to resolve the conflicting rights which the practice has posed.

Government and municipalities

The state and its agencies at the national and local levels are responsible, first and foremost, for leadership. They must deliver clarity of vision on the kind of society that the integration strategy is designed to achieve, while explaining to the public the rationale of the strategy and promoting an informed, balanced public debate. The state, particularly at the local level, must take responsibility for promoting good relations among communities, including preparing residents for new arrivals. And it should exercise leadership in mobilizing the partners it needs in civil society to make the strategy work.

An effective strategy needs a sound evidence base. The state can conduct or sponsor research, consult others, and evaluate “what works.” It can prioritize effective interagency coordination. And it can ensure that integration objectives are built into its mainstream employment, housing, education, health, and urban renewal programs.

National governments can ensure that post-entry immigration controls do not pose an unnecessary barrier to integration, and that there is clarity (for migrants, employers, and service providers) on the rights and responsibilities of migrants. All Member States have a responsibility to ensure that there is effective anti-discrimination legislation. They may also take direct responsibility for delivery of services to migrants: introductory programs, language and skills training, and so forth. Finally, national states determine the conditions under which migrants may become nationals and entitled to the rights and obligations, and equality of opportunity, which citizenship status confers.

Civil society

The state's responsibility is extensive, but the integration process happens in daily life, and here the agencies of civil society – employers, trades unions, community and voluntary organizations, and faith groups – have the key role to play.

Employers, for instance, do not only provide employment. Some are also providing language courses for new migrants or allowing time off from work to attend courses off-site. Trades unions have taken responsibility for ensuring that migrants have access to information on health and safety and employment rights. Their role in addressing exploitation of low-wage migrants by rogue employers is vital.

Membership of a union is also an important way for migrants to engage with non-migrants in circumstances where they have a common interest.

Voluntary organizations play a significant role in many countries by providing services to migrants that meet their particular needs, from health, education, and housing to specialist advice on immigration rules. Governments acknowledge that they do not themselves always have the detailed knowledge of migrants' diverse needs and that those needs are better met by organizations and groups in this sector.

Beyond services, community and faith groups play another key role in building bridges between migrants, with other members of their ethnic or faith group, and with the wider community. They provide a means of access for governments to consult migrants, and can provide migrants with ways not only to access mainstream jobs and services, but also to contribute to the community in a voluntary capacity.

Individuals in the local community

Members of the public can offer a vital ingredient in the integration process that no government can provide: the welcome and understanding that can foster a sense of belonging and security. Their openness to new people and ideas, their willingness to engage in conversation and invite newcomers into their homes, can be the most important source of information and advice to migrants on local services and social norms, as it is to anyone who moves into a new neighborhood within their own country. Through a friendly neighbor, migrants can meet other members of the

community, hear about vacant jobs and accommodation, learn how to register with a local doctor and where to leave rubbish for collection. Neighbors, in turn, learn about migrants and can contribute in their conversations with others to a more informed public debate.

Media

The media has a responsibility to ensure that coverage of incidents involving migrants is balanced and that information on numbers of migrants or data on use of services, for instance, is accurate. In some states there are voluntary codes of conduct providing guidance to journalists. Governments can ensure access to accurate information and that misconceptions are actively redressed.

State of Play at the EU Level

The EU has long recognized that integration is a necessary part of a comprehensive immigration and refugee strategy; but is only now according it priority. The European Commission sought to push it farther up the agenda in its Communication on Immigration in 1994, and the integration of third-country nationals formally reached the agenda at the European Council in Tampere in 1999 as one of four themes of a new, comprehensive migration strategy.

Primary responsibility for integration remains at the national and local level. But it is now recognized that EU goals in relation to immigration, economic growth, and social cohesion all necessitate a focus on integration. The EU has (prior to agreement on the new Constitutional Treaty) no specific legal competence in relation to the integration of migrants. It does, however, have competence to address many issues central to it including the regulation of migrants' rights post-entry (e.g., the Directive on Family Reunification); targeted programs for ethnic minorities like Equal; and mainstream strategies on employment, social inclusion and health.

Since the Amsterdam Treaty (1999), the EU has in particular had a mandate to require anti-discrimination legislation. Directives (2000/43/EC and 2000/78/EC) now require Member States to legislate against discrimination on grounds of race (in employment,

goods, and services); to establish a statutory race body to provide assistance to individual victims; and to ban discrimination in employment on grounds of religion or belief (since December 2003).

Thessaloniki

The Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) Council in October 2002 asked the Commission to come forward with proposals for a more comprehensive integration strategy, and the conclusions of the Greek Presidency in Thessaloniki in June 2003 confirmed that:

“The European Council deems it necessary to elaborate a comprehensive and multidimensional policy on the integration of legally residing third country nationals who should be granted rights and obligations comparable to those of EU citizens.”

It was agreed at Thessaloniki that the policy should cover employment, economic participation, education and language training, health and social services, housing and urban issues, as well as culture and participation in social life, and should take into account the particularities of different migrants, e.g., children and refugees. It noted approvingly that agreement had now been reached on the directives on family reunification and long-term resident status, which it recognized as essential instruments for integration.

The Thessaloniki conclusions saw integration as a “continuous, two-way process based on mutual rights and corresponding obligations of legally residing third-country nationals and the host societies.” While primary responsibility remained that of Member States, it argued that policies to achieve integration should be developed within a coherent European framework, taking into account the legal, political, economic, social, and cultural diversity of Member States. The development of such a framework would be assisted by defining some common basic principles. It would also be necessary to share knowledge and experiences, and to that end the recently established group of officials as ‘national contact points’ on integration would facilitate coordination. The Commission was invited to present an Annual Report on Migration and Integration in Europe, mapping data, policies, and practice, as an aid to developing “policy initiatives for more effective management of migration in Europe.” Integration was thus clearly seen as one part of a broader migration

management agenda. Finally, it was acknowledged that the success of an integration policy relies on the involvement of a wide range of actors including not only state agencies, but also trade unions, employers, NGOs, migrant organizations, and organizations engaged in cultural, social, and sporting activities.

Commission Communication 2003

The communication from the Commission on Immigration, Integration and Employment had been published earlier, on June 3. It set out the approach to integration, endorsed at Thessaloniki, which is now being developed and is therefore worth mentioning in some detail.

The communication set integration within the context of both the Tampere (migration) and Lisbon (economic prosperity) agendas, seeing successful integration of new and settled migrants as a matter of social cohesion and economic efficiency. It emphasized participation: the need for states to create the conditions in which it is possible for the immigrant to participate in economic, social, cultural, and civil life; while “immigrants respect the fundamental norms and values of the host society and participate actively in the integration process, without having to relinquish their own identity.” The Commission foresaw migrants acquiring more rights and obligations depending on their length of residence, with integration measures available to them soon after arrival. It recognized that asylum seekers might also need integration measures but noted that, as migrants without the right to remain, they were outside of the scope of the communication. In relation to irregular migrants, while endorsing the need for an effective policy of return, the communication went so far as to acknowledge that “integration policies cannot be fully successful unless the issues arising from the presence of this group of people are adequately and reasonably addressed.”

The communication established a number of important principles: that the approach should be holistic (embracing economic and social integration, addressing cultural and religious diversity, citizenship, and political rights); should reflect the varying needs of different categories of migrant; should engage a wide range of non-state stakeholders; and should require investment of resources. It argued that immigrants should themselves participate in the design and evaluation of the programs and

policies that affect them. Significantly, it argued that while special programs were necessary in the initial phase of integration, in the long term it was important that migrants access mainstream services, which must take account of their specific needs.

In relation to integration into the labor market, the communication cited the need to recognize migrants' existing qualifications, to remove unnecessary barriers such as disproportional language requirements, to address discrimination, and to upgrade migrants' occupational and language skills. The goal should be to reduce by half the unemployment gap between non-nationals and nationals by 2010. Social partners needed to ensure that migrants receive equal pay and working conditions, and employers that diversity in the workplace is well managed.

The communication also covered the importance of education, for language acquisition, social orientation, and bridge-building across communities. It suggested that diversity should be reflected in the curriculum, that schools should work closely with parents, and that problems – which it identifies only in relation to large numbers of immigrants concentrated in one school – should be addressed. It noted the factors that lead to housing segregation, the lack of affordable housing, and the barriers posed to migrants' sense of belonging and participation by racism and xenophobia. Regional planning strategies to address segregation were cited as one area for policy development. Access to health and social services was a further area where it was suggested that existing policies could be adapted to address migrants' particular needs. Information for migrants and training for service providers, with migrant participation in planning services, was recommended.

Migrant participation was emphasized not only to ensure the cultural sensitivity of services, but also as a broader path towards social mixing and development of mutual respect across communities. The Commission stressed the need to ensure that the public has accurate information about the contribution migrants make in order to challenge negative attitudes. Politicians and the media should, it suggested, set an example for civil society.

The Tampere conclusions (1999) had already endorsed the value of naturalization for third-country nationals in fostering a sense of belonging and according important

legal rights. The Commission had itself proposed a concept of ‘civic citizenship’ under which non-nationals would acquire a certain level of rights over a period of years, including some rights of participation in elections. It now saw the Charter on Fundamental Rights as central to making these rights a reality.

Turning to policy levers, the communication proposed faster progress on pending directives, for instance on recognition of qualifications; and full implementation of the directives on race and religious discrimination. It recommended that Member States go beyond the minimum and give public bodies a duty to promote equal treatment. A major publicity campaign was anticipated, focusing on employers and employees, and an annual report published on Equality and Discrimination in the EU.

The national contact points, officials from Member State governments, would be a means of sharing information and strengthening coordination of policies at the national level, while ensuring synergy with related EU policies on employment, social inclusion, and anti-discrimination. The first priorities identified by the Commission for the contact group were to identify optimal models for introduction programs for new arrivals; extending access to language training; and participation in civil, cultural, and political life.

In relation to the European Employment Strategy, the Communication urged Member States to increase migrants’ access to training and employment services to reduce unemployment; to develop a mix of sanctions and preventative measures to tackle undeclared working; to monitor the needs of the labor market and the role of immigration within it; to share good practice; and to implement a series of other measures including fast-track language training for professionals.

Member States have also been required since 2001 to report on National Action Plans for Social Inclusion, and the Commission asked that subsequent reports on measures to promote the social integration of individuals at particular risk of exclusion should pay greater attention to immigrants.

In addition to the existing European Refugee Fund, 12 million Euros over three years would fund pilot projects (“INTI” projects) on sharing information and good practice

in order to develop greater consistency of practice across the EU. Separately, the Commission is exploring the potential for developing a series of indicators for measuring integration, for comparative purposes, as part of an action plan for the collection and analysis of community statistics in the migration field.

Progress in 2004

The Commission's first, brief, annual report on migration and integration was published in July 2004. Summarizing migration trends and evidence on fiscal and labor market impact, the report on integration is drawn from the national contact points and from the National Action Plans on Employment and on Social Inclusion. In those plans, the Commission found greater priority being accorded to integration issues. However, at EU and national levels, in some major policy fields the mainstreaming of integration issues remains slow. At the national level, in relation to employment, it found limited participation by social partners, and scant evaluation of the effectiveness of policies on the ground. Many occupations remain restricted to nationals. Provision of language tuition for new arrivals was increasing, as had provision of civic education (or 'social orientation').

It found that many Member States had little analysis of the reasons why immigrants are particularly at risk of poverty and exclusion, and were experiencing difficulties addressing residential segregation and poor housing. Action on discrimination and racism was often not connected to strategies on integration, and it had been made more difficult by negative stereotyping of migrants in the media and the rise in support for the far right.

The Commission found it "difficult to assess whether there has been progress in developing comprehensive integration strategies at national level," while acknowledging the increase in specific measures and at least awareness of the importance of including immigration objectives in mainstream policies and programs. Gender considerations had not yet been taken on board, in policy or data. Nor had the directives on discrimination been transposed into national legislation in some Member States, a situation on which the Commission intended to act.

The national contact points were engaged in developing a handbook for practitioners and policy makers and this was duly published later in the year. It covers good practice on introduction programs, civic participation, and indicators for measuring progress.

The report stressed the importance of developing networks for dialogue with migrant organizations, and emphasized that it would monitor the legal framework of rights accorded to migrants within Member States. It would also take forward the proposals to establish a set of common principles on integration as the basis for subsequently identifying common objectives across the policy fields. It foresaw the national contact points playing a significant role in these subsequent developments. But the Commission would also consider the need for a more formal basis for the exchange of information on integration alongside the existing EU mechanisms on employment and inclusion.

Finally, the annual report stated that the Commission's budget for 2007-2013 would provide specific support for a common policy on immigration, including incentives to Member States to promote integration, but without further clarity on what form this provision might take. (In practice, it may prove appropriate to bring the Refugee Fund into a broader integration fund in order to help overcome the institutional barriers between provision for refugees and that for other immigrants whose needs are, in many respects, the same).

There are also mainstream funding streams such as the European Social Fund which in 2000-2006, for instance, will spend one-fifth of its budget promoting equal opportunities in the labor market, with some funds directed specifically at migrants. This is also true of the Socrates education program, the program supporting vocational training, and the Entrepreneurship Action Plan. This demonstrates the importance of mainstreaming relative to targeted initiatives that cannot attract equivalent funding.

Dutch Presidency

The Dutch Presidency (July-December 2004) subsequently gave considerable priority to progress on the integration agenda, arguing that:

“The long term well being of many of our societies is probably more contingent upon solving the immigration and inter-group relations puzzle than some of us may acknowledge publicly.”

Its goal was not to harmonize policies across the EU, but to reach agreement on the key elements of the common EU framework that Thessaloniki had endorsed. Its achievement was agreement by all 25 Member States on Common Basic Principles for immigrant integration policy at the EU Justice and Home Affairs Council in November.¹ The preamble to the Common Basic Principles establishes the rationale for action at EU level by stating that:

“The failure of an individual Member State to develop and implement a successful integration policy can have in different ways adverse implications for other Member States and the European Union.”

It cites the potential impact of this failure on the economy, on fulfilment of international human rights obligations, and on tensions within society. The preamble suggests, on this basis, that it is in the common interest of all Member States that each is encouraged to pursue effective integration strategies.

The Common Basic Principles are non-binding but intended to provide guidance on developing goals and priorities and on measuring progress, both for states with experience with immigration as well as for those which have only recently become migrant destinations. They are also intended

“to assist the Council to reflect upon and, over time, agree on EU-level mechanisms and policies needed to support national and local-level integration policy efforts, particularly through EU-wide learning and knowledge-sharing.”

¹ Council of the European Union Document 14615/04 19 November 2004

This is clearly seen as a first step towards greater EU intervention in ensuring that adequate steps are taken in each Member State to promote integration, in the interests of the EU as a whole.

The eleven principles adopted after much debate largely reflect the holistic approach the Commission had taken in its earlier communication: that integration is a two-way, multi-dimensional process of mutual accommodation, with recognition of the need for host societies to remove the barriers to integration, including discrimination; and a process that must respect the rights of migrants as well as their obligations. The Common Basic Principles emphasize the importance of employment, language acquisition, education, living environment, opportunities for social mixing, and migrant participation in decision-making. They assert that everybody in the EU must “adhere closely to the basic values of the EU,” not only migrants, and that the practice of diverse cultures and religions are guaranteed by the Charter of Fundamental Rights and must be safeguarded unless particular practice conflicts with other inviolable European rights or with national law. Reference is made, in that context, to the freedom of women to choose whether to practice a particular religion.

The Common Basic Principles emphasize the importance of mainstreaming integration measures into all relevant policy portfolios. They stress the value of engaging non-state actors and of coordinating their contribution. Looking ahead, they talk of developing clear goals and indicators at the EU level and evaluation mechanisms, to learn from experience and from each other.

The Common Basic Principles are less comprehensive than the earlier Commission communication and their understanding of integration less nuanced: they imply, for instance, that integration is a uni-directional process that will reach completion. Temporary and irregular migrants are not included within the target group. An inclusive, positive vision gives way, in places, to a more negative tone (references to ‘law-abiding’ immigrants and ‘migrant youth delinquency’), with somewhat greater emphasis on migrants’ responsibility to integrate than on the responsibility of the receiving society to provide opportunities for them to do so. The goal is to overcome a deficit of migrant integration rather than to build a more cohesive, inclusive, society. The strength of the Common Basic Principles, however, is in adding the endorsement

of all Member States to a holistic integration strategy that focuses not only on migrants, but also on dismantling the barriers to integration that they face.

The Dutch Presidency brought the government ministers responsible for integration together for the first time. At a conference in Groningen, focusing on introductory programs and on measures relating to youth, it was evident that they would value greater coordination and information sharing but did not agree on the extent to which the EU should take the lead or have significant financial responsibility. While some supported the creation of a European Fund for Integration, others thought all funding for integration should remain within the competence of Member States. They did ask that the European Commission, with the national contact points, create a dedicated website on integration to provide access to information on good practice in and beyond Member States.

The European Council in early November 2004 anticipated agreement on the Common Basic Principles in its forward agenda for the EU, “The Hague Program.” Adopted at a time of heightened awareness of security issues, the Hague Program situates integration within the security and justice issues on the EU agenda. Throughout the program there is a sense of urgency about implementation, outcomes, and evaluation. On integration, it reiterates the need for greater coordination of national policies and EU initiatives and states that “a framework, based on these common basic principles, will form the foundation for future initiatives in the EU, relying on clear goals and means of evaluation.” The establishment of the dedicated integration website that the ministers had proposed would support the exchange of information.

After his appointment as Commissioner for Justice and Home Affairs, Franco Frattini announced that he would launch a communication on a coherent framework for integration during 2005 to implement the integration dimension of the Hague Program.

Conclusion and Way Forward

The alienation of a small minority of immigrants, and evidence of broader economic and social exclusion, has forced the issue of integration to the forefront of the EU's agenda. On each index of integration – employment, education, health, living standards, civic participation, and community relations – migrants are often disproportionately disadvantaged even in the second and third generations. The strong focus on integration could now provide the momentum for addressing the barriers faced by migrants. But public concern, some open hostility and support for the far right, have set up a political Catch-22: integration measures are needed yet the allocation of resources to services that migrants need can be contentious when resources for the population as a whole are limited.

Member States recognize that migration will be a continuing and evolving feature of Europe's future and that the integration of migrants requires policy intervention. The need to ensure social cohesion is matched by the need to ensure the integration of migrants into Europe's labor markets, in which their skills and labor will continue to be essential to its prosperity. Even in those states with long experience with immigration, integration measures are limited and have not been based on a comprehensive understanding of the barriers to integration. States have differed in the extent to which they have focused on foreigners or ethnic minorities, on newcomers or second generation, on economic integration or cultural assimilation. In addition, in the northern, southern and eastern states of Europe, states have differed in the extent to which there is an expectation that the state or civil society will take responsibility for integration initiatives. There are signs of some convergence, but huge differences remain in emphasis and approach.

The Greek and Dutch presidencies of the EU in 2003-2004 oversaw progress towards acceptance by Member States that the EU has a role to play in advancing the integration agenda, even while primary responsibility remains at the national and local levels. It is accepted that there should be a common framework for integration policies and the first step, a document on Common Basic Principles, has been agreed.

Despite a heavy emphasis within some states on the perceived failure of migrants to adapt and elements of compulsion in language and social orientation programs, Member States have signed up to a more balanced, multi-dimensional analysis. There is, moreover, agreement on some concrete steps:

- Implementation of anti-discrimination legislation (albeit contentious in practice in some states)
- Mainstreaming of integration into the EU employment and social inclusion strategies
- Sharing of good practice through national contact points with further editions of the handbook and a dedicated website
- A small budget for pilot initiatives with a more significant budget from 2007 (Euros 1.7 billion), and an annual report on integration to monitor progress

The next step is thus to take the existing agenda forward, and for the Commission to act in those areas where it has a clear mandate, for instance in enforcing the discrimination directives and in mainstreaming integration within the employment and social inclusion action plans.

Cross-cutting governance arrangements

The Commission will need to develop a stronger basis for cooperation across directorates for this quintessential cross-cutting agenda. This is particularly important between Justice, Freedom and Security (known as “JLS,” formerly Justice and Home Affairs) which leads on migration, integration, and fundamental rights, and Employment and Social Affairs, which leads on employment, social inclusion, and discrimination. It is no secret that understandable differences of emphasis exist between these two directorates, and that each insists that it should lead on integration. This has made agreement on a common agenda a difficult process.

It remains unclear how the Commission can develop a consistent integration strategy mainstreamed across policy fields unless this division is overcome. At the national level there is equally a challenge for Ministers responsible for integration, wherever located, to ensure that this issue is given some priority within the departments that lead on employment, education, health, international development (for cooperation

with source countries) and other crucial policy areas. Mechanisms are thus needed for dialogue with stakeholders within and across governments, and within the Commission, not only to secure cooperation in mainstreaming integration objectives across policy portfolios, but also to develop a common understanding of the strategy's multiple objectives.

Mainstreaming

Integration objectives need to be built into all of the Commission's relevant mainstream programs and budgets, as has already begun in employment and social inclusion. There is more capacity in those programs to achieve change, not least those requiring regular reporting on national action plans, than in any additional projects targeted only at the migrant community. Targets and performance indicators required in the guidelines of the action plans should specifically require reporting on indexes that measure the inclusion of immigrants alongside those of the rest of the population. Where relevant, data reported should reflect gender, and not mask differences between and within the main immigrant communities.

The Commission could carry out a review to identify which Community policies, programs, budgets, and policy levers are most relevant to integration, to inform its mainstreaming approach. It could also lead by example, reviewing its own staffing procedures to increase the number of ethnic minority staff at all levels – both to ensure equal opportunities and to guarantee that policymaking benefits from their experience. It could reconsider the bar on employment of resident third-country nationals, while encouraging a review within Member States of the impact of occupational barriers to non-nationals.

Research, monitoring and evaluation

There is a role for the Commission in developing a broader evidence base for integration policies, through research, monitoring, and evaluation. The fact that we know that language proficiency has a significant, measurable impact on labor-market performance, for instance, is a powerful reason for providing access to language classes. But we do not have an equal understanding of the impact of other integration policy levers. An approach that “works” in one Member State may not be entirely suitable for another, but it may offer insights from which others can learn.

The Commission is committed to disseminating information on good practice through its proposed dedicated website. What constitutes “good practice,” however, depends on criteria for measuring outcomes, and the evaluation itself should be conducted with independence and rigor. The work being carried out to identify indicators to measure national progress is valuable, but the Commission could also ensure that resources and guidance are available to monitor and evaluate individual programs according to agreed-upon criteria that would make comparison with programs in other Member States more meaningful.

Research is also needed on the barriers to integration, within and beyond the labor market. Results should be disseminated in a form accessible to policymakers to address assumptions and misconceptions on which policy initiatives can otherwise be based.

Review legal controls

It is recognized that admission policies have an impact on capacity to integrate, but little attention has been paid to the impact of post-entry controls on migrants’ access to jobs, services, and participation. At the EU and national levels, there is a need to review the impact of immigration controls to ensure that those restrictions which remain are no more than necessary to achieve competing objectives. The rights and responsibilities accorded to migrants should reflect their temporary or permanent status, with maximum possible access to the rights that promote integration – including work, family reunification, public services, and participation in the democratic system. Understanding the impact of these controls, for instance on the life style of male migrant workers not permitted family reunification, or the implications of permits that tie the migrant to a named employer, could be a further topic of research.

The Commission could also endeavor to give substance to the notion of civic citizenship by developing a framework of minimum civil, political, social, and economic rights and responsibilities that apply to all migrants within the EU, some on arrival and others after an agreed-upon residence period. It can, and has given,

substance to some of these rights through directives such as that on family reunification and the rights of third-country-national migrant workers.

In developing a framework of minimum rights, it should at least initiate a debate on the position of irregular migrants who, regardless of legal status, have some civil rights. Moreover, excluding irregular migrants from basic health care, or their children from education, has social consequences which should be taken into account. Some Member States (e.g., Italy) protect the access of irregular migrants at least to emergency health care. The Commission could initiate research on the impact of this approach in order to inform policy development.

Tackle Discrimination

On discrimination, the Commission has the authority to monitor implementation of the directives and to take action against any of the 25 Member States that fail to give them force in domestic law, including the establishment of a specialized “race” body to promote compliance. The Commission may need to be tough on Member States that drag their feet. Migrants who are treated unfairly on grounds of race or religion, denied the opportunity to prosper and participate, will never feel the sense of belonging and commitment to their new country which integration programs, however well designed, cannot deliver. In practice, discrimination legislation is itself only the first step: subsequent action is needed to ensure that employers (and in the case of race, service providers) have the knowledge and incentive to comply.

The Commission suggested in its communication that Member States could go beyond minimal compliance and put a statutory duty on public bodies to promote equality. The Council of Europe has recommended this to its broader European membership since 2002. The UK is currently implementing this for race, and this new approach has shifted the debate from an emphasis on victims and litigation to a focus on outcomes. Are ethnic minorities securing access to jobs and services, and achieving education, employment, and health outcomes, in the same way as the rest of the population? By requiring public bodies, from health and education providers through to the police and housing authorities, to identify barriers to equality in their

services and take steps to deliver change, the new law is taking equality from the margins towards the mainstream of each organization's service planning. The Commission could play a role in ensuring that this and broader experience in implementing discrimination legislation is shared among policymakers, social partners, specialized bodies, NGOs, and migrant organizations.

EU law currently requires protection from racial discrimination in employment and services, but only in employment if discrimination is on grounds of religion or belief. Given current levels of hostility towards Muslims, we may expect to find evidence of discrimination in services on grounds of religion, for instance by landlords or education providers. In parts of Europe, e.g., Northern Ireland, discrimination on grounds of religion has been well proven. The Commission could ensure that research evidence on current experiences with religious discrimination is collated and if necessary new research undertaken, with a view to extending the Directive on religious discrimination in employment to cover goods and services. If the desired outcome is for religious minorities to feel and be included, an effective integration strategy should ensure that they are not treated less favorably when seeking access to housing, health, or education services.

Information and advice to migrants

Member States are increasingly seeing the need to provide migrants with information on their rights and responsibilities, on the practicalities of life such as finding a local doctor and opening a bank account, and on social expectations for behavior. The manual for new members of Danish society, for instance, in addition to much practical information, advises migrants not to take offence if a colleague's use of irony in humor seems rude.

Migrants may fail to take up essential services if they do not know that they are entitled to use them, e.g to register with a local doctor. Equally, tensions can be caused by inflated expectations of a service or by lack of knowledge of social expectations.

² ECRI General Policy Recommendation No 7 on National Legislation to Combat Racism and Racial

Recognizing the need for this information does not, however, necessarily translate into a political priority to allocate resources to provide it. This can be exacerbated where integration is the responsibility of a department that currently has significant competing claims on resources, e.g., for dealing with crime and national security. The EU could help to overcome this with its dedicated integration budget, for which one category of expenditure could be information and advice provision for new arrivals.

Migrants need access to independent advice so that they can access the opportunities that are open to them and avoid exploitation by unscrupulous employers, for example, or landlords. Evidence suggests that many do not join trade unions in the early period after arrival, and rely for advice on migrant community organizations that may not be well equipped to provide the information and advice needed. Language barriers may inhibit migrants seeking advice elsewhere, so that increasing the capacity of migrant organizations as a first port of call may be one way forward.

Mobilization of Civil Society

It is agreed that there is a need for dialogue to inform, engage, and mobilize civil society partners in the integration process. While for governments the agencies in civil society are an under-utilized resource, they are also an important counter-weight to a state-driven agenda tending to focus too narrowly on language and employability. Integration happens at the local level and it is local employers, trade unions, voluntary and community organizations that, along with families and neighbors, will be central to the integration process, whether governments engage them within a formal strategy or not.

The social partners are, however, only vaguely aware of the key role they play and the responsibility they share for its success or failure. They are, with other players in civil society such as faith groups and community organizations, scarcely recognized as partners in the integration process. Discussions could be initiated at an early stage to establish what would be the most effective means to develop and disseminate ideas on the roles that these partners could play and to monitor their impact.

The question arises whether the European Commission itself can contribute directly to this exercise, or should provide a framework of ideas, guidance, and funding to enable it to happen. This could be a topic which the national contact points could include in their agenda for policy development and guidance in 2005-2006. If local partners are to play a significant role, they will also need to have a voice in policy development. Eurocities, a network of large cities in Europe, recently called for an explicit partnership on integration and a role in policy design.

Build bridges across communities

There are many examples of local initiatives to build bridges between migrants and their neighbors, bringing people together in circumstances in which they develop shared interests, common understanding, and positive relations. Neighborhood welcoming committees, mentoring, and engaging migrants as volunteers in community projects are some of the schemes that have delivered results. Yet there is little coordination within or across Member States and scant evaluation or shared learning. Nor are there ample resources to enable such initiatives to be developed in all of the areas where they are most needed.

Public hostility can reflect racism or xenophobia. It can also reflect fears about competition for jobs or public services, or personal security, and such fears need to be addressed. Where good practice exists, it has often been initiated by community organizations or municipalities in response to an immediate local need. The Commission could encourage such initiatives by making available matching funds, by disseminating information on successful initiatives on the proposed integration website, and by suggesting that these initiatives have some priority within the work program of the national contact points. Major questions, such as ways in which faith groups can play a significant role in building bridges across communities, need to be the focus of research, to put more information and analysis into the public domain.

Understanding and acceptance of human rights standards

The Common Basic Principles assert that all those in Europe need to adhere to some unifying common values. Each Member State is a signatory to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which not only sets down minimum standards on how the state treats people within its borders but also provides an ethical code for

how we treat each other. The convention teaches respect for privacy, equality, and family life, while challenging intolerance and degrading treatment. The Charter of Fundamental Rights builds on those standards. The EU public do not, in their diversity, need to agree on everything. There was huge diversity of values in Europe before post-war migration added to that cultural mix. But Europe needs a common code that overrides unacceptable extremes. The ECHR and broader international human rights standards provide that, and the EU needs to consider what steps should be taken to promote understanding and acceptance of those standards among people and institutions.

Where states have established Human Rights Commissions or equality commissions with a broader human rights mandate, those institutions can play a significant role in raising awareness, a role in which the Council of Europe should continue to play an important part. At the EU level, the European Monitoring Center on Racism and Xenophobia is to be developed into a broader human rights agency that could be given a role in building awareness and understanding of human rights, as well as of monitoring abuse. There is a place here, too, for interfaith dialogue to clarify the broad areas of agreement on fundamental values and those areas where differing interpretations, among the majority or a minority within a faith group, need to be resolved.

Public debate

Bridge-building initiatives, and human-rights awareness, could be part of a wider attempt to foster a more positive, balanced public debate. There is an urgent need for leadership of that debate at the EU, national and local levels, by politicians who could help to ensure that the public has accurate information, presented in a way that builds confidence in migration management, and addresses misinformation and misconceptions. The public has had little explanation of the rationale for migration policies and has not accepted that migration is a necessary part of Europe's future and that it can bring benefits. There is little recognition by Member States of their immigration history and the lessons that can be learned from it, for instance through support for immigration museums. The Commission framework could address the terms in which national and local governments could help to put the facts about migration into the public domain, explain the rationale for policies, and avoid

contributing to negative media coverage. The Commission could itself make public EU-wide data.

If the Commission were to embrace and implement this broad integration agenda, its role would develop from that of legislator, regulator, and monitor, to one of leader and mobilizer, under the watchful eye of Member States and the European Parliament. The urgency of this agenda, and the value in developing a common framework that encompasses labor market, social, cultural and political engagement, suggests that the European Commission should be encouraged and given the resources to do so.

The danger inherent in an EU-led approach is that it develops as a top-down strategy. Integration happens at the local level. Moreover, it is not something that is done *to* migrants, but a process in which they are but one significant player. The EU can provide a framework, legal minimum standards, and resources. It can help to mobilize the stakeholders. But the Commission and Member States must ensure that the voices of migrants and of agencies at the local level are heard when the goals and policy levers of the integration process are chosen. Migrants will be a permanent part of Europe's future and, in the final analysis, new residents and old will need to negotiate their future together.

Bibliography

Cabinet Office (2003) Ethnic Minorities in the Labour Market, Final Report, Prime Minister's Strategy Unit

European Commission (2003) Communication on Immigration, Integration and Employment, COM (2003) 336 final

European Commission (2004) Handbook on Integration for Policy-Makers and Practitioners http://europa.eu.int/comm/justice_home/

European Commission (2004) First Annual Report on Migration and Integration, COM (2004) 508 final

European Policy Centre/King Baudouin Foundation (2005) *Beyond the Common Basic Principles on Integration: the next steps* Issue Paper 27 6 April 2005

EU Presidency Conclusions Thessaloniki European Council June 2003. Council of the EU, Brussels, 1 October 2003. 11638/03. Polgen 55

Frazer H (2004) 'The National Action Plans on Poverty and Social Exclusion and Provision for Migrants' at Irish Presidency Conference 'Reconciling Mobility and Social Inclusion – the role of Employment and Social Policy', Bundoran 1st April 2004

Parekh, B (2000) *Rethinking Multiculturalism, Cultural Diversity and Political Theory*, MacMillan, London

Portes and Zhou (1993) 'The New Second Generation: Segmented Assimilation and its Variants' *ANNALS, AAPSS*, 530, November 1993

Rudiger A and Spencer S (2003) 'Social Integration of Immigrants and Ethnic Minorities', paper to OECD/European Commission conference 'The Economic and Social Aspects of Migration' Brussels, 21-22 January

<http://www.compas.ox.ac.uk/about/publications/Sarah/OECDpaper03.pdf>

Spencer, S, and Anna di Mattia (2004) 'Introductory Programmes and Initiatives for New Migrants', paper for the Ministerial Conference on Integration, Groningen, November 2004

<http://www.compas.ox.ac.uk/publications/Integration%20report%20summary.shtml>

Weil P and Crowley J (1999) 'Integration in Theory and Practice: A comparison of France and Britain' in Vertovec S (ed) Migration and Social Cohesion. Edward Elgar, UK and USA