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INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION (GCIM)**

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GCIM MIGRATION FUTURES WORKSHOP

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Global Commission on International Migration
Centre for Migration, Policy and Society, University of Oxford
Refugee Studies Centre, Queen Elizabeth House, University of Oxford
Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation, University of Warwick

Participants

Catherine Barber, Oxfam

Jo Boyden, Refugee Studies Centre, Queen Elizabeth House, University of Oxford

Stephen Castles, Director of the Refugee Studies Centre, Queen Elizabeth House, University of Oxford

Robin Cohen, Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation, University of Warwick

Jeff Crisp, Director, Policy and Research, Global Commission on International Migration, Geneva

Jan de Wilde, International Organisation for Migration, London

Matthew Gibney, Refugee Studies Centre, Queen Elizabeth House, University of Oxford

Nigel Harris, Development Planning Unit, University College London

Barbara Harriss-White, Queen Elizabeth House, University of Oxford

Eva Lotta Hedman, Refugee Studies Centre, Queen Elizabeth House, University of Oxford

Khalid Koser, Senior Policy Analyst, Global Commission on International Migration, Geneva

Christiane Kuptsch, Sustainable Migration Solutions, International Institute for Labour Studies (ILO/BIT/OIT)

Linda McDowell, School of Geography & the Environment, University of Oxford

Alisdair Rogers, School of Geography & the Environment, University of Oxford

Nick Van Hear, Centre for Migration, Policy and Society, University of Oxford

Ellie Vasta, Centre for Migration, Policy and Society, University of Oxford

Steve Vertovec, Centre for Migration, Policy and Society, University of Oxford

Workshop Organization

Emma Newcombe, Centre for Migration, Policy and Society, University of Oxford

Rapporteur

Alisdair Rogers, School of Geography & the Environment, University of Oxford

Contact Details

GCIM Secretariat, Rue Richard-Wagner 1, 1202 Geneva, Switzerland, <http://www.gcim.org/en/>

COMPAS (Centre on Migration, Policy and Society), University of Oxford, 58 Banbury Road, Oxford, OX2 6QS, UK <http://www.compas.ox.ac.uk>

Refugee Studies Centre, Queen Elizabeth House, University of Oxford, 21 St Giles, Oxford, OX1 3LA, UK, <http://www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/>

CSGR (Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation), University of Warwick, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK, <http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/csgr/>

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Introduction and workshop objectives

Jeff Crisp (GCIM, Geneva)

The Global Commission on International Migration was established as an independent body in 2003. GCIM's mandate has three components:

- to place international migration on the global agenda;
- to analyse gaps in current policy approaches and examine inter-linkages with other issue-areas;
- to present recommendations to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and other stakeholders.

A report, designed to be both pragmatic and visionary, will be delivered in mid-2005. The report will address migration at global, regional and national levels, focusing on seven priorities: migrants in the global labour market; international migration, economic growth, development and poverty reduction; irregular migration, state security and human security; migrants in society - diversity and cohesion; international migration and human rights; the legal and normative framework of international migration; and the governance of international migration.

In addition to broad-based regional consultations, the Commission is holding a series of thematic seminars with NGOs, migrant associations, the private sector, trades unions, the media and other stakeholders. The objective of this workshop is to consider the future of international migration, in terms of the facts, forces and variables that will affect immigration in the next fifty years. The workshop's three themes are:

- what will be the driving forces of international migration?
- what impacts will new mobilities and diversities have on society? and
- what will be the shape of politics, policy and governance in respect to international migration?

What will drive international migration in the next fifty years?

Robin Cohen (CSGR, University of Warwick)

It has now become almost conventional for migration theorists to identify three levels or layers of causal theory – macro (structural), meso (e.g. family, networks, traffickers) and micro (rational choice/ individual calculative models). Over the last few years, a number of recent theoretical pleas and empirical studies have sought to fill the relatively under-theorized meso level. By common consent this has yielded fruitful accounts of (in particular) why migration continues once it has started. Arguably, we need now to go back to the now relatively neglected macro level. Macro explanations were dominated by Marxists and world systems/world historical theorists and perhaps fell out of favour with the collapse of such theory. But there are a number of important insights from these traditions that we may need to rescue, and some explanations that are macro and structural without being Marxist.

At least six distinct macro-level explanations can be identified which may have predictive power. The first two might be described as ‘Marxist 1’ and ‘Marxist 2’. Marxist 1 draws its inspiration from Marx’s observation in relation to the Irish that ‘It is not population that presses on productive power; it is productive power that presses on population’. It draws attention to the fact that rural areas were subject to massive changes in the industrial revolution. To enclosures and land consolidation, must nowadays be added the demand for energy (especially hydroelectric power), the green revolution and GM crops, the provision of wildlife parks and conservation areas and industrialization of planting, logging, cropping and packing (‘field factories’). All of this has led to massive displacement of rural populations. India and China, where one-third of the world’s inhabitants are found, are the key countries involved, but others include Nigeria, Brazil, Indonesia, South Africa and Mexico.

What happens when the rural world starts moving can be seen in several recent examples. The Three Gorges project on the Yangtze river, China, will eventually displace 1.2 million people. As many as 3000 large dams have built in India since 1947, and they have so far displaced 21.6 million people. China’s ‘floating population’ is reckoned to be between 80-120 million, a significant figure when compared with the usual estimates of global immigration of 150 million. The ‘floating population’, which has appeared particularly since the modification of the *hukou* (registration) system, is defined as the number of people who changed residence in an one year. On the same measure, the rate of change of residence may be less than in the USA, but the sheer magnitude is greater and their rate of absorption into urban employment is lower. Rural-to-urban movement also lies behind the emergence of about 30 cities in India with populations of more than 1 million; there are 12 million in Greater Mumbai alone. Though there is a thriving manufacturing base in both China and India, it takes little imagination to think of a migration coil, ready to be sprung.

The Marxist 2 argument concerns arrangements to subordinate labour to capital. Again, China is a revealing case. The industrial (including rural industrial) labour force in China is often composed of semi-free (‘helot’ type) workers, unorganized and exploited. In China the Party actually runs compulsory work camps, subordinating workers to produce cheap goods for the international market. The Army is a major employer. Organization of this workforce and its

exposure to cultural alternatives will drive up wages and possibly result in unemployment – thus creating the basis for another emigration flow.

In addition to these classic Marxist arguments, there are struggles for economic resources and political hegemony, and in particular US imperialism. Are there limits to US power? This is an ongoing debate, in which it might be argued that ‘American empire’ is overextended, that the associated financial deficits are unsustainable, or that the US lacks either sufficient ‘soft power’ or the necessary willpower to sustain its reach. There are those who claim that the USA is losing control of core global institutions, and that nationalism and regionalism are more powerful than expected, as is Islamic radicalism. Will there be a move back to an Isolationist USA (remember we are talking 50 years!) and the growth of a multi-polar world, sometimes without clear regional hegemonies? If the world became bipolar, around the USA and China, how would China respond to continuing US deficits? Might there perhaps be a new warlordism in the Balkans, the Caucasus, the Horn of Africa, West Africa and more generally? In any case, struggles for political hegemony, sometimes linked to economic resources, will trigger refugee movements and economic migrants.

There are three other structural forces. Firstly, there are key demographic trends, especially the increased demand for personal services, the feminization of the labour force and the ageing of the European, Japanese and North American populations, which will lead to increased demand for immigrant service workers. Secondly, environmental change – for example in the relations between global warming and water shortages - may lead to permanent shifts of population into more favoured areas, displacing population in some cases, augmenting populations in other areas. Finally, shortages of fossil fuels (or prohibitive prices) and changes in the supplies of other power sources could also displace populations.

If these are the major structural or macro-level forces shaping migration in the next fifty years, what might the consequences be? In a mildly predictive spirit, one can identify a number of wacky (or not-so-wacky) outcomes at the meso level.

In rich states, among some politicians, the popular press, parties, and racist groups there will be determined resistance to the immigration consequences of these structural drivers of migration. Can we imagine ‘*Migration Wars*’ driven by the political demands from some states to seal their borders and the economic and social demands on other states to promote the export of migrants, following the example set by the Philippines? Could the US-Mexico border be the locus of one such conflict?

Could there be massive exports of old people to coastal zones in poorer countries to establish ‘*Gerontcolonies*’? These schemes might be state-sponsored rather than voluntary. Japanese plans for a Silver City near Brisbane could be a harbinger of such trends. Another likely setting would be Baja California, though here initial schemes to house 140,000 households are led by the private sector.

Could rotating migrant labour systems be reinstated (akin to the Bracero programme, the German guestworker system, and the apartheid migrant labour system in S. Africa) this time policed by an international agency, thereby creating a kind of *Global Rent-a-Worker* system?

Perhaps we have been too quick to assume that such programmes have failed and cannot work again.

Might the borders between nation states be replaced by deep strips or 'Separation Zones' where border industrialization and hospital care takes place, managed and financed by the country on the rich side of the strip and staffed by the country on the poor side of the strip? The Border Industrialization Program in Mexico is an obvious pointer.

Could, additionally or alternatively such zones (or remote spots or islands) be taken over by criminal gangs, or 'Snakehead States', who provide basic law-and-order functions and manage labour supplies, trafficking in women, children, arms and drugs? Are Miami, Ciudad Juarez, parts of Colombia, and Equatorial Guinea signposts in this direction? Such states might export workers and import capital on their own terms.

What will drive international migration? Response

Nigel Harris (Development Planning Unit, University College London)

When thinking about what will drive international migration in the future, what matters above all is the geography of the world economy. One cannot predict whether there will be a world war, or which states might fail and generate refugee movements. But one can be sure that migration will continue to be driven by labour demand, within the context of globalization. Even then, globalization is both worrying and unpredictable. We are witnessing the formation of a single, integrated world economy that supersedes the nation-state framework. As capital escapes the state and goes global, it no longer has any loyalty to particular countries. All factors are becoming mobile, and companies can even carry comparative advantage to new locations – just as migrants can transport their 'comparative advantage' to new lands. There is increasing competition to capture *both* mobile capital and mobile labour, between states and even between individual cities. Needless to say, one system does not just finish even if another one has begun, and there are plenty of signs of the old, nineteenth-century geopolitics around, for example in the recent struggle between Russia and the USA over the fate of the Ukraine.

In the new global system, capital organizes economic geography outside the control of particular states. If states try to stop the flow of goods or people, they risk undermining their competitiveness. If there is too much management, flows will go underground, just as black economies emerge in bureaucratically managed economies. In the new system, labour follows capital and the bulk of the growth of the labour force will be in developing countries; 80 per cent of the world's labour force will be in the Third World. Developing countries will possess by far the greater share of people in their 20s and 30s, so vital to manufacturing. In the North, ageing societies will lose part of their comparative advantage. One wonders how long it will be before the USA for instance, has to recruit its army abroad or outsource its military activities to somewhere like Bangladesh? Or might there be tax incentives to those in the developed world to retire abroad?

Although states will be unable to block the movement of companies or people, there will nonetheless be obstacles, chief among them xenophobia. How will we manage xenophobia? It

may not be a rational sentiment, but there is a contradiction between needing immigrant labour but not wanting immigrants. Perhaps the solution will be more temporary, circulating or irregular migration. Or perhaps migration could be sold in terms of its connections with aid, education and development assistance.

It is important to appreciate the speed with which the geography of the world economy is changing. Take one example, the rise of China, mentioned by Robin Cohen. It is now the third largest trader in the world and has overtaken Japan. This has happened in the space of twenty years, and particularly in two regions – the Pearl River Delta (PRD) and the Yangtze Delta. The PRD is already running out of labour and has a shortfall of two million workers. To compete with the Yangtze Delta region the PRD will have to look westwards for its workers, first to other Chinese provinces and then perhaps to Sub-Saharan Africa. The end of the Multi-Fibre Agreement in 2005 may encourage Chinese manufacturers to move abroad rather than pay higher wages at home. Meanwhile, India is waiting in the wings. It already has a potentially mobile IT industry, and its garment sector might also be on the move. Shifts in economic location affect migration through a chain of relations. Inside China, there are estimates that in 20 years 300 million people will move from rural to urban areas. Internal migration generally leads to international migration, though with uncertain consequences.

As well as new agreements over the garment industry, the current Doha Round of trade talks will affect agriculture and services. If agriculture is more opened up, might it cause the movement of labour from Florida to Mexico, say, though still under the control of US farmers? In services, might Ugandans for example tender for New York's cleaning contract, flying workers in and out on demand? Similarly mobile workforces could be mobilized for hospitals, construction sites, hotels and so forth.

To conclude, I can imagine two scenarios. In one, the great powers will relinquish control over their national economies by increasingly outsourcing. They could live off the rent of managing these networks, and live comfortably off the profits while the rest of the world does the work. If standards of living elsewhere rise as a consequence, xenophobia will decline. Inside developed countries, there could be something like the Greek city state, founded on a minority of citizens enjoying full rights and a mass of circulating workers. In the second, nightmare scenario, there is a return to closure of all kinds, including protectionism and xenophobia. Small, terrorized populations will be isolated within their fortresses trying to hold on to what they have, but paying a high costs to do so. They will live off their assets but slowly decline, using military power to protect what is left.

What will drive international migration? Response

Barbara Harriss-White (Queen Elizabeth House, University of Oxford)

It is impossible to know what will happen fifty years into the future. There are so many things that could happen, such as catastrophic global climate change, or other environmental change.

Robin Cohen outlines two macro-level explanations of international migration, which he terms Marxist 1 and Marxist 2. In the first, Capital presses on population. The State, often backed by

or jointly with the corporate sector, lies behind the many forms of enclosure we see around the world, in land, forest, mineral and water resources, and commons of all kinds. The State-backed private sector displaces people living on such sites, sometimes with force. This constitutes a kind of primitive accumulation strategy alongside advanced capitalism. People are also being forced to move by waste, the result of land degradation, pollution and waste dumping, leading to a mass reserve army of labour that may include skilled as well as unskilled workers. Marxist 2 is about arrangements to subordinate labour to capital and here we must note that in many populous regions, agriculture is no longer absorbing labour. Five to ten years from now, when there are no new jobs in agriculture, what will the alternative be? It should be possible to blur the distinction between Marxist 1 and 2, by imagining the following process. Labour cannot organize itself, it is pushed off the land, without property or rights, and is forced into informalization.

I have some scenarios of my own to add. What is it that drives migration from the Agrarian Countries (AC), as I call them to the Developed Countries (DC)? It is notable that only around 3 per cent of the world's population has moved internationally, and that even among managers and owners of capital, there are impediments to mobility. Capital in the form of Foreign Direct Investment is more valued by and attracted to some regions than others, most obviously within Developed Countries. Why doesn't capital move more than it does and respond to the price of labour? There are examples of business diasporas, such as Non-Resident Indians and Overseas Chinese, but what about the others? Why don't more people move to manage FDI? Is it that they fear the lack of physical and social security if they do so? States that provide such security can encourage inflows of migrants. The cosmocracy of managers and professionals seeks security, especially when moving DC-AC. As the propertied class, they are the most mobile, but they respond to more than just money. Some security is provided in DCs by the political regulation of pensions, services and work rights. In this sense, social policy is also economic policy. The mass of labour in developing countries cannot move so easily. The equivalent security for those moving from Agrarian to Developed Countries may come from kinship, or other forms of social regulation. But, insofar as the mass of migrant labour will only be able to engage in small scale, seasonal or temporary migration, they will be prey to predatory working conditions and vulnerable to all forms of social insecurity.

Where I disagree with Nigel Harris is over the role of the State. The State is crucial as a driver of international migration, and not just as a force that tries (and fails) to stop or regulate it. The State is responsible for investment parameters and for social (in)security and in this sense the power of states is not going to decrease.

What will drive international migration? Summary of discussion¹

I 'State v market'

Although the issue of migration is sometimes discussed in terms of the state or the market, several participants argued that it is not so simple. Migration is driven and regulated by interactions between states, markets and other entities, including companies. These companies,

¹ The roundtable discussions following each presentation are summarized according to theme rather than by contributor, in keeping with the 'Chatham House rules' concerning attribution.

in contrast to what Nigel Harris argues, may still be *national* multinationals, meaning that states are not so much getting weaker as becoming more differentiated. The actions of states lie behind many refugee movements, but also other kinds of flow which might appear economic but are not. For example, some migration from Indonesia to Malaysia is related to military-run logging operations. The interaction of state and market can be illustrated by the contrast between China and the USA. The Chinese state lacks the power to manage population mobility by fiscal means, so it must rely on *hukuo* administrative system and make the best of a bad job. It was a conscious decision to reform the *hukuo* and create a floating army, which is going to encourage people to emigrate, but they had the choice *not* to do it. In the USA, the state could reassert its control over mobility, but chooses not to, persuaded in part by the Wall Street Journal and elements inside the Bush administration that free migration is a good thing.

2 The limits of political economy

Do people move because they have to or because they want to? Several participants stressed the significant and growing role of non-economic drivers of immigration, including lifestyle choices made with regard to consumption but also housing, education and health care. Others disagreed, insisting that mostly people are forced to move because their ways of living are being disrupted. Advocates of cultural causes linked increasing migration to youthful populations. The young in particular, are motivated by exposure to western consumption patterns and, as was pointed out, it is often children who most want to migrate. At the same time, the majority of countries affected by armed conflict also have the youngest populations. This raises the question of whether lifestyles are converging across the world or whether there remain significant differences, for instance in the contrasting attitudes to leisure found in Europe and the USA. There might be a paradox here. The global elite has the most homogenous lifestyle, based on five star hotels and the like, but they are also the most mobile.

3 Environment

It was pointed out although there are considerable uncertainties over such things as climate change and variability, environmentally-related displacement has, up till now, never been just environmental. How the state manages environmental hazards and disasters also matters. Furthermore, it is not just a matter of people leaving environmentally-marginal land. Sometimes they are forced into it, as is happening across South Asia.

Reply from Robin Cohen

I would like to make four brief points in reply to this discussion. Firstly, the state's functions are indeed changing, though some states – the USA and China – will remain more powerful than others. States do more than control flows of people; they also condense identity, culture, security, health etc. together. One thing states can do is differentiation, or affect how migrants and others are categorised and classified. We are seeing many more such categories than before. Secondly, culture also matters, but the state acts as a condenser or arbiter of cultural values. We need more discussion on this. Thirdly, it is clear to me that our discussions must be more inflected by the politics of land and land degradation. What are the tipping points? How are land issues related to 'failed states'? Last, we need to know more about the relations between internal and international migration.

What will be the nature of global diversity and mobility over the next fifty years?

Steve Vertovec (COMPAS, Oxford University)

An effective way of building future scenarios is to identify the major axes involved, in this case axes of diversity and mobility (Figure 1). Depending on the 'score' on each axis, different scenarios will result. For example, whether global inequalities will become greater or lesser in the future will affect migration, but it can be distinguished from whether McDonaldization – meaning the standardization of ways of doing things – is superficial or deep. Different futures result from their varied permutations.

Inequality	low.....high
McDonaldization	superficial.....deep
Balkanization	rhetoric.....practice
Identity	multiple.....singular
Security	peripheral.....central
Voice	enabled.....stifled
Movement	facilitated.....restricted

Figure 1: Axes of future scenario building

Out of the many permutations of these axes, I identify four main scenarios of global diversity and mobility. These can be labelled as: the 'Carcassone' scenario based on the control of privilege; the 'Cosmopolis' scenario of open engagement; the 'Huntingtonia' scenario of competitive division; and finally, the 'Oldham and Granada' scenario of iconic sites. I will briefly sketch out each one in turn.

Scenario One: 'Carcassone' – the control of privilege

The basis of this future is the combination of islands of prosperity surrounded by, but protected from, seas of poverty (high inequality). Carcassone, a city in France, is famed for its well-preserved mediaeval city walls, and it might stand as a symbol of this division. Today's gated communities resemble the walled cities of the past. They are sites from which linkages with the world system can be controlled. The essence of this scenario is therefore globalization for some, but de-linkage for many. It will be founded on highly-restricted mobility for the masses, but freedom of movement for the elites. The city's 'gates' will be where distinctions are made between different types of migrant, resulting in admission for some but not others. There is a scene in Terry Gilliam's satirical film *Jabberwocky* (1975), which encapsulates this scenario. Set in a mediaeval landscape of rural distress, the film's hero Denis (played by Michael Palin) attempts to enter the city. When he reaches the front of the long queue of bedraggled peasants seeking refuge inside the walls, the guards interrogate him, but he fails to meet their demanding criteria for entry. Neither his quest to make a fortune to win his sweetheart nor his possession of a precious vegetable are enough, and – in a final humiliation – the guards demand that he drop his trousers. This too fails. Denis cannot know the criteria for admission and, even if he did, he would not meet them.

There are three further features of Carcassone. Alongside restricted mobility, there will be restrictions on who can be heard, on who might participate in democratic processes. Secondly, identities will be reified. Finally, protectionism will be the foundation of policy.

Scenario Two: 'Cosmopolis' – open engagement

The opposite of a scenario based on the control of privilege would be a world founded upon open engagement, a Cosmopolis in other words. The recent European Social Forum expresses the ideals of this future. Multiple points of access to debate and expressions of interest will be matched by the widespread recognition of difference, grounded in a background of human rights and 'citizens of the world' values. Cosmopolis will be a world of high interchange of all kinds, including human mobility. Inequality will be lower than present, and policies of global governance more widespread.

Scenario Three: 'Huntingtonia' – competitive division

Taking its name from the author of *The Clash of Civilizations*, Samuel Huntington, this scenario is dominated by the hardened boundaries of cultural identity. Taking a territorial form, there will be conflict between these identities. Inequalities will be fixed or frozen, following the lines of civilizations. Mobility between them will be restricted in the name of greater security. In the political sphere, only some voices will be allowed or heard, and policy will be informed by domination.

Scenario Four: 'Oldham & Granada' – iconic sites

The report on the riots of 2001 in the city of Oldham, in northern England, spoke of communities living 'parallel lives'. In this scenario, communities living side-by-side may or may not mix. In Oldham there was disorder and conflict. In Moorish Granada by contrast, the mixing of differences was the basis of *convivencia*, living together. Modern-day Toronto may lay claim to the same status. In both iconic sites there will be high levels of mobility. There will be shifting sets of inequalities and contextually competing voices, with no clear or stark lines of domination. In this world, a combination of market forces and ad hococracy informs policy.

Having sketched out these four scenarios it must be said that the most likely outcome over the next fifty years is some combination of them. Furthermore, in many respects they are already happening. We can already see evidence, for example, of a combination of the rhetoric and policies of Balkanization against a backdrop of global cultural commonalities. It is also possible to foresee new modes of stratification, going beyond class divisions based on relations to capital. Could there be a three-tier global society? At the top, a mobile, cosmopolitan business class. Next, a globally-connected, multi-interest middle class. And beneath them, a segregated working class with restricted movement.

In conclusion, there remain a number of questions about the nature of global diversity and mobility in the next fifty years. First of all, what are the trends and policy decisions *now* that set the course toward any of the four scenarios? Secondly, there are several 'wild cards' that might influence any future scenario. These include terrorism and economic collapse, but also such things as environmental devastation and health crises such as HIV/AIDS. We still do not really know how the increased communication levels associated with new technologies will affect identities and mobilities. Lastly, what happens to the nation-state in all of this?

Global diversity and mobility: Response

Linda McDowell (School of Geography & the Environment, University of Oxford)

It is instructive to cast our minds back 50 years, to ask whether we could predict then what is happening now. Some of my own work has been on migrants in the 1950s, particularly the Displaced People and European Volunteer Workers. They were victims of war, but they were then transformed into 'workers' by the various programmes that admitted them to the UK, for example.

My first response to Steve is to ask what are the bases of the deepening inequalities in receiving states? What dimensions matter most – income, class, gender, ethnicity, religion – and how do they connect with one another? How are notions of family and sexuality being transformed in relation to mobility and diversity? For example, we might want to know about the feminization of the workforce and its relation to global mothering or 'global care chains'. In this context, how far can the neo-liberal state go in reorganizing work and services? What will it provide, who will run it and who will work for it?

Out of these inequalities, what sort of class structure will emerge? Will it be bifurcated? Will it, as Esping-Anderson has suggested, take an increasingly gendered form? And who will be excluded from the working-class altogether? Perhaps not just the migrant poor, but some of the native poor as well.

And just a few final remarks – the choice of iconic sites was a little too ethnocentric! And perhaps the London Social Forum was not the best exemplar of cosmopolis, because fighting broke out during it along ethnic divisions. Beyond that, why must we always descend to the local scale or city level to understand the impact of diversity and mobility? There are important global and regional scale processes at work as well.

Global diversity and mobility: Response

Alisdair Rogers (School of Geography & the Environment, University of Oxford)

Setting aside matters of political economy for the moment, I'd like to start with a few comments on each of the scenarios. Regarding Carcassone, sheltering behind walls is a strange kind of privilege, akin to self-imprisonment maybe. And privileged classes may not be the only ones who entrench themselves in walled environments; somewhere Castells refers to the 'exclusion of the excluders by the excluded', meaning that communal identities also form enclosed communes. Cosmopolis is reminiscent of Hardt and Negri's optimistic, postmodern communist vision of the 'multitude', demanding the right of mobility and challenging Empire. It is not only an elite phenomenon in this respect. Leaving aside Huntington, who perhaps receives too much attention, divided cities like Oldham and Granada can of course be peaceful. It is worth noting that by 2050 it is estimated that two thirds of the world's inhabitants will reside in cities.

What new forms of diversity or stratification might arise in 50 years time? We might think of mobility-related inequalities in terms of four dimensions, each focusing on the body of the

migrant or mover. The first is simply the degree to which a person is insurable or can provide guarantees of security, health or fitness. The second, and closely related dimension, is more biopolitical, registering the genetic fitness of a body, externally and internally. There's a possibility that racial discriminations could be revived using intimate genetic information. I note that in the film clip Steve showed, Denis's final failure to pass into the city stems from the inadequacies of his legs! His body is not fit enough to pass, in other words. Thirdly, inequalities in mobility may be, indeed already are, more extensively monitored by electronic means of surveillance. Could temporary workers be electronically tagged for example? Lastly, and this is speculation, might we see individual or personal carbon budgets? If we follow the logic of Kyoto, in the future we may need to move less in order to reduce the consumption of fossil fuels. Environmental arguments can certainly be mustered against migration. But perhaps also individuals will be held responsible or accountable for their individual movements, economically and morally. The privileged will undoubtedly find ways round such rules, but they might provide a new way of enforcing and legitimizing differential inequality. The geography of this privilege might consist of tunnels linking 'Carcassones', regulated, monitored and under surveillance.

Global diversity and mobility: Summary of discussion

1. Would walled communities ever be viable?

Several participants questioned whether it would ever be possible for walled communities of privilege, described in the Carcassone scenario, to actually cut themselves off from migrant flows. Who would tend to them, providing care work, personal services, mowing lawns etc (as in the movie *Lawn Dogs*)? Such enclaves need their helots and poor people already sustain wealthy communities. People will migrate, and come as either immigrants or guestworkers. How they would be integrated is an open question; perhaps some form of 'probationary citizenship' will be developed, granted to persons who are good workers and biologically secure. They'd be like policed guestworkers. But their children, the second generation, are not going to accept the same jobs as their parents. Even now, there already are diasporas in gated communities with connections to the Third World, and they might very well leave and go elsewhere if they're not wanted. In other words, closure can be contested by relocation, perhaps to NICs. Perhaps careworkers could be described as the 'new plumbers' – workers that everyone needs and who are in such short supply that there will be competition for their services.

What would happen to those areas excluded? According to the recent writings of Mark Duffield and Manuel Castells, among others, there'd be a danger that any excluded areas would be under-mined by crime, drugs, illegal migration etc. These could not be ignored indefinitely.

Furthermore, one might ask how such enclaves could pay for themselves in the long run. US multinationals for example are already declining to repatriate profits. Could such places really succeed when capital goes global?

2. Acceptance of diversity

There was some discussion over how far societies have actually gone in accepting or recognizing diversity. According to one view, there is good evidence that developed countries are positive

towards diversity and integration, and that it is working – as for example shown by the various studies of Portes and colleagues on the second generation in the USA. These generally show that groups doing well have strong community ties plus human capital, and live separately from the US working class. As a result, they are good for the economy, and will therefore be accepted. Elsewhere, the pattern is for social and political integration, though not always cultural integration. In liberal states, governments will not be able to withstand the demands of, say, the second generation, at least not over the long term. But in the newer countries of immigration, there is so far less evidence of acceptance, for example in Malaysia. The question is, will they ‘catch up’ with the established immigration countries, or is something different going on?

Taking a contrary view, several commentators noted recent events in the Netherlands, a country formerly known for its high level of tolerance for diversity. Was this a blip or a new trend? It was pointed out that for some countries there was a long history of unrest and riots, suggesting a cyclical pattern. But what if there was something new and different this time, namely a sense among the intelligentsia, always regarded as immune from intolerance, that things had ‘gone too far’? There are indications of this in the UK, as revealed for example, in the recent British Social Attitudes Survey. This showed growing scepticism about immigration and diversity among graduates and the middle-classes. What lies behind this possible change of heart? Could it be anxieties about security?

3. Reversibility of migration trends

There was considerable scepticism about the possibility of migration slowing down as a result, for example, of environmentally-inspired regulations. The demand for labour will not go away; people will come in one form or another, either as immigrants, guestworkers or asylum-seekers. At the same time, there is an enormous pool of people wanting to or needing to move. Furthermore, with the ageing of many societies, particularly in Europe, there will be a need for migrants as careworkers, if nothing else. It was noted however, that there might be alternatives to permanent migration to provide care labour, including short-term circular migration or greater state control over key sectors. In other words, while there was general agreement that migration trends, being economically and demographically driven, were irreversible, the exact form of that flow was undetermined.

4. Class formation and inequality

Classes are no longer formed solely in the sphere of production, but also in consumption. Once upon a time, powerful classes formed around control of the national state. But without the nation-state, what will classes do? Nothing but consume? And what of the ‘native’ working class – can one assume that there will be no change there, or no new inequalities?

Migration, particularly of care workers, also implies global inequalities around social reproduction, not just production or consumption. Much has already been written about ‘global care chains’, in which women from poor countries provide care for children in rich countries, leaving their own children to be looked after by relatives. This does not only extend to child care, but might more generally apply forms of labour involved in intimate acts – nurses, sex workers, even nuns. Such work includes a paradoxical relationship of intimacy and otherness

and, at its heart, a schizophrenic combination of rejection and acceptance. This makes it hard to understand how it fits into policy.

5. Policy implications

At various points, the discussion returned to the policy implications of the scenarios Steve Vertovec spelled out. What is the state doing now, or what could the state do now, to affect these possible futures? A number of separate remarks were made on this issue. On integration, the Netherlands for example, seems to be moving away from Cosmopolis, although it could be argued that their policy has long been characterized by ad hocery. France is establishing university course for imams, in order to encourage them to be French-speaking and more conducive to integrating their followers. On labour demand, states could do more to retain care workers by blocking emigration or offering better salaries. On rights of mobility, there are already biometric surveillance and monitoring systems in play and clear signs of insurance premiums being affected by personal medical or genetic data. The appropriate response from citizens is to consider how much they are willing to give away of our privacy and how much are they willing to be monitored? What are the prospects of more taxation on air travel, a policy that might have general effects on mobility? Finally, there are active proposals from some quarters to introduce personal carbon quotas.

Reply from Steve Vertovec

A brief comment on each of the scenarios. On Carcassone's walls being a strange kind of power, one can nonetheless note the thousands of middle-class householders seeking gated communities around the world. The sense of control and security is certainly in demand. Regarding stratification, one can certainly envisage these walled enclaves being linked. The cosmopolitan business class already lives in corridors between airports, hotels etc. For its part, Cosmopolis remains an ideal in the UN. In some ways, Huntingtonia is where the USA is currently headed, and the effects of recent policies are being felt throughout the world, e.g. biometric visas, offshoring control of mobility, tagging etc. The choice of iconic sites might be Eurocentric – alternatives could include Istanbul or Singapore for example. I chose Oldham because the report into the riots there specifically mentioned the notion of parallel lives as a problem.

In the next 50 years ...what will be the shape of politics, policy and governance in respect to international migration?

Stephen Castles (Refugee Studies Centre, QEH, Oxford University)

Looking 40-50 years ahead, will there be an effective, collaborative and fair system for the regulation or management of international migration? The present situation is marked by a deficit in governance compared with other areas of cross-border transaction. The first step to analysing the prospects for change is to understand the reasons for the relative anarchy and fragmentation of international migration governance. Then we need to examine possible future scenarios, and the trends that might lead towards one or other of these. Finally, it may be useful to try to imagine factors that could lead to fundamental and unforeseen shifts.

As with other themes at this Workshop, it is useful to cast our minds back 40 years, and to think how much of what has happened in international migration since could not have been predicted. However, this is less the case with governance than with the other themes. Here we can see the continuity of the central theme of *national sovereignty* over who crosses the borders. At a time when states have almost given up trying to control flows of capital and commodities, controlling flows of people is a jealously guarded vestige of national sovereignty. It has become emblematic for attempts to shore up the nation-state – especially for right-wing politicians and media, and their constituencies of people bewildered and threatened by globalization. However, what is new is the growing realization that national control of migration cannot be effective under current conditions, leading to attempts to achieve supra-national regulation (above all the EU) and international cooperation (of which the GCIM itself is representative).

The governance deficit

Never before has international migration been so high on the political agenda. Yet the more that states and supranational bodies do to restrict and manage migration, the less successful they seem to be. 'The gap between the *goals* of national immigration policy... and the actual results of policies in this area (*policy outcomes*) is wide and growing wider in all major industrialised democracies' (Cornelius et al. 1994). Undocumented migration, entry of asylum seekers and the formation of new ethnic communities all seem to be driven by forces which governments cannot control. This does not mean that state policies do not matter – they do influence migratory patterns in important ways – but often not in the ways policy makers say that they intend.

International migration is one of the major types of *flows* across national borders, which are perhaps the most crucial expression of globalization. My understanding of globalization cannot be mapped out here, but is roughly based on the accounts in (Bauman 1998; Castells 1996; Held et al. 1999). The other main types are the flows of capital (especially investments), commodities (trade) and ideas. As is often remarked, global elites welcome the first two of these, favour some elements of the flows of ideas (trade in intellectual property and professional services), but are most sceptical about flows of people. As a result, international *regimes* have been developed to facilitate and regulate financial flows and trade. There are also global arrangements to manage the flow of ideas – at least in the forms of intellectual property and services. But

there is no corresponding global regime to control migration (with one important exception, as will be discussed).

This does not mean that there is no governance of migration, but rather that it is piecemeal, incoherent and non-transparent. Governance of migration takes place principally through the actions of national governments, although many other actors also play a part in determining the conditions and forms of governance. The European Union represents the beginnings of forms of regional or international governance, but this is a so-far isolated development. There is no open process to balance out the conflicting interests of the various states and other actors, leading to contradictions, conflicts and fragmentation in the field. This deficit in governance can be seen as part of a wider democratic deficit in the international arena.

There are certain key contradictions underlying this ‘anarchic governance of migration’. Firstly, there is a contradiction between the growing efforts at control by states and the apparent increase in irregular migration. Secondly, the *national* logic of control, based on territories and boundaries, is contradicted by the more *transnational* logic of migrant networks and diasporas. Migrants think more transnationally than states do. Thirdly, there is a tension between public hostility to migration on the one hand, and elite support for it on the other. Finally, there is the underlying contradiction between national-level politics and more transnational economics.

In order to address future scenarios of governance it is necessary to understand what drives international migration. I will not deal with this topic here, because it has been dealt with already in this workshop and because I have recently published my views on these matters (Castles 2004a; Castles 2004b). Before presenting the scenarios however, I do want to discuss two general issues: who the actors in migration policy are and what might be meant by an international migration regime.

The actors in migration policy

Global governance is often (whether explicitly or implicitly) seen as the preserve of the ‘international community’, which in practice means a loose coalition of UN agencies and other international and regional organizations, together with the most powerful states. Is this approach feasible and desirable in the field of migration? The actors and their multi-layered relationships are very complex, and may call for a different approach to governance. There are two kinds of actors in migration policy. One kind is easily identified in the conventional view of migration, but other actors are hidden. The visible actors fall into four main categories. States remain the major actors, and although they are generally classified as either sending, receiving or transit states, a growing number are all three. Secondly, there are regional bodies such as ASEAN, the EU and NAFTA although, as noted above, their role is so far minimal. Intergovernmental organizations must also be taken into account, among them of course the UNHCR, IOM, ILO, UN Population Division and UNESCO. Organized interest groups of various kinds, including employer organizations and workers’ unions must also be reckoned as actors in migration policy.

The hidden actors exist both within and outside states. Within states, it is often the case that various ministries have conflicting mandates. In the UK for example, it can be said that the

Home Office and the Department for International Development have contrasting interests. The same can be said for the EU's Directorates-General. Public opinion itself must be considered an important actor, insofar as it is constructed by politics and the media. In terms of migrants rights, civil society organizations and NGOs have become very important actors, while migrant communities, including transnational communities or diasporas, cannot be ignored. The latter, for example, may sometimes play a role in sustaining conflicts that cause international migration. Finally, the 'migration industry' is increasingly influential in affecting migration policy. Its main business is to make money from facilitating mobility, whether legal or illegal, and thus it has a vested interest in keeping flows of people going. The power and resources of these various actors differ immensely and also change over time and locations. The one-sided emphasis on the role of state and intergovernmental actors conceals the great importance of migrant agency and the growing salience of networks. The relatively recent awareness of the role of diasporas indicates that this might be an area of growing importance in the future.

Towards an international migration regime?

The future governance of international migration can be imagined in terms of alternative international migration regimes. For practical purposes, and without going into the debate on regime theory in political science, it may be said that an international regime consists of four elements:

- a set of *legal instruments* (both international and national) designed to regulate a specific policy area;
- a number of *institutions* designed to ensure implementation of the legal norms, and to provide such services as standard-setting, monitoring and dispute resolution;
- a set of *international norms* concerning desirable conditions and outcomes in the field, and
- a set of *policies* to achieve these.

An obvious example of such a regime is the international refugee regime (Crisp 2003). The core of the regime is the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, which defines who is officially a refugee and what rights such persons should have (Figure 2). This has been extended by the 1967 Protocol (which removed the geographical and temporal limits of the Convention) and by the 1969 Refugee Convention of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), which broadened the refugee definition to include people fleeing war (Loescher 2001, 125-6). The most important institution is the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), but many other international organisations play a part: intergovernmental agencies like the World Food Programme (WFP) and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF); the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC); as well as hundreds of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) such as OXFAM, the International Rescue Committee (IRC) and Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF). States and their appropriate agencies as well as national humanitarian organizations may also be seen as part of the regime. Norms include the principle of *non-refoulement* and the right of displaced persons to protection and assistance. Policies have proliferated recently, and concern *inter alia* measures to reduce numbers of asylum seekers, to integrate recognized refugees, and to address the 'root causes' of displacement in regions of origin.

This example has been dwelt upon because of its relevance for our topic: the refugee regime – for all its problems and imperfections – is the only elaborated regime in the field of international migration. We can find regimes at various levels of development and effectiveness in the field of financial flows (the IMF and the World Bank), trade (the WTO), the environment, telecommunications, intellectual property and so on. The UN system itself is designed to encourage cooperation on security, peace and development, and on a range of associated matters (Held et al. 1999, sections 1.2 and 1.3).

Elements of an international migration regime	The current refugee regime
<i>International legal instruments</i>	The 1951 Geneva Convention and subsequent protocols
<i>Institutions</i>	UNHCR, WFP, UNICEF, IRC and NGOs
<i>Norms</i>	<i>Non-refoulement</i> ; protection and assistance
<i>Policies</i>	Reducing asylum flows, integrating recognized refugees, addressing ‘root’ causes

Figure 2: The International Refugee Regime

There is no equivalent system of legal instruments, institutions and norms for voluntary international migration, in its main guises of economic migration, family reunion and return migration. Explaining why not is a crucial part of the discussion on this theme. When people talk about the need for global governance in international migration, they often argue for an approach analogous to the refugee regime: an international legal instrument to regulate migration, a body – sometimes called the World Migration Organization (WMO) to oversee implementation, and an underlying set of norms to underpin these (see for instance Bhagwati 2003). However, it is worth discussing whether governance of international migration should really take this rather traditional and hierarchical form, or whether more flexible, inclusive and networked forms of governance might be conceivable in future. This depends to some extent on identifying the actors in such a system.

Bearing this in mind, it is possible to suggest three scenarios (or ideal-types) of the way governance might develop. The scenarios are:

1. An international migration management regime by 2040
2. The anarchy of imperfect markets and hypocritical states
3. Gradual steps towards multi-level governance

Scenario One: An international migration management regime by 2040

In this scenario, the international legal instruments are formulated by something like a ‘World Migration Management Convention’, and the major institution supporting the law is a ‘World

Migration Organization'. Such a system (deriving in part from the IOM's recent thinking in the area) seems to be seen as an essentially top-down and hierarchical system. The main source of power is 'the international community', and as in other areas of international relations, migration management seems to imply imposing the values, methods and interests of the rich labour-importing countries on the regions of origin and the migrants themselves. The guiding norms are therefore directed towards achieving the predictability and controllability of flows of labour. The policies based on them are best described as migration management, and include differentiating migrants by human capital, origins, gender, ethnicity, race etc. These policies serve to reproduce a stratified global labour force. However, this model is not – and cannot be – a totally top-down one: it does imply gaining the cooperation of sending and transit state governments in migration management, and this only seems feasible if the interests at least of elite groups in these countries are taken into account. Such elite interests are not narrow economic ones, but include maintaining governability – an issue which can be linked to protection of migrant workers, as the Flor Contemplacion case in the Philippines showed so vividly in the mid-1990s.

Scenario Two: The anarchy of imperfect markets and hypocritical states.

This is essentially a continuation of the current system, in which states seek to regulate migration, but fail, firstly because political and economic imperatives often clash, and secondly because of the difficulty in achieving common approaches by the many disparate actors. Such conventions as exist are ineffectual or ignored by rich states (as has happened with, for example, the 1990 United Nations Convention on the Rights of Migrant Workers and Members of their Families), and any institutions are ad hoc. It is mainly markets that shape flows and their unequal outcomes. Under such conditions, the conflicting aims and hidden agendas of state policies persist. Restriction of migration to appease public opinion is often unsuccessful because of the strong need for labour, and because of the unwillingness of politicians to impose sanctions against employers. However, there is a strong element of hypocrisy in many migration policies: politicians claim to want to stop migration, and blame 'smugglers and traffickers' as well as the migrants for their failure, while in fact taking care not to do anything that would harm employers' interests or restrict economic growth. This scenario implies the continuation of certain current trends. There is selective inclusion (and exclusion) of certain previously underdeveloped regions into the global economy. The power differential between labour-importing and exporting states, based on a global surplus of labour, remains. Differential migration rules, categories and practices create a transnational workforce, which is stratified on the basis of human capital, gender, national origins and ethnicity or race. The dark side of this globalization from below is the reconnection of the South to the North in new ways, involving crime, drugs, smuggling etc.

Scenario Three: Gradual steps towards multilevel governance.

This scenario assumes that willingness to cooperate between the various actors may increase in the long run, not through altruism or enlightenment, but because it becomes obvious to all that one-sided governance in the interest of the powerful cannot succeed in view of the potential for subversion of these through the agency of the less powerful. In other words, industrialized country governments and employers might realise that they can only meet their labour market and social objectives, if they go some way to accept the development objectives of countries of origin, and the economic and social interests of migrants and their communities, as well as their

human rights. Migration control alone will not work. The type of governance that might emerge from this would not be top-down and centralized, but would include differing roles for different actors at variety of levels. In this scenario, a ‘World Migration Convention’ would be based less on managing flows and more on rights and legal remedies (Figure 3). Thus there might be a ‘World Migration Organization’, but its role would mainly be one of coordination, monitoring and standard setting, rather than actually managing flows. In working with states, migrants and civil society, the WMO would be less about management and more about coordination of various actors and interests. In other words, there would be multi-level governance, including states, IGOs, migrant associations and diasporas, not organized centrally but networked. What norms might inform this governance?: above all, the right of mobility for all. Policies based on these norms include fair wages and social conditions for migrants but also, something often overlooked, social protection for host populations. The disadvantaged of receiving societies will need to be disabused of their often justifiable fear that they will lose out.

Elements of an international migration regime	Gradual steps towards multilevel governance
<i>International legal instruments</i>	A World Migration Convention based on rights and legal remedies
<i>Institutions</i>	World Migration Organization, coordinating, standard setting, monitoring, networking with other actors
<i>Norms</i>	The right to mobility for all
<i>Policies</i>	Fair wages and social conditions for migrants, social protection for host populations

Figure 3: Scenario Three - Gradual steps towards multilevel governance

Why has the governance of international migration been so slow in developing? Slow progress is essentially due to the fear of labour-recruiting countries that regulation will increase the costs of migrant labour and put social obligations on receiving countries. Rich country concerns have become even stronger in recent years, first due to the discourse of the so-called ‘migration crisis’ in the early to mid-1990s, and then through the new security agenda post 9/11. The dominant trend of the last few years has been efforts to increase control and assert national sovereignty – US Homeland security is the emblematic case, but we can find similar efforts elsewhere. In Malaysia for example, currently yet another drive to remove illegal workers is under way, this time with the involvement of large-scale vigilante organizations.

The other important factor to consider is that many groups profit from the anarchy of the current situation. Why do most labour-importing economies use undocumented migrant labour, even while policy-makers claim to be ‘cracking down’? Because it is advantageous for them to

have powerless workers who will work for very low wages. There is a clear conflict here between, on the one hand public opinion and public order criteria, and on the other economic criteria.

What trends towards improved governance are visible at present?

Despite the slow progress being made, are there in fact any signs of moves towards global governance? It is my view that moves towards collaborative approaches to international governance of migration arise from the inadequacies of purely national approaches: as policy-makers and other actors realise that border control measures are not very successful and have very costly side-effects, there may be more willingness to improve governance. The following trends can be observed:

- National migration regulation: the move away from the hypocritical zero immigration principle in Europe, which opened the door for illegal recruitment and all sorts of abuses. This shift is based partly on recognition of demographic change, partly on labour market prognoses and partly on efforts to integrate existing migrant populations. The German Süßmuth Commission (Süßmuth 2001) and the recent German laws on citizenship and immigration are important signs of change.
- Supranational regulation – above all the EU system. For all its flaws it represents a significant move forward. Other regional blocs are nowhere near matching this, although discussions are taking place.
- Bilateral arrangements. An important antecedent was the German recruitment agreements with Mediterranean states in the 1960s. Labour recruitment agreements, which include clauses on working conditions and social entitlements, are being used in Europe, Asia and other regions.
- Growing understanding of the complex links between migration and development (with regard both to economic and forced migration). An important contribution was the recent House of Commons Report (House of Commons International Development Committee 2004), but other governments and agencies such as the World Bank are realising the need for appropriate approaches in this area.
- Growing understanding of migrant agency, in the form of migration networks and transnational communities. Migration theory is increasingly moving towards emphasizing the role of transnational communities (or diasporas) in shaping flows and mediating their effects on both sending and receiving countries. This understanding is beginning to flow through into policy debates (Nyberg-Sørensen et al. 2002).
- Rights-based approaches: agencies concerned with human rights, including the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, NGOs, civil society organizations and migrant associations are all working to improve migrant rights (or the rights of specific groups such as migrant women and children). Action can be observed at the local, national and international levels.
- Intensified discussion at the international agency level. The long (and sometimes frustrating) discussion between international agencies and some governments seems to be moving from the expert to the policy-maker level. This demand of many sending states at the 1994 Cairo Population Conference had been side-tracked by powerful states and agencies for many years. Now there is growing high-level political support for

the development of governance. The GCIM itself is clear evidence of this trend. However, the strength of the trend has yet to be tested.

What are the threats to moves to growing global governance?

Against these positive trends must be set a number of recent and ongoing threats. Among these are:

- Sharper resource competition due to energy shortages, which leads rich countries to seek to block economic development in less-developed regions.
- Intensification of environmental degradation, which could lead to very different economic patterns and to mass movements or displacement of 'environmental migrants'.
- Increased aggressiveness of a declining US Empire, which sees itself being overtaken by China and other emerging industrial giants. This could lead to destructive conflicts, and to a general decline in global cooperation.
- On the level of migration and integration, the backlash against multiculturalism since the mid-1990s makes it possible to imagine strong trends towards nationalism and exclusion of minorities.
- As new areas of the developing world gain access to global mobility networks, there may be such large surpluses of migrant workers (and potential migrant workers), that labour-importing countries attempt to move back to more draconian national control systems.

Conclusion: What is likely to change in the decades ahead?

The threats outlined above are unpredictable – indeed the only thing that can be predicted is that existing trends will not simply be continued in a linear fashion. However, in my view the balance of probability is that there will be a gradual shift towards more comprehensive and inclusive forms of migration governance. This perhaps optimistic expectation could be a useful basis for discussion – both about its validity and about the measures needed to encourage moves in this direction. At the present time, there is clearly a struggle going on between two basic tendencies. On the one hand there are attempts to reassert sovereignty and to securitize migration, in which international action is simply seen as an adjunct to national policies. On the other hand, there is a realisation of the need for international cooperation to achieve mutually beneficial outcomes for all the main actors. It is obviously impossible to say what the outcome of this struggle will be. Most likely, there will be no resolution, but an ongoing policy debate, with strong elements of muddling through. Nonetheless, it remains in the interest of powerful actors to compromise and recognize the rights of others. In my view the long-term imperative to achieve some degree of control and predictability will gradually lead to evolution of global and regional governance, with inclusive elements, that may (hopefully) be closer to the third scenario than the other two.

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Politics, policy and governance: Response

Khalid Koser (GCIM, Geneva)

The Global Commission on International Migration has a number of initial thoughts on governance that are intended to be realistic and conservative. Firstly, states have the right to control their borders and should keep that right. Secondly, one can assume continuing divergence of interests between and within states. Thirdly, it is assumed that irregular migration will continue, even if it does so at a lower level than present. Based on these starting points, three questions arise: 1) what can be done to make states cooperate without giving up controls? 2) how can these divergences be narrowed? 3) how can we cope with continuing irregular migration?

Taking these questions, I have three main responses to Stephen Castles' presentation. First of all, we should ask whether governance is needed at all. Are we over-stating the problem? After all, most migration is orderly, most migrants are happy and the vulnerable migrants are a minority. Such problems as there might be are certainly exaggerated by politicians and the media. And there are already existing laws, institutions and arrangements governing migration. The second response is to ask what exactly needs to be governed? What is the problem? Does irregular migration really threaten the state's sovereignty and security, or are these worries hugely exaggerated? Is the real problem in fact the state's ability to promote regular migration is undermined by irregular flows? Lastly, assuming the need for governance at all, what is the appropriate type of governance? Should it be by states or by some other institution? States are unlikely to give up control to an international multi-level body. In conclusion therefore, might what is needed be not new institutions but the better operation of existing ones and enforcement of their policies?

Politics, policy and governance: Response

Jan de Wilde (IOM, London)

It should be noted that the International Organization of Migration exists without the backing of a convention, norms or standards. It might be difficult or impractical to introduce a rights-based

regime of governance, because such rights are not widely enforced or supported by states' juridical structures. Furthermore, I see no tendency for states to cede control over migration, so there is no chance of a top-down organization of world migration flows. Instead, the present anarchy is likely to continue.

The current distinction between refugees and migrants should be retained, because in doing so we keep the 1951 Convention in place. Nothing should be done to undercut the existing laws on refugees and, besides, keeping the distinction will lead to a better division of labour among international organizations.

Politics, policy and governance: Response

Matthew Gibney (Refugee Studies Centre, QEH, Oxford University)

Firstly, is the current refugee regime in crisis? If so, can it be a blueprint for a global governance regime for migration? For example, we are already seeing states trying to export their migration control beyond their borders, and the public are hostile to refugees in general. It is doubtful whether a migration regime could take its place. Secondly, what about a right to mobility? Political theorists do not agree that it would be desirable, because there are also claims from host societies over national identity or ownership over society. Thirdly, there can be no realistic prospect of a migration regime without more development, and so maybe assisting development is the alternative for now.

Politics, policy and governance: Summary of discussion

1. Control or the appearance of control?

What matters more, that states – in a global governance system or not – actually control migration flows or instead successfully convince electorates that they control them? In one view, perhaps it is not migration *per se* but fear that should be managed. And if governments cannot handle migration sensibly, and be seen to do so, it is more likely that poor or inadequate regulations will constitute governance. In the UK, recent controversies over the number of people arriving from the EU accession states is a good example of this appearance of being out of control. In general, we do not fully understand the relationship between 'fear' and fact'. Sometimes even small incidents have enormous and unpredictable symbolic impact. Other times, even visible events or practices cause no concern. For example, the Chinese cockle pickers working in Morecombe Bay (UK), over twenty of whom drowned last year, were plainly visible. By contrast, the situation of refugees in Sangatte, France, became highly contentious. If you wanted to control appearances, which ones would you control?

Opinion was divided on this issue. Some participants judged that states did need to control migration in reality, others that they were only really interested in appearances. In support of the latter position, it was pointed out that governments were not willing to stiffen labour laws sufficiently to curb irregular migration. If they were really worried about it, they could take action. For instance, one might wonder why governments don't raid workplaces and throw illegal immigrants out, as they are purported to do in Australia. (There was some dispute as to

whether this was actually the case, or whether in fact Australia tolerates ‘white’ visa overstayers.) The opposing view recognized that these kinds of contradictions, rather than being hypocritical, most likely arose from conflicting priorities within states, for instance between domestic and financial ministries. Alternatively, they arose from tensions between governments and employers – for example in Malaysia, where large employers keep recruiting workers even though the state tries to expel them.

2. Precedents for and analogies to global migration governance

There was much discussion about comparable or parallel efforts to constitute global governance, for instance with the World Trade Organization, or with financial markets. The latter are regulated, although it is hard to figure out how from the outside. The WTO sets standards, which is something that could also be done for migration. The example of the trade union movement might be instructive. It was founded on labour scarcity, which increased the bargaining power of labour. Might some trades and professions be able to use this to their advantage now, to push for a bottom-up system of regulation, for example health professionals? Either sectorally, or more globally, the demand for labour may force states to consider inter-state or multi-level governance. Or, taken further, perhaps a refugee NGO could invite bids for medically trained refugees from states, introducing more of a market mechanism.

There are of course already many examples of states cooperating over migration. Several states are sharing databases for passenger profiling. In a sense, the UK and Denmark are pioneering the offshoring of processing refugees. One suggestion was that this could be extended to involve an international court to mediate disputes between states over such matters as the return of refugees, conditions of entry etc.

These and other ideas support the position of working up from existing rules rather than starting afresh, perhaps developing various possibilities between state and international scales.

3. Are states the problem?

One view was that any system of multi-level governance, insofar as it involves states, will never work. States routinely violate rights and have a long history of failing to support them. On a more positive note, states are not monolithic entities; some do work to enforce rights. Southern states might even be empowered by a global regime, if it recognized their powers over return for example. So, to what extent might civil society be an alternative? The experience of GCIM on involving civil society has not been successful so far. But failing to consult with civil society might mean that responses are too traditional and insufficiently creative; the views of migrants are different to those of states, and must be taken into account.

In summary, it was agreed that migration futures can only be successfully addressed in a wide context, taking into account more than just demography for example. But this larger context is precisely what makes migration governance so hard to figure. Perhaps it spills beyond the mandate of GCIM. Perhaps today’s discussion would have benefited from the contribution of more experts in fields other than migration, including representatives of civil society. In any case, by continuing to talk and think about ‘governance’ we are acknowledging that there is more involved than just controlling people.